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APPENDIX ARick Scott 
GOVERNOR 
Mr. Phillip Ellis 
Engineering Specialist Ill 
Florida Public Service Commission 
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850 
Dear Mr. Ellis: 
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT  •/ 
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 
July 18, 2013 
Jesse Panuccio 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
At your request we have reviewed the 2013 Ten-Year Site Plans ofthe electric utilities. 
The Department of Economic Opportunity's review focused on potential sites for future power 
generation, and the compatibility of  those sites with the applicable local comprehensive plan, 
including the adopted future land use map, adjacent land uses, and natural resources on or 
adjacent to the potential sites. 
Our review ofthe 2013 Ten-Year Site Plans addressed ten potential power plant sites 
identified in the Ten-Year Site Plans ofthe following utilities: Florida Power & Light Company, 
Gulf Power Company, and Seminole Electric Cooperative.  None of the potential sites were 
found to be incompatible with the applicable local comprehensive plan. 
Should you have any questions regarding these comments, please call Scott Rogers, 
Planning Analyst, at (850) 717-8510, or by email at scott.rogers@deo.myflorida.com. 
r:zi"X t11 ~d~ 
Mike McDaniel 
Comprehensive Planning Manager 
MM/sr 
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APPENDIX A2013 Ten-Year Site Plan Review 
Three utilities, Gulf Power, Florida Power and Light, and Seminole Electric, have identified a 
total of ten potential sites for future power generation.  Potential sites are identified in Rule 25-
22.070, F.A.C., as "sites within the state that an electric utility is considering for possible 
location of a power plant, a power plant alteration, or an addition resulting in an increase in 
generating capacity."  These sites are discussed below. 
1.  Gulf Power 
In its Ten-Year Site Plan, Gulf Power stated it will consider four properties as potential sites for 
future generating facilities.  Two potential sites contain existing power plants: Plant Crist site in 
Escambia County and Plant Smith Site in Bay County.  Two potential sites are undeveloped: 
Caryville Site in Holmes and Washington Counties and North Escambia Site in Escambia County. 
A.  Plant Crist Site.  This site, located in Escambia County, is designated Industrial and 
Agriculture on the adopted Future land Use Map (FLUM).  Electric power generation facilities 
are an allowed use in the Industrial category and may be allowed as a conditional use in 
Agriculture through the land Development Code.  The northern and eastern parts of  the site 
are located in the coastal high hazard area and contain wetlands and 100-year floodplain. 
Adjacent land uses are Industrial, Conservation, Agriculture, and Mixed-Use Suburban. 
For information regarding the location of  the coastal high hazard area relative to the site, 
contact Julie Dennis with the Department of Economic Opportunity, Bureau of Comprehensive 
Planning, at (850) 717-8478.  For wetland compatibility issues, contact the Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP) Office of Submerged lands and Environmental Resources at 
(850) 245-8474.  For information on floodplain compatibility, contact the State of Florida 
Floodplain Management Office at (850) 413-9960. 
B.  Plant Smith Site.  located in Bay County, the Plant Smith site is adjacent to the North Bay 
area of St. Andrews Bay.  The site is located in the Category 1, 2, 3 and 4 storm surge zones.  It 
is designated Industrial and Conservation on the adopted FlUM.  Public utilities are allowed 
uses in both Industrial and Conservation.  Adjacent land uses are Agriculture-Timber and 
Conservation.  Wetlands and 100-year floodplains are also located onsite. 
For further information regarding the location of storm surge zones relative to the site, Gulf 
Power should contact Julie Dennis with the Department of Economic Opportunity, Bureau of 
Comprehensive Planning, at (850) 717-8478.  For assistance with wetland compatibility issues, 
contact the DEP Office of Submerged lands and Environmental Resources at (850) 245-8474. 
For information on floodplain compatibility, contact the State of Florida Floodplain 
Management Office at (850) 413-9960. 
APPENDIX AC.  Caryville Site.  The Caryville site is located in Holmes County, Washington County, and the 
City of Caryville, and it is adjacent to the Choctawhatchee River.  The site is designated 
Agriculture in Holmes County, Agriculture/Silviculture in Washington County, and Agriculture 
and Conservation in Caryville.  In all three jurisdictions, public utilities are allowed in areas 
designated Agriculture. The site is surrounded by agricultural land uses.  Floodplain and 
wetland areas exist throughout the site. 
Gulf Power should contact the following DEP offices for further information: {1) for 
compatibility with Outstanding Florida Waters, contact the Standards and Assessment section 
at {850) 245-8064; and (2) for wetland compatibility issues, contact the Office of Submerged 
Lands and Environmental Resources at (850) 245-8474.  For information on floodplain 
compatibility, contact the State of Florida Floodplain Management Office at {850) 413-9960. 
D.  Northern Escambia Site.  The site is located in northern Escambia County, approximately five 
miles southwest of the City of Century and west of the Escambia River. The Escambia County 
Future Land  Use Map designates the site predominantly as Agriculture with a very small part 
designated as Rural Community.  Electric power generation facilities may be allowed as a 
conditional use in Agriculture and Rural Community through the land development code.  The 
site is surrounded predominantly by Agriculture future land uses and a small area of Rural 
Community.  The site and surrounding area are primarily used for timber harvesting and 
agricultural use, and the site is in close proximity to transmission, natural gas pipelines, railroad, 
major highways and access to water.  The site contains a substantial amount of uplands with 
some wetlands, and Mitchell Creek that traverses the site. 
For information regarding wetland compatibility issues, contact the Department of 
Environmental Protection Office of Submerged Lands and Environmental Resources at {850) 
245-8474. 
2.  Florida Power and light.  Florida Power and Light (FPL) has identified five potential sites as 
described below. 
A.  Babcock Ranch, Charlotte County.  This site is designated Babcock Ranch Overlay District 
(BROD) on the FLUM.  The Development Order for the Babcock Ranch Development of Regional 
Impact (DRI) identifies this site as a Primary Active Greenway approved for the placement of 
solar generating facilities.  Adjacent land uses to the east, west and south are also BROD.  Land 
north of  the site is designated Resource Conservation.  The BROD is being developed under a 
cohesive set of policies, guided by the County's comprehensive plan, through the Master 
Incremental DRI  process.  No environmental or other compatibility issues have been identified 
for this site. 
B.  DeSoto Solar Expansion, DeSoto County.  This site is designated Electrical Generating Facility 
on the County's adopted Future Land  Use Map. The surrounding FLUM designations are 
Electrical Generating Facility and Rural/  Agriculture.  The site has been disturbed as a result of 
agricultural activities on the property.  The site is adjacent to an existing transportation corridor 
APPENDIX Awith roadway capacity.  Demands on water facilities have already been considered in the 
growth projections ofthe County's comprehensive plan.  No environmental or other 
compatibility issues have been identified for this site. 
C.  Manatee Plan site, Manatee County.  This site is designated Public/Semipublic-2 on the 
adopted FLUM.  Power generating facilities are an allowed use in this FLUM category.  Adjacent 
uses are Public/Semipublic-2 and Agricultural-Rural.  The site is also adjacent to Lake Parrish, 
which provides water to the existing power facility.  Much of the property is disturbed due to 
agricultural activities onsite.  No environmental or other compatibility issues have been 
identified for this site. 
D.  Martin County site.  FPL is currently evaluating potential sites in Martin County for a future 
solar facility.  No specific locations have been selected.  The County's adopted comprehensive 
plan contains provisions for siting power generating facilities which use renewable energy 
sources.  Future Land Use Policy 4.8C.l allows alternative energy facilities in appropriate zoning 
districts.  The policy states that "As the technology for wind, solar and other forms of power 
generation advance, the Land Development Regulations shall be revised to permit different 
forms of power generation in appropriate zoning districts."  Policy 4.13A.12, which addresses 
the Public Utilities future land use category, states that "electrical power facilities solely 
utilizing solar, wind or other renewable energy fuel or energy source may be permitted in any 
other Future Land Use Designation, consistent with the Land Development Regulations." 
For assistance with wetland compatibility issues, FPL should contact the Office of Submerged 
Lands and Environmental Resources at (850) 245-8474.  For information on floodplain 
compatibility, contact the State of Florida Floodplain Management Office at (850) 413-9960. 
E.  Putnam County site.  FPL is currently evaluating potential sites in Putnam County for a future 
solar facility or natural gas-powered facility.  No specific locations have been identified.  Sites 
currently under investigation are approximately 2,800 acres in area.  The Industrial and 
Community Facilities and Services land use categories allow electrical generating plants.  The 
County's Comprehensive Plan contains policies that address compatibility and suitability of land 
uses, as well as directing development away from environmentally sensitive lands. 
3.  Seminole Electric. 
Seminole Electric has identified one site, a 350-acre parcel located northeast of the City Bell in 
Gilchrist County, as a potential power plant site.  Much of  the site has been used for silviculture 
(pine plantation) and consists of large tracts of planted longleaf and slash pine community.  The 
site is designated Agricultural on the adopted Future Land Use Map.  Electric generating 
facilities may be permitted as a special use in areas designated Agricultural.  Issues that would 
be considered by the County through the special use review process include the amount of 
water projected to be used by the facility, the impact of water use on agricultural activities, and 
the impact of the facility on natural resources, including aquifer recharge areas and wetlands. 
The Gilchrist parcel is located near the Wacasassa Flats, a 50,000-acre high quality wetlands-to-
APPENDIX A'  .  ..  . 
uplands ecosystem located in the middle of  the County.  Wacasassa Flats is a perched water 
table system that provides significant water storage, water filtering and wildlife habitat. 
For assistance with wetland compatibility issues, Seminole Electric should contact the Office of 
Submerged Lands and Environmental Resources at (850) 245-8474.  For information on 
floodplain compatibility, contact the State of Florida Floodplain Management Office at (850) 
413-9960. 
4.  Utilities With No Potential Sites Identified in the TYSP:  The following utilities identified no 
potential sites in their TYSPs:  Gainesville Regional Utilities, Progress Energy Florida, Lakeland 
Electric, City of Tallahassee, Florida Municipal Power Agency, Tampa Electric Company, JEA, and 
Orlando Utilities Commission. 
APPENDIX AFrom: Bull, Robert
To: Phillip Ellis
Cc: Mulkey, Cindy
Subject: DEP Siting Coordination Office Ten Year Site Plan Review
Date: Monday, July 22, 2013 10:57:45 AM
The Department of Environmental Protection’s Siting Coordination Office (SCO) has
reviewed the 2013 Ten Year Site Plans for Florida’s Electric Utilities and found the
documents to be adequate for planning purposes.  Thank you for the opportunity to review
and comment on the plans.  If you have any questions for our office, feel free to contact me.
 
Thank you,
 
Bobby Bull, P.E.
Florida Department of Environmental Protection
Siting Coordination Office
2600 Blairstone Road, MS 5500
Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400
robert.bull@dep.state.fl.us
850/717-9111
 
Please take a few minutes to share your comments on the service you received from the department
by clicking on this link DEP Customer Survey.
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BY: 
Florida Department of  Transportation 
RICK SCOTT 
GOVERNOR 
Phillip Ellis 
Division of Regulatory Analysis 
Public Service Commission 
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard 
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 
Dear Mr. Ellis: 
605 Suwannee Street 
Tallahassee, FL  32399-0450 
June 26, 2013 
ANANTH PRASAD, P.E. 
SECRETARY 
The Siting Coordination Office has reviewed the ten-year site plans and find these are 
suitable as planning documents. If you have any questions please feel free to call me at 
(850)414-4572. 
Sincerely, 
Connie Mitchell 
Siting Coordination Office 
www  .dot.state.fl.  us 
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•  Northeast Florida Regional Planning Council 
•  Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council 
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MEMORANDUM 
 
To: Phillip Ellis, Florida Public Service Commission 
 
From: Hugh W. Harling, Jr., Executive Director 
            Tara M. McCue, AICP, Director of Planning and Community Design 
 
Date: August 1, 2013 
 
Subject: 2013 Ten-Year Site Plans Review 
- Florida Power and Light 
- Orlando Utilities Commission 
- Progress Energy 
 
The East Central Florida Regional Planning Council staff has completed a review of the 2013 Ten-Year Site 
Plans for the agencies listed above.  Staff comments to each utility are italicized below. 
 
Florida Power and Light (FPL) 
Staff finds the document to be suitable for planning purposes.  Council staff will provide further comments on 
environmental and regional impacts when new or modified units, projects or transmission lines are proposed 
and additional data and information are provided. 
 
Orlando Utilities Commission (OUC) 
Staff finds the document to be suitable for planning purposes.  Council staff will provide further comments on 
environmental and regional impacts when new or modified units, projects or transmission lines are proposed 
and additional data and information are provided. 
 
Progress Energy Florida (PEF) 
Staff finds the document to be suitable for planning purposes.  Council staff will provide further comments on 
environmental and regional impacts when new or modified units, projects or transmission lines are proposed 
and additional data and information are provided. 
 
If you require any further information or comments, please contact Tara McCue, AICP at tara@ecfrpc.org or 
by phone at (407) 262-7772 
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APPENDIX AServing 
Alachua •  Bradford 
Columbia •  Dixie •  Gilchrist 
Hamilton •  Lafayette •  Madison 
Suwannee •  Taylor •  Union  Counties 
Central 
Florida 
Regional 
Planning 
Council  2009 NW 67th Place, Gainesville, FL 32653-1 603 •  352.955.2200 
July 16, 2013 
Mr. Phillip Ellis 
Division ofRegulatory Analysis 
Florida Public Service Commission 
Capitol Circle Office Center 
2540 Shumard Oak Blvd 
Tallahassee, FL  32399-0850 
RE:  Regional Review ofTen-Year Site Plan, 2013-2022 
Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
Dear Mr. Ellis: 
Pursuant to Section 186.801, Florida Statutes, Council staffhas reviewed the proposed Ten-Year Site 
Plan and provides the following comments. 
The above-referenced ten-year site plan proposes to construct eight natural gas-powered electrical 
generation stations by 2022 to be located within Gilchrist County.  The combined summer electrical 
generating capacity of  the stations will be 1,770 megawatts, while the combined winter electrical 
generating capacity of  the stations will be 2,080 megawatts. The ten-year site plan notes that 385 
megawatts of  the summer generating capacity and 456 megawatts of  the winter generating capacity will 
be cooled by water using wet cooling towers with forced air draft fans. 
The subject property of  the Gilchrist County site is located adjacent to Waccasassa Flats, a Natural 
Resource of  Regional Significance as identified and mapped in the North Central Florida Strategic 
Regional Policy Plan.  Page IV-55 of  the North Central Florida Strategic Regional Policy Plan notes the 
following regarding Waccasassa Flats. 
Occupying approximately 61,653 acres, Waccasassa Flats runs down the center of  Gilchrist 
County.  The flats are part of  a larger wetland system which runs into Levy County and the 
Withlacoochee Regional Planning District.  During the rainy season, waters in the aquifer build 
up sufficient pressure to spill out of  the many sinkholes and ponds scattered throughout the flats 
to inundate the area. 
The area is predominantly comprised of  commercial pine plantation.  Pine stands are interspersed 
among numerous cypress ponds, depression marshes, hydric hammock, and other wetland 
communities.  Several lakes (the largest of  which is 150 acres), small areas of upland hardwood 
forest, sandhill, and other minor natural communities contribute to the diversity of  the flats. 
Applicable regional plan goals and policies include the following: 
REGIONAL GOAL 4.7.  Maintain the quantity and quality ofthe region's surface water systems 
in recognition of  their importance to the continued growth and development of  the region. 
Dedicated to improv ing the quality of life of the Region's  citizens, 
by coordinating growth management, protecting regional resources, 
promoting economic development and providing technical services to local governments. 
APPENDIX AJ 
Letter to Mr. Phillip Ellis 
Page2 
July 16,2013 
Policy 4.7.5.  Use non-structural water management controls as the preferred water management 
approach for rivers, lakes, springs, and fresh water wetlands identified as natural resources of 
regional significance. 
Policy 4.7.6.  Support the coordination of land use and water resources planning for surface water 
resources designated as natural resources of  regional significance among the Council, local 
governments, and the water management districts through regional review responsibilities, 
participation in committees and study groups, and ongoing communication. 
Policy 4.7.12.  Ensure that local government comprehensive plans, DRis, and requests for federal 
and state funds for development activities reviewed by the Council include adequate provisions 
for storm  water management, including retrofit programs for known surface water runoff problem 
areas, and aquifer recharge protection in order to protect the quality and quantity of  water 
contained in the Floridan Aquifer and surface water systems identified as natural resources of 
regional significance. 
Policy 4.7.13.  Work with local governments, state and federal agencies, and the local water 
management districts in the review of  local government comprehensive plans and developments 
of  regional impact as they affect wetlands identified as natural resources of  regional significance 
to ensure that any potential adverse impacts created by the proposed activities on wetlands are 
minimized to the greatest extent possible. 
The proposed electrical power generation site to be located in Gilchrist County will be consistent with the 
regional plan provided the water consumption of  the electrical generating stations does not result in 
significant and adverse impacts to the wetland functions ofWacassassa Flats.  However, the ten-year site 
plan does not indicate the water source or the amount of  water to be used to cool the electrical generating 
stations.  Additionally, the ten-year site plan does not provide an analysis of  environmental impacts to 
Wacassassa Flats of  the withdrawal of  groundwater used to cool the electrical generating units. 
Therefore, it is recommended that the ten-year site plan include information on the water consumption of 
the electrical generating stations as we!l as an analysis of  envircmmental impacts to Wacassassa F!ats as a 
result of  their water consumption.  Finally, it is recommended that an alternative environmental impact 
analysis be provided whereby 100 percent ofthe electrical generation capacity ofthe site is cooled using 
air. 
If  you have any questions concerning this matter, please do not hesitate to contact Steven Dopp, Senior 
Planner of  the Planning Council's Regional and Local Government Programs staff, at 352.955.2200, 
extension 109. 
Sincerely, 
Scott R. Koons, AICP 
Executive Director 
v:\chouse\responses\20 12-13  _ 60-docx 
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Alachua •  Bradford 
Columbia  •  Dixie •  Gilchrist 
Hamilton •  Lafayette •  Madison 
Suwannee •  Taylor •  Union  Counties 
Central 
Florida 
Regional 
Planning 
Council  2009 NW 67th Place, Gainesville, FL 32653  -1 603 •  352. 955. 2200 
REGIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION AND RESPONSE 
Date:  7-16-13 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
#60- Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc., Ten-Year Site Plan 2013 -2022 
TO:  Mr. Phillip Ellis 
Division of  Regulatory Analysis 
Florida Public Service Commission 
Capitol Circle Office Center 
2540 Shumard Oak Blvd 
Tallahassee, FL  32399-0850 
_x_  COMMENTS ATTACHED 
NO COMMENTS REGARDING TillS PROJECT 
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING THESE COMMENTS, PLEASE CONTACT 
STEVEN DOPP, SENIOR PLANNER, AT THE NORTH CENTRAL FLORIDA REGIONAL 
PLANNING COUNCIL AT (352) 955-2200 OR SUNCOM 625-2200, EXT 109 
Dedicated to improving the quality of life of the Region's citizens, 
by coordinating growth management, protecting regional resources, 
promoting economic development and providing technical services to local governments. 
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REGIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION AND RESPONSE 
Date:  7-16-13 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
#58- Progress Energy Florida, Inc. Ten-Year Site Plan, 2013-2023 
TO:  Mr. Phillip Ellis 
Division ofRegulatory Analysis 
Florida Public Service Commission 
540 Shumard Oak Blvd. 
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 
CO~ENTSATTACHED 
__x_  NO COMMENTS REGARDING THIS PROJECT 
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING THESE COMMENTS, PLEASE CONTACT 
STEVEN DOPP, SENIOR PLANNER, AT THE NORTH CENTRAL FLORIDA REGIONAL 
PLANNING COUNCIL AT (352) 955-2200 OR SUNCOM 625-2200, EXT 109 
Dedicated to improving  the quality of life of the Region's  citizens, 
by coordinating growth management, protecting regional resources, 
promoting economic development and providing technical services to local governments. 
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REGIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION AND RESPONSE 
Date:  7-16-13 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
#59- Gainesville Regional Utilities- 2013 Ten-Year Site Plan 
TO:  Mr. Phillip Ellis 
Division ofRegulatory Analysis 
Florida Public Service Commission 
540 Shumard Oak Blvd. 
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 
CO~ENTSATTACHED 
___x_  NO COMMENTS REGARDING THIS PROJECT 
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING THESE COMMENTS, PLEASE CONTACT 
STEVEN DOPP, SENIOR PLANNER, AT THE NORTH CENTRAL FLORIDA REGIONAL 
PLANNING COUNCIL AT (352) 955-2200 OR SUNCOM 625-2200, EXT 109 
Dedicated to improving the quality of life of the Region's citizens, 
by coordinating growth management, protecting regional resources, 
promoting economic development and providing technical services to local governments. 
APPENDIX AJune 7, 2013 
Ref!ional 
Coun<:il 
Ms. Jeanette Sickel 
Florida Public Service Commission 
Division of  Economic Regulation 
2540 Shumard Oak Blvd. 
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 
Dear Ms. Sickel: 
Bringing  Communities  Together 
Baker •  Clay  •  Duval  •  Fla~ler •  Nassau  •  Putnam •  St. johns 
Please find attached the Northeast Florida Regional Council's review for JEA's ten-year 
site plan. 
JEA Ten-year Site Plan: The ten-year site plan, as required by Section 186.801 of  the 
Florida Statutes (F.S.), was reviewed by the Northeast Florida Regional Council staff. 
Action taken: Staffs review was approved by the Council and authorized for 
transmittal to the Florida Public Service Commission. 
If you have any further requests or questions, please contact Ms. Ameera Sayeed, Senior 
Regional Planner, (904) 279-0885, ext. 151  or asayeed@nefrc.org. 
Edward Lehman 
Director of  Planning & Development 
Attachment 
EL/ag 
RECEIVED 
JUN  21  Z013 
BY: 
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FROM: 
RE: 
ReQional 
council 
May 31,2013 
Brlnfllnfl Communities Toflether 
Baker  • Clay  •  Duval  •  Flagler  •  Nassau  •  Putnam  •  St. Johns 
MEMORANDUM 
Northeast Florida Regional Council 
Planning and Growth Management Policy Committee 
!() 
fr> 
Ameera F. Sayeed, GISP, Senior Regional Planner 
Review of JEA Ten-Year Power Plant Site Plan 2013-2022 
Introduction 
Each year every electric utility in the State of Florida produces a ten-year site plan that includes 
an estimate of future electric power generating needs. The purpose of the ten-year site plan is to 
disclose the  general  location of proposed power plant sites and  facilitate coordinated planning 
efforts. Pursuant to Section 186, Florida Statues, Council staff reviewed the most recent ten-year 
site plan prepared by the Jacksonville Electric Authority (JEA). The purpose of this report is  to 
summarize JEA's plans for future power generation and provide comments for transmittal to the 
Florida Public Service Commission (Commission). 
Statutory Authority 
Section  186.801, Florida Statutes, requires that all  major generating electric utilities in  Florida 
submit a Ten-Year Site Plan to  the Commission for review.  Each Ten-Year Site Plan contains 
projections of the utility's electric power needs for the next ten years and the general location of 
proposed power plant sites and major transmission facilities. In accordance with the statute, the 
Commission  performs  a  preliminary  study  of each  Ten-Year  Site  Plan  and  must  determine 
whether it is "suitable" or "unsuitable". In conducting its review, the Commission considers the 
views of appropriate local and state agencies. The Northeast Florida Regional Council reviews 
electric utility Ten-Year Site Plans within the region and submits comments to the Commission 
for review. The Commission forwards the  Ten-Year Site Plan review,  upon completion, to  the 
Florida Department of  Environmental Protection (DEP) for use in subsequent power plant siting 
proceedings. To fulfill  the requirements of Section  186.801, Florida Statutes, the  Commission 
has adopted Rules 25-22.070 through 25-22.072, Florida Administrative Code. Electric utilities 
must file the Ten-Year Site Plan by April 1st. 
APPENDIX ABoard Memorandum 
May 31, 2013 
Purpose 
The intent of  the Ten-Year Site Plans is to give state, regional, and local agencies advance notice 
of proposed power plants and transmission facilities. However, the Ten-Year Site Plans are not a 
binding plan of action on electric utilities. As such, the Commission's classification of a Ten-
Year Site Plan as suitable or unsuitable has no binding effect on the utility. Such a classification 
does not constitute a finding or determination in docketed matters before the Commission. The 
Commission  may  address  any  concerns  raised  by  a  utility's  Ten-Year  Site  Plan  at  a  public 
hearing. Because the Ten-Year Site Plans are planning documents containing tentative data, they 
may not contain sufficient information to allow regional planning councils, water management 
districts, and other reviewing agencies to evaluate site-specific issues within their jurisdictions. 
Each  utility  is  responsible  for  providing  detailed  data,  based  on  in-depth  environmental 
assessments,  during  Power  Plant  Siting  Act  or  Transmission  Line  Siting  Act  certification 
proceedings. 
Summary of the Plan 
JEA  is  the seventh largest municipally owned electric utility in  the  United States in  terms of 
number of customers. JEA's electric service area covers most of Duval County and portions of 
Clay and  St.  Johns  counties.  JEA's service  area covers  approximately 900  square  miles  and 
serves approximately 420,000 customers. The evaluation has revealed that JEA has included in 
this ten-year plan the necessary analysis. The existing JEA electric supply resources, forecasts of 
customer energy requirements and peak demands, forecasts of fuel process and availability, and 
an analysis of alternatives for resources that would meet JEA's future capacity and energy needs 
were reported in the ten-year plan. JEA forecasts accounted for the system peak demand growth 
and  energy consumption resource plan;  in  addition to  cost considerations,  environmental  and 
land use considerations were amply factored into the ten-year plan. JEA had provided population 
estimates in  previous ten-year site plans and it appears that the current plan no  longer includes 
the population forecast and accompanying discussion. 
JEA consists of  three separate entities: The JEA Electric system, the St. Johns River Power Park 
and the Robert W. Scherer system. Collectively, these plants consist of  two dual-fired (petroleum 
coke/coal) Circulating Fluidized Bed steam turbine-generator units (Northside steam Units 1 and 
2); one dual-fired (oil/gas) steam turbine-generator unit (Northside steam Unit 3); five dual-fired 
(gas/diesel)  combustion turbine-generator units  (Kennedy GT1  and  GT8,  and Brandy Branch 
GTI, CT2, and CT3); two natural gas-fired combustion turbine-generator units (GEC GT1  and 
GT2); four diesel-fired combustion turbine-generator units (Northside GTs 3, 4,  5,  and 6); and 
one combined cycle heat recovery steam generator unit (Brandy Branch steam Unit 4). The St. 
Johns River Power Park (SJRPP) is jointly owned by JEA (80 percent) and Florida Power and 
Light (FPL) (20 percent). SJRPP consists of two nominal 638 MW bituminous coal fired units 
located north of  the Northside Generating Station in Jacksonville, Florida. 
Nuclear Generation 
In March 2008, JEA approved the policy of pursuing nuclear energy partnerships with the goal 
of providing 1  0 percent of JEA'  s power from nuclear sources. In June 2008, JEA entered into a 
purchase power agreement with the  Municipal  Electric  Authority of Georgia (MEAG) for a 
portion of MEAG's entitlement to  the Vogtle Units 3 and 4,  which are proposed new nuclear 
units. These two new nuclear units are under construction at the existing Plant Vogtle location in 
2 
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Burke County, GA. JEA is entitled to net firm capacity of206 MW from the proposed units. JEA 
assumes they will have available capacity beginning in the year 2017 from Unit 3 and additional 
capacity from Unit 4 beginning in the year 2018. 
Clean Power and Renewable Energy 
JEA  has  pursued  several  clean power initiatives  and  is  in  the  process of evaluating potential 
renewable  energy  resources.  JEA  has  worked  with  the  Sierra Club  of Northeast Florida,  the 
American Lung Association and local environmental groups to establish a process to maintain an 
action  plan entitled "Clean Power Action Plan".  This Plan  includes an  advisory Panel  that  is 
comprised of community representatives. Also, JEA has included  in  their review and planning 
installation  of  solar  photovoltaic,  solar  thermal,  landfill  and  wastewater  treatment  biogas 
capacity  and  wind  capacity.  Progress  has  extended  to  include  installation  of clean  power 
systems, unit efficiency improvements, commitment to  purchase power agreements (including 
nuclear power), legislative and public education activities, and research into and development of 
clean power technologies. 
Solar 
JEA  has  installed  35  solar  PV systems,  totaling  222  kW,  on  public  high  schools  in  Duval 
County,  as  well  as  many of JEA's facilities,  and the Jacksonville  International  Airport.  JEA 
implemented  the  Solar Incentive  Program  in  early  2002.  This  program  continues  to  provide 
rebates  for  the  installation of solar thermal  systems.  In  addition to  the  solar thermal  system 
incentive program, JEA established a residential net metering program to encourage the use of 
customer-sited solar PV systems, which was revised as  the Tier 1 &  2 Net Metering policy in 
2009, to  include all customer-owned renewable generation systems up to and equal to  100 kW. 
In  2011,  JEA  established  the  Tier  3  Net  Metering  Policy  for  customer-owned  renewable 
generation systems greater than 100 kW up to 2 MW. JEA signed a purchase power agreement 
with Jacksonville Solar, LLC in  May 2009 to provide energy from a  15.0 MW DC rated solar 
farm, which began operation in summer 2010. 
Landfill 
JEA  owns  three  internal  combustion  engine  generators  that  are  fueled  by  the  methane  gas 
produced by the landfill. JEA also receives landfill gas from the North landfill, which is fed to 
the Northside Generating Station and is used to generate power at Northside Unit 3. 
Wind 
JEA purchases 10MW of wind capacity from NPPD's (Nebraska Public Power District) and in 
tum  the  NPPD  buys  back  the  energy  at  specified  on/off  peak  charges.  JEA  receives 
environmental credits associated with green projects. JEA entered into a 20-year agreement with 
Nebraska Public Power District to continue to  participate in the wind generation project located 
in Ainsworth, Nebraska. 
Biomass 
JEA owns three internal combustion engine generators located at the Girvin Road landfill. This 
facility was placed into service in July 1997, and is  fueled by the methane gas produced by the 
landfill. The facility originally had four generators, with an aggregate net capacity of  3 MW. Gas 
3 
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generation has declined, and one generator was removed and placed into service at the Buckman 
Wastewater Treatment facility. 
In  2011, JEA started a co-firing biomass in  the Northside Units  1 and  2,  utilizing wood chips 
from JEA tree trimming activities as a biomass energy source. Northside 1 and 2 has produced a 
total of 2,154 MWh of energy from  wood chips during 2011  and  2012. JEA has received bids 
from local sources to provide sized biomass for potential use for Northside Units 1 and 2. 
Plug-in Electric Vehicle Peak Demand 
In 2012, JEA developed the PEV demand and energy forecast for the service territory using the 
2011  information from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the Edison Electric Institute 
(EEi), the  U.S.  Census Bureau, and the Bureau of Economic and Business Research (BEBR). 
JEA's  baseline  forecast  of the numbe:- ef p!ug-irr  vehicles  in  the  area  was  determined  from 
BEBR's forecasted population growth rate, the U.S. Census Bureau's 2010 estimated number of 
vehicles, and EPRI' s forecasted low scenario PEV penetration rate. JEA forecasted the average 
usable  battery  capacity  per vehicle  using  the  upcoming plug-in  vehicle  model  rollouts  from 
Toyota,  Honda,  Ford,  and  General  Motors,  and  grew  the  capacity  by  1 kWh  per year.  The 
baseline forecast assumed that charging would initially be  uncontrolled at home until the mid-
2020s when public  infrastructure became feasible and available. When comparing Pike's 2012 
PEV  forecasted  vehicle  sales  with  JEA's 2012  forecast,  JEA's baseline  projections  were  63 
percent higher than Pike. Because of this difference, JEA shifted the start of its  PEV forecast 
back  5  years  to  2017.  Because  Pike  did  not  provide  forecast  data  for  Duval  County,  JEA 
maintained the previously forecasted annual increases. 
Staff Evaluation 
The JEA forecasts are much more statistically sound. In the past JEA used regression analyses, 
which  would  not  necessarily  account  for  statistical  anomalies.  To  address  the  variability,  in 
recent  year  with  the  demand,  JEA  also  used  historical  data,  growth  rates  and  established 
regression analyses for the  13-year progression to establish periods of economic downturn and 
prerecession  periods.  JEA forecasted  the Net Energy Load to  increase  at  an  average  of 1.17 
percent per year during the last ten-year period. JEA views demand to decline in 2012 and hence 
over the 13 years the average annual growth rate for total energy is expected to be at 0.73 percent 
and 0.49 percent for net energy. 
Council  staff supports  JEA  and  the  State  of Florida's  efforts  to  continue  to  develop  new 
programs to:  1) reduce the reliance on coal and  oil  as  energy sources; 2)  increase conservation 
activities  to  offset  the  need  to  construct  new  power  plants;  and  3)  plan  to  develop  an 
environmentally sound power supply strategy that may provide  reliable  electric service at the 
lowest practical cost. 
Recommendation 
Staff recommends  that  the  Committee  and  Council  approve  this  report  and  authorize  its 
transmittal to the Florida Public Service Commission. 
4 
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Mr. Phillip Ellis 
Engineering Specialist Ill 
Division of Engineering 
Florida Public Service Commission 
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850 
Dear Mr.  Ellis: 
RF-C~~  T~""'lVED 
JUL  0 2 2013 
BY: 
Subject:  2013 Ten-Year Site Plans for Florida Electric Utilities 
Thank  you  for  your  May  21,  2013  letter  requesting  that  the  South  Florida  Water 
Management  District  (District)  review  the  2013  Ten-Year  Site  Plans  for  the  Florida 
Power  &  Light  Company  (FPL),  Progress/Duke  Energy  Florida  (DEF),  and  Tampa 
Electric Company (TECO). The District has completed its review of the site plans. 
The ten-year site plans provided by DEF and TECO do not include existing or proposed 
facilities  within  the  boundaries  of  the  District.  The  District  forwards  no  comments 
regarding these proposed sites. 
The  District  finds  the  ten-year  site  plan  provided  by  FPL  suitable  as  a  planning 
document.  The  District  offers  the  following  comments  to  assist  electric  utilities  with 
ongoing planning. 
In  planning for siting future facilities,  utilities should  recognize that water availability is 
limited  in  specified  areas by the  District's  Restricted  Allocation Area  rule.  The  criteria 
associated with the Restricted A!!ocation Area Rule can be found in  Section 3.2.1 of the 
Basis  of Review  for  Water  Use  Permit  Applications  within  the  South  Florida  Water 
Management District (October 23, 2012). 
For  assistance  or  additional  information,  please  contact  John  Morgan,  Lead  Policy 
Analyst, at (561) 682-2288 or jmorganj@sfwmd.gov. 
Sincerely, 
Sharon M. Trost, P.G., AICP 
Director, Regulation Division 
South Florida Water Management District 
SMT/jm 
3301 Gun Club Road, West Palm Beach, Florida 33406  •  (561) 686-8800  •  FL WATS 1-800-432-2045 
Mailing Address:  P. 0. Box 24680, West Palm Beach, FL 33416-4680  •  www.sfwrnd.gov 
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Mr. Phillip Ellis, Engineering Specialist III 
Division of Engineering 
Florida Public Service Commission 
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard 
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 
 
Subject: Electric Utility 2013 Ten-Year Site Plans 
 
Dear Mr. Ellis: 
 
In response to your request, the Southwest Florida Water Management District 
(District) has completed its review of the 2013 Ten-Year Site Plans (Site Plan) for 
Progress/Duke Energy Florida (DEF) and Tampa Electric Company (TECO).  The 
District’s review is being conducted pursuant to Section 186.801(2)(e), Florida 
Statutes, which requires that the Public Service Commission consider “the views of 
the appropriate water management district as to the availability of water and its 
recommendation as to the use by the proposed plant of salt water or fresh water for 
cooling purposes.” 
 
Both DEF and TECO indicate in their Site Plans that new generating facilities are 
proposed within the ten-year planning horizon.  The Site Plan for DEF indicates 
that two new combined cycle units are proposed in 2018 and 2020 at undesignated 
sites.  The Site Plan for TECO indicates that conversion of the Polk Power 
Station’s simple cycle combustion turbines (Units 2-5) to a natural gas combined 
cycle unit is currently undergoing site certification review and is proposed for 2017.  
The Site Plan for TECO also indicates that a new combustion turbine is proposed 
in 2020 at an undesignated site.  
 
With the exception of the TECO Polk Power Station Units 2-5 project, which is 
currently undergoing site certification review, no information was provided for the 
other TECO project and the two DEF projects concerning identification of the 
proposed project sites, water sources, and water demands.  Without this 
information, the District’s ability to comment on the “suitability” of the Site Plans is 
extremely limited. 
 
Please note that, pursuant to Section II.A.1.f of the current Operating Agreement 
between the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the District 
concerning the division of responsibility for management and storage of surface 
waters regulation and wetland resource regulation under Chapter 373, Part IV, 
Florida Statutes, the DEP is responsible for conducting the Environmental 
Resource Permit-related review and for taking final agency action for power plants, 
electrical distribution and transmission lines, and other facilities related to the 
production, transmission, and distribution of electricity. 
 
APPENDIX ABased on the information provided in the Site Plans, the District offers the following technical 
assistance comments for your consideration: 
 
1)  During the site certification or permitting process, consideration must be given to the 
lowest quality water available which is acceptable for the proposed use.  If a lower 
quality of water is available and is environmentally, technically and economically feasible 
for all or a portion of the proposed use, this lower quality water must be used.   
 
2)  For new generating facilities proposed in the southern and much of the central 
portions of the District, there are additional water use restrictions.  These areas have 
been designated as Water Use Caution Areas.  This designation has occurred in 
response to water resource impacts, such as salt water intrusion, lowered lake levels 
and reduced stream flows, which have been caused by excessive ground water 
withdrawals.  Regional recovery strategies are being implemented to address the 
adverse water resource impacts.  Consequently, the District has heightened concerns 
regarding potential impacts due to future groundwater demands and availability within 
these areas. 
 
3)  The most water conserving practices must be used in all processes and components 
of the power plant’s water use that are environmentally, technically and economically 
feasible for the activity, including reducing water losses, recycling, and reuse.  
 
We appreciate this opportunity to participate in the review process.  If you have any questions or 
require further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me at (352) 796-7211, extension 
4790, or james.golden@watermatters.org. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
James J. Golden, AICP 
Senior Planner 
 
JG 
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Mr. Phillip O. Ellis 
Strategic Analysis & Government Affairs 
Public Service Commission 
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard 
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 
pellis@psc.state.fl.us 
 
CC: Traci Matthews 
tmatthew@psc.state.fl.us 
 
Re: Comments on 2013 Ten-Year Plan Submittals 
 
Dear Mr. Ellis and Ms Matthews: 
 
Thank you for accepting these comments on behalf of the Sierra Club and its nearly 27,000 Florida 
members and on behalf of Earthjustice.  We appreciated the opportunity to participate in the Public 
Service Commission (PSC)’s Ten-Year Plan review process in 2012, and are happy to continue our 
participation this year. 
 
In last year’s comments,
1 we asked that the PSC consider the implications of the retirement of Duke 
(then Progress) Energy’s Crystal River Units 1 & 2, and of Gulf Power’s Lansing Smith Units 1 & 2.  
We advised the PSC that the units had significant environmental compliance obligations which 
rendered them noneconomic to run in the near-term, but that neither company had included full 
analysis of that possibility in its submittal.   
 
We appreciate that the PSC addressed these retirement issues in its review of the 2012 plans. See, e.g., 
PSC, Review of the 2012 Ten-Year Site Plans (“2012 Review”) at 3.  We respectfully submit that that 
analysis should continue in further depth this year because both utilities have now confirmed our 
retirement predictions from last year.  Duke has committed to retiring Crystal River 1 & 2 for 
economic reasons and Gulf, though it has not made a final decision, has deferred further 
environmental compliance work on Lansing Smith and has requested PSC approval for transmission 
upgrades which would allow for Lansing Smith 1 & 2 to shut down. 
 
In its review, the PSC assumed that the capacity of these retiring units would be replaced by natural 
gas, which would increase natural gas’s share in Florida’s  electric generation to 62.9% by 2022 (up 
from 56.7% without the retirements, and from 57.7% in 2011). Id.  The PSC states that it views “the 
growing lack of fuel diversity” within Florida as a “major strategic concern.” Id. at 39.  Although we 
certainly welcome the retirements of these dangerous coal plants, we share this fuel diversity 
concern: Undue dependence on natural gas leaves the state overly vulnerable to fuel price volatility, 
even as potential LNG exports and other shifts in the gas market seem likely to increase gas prices in 
the medium term.  For this reason, we strongly suggest that the PSC consider planning scenarios 
which employ other, less risky, resources to make up some or all of the share of generation now 
served by the retiring plants.   
 
                                                           
1 Attached as Exhibits 1 & 2, for your reference. 
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In particular, we believe that demand-side management measures, including energy efficiency, other 
demand  response programs, and demand-side renewable energy, can make up a significant portion 
of any resource gap left by the likely retirements.  Increased supply side renewable energy can also 
increase the diversity of the state’s resource mix. Because the PSC will be considering new goals for 
both Duke and Gulf under the Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act (FEECA) this year, 
this is a particularly good time to develop the data needed for sensible planning. 
 
I.  Coal Retirements  
 
Both Duke and Gulf have confirmed that retirement is likely in the cards for their economically 
vulnerable plants, though Duke has gone further and confirmed that Crystal River 1 & 2 will 
certainly retire.  Duke appears to be planning to address these retirements largely through adding 
new generating capacity.  Gulf intends to rely on power imports in the near term. 
 
Duke/Progress  
 
Duke has confirmed “expected retirement of Crystal River 1 & 2 in 2016.” Duke TYSP at 3-2.  As 
Duke explains in testimony filed in the Environmental Cost Recovery Docket, the lifecycle projected 
system cost for retiring units 1 & 2 is far lower than the cost of retrofitting the units to comply with 
environmental compliance obligations: The difference between the retirement and retrofit scenarios 
is $ 1.32 billion in Duke’s base case analysis; retrofit is unfavorable only in the extremely unlikely 
case of very high gas prices and no CO2 regulation. Direct Testimony of Benjamin M. H. Borsch on 
Behalf of Progress Energy Florida (Apr. 1, 2013) at 4, Docket No. 130007-EI; see also Progress 
Energy Florida, Review of Integrated Clean Air Compliance Plan (Apr. 1, 2013) (“Duke Compliance Plan”) at 
25-26. 
 
To be sure, Duke has held out the option of making short-term fuel mix adjustments which might 
allow the units to continue operating, perhaps as long as 2020.  Duke Compliance Plan at 21.  
Continued operation would plainly be economically imprudent.  As we demonstrated in our 
comments and workshop presentation on last year’s plan, and as the figure below shows, the Crystal 
River units already verge on noneconomic when compared even against the substantial expense of 
constructing a new combined cycle natural gas plant to replace their capacity, much less against 
more sensible options, including demand side programs.
2 
 
                                                           
2 This figure is drawn from our 2012 workshop presentation and is based on work by Synapse Energy Economics, using 
public cost estimates from the Energy Information Administration’s cost reporting forms and the EPA’s Integrated 
Planning Model, developed by Sargent & Lundy.   
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Because Crystal River 1 & 2 are uneconomic by almost any measure (as Duke acknowledges), the 
pertinent question is how best to replace any portion of their 965 MW in nameplate capacity which 
will be required going forward.  (In practice, this lost capacity is smaller: both units have been 
relatively little used in recent years.)  Lost capacity from the 860 MW Crystal River 3, the retired 
nuclear unit at the site, will also play a substantial role in system planning, of course. 
 
Over the period from 2013 to 2022, Duke expects its firm summer peak demand to grow by 1287 
MW, TYSP at 3-7, and increase of just shy of 15% over the next decade, or about 1.5% per year. At 
present, Duke reports that it intends to make up necessary capacity to match this growth through 
“planned power purchases from 2016 through 2020 and planned installation of combined cycle 
facilities in 2018 and 2020 at undesignated sites.”  Id. at 3-2.  According to Duke, these energy 
imports are likely to grow an additional 1470 MW above its current ~ 1900 MW of imported 
capacity, id. at Schedule 7.1.  The addition of a 1307 MW (winter capacity) combined cycle facility in 
2018, and a second 1307 MW facility in 2020 then replaces these imports.   See id. at 3-7, 3-10 – 3-11.  
This additional capacity is 764 MW greater than the capacity which Duke is losing, leading to a 21% 
reserve margin by 2022. 
 
As we discuss below, Duke’s strategy of increasing its built generating capacity substantially in 
response to projected growth, and relying on natural gas generation to do so, is not the prudent one 
for either the company or for Florida.   
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Gulf Power 
 
As the figure above indicates, Lansing Smith 1 & 2 are even less economically attractive to operate 
than the uncontrolled Crystal River coal units.  Gulf has not yet committed to retirement publicly, 
but its filings in this docket and in the Environmental Cost Recovery docket make clear that it is 
preserving that option. 
 
Specifically, Gulf has requested the PSC approve a $77 million transmission upgrade project, which 
it explains is necessary to ensure that Lansing Smith is not a must run unit. Gulf Power, Third 
Supplemental Petition of Gulf Power Company Regarding its Environmental Compliance Program, Docket No. 
13007-EI (Mar. 29, 2013) at 8.  According to Gulf, these upgrades will allow Plant Smith to run at 
lower levels or to close, and would be “required if these units retire or are controlled as a result of 
[the mercury and air toxics rule].” Id. at 8.  Gulf, thus, maintains that it intends to “reserve the 
decision to install … controls or to retire the two units for a future time when more is known with 
regard to costs of compliance requirements associated with additional environmental regulations.” 
Id. 
 
Because Gulf Power – unlike Duke – has not shared cost information with the public comparing the 
cost of controlling versus retiring the plant, see Gulf Power, Environmental Compliance Program 
Update, Docket No. 13007-EI (Mar, 29, 2013) at 22-27, it is clear that it anticipates considerable 
additional compliance obligations at Plant Smith, including additional air, water, and waste rules. Id. 
at 22.   Although Gulf has not provided economic analysis of a retirement option, it is clear that 
operating costs from the mercury rule alone would “greatly increase the variable operating cost of 
Smith Units 1 and 2,” id. at 23, enough so that spending $77 million on transmission to reduce the 
operating need for the plant is more economic than continuing to run it, id. at 26.   
 
 We certainly agree that it is better to run Plant Smith less.  The truth, however, is that Plant Smith is 
not economic to run at all under current conditions.  It is certainly not economic to run going 
forward as environmental compliance costs increase.  The appropriate course for Gulf Power is to 
retire the facility, rather than simply building transmission which will allow it to operate the costly 
plant somewhat less.  Its transmission project, apparently, will enable that retirement, which remains 
an option.  We urge the PSC to continue to analyze retirement possibilities. 
 
In this regard, Gulf’s Ten Year Site Plan submission does not clearly discuss all the implications of 
Plant Smith.  It acknowledges, again, that “potential incremental capital expenditures for compliance 
may be substantial,” Gulf TYSP at 3, but does not yet appear to provide a straightforward 
retirement analysis.   Gulf anticipates 575 MW in summer peak demand growth by 2022 (about 20% 
growth over that period, or, according to Gulf, a 1.9% annual increase over the next decade). See 
Gulf TYSP at Schedule 3.1.  
 
Gulf’s plan indicates that capacity additions are not necessary to manage this projected growth.  Gulf 
reports that a power purchase agreement (PPA) which it has signed with Shell Energy for use of 885 
MW of capacity from an existing gas combined cycle plant will meet its needs through 2023, after 
which it will construct additional in-system capacity. Id. at 2-3.  For this reason, the PSC’s projection 
last year that Lansing Smith’s retirement will lead to gas generation increases in Florida appears to be 
incorrect in the near term.  As with Crystal River’s retirement, however, we believe that demand-side 
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options and other non-gas resources should be emphasized to meet any capacity needs that 
eventually arise. 
 
II.  Implications for the Ten-Year Plan and FEECA Goal-Setting Processes 
 
Because the PSC will shortly move fully into the FEECA goal-setting process for the next five years, 
this is a particularly appropriate time to consider alternate futures for the Duke and Gulf power 
networks, with an emphasis on resources which the Legislature designed FEECA to encourage.  The 
cost of adding new fossil capacity will almost always be higher than the cost of demand-side 
measures.  The savings possible through an efficiency-focused strategy, coupled with efficiency’s 
potential to help Florida avoid the undue dependence on natural gas which the PSC is seeking to 
avoid, argue strongly for a careful analysis of these questions in this year’s Ten-Year Site Plan 
Review. 
 
The Legislature has determined that it is “critical to utilize the most efficient and cost-effective 
demand-side renewable energy systems and conservation systems in order to protect the health, 
prosperity, and general welfare of the state and its citizens.” Section 366.81, F.S.  A study 
commissioned by the Legislature this past year confirmed these findings, concluding that “FEECA 
appears to provide a positive net benefit to ratepayers.”  Galligan et al., Evaluation of Florida’s Energy 
Efficiency and Conservation Act (Dec. 7, 2012) (“FEECA Study”) at 9. 
 
Despite these benefits, the PSC has, in the past, opted to suspend further program expansion for 
Duke and FPL, on cost grounds.  See, e.g., Re: Progress Energy Florida, Inc., Docket No. 1000160-EG, 
2001 WL 3659327 (Aug. 6, 2011).  The PSC should revisit this position during this year’s goal-
setting process in view of the positive findings of the legislative study, and the pressing need to 
address the retirements of vulnerable coal units in ways that best protect the ratepayers from further 
risk from fossil fuel price shifts and regulatory uncertainty.  Ratepayers will face costs associated 
with new capacity and loss of fuel supply diversity which are far greater than those imposed by 
demand-side programs --- programs which the legislative study have determined have net benefits. 
 
In particular, the PSC should view with skepticism Duke’s proposal to construct 2614 MW of 
natural gas generation in just the next few years in order to cope with a 1.5% annual average growth 
rate in its predicted demand.  Initially, Duke has a history of significant positive errors in its 
forecasts.  As the PSC explained in its 2012 Ten Year Site Plan Review, Duke overestimated net 
energy for load forecasts by 11.36% on average between 2007 and 2011, and by 6.17% between 
2006 and 2010.  2012 Review at 19.  Certainly the recession contributed to some of this overage, but 
the size of the error should give the PSC pause. 
 
More importantly, however, the 1.6% demand growth rate which Duke forecasts, even if accurate, is 
within the range of load growth rates which demand-side management can address.  According to 
the legislative FEECA study, many states require annual reductions far greater.  See FEECA Study at 
177-180.  States requiring savings of at least 1% a year, according to that study, include Arizona, 
Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, and Texas, with many other 
states not far behind (still other states, including California, are listed as having very large reduction 
goals, but a percentage reduction is not specified).  See id.  Such reduction rates would entirely offset 
Duke’s projected load growth, obviating the need for much, if not all, of its projected capacity needs 
in light of the Crystal River retirements.   
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Duke plainly has the potential to greatly expand its programs.  It reports that only 25% (405,000 
customers out of 1.6 million) take part in its demand response program, for instance. Duke TYSP at 
1-1.  This low participation is likely one reason  that Duke is well below its FEECA goals for 
summer MW and annual GWh reductions – missing the annual target by more than 60%. See PSC, 
Annual Report on Activities Pursuant to [FEECA] (Feb. 2013) at 19.  Duke has told the PSC that it was 
unable to reach its performance levels because “of the Commission decision to not approve a new 
DSM plan” for the company. Id. at 20.  Thus, if the PSC engages with Duke to approve an improved 
plan, Duke may well be able to increase efficiency programs sufficiently to greatly decrease its 
capacity needs. 
 
This analysis also applies to Gulf.  Although Gulf does not plan new capacity for the next decade, it, 
too, has potential for further improvements, failing to meet even its modest existing FEECA goal by 
12%. Id. at 19.  If Gulf were performing at the level of nationally leading utilities – saving more than 
1.5% of its demand per year – it could likely avoid those projected capacity additions. 
 
Such enhanced performance could help Florida, as a whole, to meet the Legislature’s directive in 
FEECA.  At present, Florida ranks in the bottom half of the states with regard to energy efficiency.  
See American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, State Scorecard 2012 (ranking Florida #29).
3  
The coal retirements before the PSC provide a strong incentive to do better. 
 
We understand that the PSC will be conducting substantial analysis on this front during its FEECA 
goal-setting process, see Section 366.82, F.S., which requires careful consideration of the “full 
technical potential” of demand-side programs.  We suggest that the PSC conduct that analysis in 
tandem with its Ten-Year Site Plan review, valuing demand-side programs as a resource which can 
be used to address capacity and energy issues arising from the coal retirements announced or likely 
in the site plan docket.  Thus, in its 2013 Ten-Year Site Plan Review, the PSC could profitably 
evaluate the several different scenarios post-retirement, including scenarios in which capacity is 
replaced with more aggressive demand side measures. Other scenarios should also, of course, 
explore the potential of other energy sources, including enhanced in-state renewables, including 
solar, and out-of-state PPAs for renewable (and hence zero fuel cost) energy.  In the FEECA 
process, meanwhile, the PSC can consider the costs and benefits of such measures, especially as 
compared with costly and risky new gas capacity.  The two processes can and should reinforce each 
other as the PSC works to find ways to minimize risks and costs to ratepayers. 
 
III.  Conclusion 
 
 
Last year, we cautioned that a significant amount of coal-fired capacity in Florida was set for 
retirement.  That process has continued.  To manage any ratepayer risk from these retirements and 
the possible over-dependence on natural gas which they may promote, the PSC should emphasize 
demand-side management options as alternatives to gas-fired capacity.  We look forward to working 
with the Commission to ensure that Florida ratepayers secure healthier air and a more reliable and 
efficient electricity system. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
                                                           
3 Available at: http://aceee.org/energy-efficiency-sector/state-policy/aceee-state-scorecard-ranking. 
APPENDIX A7 
 
Craig Segall 
Staff Attorney 
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July 2, 2012 
 
Phillip O. Ellis 
Strategic Analysis & Government Affairs 
Public Service Commission 
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard 
Tallahassee, FL 32399‐0850 
pellis@psc.state.fl.us 
 
CC: Traci Matthews 
tmatthews@psc.state.fl.us 
 
Re: Comments on Gulf Power’s Ten‐Year Plan Submittal 
 
Dear Mr. Ellis and Ms Matthews: 
 
Thank you for accepting these comments on behalf of the Sierra Club and its more than 
27,000 Florida members, and on behalf of Earthjustice.  We look forward to participating in the 
Public Service Commission (PSC)’s Ten‐Year Plan review process.  We are writing to help inform 
the Commission of serious regulatory risks which should be addressed in this Ten‐Year Plan. 
 
As you know, Ten‐Year Plans are designed to provide a broad overview of a utility’s 
“power‐generating needs and the general location of its proposed power plant sites;” 
accordingly, plans must be “suitable” for planning purposes.  F.S. § 186.801; see also F.A.C. §§ 
25‐22.070 & 25‐22.071. These plans are among the many tools used by the Commission as it 
fulfills its statutory responsibilities to maintain “sufficient, adequate, and efficient service” and 
“fair and reasonable rates” for all Floridians.  See, e.g., F.S. § 366.03. 
 
To do so, the Commission will have to address the implications of substantial new 
environmental compliance obligations at several aging coal‐fired units.  A recent report for 
state utility commissioners, primarily authored by former Colorado PSC Chair Ron Binz, puts the 
problem succinctly, reminding regulators that “[t]he U.S. electric utility industry, which has 
remained largely stable and predictable during its first century of existence now faces 
tremendous challenges,” including the prospect of substantial retirements of aging coal‐fired 
power plants.  See Ron Binz & CERES, Practicing Risk‐Aware Electricity Regulation: What Every 
State Regulator Needs to Know (2012) at 5.
1  These “retrofit or retire” decisions will lead to 
significant changes in the Florida coal fleet, and the PSC will be charged with managing these 
shifts.  As Commissioner Binz writes: 
 
The question for regulators is whether to approve coal plant closures in the face of new and 
future EPA regulations, or to approve utility investments in costly pollution controls to keep 
the plants running.  Regulators should treat this much like an IRP proceeding: utilities 
                                                            
1 Attached as Ex. 1. 
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should be required to present multiple scenarios differing in their disposition of the coal 
plants.  The cost and risk of each scenario should be tested using sensitivities for fuel costs, 
environmental requirements, cost of capital, and so forth.  In the end, regulators should 
enter a decision that addresses all of the relevant risks. 
 
Id. at 9. 
 
These comments highlight some of these important risks.  The Commission should use the 
Ten‐Year Plan informational docket to fully investigate them. We have submitted similar 
comments addressing plans filed by several different utilities; this filing focuses on coal‐fired 
power plants operated by Gulf Power. 
 
I.  Gulf Power’s Plants Face Substantial Environmental Compliance Costs 
 
Gulf Power’s Lansing Smith, Crist, and Scholz plants are aging facilities lacking major 
pollution controls.  These plants are an increasingly bad deal for ratepayers:  In addition to 
posing a serious threat to public health, they are not economic to operate.  As utilities and PSCs 
around the country are increasingly recognizing, rising pollution control and fuel costs make 
coal power an unattractive proposition, especially as energy efficiency, demand‐side resources, 
and renewable power become ever more available and as natural gas prices continue at record 
lows.  Multi‐million dollar life‐extension projects for aging coal plants are not prudent in these 
circumstances.   Accordingly, Gulf anticipates that it is likely to retire many of its plants in the 
near future. Gulf Power Ten Year Plan (“Gulf Plan”) at 3. 
 
Because Gulf’s plans have important implications for the “need … for electrical power” in its 
service territory, and for how that need is to be met, as well on “fuel diversity within the state,” 
on the “environmental impact” of any proposed replacement power, and on the state 
“comprehensive plan,” see F.S. § 186.801, the Commission should ensure that Gulf discloses its 
intentions in its Ten‐Year Plan as fully as possible.  It is particularly important to do so because 
Gulf will face compliance obligations within the next few years that will lead to retirement 
decisions.  The Commission can best protect Floridians by beginning the planning process for 
these likely retirements now.  The Plan is not suitably detailed to allow for this planning to be 
successful, so, at the end of these comments, we respectfully urge the PSC to require Gulf to 
submit critical additional information. 
 
Gulf Power’s Lansing Smith and Scholz plants are the most likely retirement targets because 
both plants lack “scrubbers,” the flue‐gas desulfurization systems required to remove SO2, 
which can cause deadly respiratory damage, and other acid gases from their emissions.  
Scrubber systems for these plants would cost hundreds of millions of dollars.  Such an 
investment, and the corresponding rate increase, would not be prudent when much cheaper 
sources of power are available.  Accordingly, the Commission should work with Gulf Power to 
investigate retirement options for these plants. 
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In the discussion below, we explain the likely sources of scrubber liability for the Lansing 
Smith and Scholz plants, before briefly highlighting the many other environmental compliance 
costs which Gulf is likely to face. 
 
A.  Likely Scrubber Liability for Gulf Power Facilities 
 
Three separate environmental and public health protection programs are likely to drive 
scrubber installation requirements, and hence “retire or retrofit” decisions, at the Lansing 
Smith and Scholz facilities: the SO2 National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”), 40 C.F.R. 
§ 50.17, the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (“MATS”), 40 C.F.R. Subpt. UUUUU, and the 
Regional Haze Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 51.308.   
 
i.  The SO2 NAAQS 
 
Just five minutes of exposure to SO2 can make people sick; in fact, the causal link between 
this pollution and asthma attacks and other respiratory problems is the “strongest” such link 
which the EPA’s scientific advisory board can identify.  75 Fed. Reg. 35,520, 35,525 (June 22, 
2010).  To protect the public from such pollutants, EPA is required to set NAAQS specifying the 
safe level of public exposure; states then develop state implementation plans (SIPs) to ensure 
that those standards are attained.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409 & 7410. EPA’s decision to protect 
public health by lowering the NAAQS for SO2 to a maximum allowable exposure of 75 ppb (a 
concentration equivalent to 196.2 μg/m
3) over an hour, see 75 Fed. Reg. 35,520 (June 22, 
2010), thus obliges Florida to update its SIP to ensure that its citizens are protected from this 
dangerous air pollution. 
 
States are generally required to submit updated SIPs “within 3 years” after EPA updates a 
NAAQS; because EPA finalized its NAAQS in 2010, Florida’s plan is due in 2013.  42 U.S.C. § 
7410(a)(1).   The plan must “provide[] for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of” 
the standard throughout Florida.  Id.  Although EPA’s approval and review process may delay 
plan implementation for a year or two after submission, the Commission can reasonably expect 
Florida’s SIP to be operating by 2015 or before. 
 
This tight timeline is directly relevant to the Commission’s review of Gulf Power’s plans 
because the Lansing Smith plant is causing violations of the NAAQS, and so will have to install 
controls under any legal SIP.  Sierra Club engaged an expert air modeler, Steve Klafka of Wingra 
Engineering, to evaluate the plant’s compliance with the NAAQS, using EPA’s models and 
methodology.
2  We modeled both the plant’s allowable emissions – those authorized by its Title 
V Air Operation Permit, No. 0050014‐018‐AV – and its maximum emissions in 2011, the most 
recent year with complete data in EPA’s Air Pollution Markets Database.  Whether measured by 
its permit or by its most recent maximum emissions, the plant causes the pollution in the air 
over Panama City to reach unsafe levels, violating the NAAQS several‐fold. 
 
                                                            
2 The methodology is described in detail in the attached report, Ex. 2. 
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  Importantly, Lansing Smith causes NAAQS violations even when operating below its 
permitted maximums.  Last year, Lansing Smith’s highest operating hour emissions saw SO2 
concentrations reach 346.5 μg/m
3, which is nearly double the safe value.  See Ex. 2 at Table 1. 
 
Indeed, Lansing Smith’s SO2 emissions are so extreme that, according to the Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection (“FL DEP”), they even violate the far more lenient 
NAAQS that the new standard replaces.  See FL DEP Permit No. 0050014‐018‐AV at 5.  As such, 
FL DEP requires Gulf Power to post no trespassing signs to “protect the general public” from 
crossing the plant’s fence line, within which the pollution is the most intense.  See id.  This is not 
a safe facility. 
 
To reduce this illegal pollution, Lansing Smith would have to cut total facility emissions by 
77.6% from its current permit.  Id. at Table 3.  To do so, it is highly likely to have to install a 
scrubber, thereby confronting hundreds of millions in control costs, which we document more 
fully below. Importantly, these costs will be far outweighed by public health benefits.  EPA 
determined that the NAAQS will produce on the order of $36 billion in net benefits once safe 
levels of SO2 have been attained.  75 Fed. Reg. at 35,588.  Panama City residents will secure a 
substantial portion of these benefits – in the form of fewer asthma attacks, emergency room 
visits, and premature deaths – once Lansing Smith’s pollution has been controlled.   
 
We have not yet modeled the Scholz facility, but it is also an unscrubbed coal boiler, 
burning high‐sulfur bituminous coal, and its permitted emissions are far higher than Lansing 
Smith’s.  While the Lansing Smith permit allows emissions of up to 4.50 lbs/MMBtu of SO2, FL 
DEP Permit No. 0050014‐018‐AV at 8, the Scholz permit allows the facility to emit up to an 
astonishingly 6.17 lbs/MMBtu, FL DEP Permit No. 0630014‐010‐AV at 6.  FL DEP candidly 
acknowledges that this emission rate “indicates exceedances” near the facility of even the more 
lenient NAAQS which EPA has since replaced, and so requires Gulf Power to take “precautions… 
to preclude public access.”  Id.  Scholz is an even dirtier plant than Lansing Smith, and so is very 
likely to run afoul of the new NAAQS as well.   
 
In short, the SO2 NAAQS, a pollution control requirement which Gulf Power does not even 
acknowledge in its Ten‐Year Plan, is highly likely to require the Lansing Smith and Scholz 
facilities to retrofit or retire.  It is not the only requirement to do so, as we next discuss. 
 
ii.  MATS Requirements 
 
In the Clean Air Act of 1990, Congress ordered EPA to investigate hazardous air pollutants 
emitted by power plants, and to promulgate emissions standards for these pollutants if they 
threatened public health.  42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1).  Because coal power plants are dominant 
sources of mercury, acid gases, and other highly toxic pollutants, EPA was obligated to issue 
such standards, and finally did so in 2012, 22 years later.  See 77 Fed. Reg. 9,304 (Feb. 16, 
2012). 
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The final MATS rule issued in response to this Congressional mandate requires operators to 
control mercury and acid gases. A smoke stack scrubber can be required to comply with EPA’s 
control requirements.  In EPA’s analysis of facility compliance options, it presumed that coal 
plants emitting more than 2 lbs/MMBtu of SO2 would have to install scrubbers to comply with 
the standard.  77 Fed. Reg. at 9,412.  As we note above, Lansing Smith emits more than twice 
this amount, and Scholz emits three times this threshold quantity.  As such, scrubbers will very 
likely be required at these plants in order to comply with MATS. 
 
The Clean Air Act requires that existing sources comply with MATS “as expeditiously as 
practicable, but in no event later than 3 years after the effective date” of the standard.  42 
U.S.C. § 7412(i)(3).  Because MATS was promulgated and effective on February 16, 2012, plants 
must comply by that date in 2015.  Although limited compliance extension of up to 1‐2 
additional years may be available in some limited circumstances, see id., these extensions are 
disfavored. 
 
Accordingly, as Gulf Power recognizes, MATS “may severely restrict Gulf’s coal‐fired 
generation or completely eliminate the generation produced by Gulf’s coal‐fired units at Plants 
Smith and Scholz by as early as 2015.”  Gulf Plan at 3. 
 
iii.  Regional Haze Requirements 
 
Since 1977, the Clean Air Act has required EPA and the states to make “reasonable 
progress” towards restoring natural visibility in Class I areas – which are essentially national 
parks and wildernesses.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7491.  EPA’s rules to address regional haze, 
promulgated in 1999, are now being implemented. Florida is the process of a SIP revision 
intended to protect Class I areas affected by sources in the state.  See FL DEP, Regional Haze 
Plan for Florida Class I Areas (Draft as amended May 2012).
3 Gulf Power has already 
determined that this rule, alone, may lead it to retire the Lansing Smith facility. 
 
  The regional haze rule requires that Florida impose controls at all sources of visibility‐
impairing pollutants to the extent such controls will be needed to make reasonable progress 
towards restoring natural visibility by 2064.  See 40 C.F.R. § 51.308(d)(3).  The Act and the Rule 
also require sources which were in existence by August 7, 1977, but which had not been in 
operation before August 7, 1962, to install “the best available retrofit technology” (BART) to 
control visibility‐impairing pollutants.  42 U.S.C. § 7491(b)(2)(A) & 40 C.F.R. § 51.308(e).  FL DEP 
has determined that the Crist facility is subject to reasonable progress analysis and that Lansing 
Smith is subject to BART.  See FL Draft Regional Haze Plan at 98 & 102. 
 
  FL DEP had planned to rely upon a separate EPA SO2 trading program, the Clean Air 
Interstate Rule (“CAIR”) to address these requirements, but CAIR has been replaced with a new 
program which does not control SO2 in Florida.  See 77 Fed. Reg. 31,240, 31,248 (May 25, 2012).  
As such, FL DEP is reanalyzing control options and will have to consider source‐specific control 
                                                            
3 Available at http://www.dep.state.fl.us/air/rules/regulatory/regional_haze_imp.htm. 
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requirements for Crist and Lansing Smith. Scholz should also be implicated in this re‐analysis 
because FL DEP had previously excluded relatively small facilities largely because it assumed 
CAIR would address most SO2 emissions.  Now that CAIR is no longer available, Scholz will have 
to be analyzed as well.   Thus, as a result of these analyses, FL DEP will have to address SO2 
emissions, in some fashion, from all of Gulf Power’s coal plants. 
 
  These controls are likely to drive scrubber requirements (and other controls or 
operating restrictions at scrubbed plants like Crist) because, according to FL DEP, SO2 is the 
dominant source of visibility‐impairing pollution in Florida.  See, e.g., FL Draft Regional Haze 
Plan at 91‐92.  Thus, these rules, too, are highly likely to drive scrubber requirements at the 
Lansing Smith facility. 
 
  Gulf Power has admitted as much to FL DEP.  In a “BART Implementation Plan” 
submitted to DEP on May 21, 2012
4, it indicated that it will complete a BART analysis for 
Lansing Smith, and that it will decide, by January 1, 2015, whether to install a scrubber on the 
plant by 2018 (or later), “commit to retire the operation of Smith Unit 1 by January 1, 2022 and 
Smith Unit 2 before January 1, 2021,” or to seek permit levels by 2015 reducing plant 
operations below BART emissions limits.  Gulf BART Plan at 2.  Because BART determinations 
will be approved within the next year, it is not at all clear how Gulf Power expects to run its 
plants until the early 2020s.  Retirement within the next few years is the more likely option. 
 
iv.  Scrubber Costs 
 
We have calculated the approximate cost of installing and running scrubbers (at 90% 
efficiency, a level which would likely be required, at a minimum, to meet the requirements of 
all three relevant rules) at Lansing Smith and Scholz, based upon the EPA’s Integrated Planning 
Model and a scrubber‐focused appendix developed by Sargent & Lundy.
5  This model predicts 
that the capital costs for fitting Lansing Smith Units 1 and 2 with scrubbers at $234 million.  The 
incremental costs (including running costs) of these upgrades would be $43.1/MWh annually. 
Gulf Power would no doubt seek to pass these costs on to rate‐payers if it opted to continue to 
run the plant, rather than to retire it. 
 
Scrubber costs for Scholz are also very high.  Using the same government modeling, we 
calculated that scrubbers for Scholz units 1 & 2 would cost $106 million to install, yielding a 
$243.5/MWh spike in incremental costs. 
 
  These figures do not include the incremental costs of effluent controls for scrubber 
waste. Any such additional upgrades would, of course, add to these costs, as would any 
additional measures required at Crist to bring that facility into compliance.  The expenditures 
are extraordinarily high simply in order to extend the lives of these decades‐old, expensive, 
coal‐fired power plants.  Gulf Power is unlikely to make them and, we submit, it would not be 
                                                            
4 Attached as Ex. 3. 
5 All modeling parameters can be found at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progsregs/epa‐ipm/BaseCasev410.html. 
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appropriate for the Commission to authorize such costs where less expensive options are 
available. 
 
B.  Other Environmental Liabilities 
 
As Gulf Power acknowledges, Gulf Plan at 3, scrubber costs are not the only liabilities it 
faces.  There are also pending rules requiring upgrades to coal plant cooling water systems, see 
76 Fed. Reg. 22,174 (Apr. 20, 2011), better handling and disposal practices for coal combustion 
waste, see 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128 (June 21, 2010), and new treatment systems for liquid effluent 
discharges,
6 all of which are likely to be finalized in the next two years.  EPA is also updating the 
NAAQS for particulate matter and for ozone.   Moreover, EPA has recently proposed carbon 
controls for new electricity generating units.  See 77 Fed. Reg. 22,39 (Apr. 13, 2012).  Once 
finalized, these rules will obligate EPA to extend carbon controls to existing facilities, including 
Gulf Power’s fleet.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d).  The cumulative impact of these liabilities on Gulf 
Power will be large.  Indeed, according to Gulf, “the additional costs to comply with the final 
versions of EPA’s proposed water quality and coal combustion by‐product rules” alone “may 
result in total combined compliance costs that render controlled coal‐fired operations 
uneconomical in the long term.”  Gulf Plan at 3. 
 
Coal ash costs will be particularly pressing for Gulf Power.  According to the Toxic Release 
Inventory, its Lansing Smith facility discharged 520,281 pounds of ash to its impoundment in 
2006, a typical year, making Lansing Smith the 57
th largest source of ash in the country and the 
second largest sources in Florida.
7  Highly troublingly, carcinogenic hexavalent chromium, which 
leaches from coal ash, has been found in groundwater wells near Lansing Smith at over 5,000 
times safe levels (as determined by California for its drinking water goals), and above federal 
standards.
8  Clean‐up costs for this contamination, including halting wet storage of ash, will be 
yet another substantial expense for the plants. 
 
C.  Likely Retirements 
 
The cumulative compliance costs from all the rules which apply to Gulf Power’s fleet are 
very large.  Upon reviewing them, and considering the wide availability of more inexpensive 
power sources, Gulf Power is highly likely to follow industry trends towards coal retirement. 
 
Coal use is falling quickly, in response both to the cost of pollution controls and to national 
economic trends, including the growth of inexpensive wind power and the boom in shale gas 
production.  As EPA has recently documented, “all indications suggest that very few new coal‐
fired power plants will be constructed in the foreseeable future.” 77 Fed. Reg. at 22,413, and 
the Energy Information Administration (EIA) is documenting increasing retirements of existing 
plants.  In particular, the EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook for 2012 forecasts no new unplanned 
                                                            
6 See EPA’s plans for this rule at http://water.epa.gov/scitech/wastetech/guide/steam_index.cfm 
7 See Ex. 4, attached. 
8 Lisa Evans, EPA’s Blind Spot: Hexavalent Chromium in Coal Ash (2011) at 6, attached as Ex. 5. 
APPENDIX A 
coal capa
confirms
come on
natural g
date hav
have ann
 
In
these ret
Energy A
combine
demonst
Unde
additiona
technolo
options. 
 
D.  R
 
Altho
“assume
2012‐202
                  
9 Available
10 See, e.g.
schedule” 
https://ww
release.pa
2011; First
Power Plan
https://ww
entalregula
Nuclear” (S
newswire.c
11 Attached
acity through
 that this tre
line are coal
gas.  EIA, Elec
e been pred
nounced tho
ndustry‐wide
tirements ar
Analysis,
11 a w
d cycle level
trates. 
er these circu
al costs on th
ogy. Instead, 
Gulf Power 
Recommende
ough Gulf Po
[s]” that Lan
21 planning 
                       
 at: http://205
, Progress Ene
(Apr. 1, 2011) 
ww.progress‐en
ge?title=Progr
tEnergy Press R
nts” (Jan. 29, 2
ww.firstenergy
ationswillretire
Sept. 7, 2011) 
com/ens/sep2
d as Ex. 6. 
h 2020.  RIA 
end continue
l‐fired; inste
ctric Power M
dominantly c
usands of m
e levelized c
re occurring.
widely‐used 
lized costs a
umstances, 
heir ratepay
they are op
could, and s
ed Commiss
ower has ack
nsing Smith a
cycle.”  Gulf
                   
5.254.135.7/ele
rgy Press Relea
(recording the
nergy.com/com
ess+Energy+Ca
Release, “FirstE
2012) (announc
corp.com/cont
esixc.html; Env
(documenting 
2011/2011‐09‐0
at 5‐5.  EIA’
es.  Thus far 
ead, new cap
Monthly Jun
coal‐fired un
megawatts w
ost figures c
  The most r
reference, s
re already b
prudent ope
yers by runni
ting to retire
should, decid
sion Action
knowledged 
and Scholz “
f Plan at 3.  A
ectricity/mont
ase, “Progress 
e retirement of
mpany/media‐
arolinas+to+re
Energy, Citing I
cing the retirem
tent/fecorp/ne
vironment New
retirement of 
07‐091.html. 
9 
s most rece
this year, no
pacity additio
ne 2012 at Ta
its.  See id. a
worth of coal 
compiled by 
recent (2011
shows that e
below those 
erators are in
ing coal‐fired
e older units
de to follow 
that some r
will be avail
As we have d
hly/pdf/epm.p
Energy Carolin
f four North Ca
‐room/news‐ar
etire+coal+pow
Impact of Envi
ment of six coa
ewsroom/new
ws Service, “Do
two Virginia co
nt Electric P
one of the 5
ons are large
able ES3.
9 Co
at Table ES4
retirements
independen
1) edition of 
energy effici
of coal, as th
ncreasingly d
d units with 
s and pursue
the same co
retirements 
able to oper
demonstrate
pdf. 
nas to retire co
arolina coal pla
rchive/press‐
wer+plant+ahea
ronmental Reg
al plants in Ohi
ws_releases/firs
ominion Virgini
oal plants), ava
Power Month
5,627 MW of
ely in renew
onversely, re
. Utilities ac
s over the la
nt analysts d
Lazard’s Lev
ency, wind, 
he figure be
deciding not
 costly new 
e cleaner, ch
ourse. 
may occur, i
rate on coal 
ed above, th
oal power plan
ants), available
ad+of+schedu
gulations, Will 
io), available a
stenergy_citing
ia to Replace C
ailable at http:
hly report 
f new units t
wable power 
etirements t
ross the cou
ast few years
demonstrate
velized Cost 
and natural
low 
t to impose 
pollution 
heaper, ener
it nonethele
throughout
his assumptio
nt ahead of 
e at 
le&pubdate=0
Retire Six Coa
t 
gimpactofenvi
Coal Plants wit
://www.ens‐
to 
or 
to 
untry 
s.
10 
e why 
of 
 gas 
rgy 
ess 
t the 
on is 
04‐01‐
l‐Fired 
ronm
h Gas, 
 
APPENDIX A10 
 
arbitrary and unsupportable:  The compliance periods for the scrubber‐forcing rules will run 
within the next two years and retirements will very likely occur within that period, and certainly 
will occur within the next decade.   This error, and Gulf Power’s failure fully to address the 
impacts of retirements upon its system and upon ratepayers, renders the draft plan 
“unsuitable” as a planning document.  See F.S. §186.801.  The Commission, “may suggest 
alternatives to the plan,” id., however, and may classify a plan as suitable upon the submission 
of “additional data,” see F.A.C. § 25‐22.071(5).  We respectfully request that the PSC exercise its 
authority to ensure that Gulf Power’s plan provides adequate data to allow the PSC and the 
public to address these plant retirements. 
 
Specifically, we submit that the Commission should seek the following information from 
Gulf Power and require resubmission of a complete plan addressing these submissions: 
 
1.  The utility should provide an analysis of all environmental compliance obligations 
which it will experience at all of its coal‐fired facilities.  For each requirement, the 
utility should cite the relevant rule, explain how it is likely to apply to the plant, the 
likely costs of compliance to the utility and to ratepayers, and the timeline on which 
compliance will be required.  The utility should also document any steps it has taken 
to address these compliance obligations, and alternative steps it might take. For 
instance, if the utility anticipates that it will have to install a scrubber to comply with 
MATS, it should report to the Commission on scrubber installation and operation 
costs, whether it has contracted to purchase a scrubber and on what timeline, and 
what other options it has considered.  See F.S. § 186.801 (requiring utilities to 
document “[p]ossible alternatives to the proposed plan”). 
 
2.  The utility should provide a comparative analysis of compliance costs and the cost 
costs of replacing the plant’s power through energy efficiency, demand response, 
power purchase agreements, new generation facilities, or other means.  See F.S. 
§186.801 (requiring utilities to explain the impact of their plans on fuel diversity and 
on the need for electric power in their regions). In light of this analysis, the utility 
should indicate whether it intends to retire any facility, and on what timeline, and 
the relative costs of retirement versus those of other options.  If retirement has not 
been selected but is being considered, the utility should indicate when the decision 
will be made. 
 
3.  For any facility where retirement is possible, the utility should discuss how it intends 
to address any reliability issues which may be caused by the retirement.  The 
Commission should play an active role in this regard, as it must maintain reliability of 
the electric grid. See F.S. § 366.05(7)‐(8) (authorizing the Commission to “require 
reports from all electric utilities to assure the development of adequate and reliable 
energy grids” and to order “installation and repair of necessary facilities” to address 
reliability issues”).  The Commission has determined that “[r]eserve margins in 
Florida typically remain well above” relevant minimums through 2020, so system‐
wide resource adequacy problems are unlikely, but the Commission may still need to 
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address localized reliability issues. If such problems appear to be present, the 
Commission should work proactively and transparently with the Florida Reliability 
Coordinating Council to address them well in advance of any planned retirement.   
 
We appreciate this careful consideration of Gulf Power’s environmental compliance options, 
and any resulting plant retirements, and remind the Commission that such thorough analysis is 
required to ensure that the Ten‐Year Plan complies with legal requirements.  We request that 
the Commission share the results of its inquiry with us and with the public, and request formal 
notice of the Commission’s next steps.   
 
Please contact the  undersigned with any concerns or questions. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
s/ Craig Holt Segall 
Craig Holt Segall 
Sierra Club Environmental Law Program 
50 F St NW, Eighth Floor 
Washington, DC, 20001 
(202)‐548‐4597 
Craig.Segall@sierraclub.org 
 
Alisa Coe 
Earthjustice 
111 South Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd. 
Tallahassee, FL 32301 
(850) 681‐0031 
acoe@earthjustice.org 
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July 2, 2012 
 
Mr. Phillip O. Ellis 
Strategic Analysis & Government Affairs 
Public Service Commission 
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard 
Tallahassee, FL 32399‐0850 
pellis@psc.state.fl.us 
 
CC: Traci Matthews 
tmatthew@psc.state.fl.us 
 
Re: Comments on Progress Energy’s Ten‐Year Plan Submittal 
 
Dear Mr. Ellis and Ms Matthews: 
 
Thank you for accepting these comments on behalf of the Sierra Club and its more than 
27,000 Florida members, and on behalf of Earthjustice.  We look forward to participating in the 
Public Service Commission (PSC)’s Ten‐Year Plan review process.  We are writing to help inform 
the Commission of serious regulatory risks which should be addressed in this Ten‐Year Plan. 
 
As you know, Ten‐Year Plans are designed to provide a broad overview of a utility’s 
“power‐generating needs and the general location of its proposed power plant sites;” 
accordingly, plans must be “suitable” for planning purposes.  F.S. § 186.801; see also F.A.C. §§ 
25‐22.070 & 25‐22.071. These plans are among the many tools used by the Commission as it 
fulfills its statutory responsibilities to maintain “sufficient, adequate, and efficient service” and 
“fair and reasonable rates” for all Floridians.  See, e.g., F.S. § 366.03. 
 
To do so, the Commission will have to address the implications of substantial new 
environmental compliance obligations at several aging coal‐fired units.  A recent report for 
state utility commissioners, primarily authored by former Colorado PSC Chair Ron Binz, puts the 
problem succinctly, reminding regulators that “[t]he U.S. electric utility industry, which has 
remained largely stable and predictable during its first century of existence now faces 
tremendous challenges,” including the prospect of substantial retirements of coal‐fired power 
plants.  See Ron Binz & CERES, Practicing Risk‐Aware Electricity Regulation: What Every State 
Regulator Needs to Know (2012) at 5.
1  These “retrofit or retire” decisions will lead to significant 
changes in the Florida coal fleet, and the PSC will be charged with managing these shifts.  As 
Commissioner Binz writes: 
 
The question for regulators is whether to approve coal plant closures in the face of new and 
future EPA regulations, or to approve utility investments in costly pollution controls to keep 
the plants running.  Regulators should treat this much like an IRP proceeding: utilities 
                                                            
1 Attached as Ex. 1. 
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should be required to present multiple scenarios differing in their disposition of the coal 
plants.  The cost and risk of each scenario should be tested using sensitivities for fuel costs, 
environmental requirements, cost of capital, and so forth.  In the end, regulators should 
enter a decision that addresses all of the relevant risks. 
 
Id. at 9. 
 
These comments highlight some of these important risks.  The Commission should use the 
Ten‐Year Plan informational docket to fully investigate them. We have submitted similar 
comments addressing plans filed by several different utilities; this filing focuses on coal‐fired 
power plants operated by Progress Energy. 
 
I.  Progress Energy’s Crystal River Plant Face Substantial Environmental Compliance 
Costs 
 
Units 1 and 2 at Progress Energy’s Crystal River plant were put into service in the late 1960s, 
and are operating without major pollution controls, including smokestack scrubbers.  See FL 
DEP Air Operation Permit No. 0170004‐025‐AV (2011) at 6.  These units are an increasingly bad 
deal for ratepayers:  In addition to posing a serious threat to public health, they are not 
economic to operate.  As utilities and PSCs around the country are increasingly recognizing, 
rising pollution control and fuel costs make coal power an unattractive proposition, especially 
as energy efficiency, demand‐side resources, and renewable power become ever more 
available and as natural gas prices continue at record lows.  Multi‐million dollar life‐extension 
projects for aging coal plants are not prudent in these circumstances.   Progress has already told 
FL DEP that it will consider retiring units 1 and 2 within the next decade.  See Progress Energy 
BART Implementation Plan for Crystal River Units 1 and 2 (June 2012) at 3.
2  Yet, Progress’s Ten‐
Year Plan does not even mention these units, much less address their retirements. 
 
Because of this striking gap, Progress’s plan is not “suitable” for planning purposes.  See F.S. 
§ 186.801.  The likely retirement of the Crystal River units has important implications for the 
“need … for electrical power” in its service territory, and for how that need is to be met, as well 
on “fuel diversity within the state,” the “environmental impact” of any proposed replacement 
power, and the state “comprehensive plan.” See F.S. § 186.801.  The Commission should 
therefore ensure that Progress submits a corrected plan which discloses its intentions as fully as 
possible.  It is particularly important to do so because Progress will face compliance obligations 
within the next few years that will lead to retirement decisions.  The Commission can best 
protect Floridians by beginning the planning process for these likely retirements now.   
 
Crystal River Units 1 and 2 are likely retirement targets because both units lack “scrubbers,” 
the flue‐gas desulfurization systems required to remove SO2, which can cause deadly 
respiratory damage, from their emissions.  Scrubber systems for these plants would cost tens of 
millions of dollars.  Such an investment, and corresponding rate increase, would not be prudent 
                                                            
2 Attached as Ex. 2. 
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when much cheaper sources of power are available.  Accordingly, the Commission should work 
with Progress Energy to investigate retirement options for these plants. 
 
In the discussion below, we explain the likely sources of scrubber liability for Crystal River, 
before briefly highlighting the many other environmental compliance costs which Progress is 
likely to face. 
 
A.  Likely Scrubber Liability for Crystal River Units 1 and 2 
 
Three separate environmental and public health protection programs are likely to drive 
scrubber installation requirements, and hence “retire or retrofit” decisions, at Crystal River: the 
SO2 National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”), 40 C.F.R. § 50.17, the Mercury and Air 
Toxics Standards (“MATS”), 40 C.F.R. Subpt. UUUUU, and the Regional Haze Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 
51.308.   
 
i.  The SO2 NAAQS 
 
Just five minutes of exposure to SO2 can make people sick; in fact, the causal link between 
this pollution and asthma attacks and other respiratory problems is the “strongest” such link 
which the EPA’s scientific advisory board can identify.  75 Fed. Reg. 35,520, 35,525 (June 22, 
2010).  To protect the public from such pollutants, EPA is required to set NAAQS specifying the 
safe level of public exposure; states then develop state implementation plans (SIPs) to ensure 
that those standards are attained.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409 & 7410. EPA’s decision to protect 
public health by lowering the NAAQS for SO2 to a maximum allowable exposure of 75 ppb (a 
concentration equivalent to 196.2 μg/m
3) over an hour, see 75 Fed. Reg. 35,520 (June 22, 
2010), thus obliges Florida to update its SIP to ensure that its citizens are protected from this 
dangerous air pollution. 
 
States are generally required to submit updated SIPs “within 3 years” after EPA updates a 
NAAQS; because EPA finalized its NAAQS in 2010, Florida’s plan is due in 2013.  42 U.S.C. § 
7410(a)(1).   The plan must “provide[] for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of” 
the standard throughout Florida.  Id.  Although EPA’s approval and review process may delay 
plan implementation for a year or two after submission, the Commission can reasonably expect 
Florida’s SIP to be operating by 2015 or before. 
 
This tight timeline is directly relevant to the Commission’s review of Progress Energy’s plans 
because the Crystal River plant is causing violations of the NAAQS, and so will have to install 
controls under any legal SIP.  Sierra Club engaged an expert air modeler, Steve Klafka of Wingra 
Engineering, to evaluate the plant’s compliance with the NAAQS, using EPA’s models and 
methodology.
3  We modeled both the plant’s allowable emissions – those authorized by its Title 
V Air Operation Permit, No. 017000–025‐AV, and its maximum emissions in 2011, the most 
recent year with complete data in EPA’s Air Pollution Markets Database.  Whether measured by 
                                                            
3 The methodology is described in detail in the attached report, Ex. 3. 
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its permit or by its most recent maximum emissions, the plant causes pollutants in the air near 
Crystal River to reach dangerous levels. 
 
The figure below shows the SO2 pollution plume the plant would create when operating at 
its permit limits.  All colored areas violate the NAAQS.  While the NAAQS is set at 196.2 μg/m
3, 
Crystal River’s permit allows pollution levels to soar to a maximum of 921.0 μg/m
3, over 460% 
of the safe value; even a bit further away from the plant, the pollution in the air directly over 
residential areas and over Crystal Bay is well above safe levels. 
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5 
 
APPENDIX A6 
 
 
 
Importantly, Crystal River causes NAAQS violations even when operating below its 
permitted maximums.  Last year, the plant’s highest operating hour emissions saw SO2 
concentrations reach 534.6 μg/m
3, which is nearly three times the safe value.  See Ex. 2 at Table 
1. 
 
To reduce this illegal pollution, Crystal River would have to cut total facility emissions by 
79.1% from its current permit.  Id. at Table 3.  To do so, it is highly likely to have to install a 
scrubber, thereby confronting hundreds of millions in control costs, which we document more 
fully below. Importantly, these costs will be far outweighed by public health benefits.  EPA 
determined that the NAAQS will produce on the order of $36 billion in net benefits once safe 
levels of SO2 have been attained.  75 Fed. Reg. at 35,588.  Crystal River residents will secure a 
substantial portion of these benefits – in the form of fewer asthma attacks, emergency room 
visits, and premature deaths – once the plant’s pollution has been controlled.   
 
In short, the SO2 NAAQS, a pollution control requirement which Progress Energy does not 
even acknowledge in its Ten‐Year Plan, is highly likely to require Crystal River Units 1 and 2 to 
retrofit or retire.  It is not the only requirement to do so, as we next discuss. 
 
ii.  MATS Requirements 
 
In the Clean Air Act of 1990, Congress ordered EPA to investigate hazardous air pollutants 
emitted by power plants, and to promulgate emissions standards for these pollutants if they 
threatened public health.  42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1).  Because coal power plants are dominant 
sources of mercury, acid gases, and other highly toxic pollutants, EPA was obligated to issue 
such standards, and finally did so in 2012, 22 years later.  See 77 Fed. Reg. 9,304 (Feb. 16, 
2012). 
 
The final MATS rule issued in response to this Congressional mandate requires operators to 
control mercury and acid gases. A smoke stack scrubber can be required to comply with EPA’s 
control requirements.  In EPA’s analysis of compliance options, it presumed that coal plants 
emitting more than 2 lbs/MMBtu of SO2 would have to install scrubbers to comply with the 
standard.  77 Fed. Reg. at 9,412.  Crystal River’s air operation permit allows it to emit 2.1 
lbs/MMBtu of SO2, meaning that the MATS rule will likely drive scrubbers installation at the 
facility.  See FL DEP Air Operation Permit 0170003‐025‐AV at 7.  Notably, Crystal River is also the 
single largest source of mercury in Florida, dumping more than 300 kg of mercury a year into 
the air around the plant.
4  On both counts, MATS compliance will, accordingly, be a major focus 
for the facility. 
 
 
                                                            
4 See Laura S. Sherman et al., Investigation of Local Mercury Deposition from a Coal‐Fired Power Plant Using 
Mercury Isotopes, Environment Science & Technology (2012), attached as Ex. 4. 
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The Clean Air Act requires that existing sources comply with MATS “as expeditiously as 
practicable, but in no event later than 3 years after the effective date” of the standard.  42 
U.S.C. § 7412(i)(3).  Because MATS was promulgated and effective on February 16, 2012, plants 
must comply by that date in 2015.  Although limited compliance extension of up to 1‐2 
additional years may be available in some limited circumstances, see id., these extensions are 
disfavored.  Accordingly, Progress Energy will have to scrub Crystal River by 2015, or shortly 
thereafter, or retire the facility, yet it entirely fails to acknowledge this major shift in its 
operations in its Ten‐Year Plan. 
 
iii.  Regional Haze Requirements 
 
Since 1977, the Clean Air Act has required EPA and the states to make “reasonable 
progress” towards restoring natural visibility in Class I areas – which are, essentially, national 
parks and wildernesses.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7491.  EPA has been very slow to implement this 
mandatory duty, but its rule to address regional haze, promulgated in 1999, are now being 
implemented, and Florida is the process of a SIP revision intended to protect Class I areas 
affected by sources in the state.  See FL DEP, Regional Haze Plan for Florida Class I Areas (Draft 
as amended May 2012).
5  
 
  The regional haze rule requires that Florida impose controls at all sources of visibility‐
impairing pollutants to the extent such controls will be needed to make reasonable progress 
towards restoring natural visibility by 2064.  See 40 C.F.R. § 51.308(d)(3).  The Act and the Rule 
also require sources which were in existence by August 7, 1977, but which had not been in 
operation before August 7, 1962, to install “the best available retrofit technology” (BART) to 
control visibility‐impairing pollutants.  42 U.S.C. § 7491(b)(2)(A) & 40 C.F.R. § 51.308(e).  FL DEP 
has determined that the Crist facility is subject to BART.  See FL Draft Regional Haze Plan at 102. 
 
  FL DEP had planned to rely upon a separate EPA SO2 trading program, the Clean Air 
Interstate Rule (“CAIR”) to address these requirements, but CAIR has been replaced with a new 
program which does not control SO2 in Florida.  See 77 Fed. Reg. 31,240, 31,248 (May 25, 2012).  
As such, FL DEP is reanalyzing control options and will have to propose source‐specific control 
requirements for Crystal River Units 1 and 2. 
 
  These controls are likely to drive scrubber requirements because, according to FL DEP, 
SO2 is the dominant source of visibility‐impairing pollution in Florida.  See, e.g., FL Draft 
Regional Haze Plan at 91‐92.   Progress Energy has indicated as much to FL DEP.  In a 2009 BART 
permit, Progress Energy agreed to retire the Crystal River units by December 31, 2020, as long 
as the second unit of its proposed Levy County nuclear facility was operating by that time.
6  Just 
a few weeks ago, Progress submitted an updated BART implementation plan to FL DEP 
indicating that, whether or not the Levy County facility comes online, it would either install a 
                                                            
5 Available at http://www.dep.state.fl.us/air/rules/regulatory/regional_haze_imp.htm. 
6 See Air Permit No. 0170004‐017‐AC (Feb. 26, 2009) at 6, attached as Ex. 5. 
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scrubber (by 2018 or 5 years after Florida’s haze SIP is approved), retire the units by December 
31, 2020, or limit operations to keep the plant’s operations below BART limits.
7 Because BART 
determinations will be approved within the next year, it is not at all clear how Progress expects 
to run its plants until 2020.  Retirement within the next few years is the more likely option. 
 
iv.  Scrubber Costs 
 
We have calculated the approximate cost of installing and running scrubbers (at 90% 
efficiency, a level which would likely be required, at a minimum, to meet the requirements of 
all three relevant rules) at Crystal River Units 1 and 2, based upon the EPA’s Integrated Planning 
Model and a scrubber‐focused appendix developed by Sargent & Lundy.
8  This model predicts 
that the capital costs for fitting these units with scrubbers as $486 million.  The result (including 
operational costs) would be a $36.6/MWh spike in incremental costs. Progress Energy would no 
doubt seek to pass these costs on to rate‐payers if it opted to continue to run the plant, rather 
than to retire it. These expenditures are extraordinarily high simply in order to extend the lives 
of these decades‐old, expensive, coal‐fired power plants. 
 
B.  Other Environmental Liabilities 
 
Scrubber costs are not the only liabilities Crystal River faces.  There are also pending rules 
requiring upgrades to coal plant cooling water systems, see 76 Fed. Reg. 22,174 (Apr. 20, 2011), 
better handling and disposal practices for coal combustion waste, see 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128 (June 
21, 2010), and new treatment systems for liquid effluent discharges,
9 all of which are likely to 
be finalized in the next two years.  EPA is also updating the NAAQS for particulate matter and 
for ozone.   Moreover, EPA has recently proposed carbon controls for new electricity generating 
units.  See 77 Fed. Reg. 22,39 (Apr. 13, 2012).  Once finalized, these rules will obligate EPA to 
extend carbon controls to existing facilities, including Crystal River.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d).  
The cumulative impact of these liabilities on Progress Energy will be large and are likely to lend 
further weight to retirement decisions. 
 
C.  Likely Retirements 
 
The cumulative compliance costs from all the rules which apply to Progress Energy’s Crystal 
River units are substantial.  Upon reviewing them, and considering the wide availability of more 
inexpensive power sources, Progress is highly likely to follow industry trends towards coal 
retirement. 
 
Coal use is falling quickly, in response both to the cost of pollution controls and to national 
economic trends, including the growth of inexpensive wind power and the boom in shale gas 
production.  As EPA has recently documented, “all indications suggest that very few new coal‐
                                                            
7 See Ex. 2, supra. 
8 All modeling parameters can be found at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progsregs/epa‐ipm/BaseCasev410.html. 
9 See EPA’s plans for this rule at http://water.epa.gov/scitech/wastetech/guide/steam_index.cfm 
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Progress Energy has entirely failed to address these environmental compliance issues, and 
the impacts of retirements at Crystal River upon its system and upon ratepayers.  The failure 
renders the draft plan “unsuitable” as a planning document.  See F.S. §186.801.  The 
Commission, “may suggest alternatives to the plan,” id., however, and may classify a plan as 
suitable upon the submission of “additional data,” see F.A.C. § 25‐22.071(5).  We respectfully 
request that the PSC exercise its authority to ensure that Progress’s plan provides adequate 
data to allow the PSC and the public to address these plant retirements. 
 
Specifically, we submit that the Commission should seek the following information from 
Progress and require resubmission of a complete plan addressing these submissions: 
 
1.   The utility should provide an analysis of all environmental compliance obligations 
which it will experience at the Crystal River plant.  For each requirement, the utility 
should cite the relevant rule, explain how it is likely to apply to the plant, the likely 
costs of compliance to the utility and to ratepayers, and the timeline on which 
compliance will be required.  The utility should also document any steps it has taken 
to address these compliance obligations, and alternative steps it might take. For 
instance, if the utility anticipates that it will have to install a scrubber to comply with 
MATS, it should report to the Commission on scrubber installation and operation 
costs, whether it has contracted to purchase a scrubber and on what timeline, and 
what other options it has considered.  See F.S. § 186.801 (requiring utilities to 
document “[p]ossible alternatives to the proposed plan”). 
 
2.  The utility should provide a comparative analysis of compliance costs and the cost 
costs of replacing the plant’s power through energy efficiency, demand response, 
power purchase agreements, new generation facilities, or other means.  See F.S. 
§186.801 (requiring utilities to explain the impact of their plans on fuel diversity and 
on the need for electric power in their regions). In light of this analysis, the utility 
should indicate whether it intends to retire any facility, and on what timeline, and 
the relative costs of retirement versus those of other options.  If retirement has not 
been selected but is being considered, the utility should indicate when the decision 
will be made. 
 
3.  For any facility where retirement is possible, the utility should discuss how it intends 
to address any reliability issues which may be caused by the retirement.  The 
Commission should play an active role in this regard, as it must maintain reliability of 
the electric grid. See F.S. § 366.05(7)‐(8) (authorizing the Commission to “require 
reports from all electric utilities to assure the development of adequate and reliable 
energy grids” and to order “installation and repair of necessary facilities” to address 
reliability issues”).  The Commission has determined that “[r]eserve margins in 
Florida typically remain well above” relevant minimums through 2020, so system‐
wide resource adequacy problems are unlikely, but the Commission may still need to 
address localized reliability issues. If such problems appear to be present, the 
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Commission should work proactively and transparently with the Florida Reliability 
Coordinating Council to address them well in advance of any planned retirement.   
 
We appreciate this careful consideration of Progress Energy’s environmental compliance 
options, and any resulting plant retirements, and remind the Commission that such thorough 
analysis is required to ensure that the Ten‐Year Plan complies with legal requirements.  We 
request that the Commission share the results of its inquiry with us and with the public, and 
request formal notice of the Commission’s next steps.   
 
Please contact the undersigned with any concerns or questions. 
 
Sincerely, 
s/ Craig Holt Segall 
Craig Holt Segall 
Sierra Club Environmental Law Program 
50 F St NW, Eighth Floor 
Washington, DC, 20001 
(202)‐548‐4597 
Craig.Segall@sierraclub.org 
 
Alisa Coe 
Earthjustice 
111 South Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd. 
Tallahassee, FL 32301 
(850) 681‐0031 
acoe@earthjustice.org 
 
APPENDIX AFrom:                              Tom Larson <tlarson@cleanenergy.org>
Sent:                               Wednesday, October 09, 2013 10:21 AM
To:                                   Phillip Ellis
Cc:                                   Office Of Commissioner Edgar; George Cavros
Subject:                          Exemplary IRPs
Attachments:                 Risk-Aware Electricity Regulation-Ceres 120419.pdf;
RAPSynapse_WilsonBiewald_BestPracticesinIRP_2013_JUN_21.pdf
 
Follow Up Flag:              Follow up
Flag Status:                     Flagged
 
Dear Mr. Ellis:
 
At the recent TYSP workshop, Ms. Edgar invited SACE to provide for PSC consideration references to IRPs of
utilities that we see demonstrating good modeling practices, more fully considering risk, evaluating alternative
resources on a level playing field, and providing greater transparency to the community.
 
Respecting risk assessment, Pacificorp and to a lesser extent Avista, both in the NWPCC territory which I mentioned, are leading
examples of IOU adoption. Also TVA has done good good work, in our estimation.  I offer a few links here to information these
utilities have posted:
 
http://www.pacificorp.com/es/irp.html
http://www.avistautilities.com/inside/resources/irp/electric/Pages/default.aspx
http://www.tva.com/environment/reports/irp/
 
Also, the Regulator Assistance Project recently conducted a couple studies on IRP practices (one with funding provided by
SACE and supported by Ceres); copy of each is attached for your convenience.
 
Please share this information with all of the commissioners as proper and customary.
 
Regards,
Tom Larson | Florida Energy Policy Manager
Southern Alliance for Clean Energy
P.O. Box 50451, Jacksonville, Florida 32240
TLarson@cleanenergy.org | Cell: 904-710-5538  Landline: 904-469-7126
www.cleanenergy.org
blog.cleanenergy.org
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Mr. Phillip O. Ellis  
Strategic Analysis & Government Affairs  
Public Service Commission  
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard  
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850  
pellis@psc.state.fl.us  
 
Cc: Traci Matthews, tmatthews@psc.state.fl.us  
 
Re: Supplemental Information Following 2013 Ten-Year Site Plan Workshop 
 
Dear Mr. Ellis and Ms. Matthews: 
 
Thank you for the opportunity to present to the Commission at the September 25, 2013, Ten-Year 
Site Plan Workshop.  At the Workshop the Commissioners raised a number of questions in response 
to our presentation and we agreed to provide supplemental information to more fully address those 
questions.  This letter transmits and explains that supplemental information.   
 
As discussed at the Workshop, the information supports deferring plan approval until the utilities 
provide a comparative analysis of the costs and quantified risks of all relevant energy resources, 
including supply side and demand side.  Substantiating the cost-effectiveness of planned investments 
in this way is squarely within the utilities’ ten-year site plan data requirements.  See F.A.C. § 25‐
22.072 (incorporating by reference Form PSC/RAD 43-E (11/97), requiring evidence of “lowest 
cost possible” planned energy).  Yet the utilities’ plans lack the requisite comparative analysis of the 
costs and risks of the various energy resources available to Florida.  Without this analysis by the 
utilities, the Commission cannot meaningfully review the plans for enumerated statutory criteria, 
such as “possible alternatives to the proposed plan,” nor can the Commission evaluate and plan for 
risks like “disrupted energy supplies or unexpected prices surges.”  F.S. § 186.801 (citing State 
Comprehensive Plan, F. S. § 187.201).  For these reasons, the information herein supports the 
Commission deferring plan approval, including approval of planned new gas-burning capacity, until 
the utilities provide the missing comparative cost-risk analysis to substantiate the cost-effectiveness 
of their proposed investments.   
 
Moreover, the Sierra Club urges the Commission to follow the regulatory best practice of making 
the comparative cost-risk analysis available for public comment.  Doing so would provide the 
Commission with a fuller critique of the options for addressing pressing issues, including the need 
to: (1) plan for significant coal and nuclear retirements; (2) appropriately minimize Florida’s exposure 
to natural gas price shocks and supply disruptions; (3) evaluate and seize opportunities to pursue 
cost competitive energy resources; and 4) hedge against the costs and risks of fossil fuel-burning 
generation capacity. 
 
I.    A Comparative Analysis of Costs and Quantified Risks of All Relevant Resources 
(Supply Side and Demand Side) Is Critical for Prudent Resource Planning. 
 
Prudent resource planning minimizes costs and risks.  To minimize not just the present value of 
revenue requirements—alone, a limited focus of resource planning—but also risk, planners 
generally evaluate a wide range of scenarios (not just the scenario deemed most likely, the “reference 
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case”).  Planners do this through a number of different methods.  Many planners use probabilistic 
modeling and sensitivity analyses for inputs including but not limited to: load growth, fuel prices, 
electricity spot prices, market structure, environmental regulations, and other risk factors.  In 
addition, some planners also rely on other analytic aids, including market reports, requests for 
proposals, and stakeholder feedback.  This section addresses the Commissioners’ questions about 
planning for cost and risk with examples and explanations of emerging best practices. 
 
a.  CERES Report—Guidance Primarily for Commissions 
 
Practicing Risk-Aware Electricity Regulation: What Every State Regulator Needs to Know offers guidance that 
is especially relevant to states like Florida that are “facing substantial coal generation retirements and 
evaluating a spectrum of resource investment options.”  Ron Binz & CERES, Practicing RiskAware 
Electricity Regulation: What Every State Regulator Needs to Know (2012)(“Risk- Aware”) at iii, Ex. 1.  Like 
other reports discussed below, this report reviews existing practices and makes recommendations for 
valuing and selecting plans to minimize risk.  What sets this report apart, and why the Sierra Club 
has highlighted it, is its focus on the role of state regulatory utility commissions in the planning 
process.  
 
Risk-Aware urges commissions to proactively identify and address risks.  See, e.g., id. at 14.  This 
includes gathering information on all relevant future conditions and investment alternatives, not only 
the conditions and investments identified by the utilities.  Id. at 46.  Further, by fostering 
transparency and stakeholder engagement throughout the planning processes, commissions are able 
to build trust and enhance understanding of energy options among all interested parties.  Id. at 11. 
 
During the Workshop, Commissioner Graham expressed interest in risk assessment methodology.  
Risk-Aware shows one way that planners can systematically assess risk.  The report draws on decades 
of relevant energy regulation and finance experience to develop a composite cost-risk analysis 
showing the relative cost and relative risk among a wide range of investment alternatives (e.g., 
nuclear, natural gas combined cycle, solar, efficiency programs).  See id. at iii, Figures 14 and 15.  
Spurring commissions to develop tailored assessments like this for their respective jurisdictions, see 
id. at 34, Risk-Aware describes its risk assessment methodology in a step-by-step fashion.  First, Risk-
Aware examines twenty-two resources across seven risk categories, wherein the report describes and 
then quantifies the risks associated with each resource.  See id. at 30 – 34; see also id. at Figures 13, 16.  
Next, Risk-Aware establishes composite risk indices for each resource.  Id. at 34 – 36.  Finally, Risk-
Aware compares relative risk and relative cost.  Id. at Figure 17.  
 
b.  Nicholas Institute Report—Risk Assessment Made Easier 
 
Least-Risk Planning for Electric Utilities, recently published by the Nicholas Institute for Environmental 
Policy Solutions at Duke University, presents another relatively easy way to address risks in resource 
plans.  See David Hoppock & Patrick Bean, Least-Risk Planning for Electric Utilities (2013) (“Least-Risk 
Planning”), Ex. 2.  Least-Risk Planning emphasizes that “evaluating a wide range of potential 
scenarios [such as 10 to 15] that fully capture the realistic range of all relevant sources of 
uncertainty is critical.”  Id. at 11 (emphasis added).  Picking up where traditional scenario analysis 
leaves off, Least-Risk Planning suggests that modeling outputs like production costs and fixed costs 
can be used to compare the costs and quantified risks of investment alternatives.  Id. at 14.  Least-
Risk Planning illustrates how, with three, then four investment alternatives (deliberately simplified 
examples), it reviews the steps by which a utility would identify trends, risks, and the hedge value of 
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energy efficiency programs and renewable resources like wind and solar.  Id. at 8, 14.  Least-Risk 
Planning maintains that utility planners and state regulators would find this method “attractive” (no 
new tools or modeling required), “sensible” (not too pessimistic or too optimistic about risks), and 
complementary to traditional scenario analysis.  Id. at 5, 6.  Indeed, some utilities like the Tennessee 
Valley Authority have adopted a similar risk assessment method already.  Id. at 6 (citing 2011 TVA 
Integrated Resource Plan).   
 
c.  Regulatory Assistance Project & Synapse Report—A Survey of Several States   
 
Best Practices in Electric Utility Integrate Resource Planning, recently commissioned by the Regulatory 
Assistance Project and prepared by Synapse Energy Economics, reviews emerging best practices in 
several states’ resource planning processes.  See Bruce Biewald & Rachel Wilson, Best Practices in 
Electric Utility Integrate Resource Planning (2013) (“Best Practices”), Ex. 3.  To be sure, many other reports 
examine resource planning best practices, and Best Practices cites some of these reports.  However, 
the strength of Best Practices is its breadth and depth of coverage, as it reviews the practices of 
several states from across the Nation and prepares case studies on three states in particular—
Arizona, Colorado, and Oregon.   
 
Overall, Best Practices recommends active commission oversight, stakeholder engagement, and 
transparency.  See id. at 26, 27.  For example, commissions in Arkansas and Hawaii promote 
transparency and robust stakeholder engagement through their planning rules.  Id. at 26, 27.  The 
Kentucky and Colorado commissions also allow interveners to file, and require utilities to respond 
to, written interrogatories and comments.  Id. at 21, 27.  In turn, the supplemental information from 
the interveners and utilities supports these commissions’ planning oversight.  Id.  
 
Best Practices stresses transparent modeling because “[m]odeling in general is only as good as the input 
assumptions used to generate the portfolios.”  Id. at 25.  Specifically, the report suggests: “A proper 
[resource plan] will include discussion of the inputs and results, and appendices with full technical 
details.  Only items that are truly sensitive business information should be treated as confidential, 
because such treatment can hinder important stakeholder input processes.”  Id. at 32.  Further, the 
best practice for commissions is to “take an active role in assessing the validity of inputs used by the 
utilities in their filings, the resulting outcomes, and whether these are consistent with both the 
[relevant state] rules and the state’s energy policies and goals.”  Id. at 27.  Limiting transparency 
hinders a commission’s ability to perform this oversight.  See, e.g., id. at 25. 
 
Best Practices also offers several insights on how to optimize modeling results.  The first insight is to 
avoid “inadvertently exclud[ing] combinations of options that deserve consideration.”  Id. at 31.  
This could happen when utilities define (potentially biased) future resource portfolios, rather than 
deferring to models to select the portfolios.  See id.  Alternatively, this could happen when “users 
constrain optimization models so that a model may not, given the cost, select the quantity of a 
specific resource that [the user] may want,” such as where a utility may limit the amount of a 
resource that a model can consider—for instance, limiting investments in energy efficiency to the 
minimum level that a state policy may require, rather than allowing the model to consider larger 
investments in energy efficiency that the model may otherwise identify as the least-cost, least-risk 
means of addressing energy needs.  Id. at 27.  Against such defects, the report offers this cure: 
 
The best [resource plans] create levelized cost curves for demand-side 
resources that are comparable to the levelized cost curves for supply-
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side resources. … By developing cost curves for demand-side options, 
planners allow the model to choose an optimum level of investment. So if 
demand-side resources can meet customer demand for less cost than supply-
side resources, as is frequently the case, this approach may result in more 
than the minimum investment levels required under other policies. 
 
Id. at 29 (emphasis added) (quoting State and Local Energy Efficiency Action Network, Using 
Integrated Resource Planning to Encourage Investment in Cost-Effective Energy Efficiency Measures (2011), at 6, 
Ex. 4).  
 
Best Practices also identifies the risks that are commonly addressed by scenario or sensitivity analyses 
in resource plans.  These include: “fuel prices (coal, oil, and natural gas), load growth, electricity spot 
prices, variability of hydro resources, market structure, environmental regulations, and regulations on 
carbon dioxide (CO2) and other emissions.”  Best Practices at 5.  The case studies on Arizona, 
Colorado, and Oregon illustrate how resource plans incorporate risk, as discussed below. 
 
◊  Arizona:  During the state’s 2012 planning process, the Arizona utility modeled low and high 
scenarios for what it deemed to be “major cost inputs,” including: natural gas prices, CO2 prices, 
production and investment tax credits for renewable resources, energy efficiency costs, and 
monetization of SO2, NOx, PM, and water.  See id. at 16.  During the modeling, the utility 
monitored certain metrics to compare and evaluate potential resource investment alternatives.  
Id. at 16-17. In addition to revenue requirements, these metrics included: fuel diversity, capital 
expenditures, natural gas burn, water use, and CO2 emissions.  Id. at 16.  Arizona’s final 2012 
resource plan and materials from five stakeholder meetings are available at 
www.aps.com/en/ourcompany/ratesregulationsresources/resourceplanning/Pages/resource-
planning.aspx.   
 
◊  Colorado:  During the state’s 2011 planning process, the Colorado utility evaluated its baseline 
case and eight alternative cases under several sensitivity scenarios, altering the price of CO2 
emissions, renewable tax incentives, natural gas prices, and level of sales.  See Best Practices at 19-
22.  Notably, per an intervener’s recommendation the Colorado Public Utilities Commission 
asked the utility to adopt higher energy efficiency goals.  Id. at 27 (citing Colorado Public 
Utilities Commission, Decision No. C11-0442; Docket No. 10A-554EG (2011)).  The utility 
incorporated the new goals into its calculation of resource need in subsequent modeling.  See 
Public Service Company of Colorado, 2011 Electric Resource Plan (2011), available at 
www.xcelenergy.com/About_Us/Rates_&_Regulations/Resource_Plans/PSCo_2011_Electric_
Resource_Plan. 
 
◊  Oregon:  Of the three case studies, Oregon’s planning process was the most comprehensive. 
Best Practices at 23.  During the state’s 2012 planning process, the Oregon utility defined 67 input 
scenarios including: alternative transmission configurations, CO2 price levels and regulation 
types, natural gas prices, and renewable resource policies.  Id. at 24.  Sensitivity cases examined 
additional incremental costs for coal plants, alternative load forecasts, renewable generation costs 
and incentives, and demand-side management resource availability.  Id.  Top resource portfolios 
were identified through a combination of lowest average portfolio cost and worst-case portfolio 
cost resulting from 100 simulation runs.  Id.  Final portfolios were selected after considering 
such criteria as risk-adjusted portfolio cost, 10-year customer rate impact, CO2 emissions, supply 
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reliability, resource diversity, and uncertainty and risk surrounding greenhouse gas and renewable 
portfolio standard policies.  Id.; see also PacifiCorp, 2011 Integrated Resource Plan, available at 
www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pacificorp/doc/Energy_Sources/Integrated_Resource_Plan
/2011IRP/2011IRP-MainDocFinal_Vol1-FINAL.pdf. 
 
II.  The Commission Should Not Approve the Utilities’ Ten-Year Site Plans:  The 
Commission Cannot Determine What the Reliable, Least-Cost Energy Mix Is 
Because the Utilities’ Plans Are Missing the Requisite Comparative Analysis of 
Costs and Quantified Risks of All Relevant Energy Resources, Including Supply 
Side and Demand Side. 
 
Commissioner Brown requested clarification of the Sierra Club’s recommendations for further 
action by the Commission.  In short, we recommended that the Commission defer approval of the 
plans until the utilities provide the requisite comparative analysis of the costs and quantified risks of 
all relevant energy resources, including supply side and demand side.  As discussed below, the 
missing analysis is legally required, and it will put the Commission—and the public—in a better 
position to ensure low-cost, low-risk power for Florida, and to understand the reasoning behind the 
investments that are ultimately selected.  Moreover, subjecting such analysis to public notice and 
comment will provide the Commission with a fuller critique of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
plans. 
  
a.  The Utilities’ Ten-Year Site Plans Must Provide an Analysis of the Relative Cost 
and Relative Risk of All Relevant Energy Resources that is Sufficient to Allow the 
Commission to Classify the Plans as Suitable or Unsuitable, Suggest Alternatives 
to the Plans, and Ensure a Reliable, Least Cost Power Supply for Florida. 
 
Ten-year site plans are Florida’s primary vehicle for collecting information about, and preparing for 
future conditions related to, the state’s power supply.  The Commission established the legally 
required data requirements in Form PSC/RAD 43-E (11/97), “Electric Utility Ten-Year Site Plan 
Information and Data Requirements” (“Form”).  See also F.A.C. § 25‐22.072 (incorporating the Form 
by reference).  Notably, the Form requires utilities to describe their planning assumptions, modeling 
methods, and outcomes.  See Form at 4-6 (enumerating these requirements in the section titled 
“Other Planning Assumptions and Information”).  Moreover, each plan must “provide sufficient 
information to assure the Commission that an adequate and reliable supply of electricity at the 
lowest cost possible is planned for the state’s electric needs.”  Id. at 4.  Here, cost should be 
considered over the life of the investment, and to ensure at a robust understanding of potential 
costs, the plans should quantify the risks that could materially affect the costs, including factors 
identified above that are routinely considered by other commissions, such as fuel price surges and 
regulatory risks.   
 
This reading of cost is supported by the governing Florida statutory provisions, F. S. § 186.601 (Ten-
Year Site Plans) and § 187.201(11)(b)(10) (State Comprehensive Plan), which call for such 
circumspect planning.  Under mandatory statutory criteria, the Commission must reviews each 
utilities’ ten-year site plan for, among other things, “possible alternatives to the proposed plan,” and 
must evaluate and prepare for risks like “disrupted energy supplies or unexpected prices surges.”  See 
F.S. § 186.801 (citing State Comprehensive Plan, F.S. § 187.201).  Without a comparative cost-risk 
analysis, the Commission lacks the prerequisite information to perform this statutorily required 
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planning oversight.  Moreover, as discussed at the Workshop and in our comments, the missing 
analysis hinders the Commission’s ability to fulfill its over-arching statutory duty to maintain 
“sufficient, adequate, and efficient service” and “fair and reasonable rates” for all Floridians.  See, e.g., 
F.S. § 366.03; see also Sierra Club, Comments on 2013 Ten-Year Plan Submittals Comments (2013) 
(“Sierra Club Comments”), Ex. 5.   
 
b.  The Utilities’ Ten-Year Site Plans Fail to Provide the Required Analysis of the 
Relative Cost and Relative Risk Among the Relevant Energy Resources Available 
to Florida. 
 
Our comments and Workshop presentation demonstrated how two utilities in particular have failed 
to include sufficient cost and risk information in their plans.  To recap, Gulf Power and Duke 
Energy Florida’s plans do not show the following:  
 
◊  Alternative load forecasts, accounting for significant positive errors in historic forecasts; 
◊  Implications, costs, and expected timelines of upcoming retirement/retrofit decisions;  
◊  Alternative investment scenarios beyond the selected “reference case” or “base expansion case”; 
◊  A sensitivity analysis of fuel price, carbon price, supply disruptions, and other risks;  
◊  A direct comparison of levelized cost curves for demand-side and supply-side resources;  
◊  A direct comparison of the relative risk among all potential energy resource investment; and  
◊  A full accounting of energy efficiency and renewable resource options, including (but not limited 
to) renewable energy contracts and self-build options for utility scale solar systems.  
 
Without the missing analysis, the Commission cannot meaningfully verify whether the proposed 
investments—such as Duke’s “planned power purchases from 2016 through 2020 and planned 
installation of combined cycle facilities in 2018 (1,307 MW, winter capacity) and 2020 (another 
1,307 MW) at undesignated sites,” Progress (now Duke) Energy Florida TYSP at 3-2—do in fact 
provide reliable, least-cost power.   
 
c.  The Commission Should Require the Utilities to Conduct a Comparative Cost-
Risk Analysis and Subject the Analysis to a Public Comment Period. 
 
As discussed at the Workshop, Florida’s energy system is at a crossroads and planning presents a 
critical opportunity to enhance the understanding of energy options among all interested parties.  
The Sierra Club urges the Commission to require the utilities to conduct a comparative cost-risk 
analysis and invite interveners’ comments on this analysis.  Doing so now would help the 
Commission address pressing issues, including the need to: (1) plan for significant coal and nuclear 
retirements; (2) appropriately minimize Florida’s exposure to natural gas price shocks and supply 
disruptions; (3) evaluate and seize opportunities to pursue cost competitive energy resources; and 4) 
hedge against the costs and risks of fossil fuel-burning generation capacity.  
   
i.  The Utilities Should Provide a Full Retirement/Retrofit Analysis of 
Existing Generation Capacity to Ensure an Accurate and Meaningful 
Cost-Risk Comparison of Energy Options Going Forward.  
 
While Gulf Power and Duke Energy Florida have confirmed the Sierra Club’s retirement predictions 
from last year, we expect (but have not seen plans that address) more coal-burning unit retirements 
within the planning horizon, such as Lansing Smith 1 and 2.  As we have seen, the Federal 
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Government has and may well continue to ratchet down power plant emissions under the Clean Air 
Act to address public health and welfare concerns.  These regulations could impact the economic 
viability of certain fossil-fuel burning capacity in Florida.  Indeed, the Florida Reliability 
Coordinating Council (FRCC) has acknowledged “potential multiple generation retirements from 
the same site, starting as early as April 2015.”  FRCC, 2013 Load & Resource Reliability Assessment 
Report (2013).  In any event, we continue to urge the Commission to require the utilities to provide 
a straightforward retirement/retrofit analysis, including decommissioning costs and timelines for 
existing generating capacity, as well as their implications for the utilities’ generating needs.  This 
information is critical for developing an accurate cost-risk comparison of all relevant energy 
resources available to Florida going forward. 
 
ii.  The Utilities Should Identify and Analyze Options to Minimize Florida’s 
Exposure to Natural Gas Price Shocks and Supply Disruptions. 
 
One of the utilities’ plans most troubling defects is their unwarranted reliance on more natural gas 
imports—channeling money out-of-state and worsening Florida’s exposure to natural gas price 
shocks and supply disruptions.  As the Sierra Club has stressed, nowhere do the plans substantiate 
that proceeding this way is cost effective or necessary.  For example, Duke and Gulf Power 
forecasted load growth near 1% per year over the planning horizon, which is well within the range 
that demand-side management could address at a lower cost.  See Sierra Club Comments. 
 
Moreover, natural gas-burning capacity is risky in ways that alternative (zero fuel cost) energy is not.  
Here, we recap three sources of risk.  First, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
dramatically revised downward its estimates of the domestic shale gas reserves, by 42% nationally, 
and by 66% in the Marcellus.  See EIA, Advanced Energy Outlook 2012 Early Release Overview (2012) at 
9.  Second, the natural gas industry is moving quickly to export liquefied natural gas.  See, e.g., Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, Proposed/Potential North America LNG Import/Export Terminals, 
available at www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/lng-proposed-potential.pdf (last visited 
October 11, 2013).  Both of these factors—declining supply and increasing demand at international 
market prices—create a risk of materially higher natural gas prices in the future.  To be sure, 
numerous studies examine the implications of natural gas exports, and at the Workshop we 
highlighted EIA’s higher risk case predicting that rapid expansion of gas exports could drive up 
domestic natural gas prices at the wellhead by as much as 54% ($3.23/Mcf) by 2018.  Whether or 
not this particular rate of price increase comes to pass, it certainly suggests that the Commission 
would benefit from a transparent analysis of price shock risks before it approves further natural gas 
generation in Florida—an analysis which is lacking in the plans.   
 
Third, Florida’s limited natural gas transport infrastructure raises the specter of supply disruptions.  
Planning should address such risks and should include the costs of building additional 
infrastructure, such as additional natural gas pipelines, in evaluating energy investment options.  For 
all these reasons, the Commission should instruct the utilities to identify in their cost-risk 
comparisons all relevant energy resource investment options that minimize Florida’s exposure to 
natural gas prices shocks and supply disruptions.   
 
iii.  The Utilities Should Identify and Justify How They Value and Select 
Alternative Energy Resources, Including the Value that Renewable 
Energy And Energy Efficiency Provide For Capacity and Energy Needs, 
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and As A Hedge Against the Risks and Costs of Further Natural Gas 
Generation. 
 
As we identified at the Workshop, alternative energy investments are low-cost, low-risk, and 
compare favorably to conventional generation.  The Commission would benefit from a full analysis 
of such resources in the utilities’ ten-year site plans.  Duke Energy Florida’s plan has served as our 
example of just how little information the utilities have provided on alternative energy investments.  
This dearth of information prevents the Commission from verifying that cost-effective alternative 
energy investments (demand side and supply side) have been appropriately valued and incorporated 
into the plans.  Duke’s plan states that by March 2013 the utility’s ongoing Request for Renewables 
logged over 310 responses—responses that are not disclosed or described in Duke’s plan.  See Duke 
TYSP at 3-21.  Duke’s plan also omits the option of self-building renewable energy projects.  The 
plan plainly lacks the requisite comparative cost-risk analysis, and even lacks the statutorily required 
“statement describing how the production and purchase of renewable energy resources impact the 
utility’s present and future capacity and energy needs.”  See F.S. § 186.801(2)(j).   
 
The Commission should not approve such defective plans, especially since the 2012 legislative study 
determined that Florida has a track record of cost-effective alternative energy investments that have 
yielded net benefits to Florida’s ratepayers.  See Galligan et al., Evaluation of  Florida’s Energy Efficiency 
and Conservation Act (Dec. 7, 2012) (“FEECA Study”) at 9, 10.  Instead, we continue to strongly 
recommend that the Commission instruct the utilities to provide analyses that identify: (1) how they 
valued and selected alternative energy resources, (2) how these resources impact the utilities’ capacity 
and generation needs, and (3) how the utilities have captured the hedge value of alternative energy 
resources against the risks associated with further expansion of fossil fuel-burning generation, 
especially of natural gas. 
 
III.  The Commission Should Demand a Clear and Thorough Analysis of the 
Comparative Costs and Risks of Energy Resources, Including Enhanced Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy Investments, Because in Today’s Market, the 
Analysis May Well Show that it is More Prudent to Invest in Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy than Natural Gas. 
 
Although at the Workshop we spent a considerable amount of time addressing risks of further 
natural gas development, the other half of a cost and risk analysis is cost.  As discussed at the 
Workshop, energy markets—and the costs of various types of energy resources, both supply and 
demand—are rapidly changing.  Renewable energy generation continues to plummet in price, while 
coal and nuclear generation continue to increase, and natural gas is showing clear and increasing 
signs of significant upward pressure.  In this mix, energy efficiency continues to be by far the 
cheapest energy resources in the market today.   
 
As we noted at the Workshop, there are any number of ways to evaluate such costs.  Below we 
identify some of the more common means of evaluating costs, and reiterate information indicating 
what those costs are in today’s market.  
     
a.  Levelized Cost of Electricity Is One Common Comparative Metric of The 
Costs of Energy Resources. 
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Levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) is one key metric for comparing resource costs, and one 
commonly cited source of LCOE data is the international advisory and asset management firm 
Lazard Ltd, Lazard’s Levelized Cost of  Energy Analysis—Version 7.0 (2013) (“Lazard’s  Analysis”).  At the 
Workshop we emphasized that national LCOE data can reveal cost trends, while resource planning 
best practice is for utilities to create (generally using models) levelized cost curves for demand-side 
resources that are comparable to the levelized cost curves for supply-side resources available within 
the context of the regional grid.  See, e.g., State and Local Energy Efficiency Action, Using Integrated 
Resource Planning to Encourage Investment in Cost-Effective Energy Efficiency Measures (2011) at 7.   
 
Since we have not seen evidence of such side-by-side levelized cost comparisons in the ten-year site 
plans, we have cited Lazard’s Analysis:  Energy efficiency programs average $0-$50 MWh, or better, 
since these figures do not fully account for the opportunity cost of foregone consumption due to 
demand response.  See Lazard’s Analysis at 4.  Renewable resources are becoming increasingly cost 
competitive.  Utility-scale solar photovoltaic systems are approaching “grid parity” without tax 
subsidies and may currently reach “grid parity” under certain conditions.  Id.  As discussed at the 
Workshop, the graph reproduced below plots Lazard’s levelized cost of electricity data from 2009 to 
2013 to show cost trends of renewable resources like solar and wind versus conventional fossil fuel-
burning resources like coal and natural gas.      
 
 
 
The trends shown in this graph favor investments in renewable resources like wind and solar 
because they are already cost-competitive with conventional generation resources like coal and gas, 
and their prices keep falling fast—thanks largely to technological advances, such as larger wind 
turbines and cheaper components for solar-power arrays.  As we have noted, the opposite is true for 
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fossil fuel-burning generation; costs are generally increasing due to increasingly stringent pollution 
controls, fuel price volatility, and supply disruption risks.  
 
a.  Given Rapidly Changing Electricity Markets, Requests for Proposals are a 
Common, But Not Exclusive, Way of Identifying Resource Costs. 
 
Commissioner Balbis requested clarification of the Sierra Club’s suggestion of using requests for 
proposals (RFPs) to test resource costs for ten-year site planning purposes.  In short, we suggested 
that, as an initial step, the Commission should obtain from the utilities more information about the 
renewable energy bids that they received in response to existing RFPs.  Duke’s plan, for example, 
states that the utility’s ongoing Request for Renewables returned over 310 bids by March 2013.  Bids 
like these are a potential trove of cost information that would enhance the understanding of energy 
options among all interested parties.  See Duke TYSP at 3021.  Indeed, the 2012 legislative study 
found that Florida jurisdictional utilities are missing opportunities to share information and best 
practices on saving energy.  See FEECA Study at 13.  Ten-year site planning is where the utilities can 
start to remedy this, and the Commission should instruct the utilities to make the bid information, 
other than the truly sensitive business information, available to the public.   
 
Further, at the Workshop we suggested that a review of existing RFPs and responsive bids may well 
reveal opportunities for further market testing, perhaps through RFPs, to identify the cost-effective 
resources available to Florida.  For instance, Connecticut recently issued an RFP to identify cost-
effective resources for meeting that state’s energy policy goals.  See Connecticut Department of 
Energy and Environmental Protection, Request for Proposals for Long Term Energy Contracts (2013), 
available at www.ct.gov/deep/cwp/view.asp?a=4405&Q=527812&deepNav_GID=2121.  Notably, Power 
Purchase Agreement Checklist for States and Locals Governments, produced by that National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory, offers guidance on developing RFPs for solar photovoltaic (PV) power purchase 
agreements in particular.  See National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Power Purchase Agreement 
Checklist for States and Locals Governments (2009), Ex. 6. 
 
Alternatively, as we discussed at the Workshop, the Commission could identify resource costs by 
reviewing examples of recent electricity purchase or production decisions, such as the new solar 
photovoltaic generation in Georgia and Colorado. See Georgia Public Service Commission, PSC 
Approves Agreement to Resolve Georgia Power 2013 Integrated Resource Plan and Expands the Use of  Solar 
Energy (Aug. 2013); Xcel Energy, Xcel Energy Proposes Adding Economic Solar, Wind to Meet Future 
Customer Energy Demands (Sept. 2013).  Additional cost data—especially from local or regional 
electricity markets—is essential for prudent planning, and the Commission should require the 
utilities to include sufficient cost data in their plans to substantiate the cost-effectiveness of their 
proposed investments. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
For all these reasons, the Commission should defer ten-year site plan approval, including approval 
of planned new gas-burning capacity, until the utilities provide the missing comparative cost-risk 
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analysis.  Moreover, the Sierra Club urges the Commission to follow the best practice of making the 
comparative cost-risk analysis available for public comment. 
 
Sincerely,  
 
/s/ 
 
Diana Csank 
Associate Attorney  
Sierra Club Environmental Law Program  
50 F St. NW, 8th Floor  
Washington, DC, 20001  
(202)-548-4595  
Diana.Csank@sierraclub.org 
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PRACTICING RISK-AWARE ELECTRICITY REGULATION
ABOUT THIS REPORT
AUDIENCE
This report is primarily addressed to state regulatory utility
commissioners, who will preside over some of the most
important investments in the history of the U.S. electric power
sector during perhaps its most challenging and tumultuous
period. This report seeks to provide regulators with a thorough
discussion of risk, and to suggest an approach—“risk-aware
regulation”—whereby regulators can explicitly and proactively
seek to identify, understand and minimize the risks associated
with electric utility resource investment. It is hoped that this
approach will result in the ef cient deployment of capital, the
continued  nancial health of utilities, and the con dence and
satisfaction of the customers on whose behalf utilities invest.
Additionally, this report seeks to present a unique discussion of
risk and a perspective on appropriate regulatory approaches for
addressing it that will interest numerous secondary audiences,
including utility managements,  nancial analysts, investors,
electricity consumers, advocates, state legislatures and
energy of ces, and other stakeholders with a particular interest
in ensuring that electric system resource investments—which
could soon reach unprecedented levels—are made thoughtfully,
transparently and in full consideration of all associated risks.
SCOPE
While we believe that the approach described herein is
applicable to a broad range of decisions facing state
regulators, the report focuses primarily on resource
investment decisions by investor-owned electric utilities
(IOUs), which constitute roughly 70 percent of the U.S.
electric power industry. The  ndings and recommendations
may be of particular interest to regulators in states facing
substantial coal generating capacity retirements and
evaluating a spectrum of resource investment options.
AUTHORS
Ron Binz, the lead author of this report, is a 30-year veteran
of utility and energy policy and principal with Public Policy
Consulting. Most recently, he served for four years as the
Chairman of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission where
he implemented the many policy changes championed by
the Governor and the Legislature to bring forward Colorado’s
“New Energy Economy.” He is the author of several reports
and articles on renewable energy and climate policy has
testi ed as an expert witness in  fteen states.
Richard Sedano is a principal with the Regulatory Assistance
Project (RAP), a global, non-pro t team of experts focused
on the long-term economic and environmental sustainability
of the power and natural gas sectors, providing technical and
policy assistance to policymakers and regulators on a broad
range of energy and environmental issues. RAP is widely
viewed as a source of innovative and creative thinking that
yields practical solutions. RAP members meet directly with
government of cials, regulators and their staffs; lead
technical workshops and training sessions; conduct in-house
research and produce a growing volume of publications
designed to better align energy regulation with economic and
environmental goals.
Denise Furey has over 25 years of experience with  nancial
institutions, structuring and analyzing transactions for energy
and utility companies. In 2011 she founded Regent Square
Advisors, a consulting  rm specializing in  nancial and
regulatory concerns faced by the sector. She worked with
Citigroup covering power and oil & gas companies, and
worked with Fitch Rating, Enron Corporation and MBIA
Insurance Corporation. Ms. Furey also served with the
Securities and Exchange Commission participating in the
regulation of investment companies.
Dan Mullen, Senior Manager for Ceres’ Electric Power
Programs, works to identify and advance solutions that will
transform the U.S. electric utility industry in line with the
urgent goal of sustainably meeting society’s 21st century
energy needs. In addition to developing Ceres’ intellectual
capital and external partnerships, he has engaged with major
U.S. electric utilities on issues related to climate change,
clean energy and stakeholder engagement, with a particular
focus on energy ef ciency. A Stanford University graduate,
Dan has also raised more than $5 million to support Ceres’
climate change initiatives and organizational development.
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FOREWORD
FOREWORD
Today’s electric industry faces a stunning investment cycle.
Across the country, the infrastructure is aging, with very old
parts of the power plant  eet and electric and gas delivery
systems needing to be replaced. The regulatory environment
is shifting dramatically as rules tighten on air pollution from
fossil-burning power plants. Fossil fuel price outlooks have
shifted. New options for energy ef ciency, renewable energy,
distributed generation, and smart grid and consumer
technologies are pressing everyone to think differently about
energy and the companies that provide it. Customers expect
reliable electricity and count on good decisions of others to
provide it.
The critical nature of this moment and the choices ahead are
the subject of this report. It speaks to key decision-makers,
such as: state regulators who have a critical role in determining
utility capital investment decisions; utility executives managing
their businesses in this era of uncertainty; investors who
provide the key capital for utilities; and others involved in
regulatory proceedings and with a stake in their outcomes.
The report lays out a suite of game-changing recommendations
for handling the tremendous investment challenge facing the
industry. As much as $100 billion will be invested each year
for the next 20 years, roughly double recent levels. A large
portion of those investments will be made by non-utility
companies operating in competitive markets. But another
large share will be made by utilities—with their (and their key
investors’) decisions being greatly affected by state regulatory
policies and practices.
This is no time for backward-looking decision making. It is
vital—for electricity consumers and utilities’ own economic
viability—that their investment decisions re ect the needs of
tomorrow’s cleaner and smarter 21st century infrastructure
and avoid investing in yesterday’s technologies. The authors
provide useful advice to state regulators on how they can
play a more proactive role in helping frame how electric
utilities face these investment challenges. 
A key report conclusion in this regard: sensible, safe investment
strategies, based on the report’s detailed cost and risk analysis
of a wide range of generation resources, should include:
( Diversifying energy resource portfolios rather than
“betting the farm” on a narrow set of options (e.g., fossil
fuel generation technologies and nuclear);
( More emphasis on renewable energy resources such as
onshore wind and distributed and utility-scale solar; 
( More emphasis on energy ef ciency, which the report
shows is utilities’ lowest-cost, lowest-risk resource.
At its heart, this report is a call for “risk-aware regulation.”
With an estimated $2 trillion of utility capital investment in
long-lived infrastructure on the line over the next 20 years,
regulators must focus unprecedented attention to risk—not
simply keeping costs down today, but minimizing overall costs
over the long term, especially in the face of possible surprises.
And utilities’ use of robust planning tools needs to be sharpened
to incorporate risk identi cation, analysis, and management.
This report offers some good news amid pervasive uncertainty:
the authors point out that planning the lowest-cost, lowest
risk investment route aligns with a low-carbon future. From 
a risk management standpoint, diversifying utility portfolios
today by expanding investment in clean energy and energy
ef ciency makes sense regardless of how and when carbon
controls come into play. Placing too many bets on the
conventional basket of generation technologies is the highest-
risk route, in the authors’ analysis.
We’re in a new world now, with many opportunities as well as
risks. More than ever, the true risks and costs of utility
investments should be made explicit and carefully considered
as decisions on multi-billion-dollar commitments are made.
As the industry evolves, so too must its regulatory frameworks.
The authors point out why and offer guidance about how.
This is news regulators and the industry can use.
Susan F. Tierney
Managing Principal
Analysis Group
APPENDIX AAPPENDIX A1      Forrest Small and Lisa Frantzis, The 21st Century Electric Utility: Positioning for a Low-Carbon Future, Navigant Consulting (Boston, MA: Ceres, 2010), 28, http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/the-
21st-century-electric-utility-positioning-for-a-low-carbon-future-1.
2            Estimates of U.S. coal- red generating capacity that could be retired in the 2015-2020 timeframe as a result of forthcoming U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) air quality regulations range from 10 to
70 gigawatts, or between three and 22 percent of U.S. coal- red generation capacity. Forthcoming EPA water quality regulations could require the installation of costly cooling towers on more than 400 power
plants that provide more than a quarter of all U.S. electricity generation. See Susan Tierney, “Electric Reliability under New EPA Power Plant Regulations: A Field Guide,” World Resources Institute, January 18,
2011, http://www.wri.org/stories/2011/01/electric-reliability-under-new-epa-power-plant-regulations- eld-guide.
3      Companies in the sector include investor-owned utilities (IOUs), utility holding companies and non-regulated af liates.
4      Marc Chupka et al., Transforming America’s Power Industry: The Investment Challenge 2010-2030, The Brattle Group (Washington DC: The Edison Foundation, 2008), vi,
http://www.brattle.com/_documents/UploadLibrary/Upload725.pdf. Brattle’s investment estimates apply to the entire U.S. electric utility industry, including IOUs, electric cooperatives and
government-owned utilities. From 2000-05, overall annual capital expenditures by U.S. IOUs averaged roughly $48 billion; from 2006-10 that number climbed to $74 billion; see Edison Electric
Institute, 2010 Financial Review: Annual Report of the U.S. Shareholder-Owned Electric Utility Industry (Washington DC: Edison Electric Institute, 2011), 18,
http://www.eei.org/whatwedo/DataAnalysis/IndusFinanAnalysis/ nreview/Documents/FR2010_FullReport_web.pdf.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The U.S. electric utility industry, which has remained largely
stable and predictable during its  rst century of existence,
now faces tremendous challenges. Navigant Consulting
recently observed that “the changes underway in the 21st
century electric power sector create a level and complexity 
of risks that is perhaps unprecedented in the industry’s
history.”1 These challenges include:
( an aging generation  eet and distribution system, and 
a need to expand transmission;
( increasingly stringent environmental regulation limiting
pollutants and greenhouse gases;2
( disruptive changes in the economics of coal and natural gas;
( rapidly evolving smart grid technologies enabling greater
customer control and choice;
( increased policy maker emphasis on demand-side
resources requiring new regulatory approaches and utility
business models;
( competition from growth in distributed generation;
( slow demand growth due to protracted economic
recovery and high unemployment;
( substantially weakened industry  nancial metrics and credit
ratings, with over three-quarters of companies in the sector
rated three notches or less above “junk bond” status.3
Many of these same factors are driving historic levels of utility
investment. It is estimated that the U.S. electricity industry
could invest as much as $100 billion each year for 20
years4—roughly twice recent investment levels. This level of
investment will double the net invested capital in the U.S.
electricity system by 2030. Moreover, these infrastructure
investments are long lived: generation, transmission and
distribution assets can have expected useful lives of 30 or 
40 years or longer. This means that many of these assets 
will likely still be operating in 2050, when electric power
producers may be required to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by 80 percent or more to avoid potentially
catastrophic impacts from climate change.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
CONTEXT: INCREASING CAPITAL INVESTMENT BY 
U.S. ELECTRIC UTILITIES AMID HISTORIC UNCERTAINTY AND RISK
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5      Moody’s Investors Service, Special Comment: The 21st Century Electric Utility (New York: Moody’s Investors Service, 2010). Importantly, customers who currently enjoy the lowest electricity rates can
expect the largest rate increases, in relative terms, as providers of cheap, coal-generated electricity install costly pollution controls or replace old coal- red units with more expensive new resources.
This dynamic could prove especially challenging for regulators, utilities and consumers in the heavily coal-dependent Midwest.
6       Richard Cortright, “Testimony before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,” Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, November 19, 2009, http://www.puc.state.pa.us/general/RegulatoryInfo/pdf/ARRA_Testimony-SPRS.pdf.
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Greatly increased utility investment combined with minimal,
zero or even declining electricity demand growth means that
retail electricity prices for consumers will rise sharply,
claiming a greater share of household disposable income
and likely leading to ratepayer resistance.5 Because the U.S.
economy was built on relatively cheap electricity—the only
thing many U.S. consumers and businesses have ever
known—credit rating agencies are concerned about what
this dynamic could mean for utilities in the long term. Rating
analysts also point out that the overall credit pro le for
investor-owned utilities (IOUs) could decline even further
since utilities’ operating cash  ows won’t be suf cient to
satisfy their ongoing investment needs.6
It falls to state electricity regulators to ensure that the large
amount of capital invested by utilities over the next two
decades is deployed wisely. Poor decisions could harm the
U.S. economy and its global competitiveness; cost
ratepayers, investors and taxpayers hundreds of billions of
dollars; and have costly impacts on the environment and
public health.
To navigate these dif cult times, it is essential that regulators
understand the risks involved in resource selection, correct
for biases inherent in utility regulation, and keep in mind the
long-term impact that their decisions will have on consumers
and society. To do this, regulators must look outside the
boundaries established by regulatory tradition. 
CHALLENGES TO 
EFFECTIVE REGULATION
To be effective in the 21st century, regulators will need to be
especially attentive to two areas: identifying and addressing
risk; and overcoming regulatory biases. 
Risk arises when there is potential harm from an adverse
event that can occur with some degree of probability. Put
another way, risk is “the expected value of a potential loss.”
Higher risk for a resource or portfolio means that more value
is at stake or that the likelihood of a  nancial loss is greater, 
or both.
Risks for electric system resources have both time-related
and cost-related aspects. Cost risks re ect the possibility 
that an investment will not cost what one expects, or that
cost recovery for the investment will differ from expectations.
Time risks re ect the possibility that circumstances will
change over the life of the investment and materially affect
both the cost of the investment and the degree to which it
bene ts consumers. Figure ES-1 summarizes the many
varieties of risk for utility resource investment.
VARIETIES OF RISK FOR UTILITY RESOURCE INVESTMENT
Cost-related Time-related
 Construction costs higher than anticipated  Construction delays occur
 Availability and cost of capital underestimated  Competitive pressures; market changes
 Operation costs higher than anticipated  Environmental rules change
 Fuel costs exceed original estimates, or alternative fuel costs drop  Load grows less than expected; excess capacity
 Investment so large that it threatens a  rm  Better supply options materialize
 Imprudent management practices occur  Catastrophic loss of plant occurs
 Resource constraints (e.g., water)  Auxiliary resources (e.g., transmission) delayed
 Rate shock: regulators won’t put costs into rates  Other government policy and  scal changes
I Figure ES-1
I
Risk is the expected value of a potential loss. 
Higher risk for a resource or portfolio means that
more value is at stake or that the likelihood of 
a  nancial loss is greater, or both.
APPENDIX A7      These biases, which are discussed further in the report, are information asymmetry; the Averch-Johnson effect; the throughput incentive; “rent-seeking”; and the “bigger-is-better” bias.
8       Frank Huntowski, Neil Fisher, and Aaron Patterson, Embrace Electric Competition or It’s Déjà Vu All Over Again (Concord, MA: The NorthBridge Group, 2008), 18, http://www.nbgroup.com/publications/Embrace_
Electric_Competition_Or_Its_Deja_Vu_All_Over_Again.pdf. The NorthBridge Group estimates that ratepayers, taxpayers and investors were saddled with $200 billion (in 2007 dollars) in “above-market” costs
associated with the build cycle of the 1970s and 80s. Between 1981-91, shareholders lost roughly $19 billion as a result of regulatory disallowances of power plant investments by some regulated utilities; see
Thomas P. Lyon and John W. Mayo, “Regulatory opportunism and investment behavior: evidence from the U.S. electric utility industry,” Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Autumn 2005): 628–44,
http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/tplyon/PDF/Published%20Papers/Lyon%20Mayo%20RAND%202005.pdf. The potential for negative consequences is probably higher today; since the 1980s, electric demand
has grown signi cantly while the environmental risks associated with utility operations, the costs of developing new generation resources, and the pace of technology development have all increased substantially.
9       While our analysis of risks and costs of new generation resources may be of most interest to regulators in “vertically-integrated” states (where utilities own or control their own generation), it also has implications for
regulators in restructured states. Regulators in all states can direct electric utilities to invest in cost-effective demand-side resources, which, as this report makes clear, are utilities’ lowest-cost and lowest-risk resources.
10    LCOE indicates the cost per megawatt-hour for electricity over the life of the plant, encompassing all expected costs (e.g., capital, operations and maintenance, and fuel). We primarily reference
LCOE data compiled by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), which aggregates three common sources of largely consensus LCOE data: the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the
California Energy Commission (CEC) and the investment  rm Lazard; see Barbara Freese et al., A Risky Proposition (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, 2011),
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/a-risky-proposition_report.pdf. LCOE costs for technologies not included in UCS’s analysis (viz., biomass co- ring, combined cycle natural gas
generation with CCS, and distributed solar) were estimated by the authors based on comparable resources referenced by UCS.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Traditional utility regulation also contains several built-in biases
that effective regulators must overcome.7 These biases, which
result in part from the incentives that traditional regulation
provides to utilities, encourage utilities to invest more than is
optimal for their customers—which is to say, more than is
optimal for the provision of safe, reliable, affordable and
environmentally sustainable electricity—and discourage them
from investing in the lowest-cost, lowest-risk resources (namely,
demand-side resources such as energy ef ciency) that provide
substantial bene ts to ratepayers and local economies. Bias
can also lead utilities to seek to exploit regulatory and legislative
processes as a means of increasing pro ts (rather than, 
for example, improving their own operational ef ciencies).
Finally, regulators face an inherent information de cit when
dealing with utility managements. This can hamper effective
collaboration around utility planning, which is arguably the
most important function of electricity regulation today.
Three observations about risk should be stressed:
1. Risk cannot be eliminated, but it can be managed and
minimized. Since risks are de ned as probabilities, it is 
by de nition probable that some risks will be realized—
that, sooner or later, risk will translate into dollars for
consumers, investors or both. This report concludes with
recommendations for how regulators can minimize risk by
practicing “risk-aware regulation.”
2. It is unlikely that consumers will bear the full cost of poor
utility resource investment decisions. The very large amount
of capital investment that’s being contemplated and the
resulting upward pressure on electricity rates will make it very
unappealing (or simply untenable) for regulators to burden
ratepayers with the full cost of utility mistakes. As a result, 
it is likely that utility investors (speci cally shareholders) will
be more exposed to losses resulting from poor utility investment
decisions than in years past. 
3. Ignoring risk is not a viable strategy. Regulators (and utilities)
cannot avoid risk by failing to make decisions or by relying on
fate. Following a practice just because “it’s always been done
that way,” instead of making a fresh assessment of risk and
attempting to limit that risk, is asking for trouble.
RISK
COSTS AND RISKS OF 
NEW GENERATION RESOURCES
We closely examine costs and risks of new generation resources
for several reasons. First, as the largest share of utility spending
in the current build cycle, generation investment is where the
largest amount of consumer and investor dollars is at risk.
Also, today’s decisions about generation investment can
trigger substantial future investments in transmission and
distribution infrastructure. Proposed power plants can be a
lightning rod for controversy, heightening public scrutiny of
regulatory and corporate decision-makers. Finally, poor
investment decisions about generation resources in IOUs’
last major build cycle resulted in tens of billions of dollars of
losses for consumers and shareholders.8 For these and other
reasons, it is especially important that regulators address,
manage and minimize the risks associated with utility
investments in new generation resources.9
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Ignoring risk is not a viable strategy. Regulators 
(and utilities) cannot avoid risk by failing to make
decisions or by relying on fate.  
Acquiring new electric system resources involves dimensions
of both cost and risk. Of these two dimensions, the tools for
estimating the cost elements of new generation, while
imperfect, are more fully developed than the risk-related
tools. As a starting point for our examination of the relative
cost and risk of new generation resources, we rank a wide
range of supply-side resources and one demand-side
resource (energy ef ciency) according to their levelized cost
of electricity, or “LCOE” (Figure ES-2, p. 8).10 This ranking 
is based on 2010 data and does not include recent cost
increases for nuclear or cost decreases for solar PV and
wind. Because carbon controls could add signi cant costs to
certain technologies but the exact timing and extent of these
costs is unknown, we include a moderate estimate for carbon
cost for fossil-fueled resources. And because incentives such
as tax credits and loan guarantees can signi cantly affect
LCOE, we examine the LCOE range for each technology with
and without incentives where applicable.
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11    Risk exposure in each risk category ranges from “None” to “Very High.” We assigned scores (None = 0, Very High = 4) to each risk category for each resource and then summed them to establish
an indicative quantitative ranking of composite risk. We also tested the robustness of the risk ranking by calculating two additional rankings of the risk scores: one that overweighted the cost-related
risk categories and one that overweighted the environmental-related risk categories.
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But the LCOE ranking tells only part of the story. The price for
any resource in this list does not take into account the relative
risk of acquiring it. To establish relative risk of new generation
resources, we return to the many risks identi ed in Figure 
ES-1 and compress those risks into seven main categories:
( Construction Cost Risk: includes unplanned cost
increases, delays and imprudent utility actions
( Fuel and Operating Cost Risk: includes fuel cost and
availability, as well as O&M cost risks
( New Regulation Risk: includes air and water quality
rules, waste disposal, land use, and zoning
( Carbon Price Risk: includes state or federal limits on
greenhouse gas emissions
( Water Constraint Risk: includes the availability and cost
of cooling and process water
( Capital Shock Risk: includes availability and cost of
capital, and risk to  rm due to project size 
( Planning Risk: includes risk of inaccurate load forecasts,
competitive pressure
We then evaluate each resource pro led in the LCOE ranking
and apply our informed judgment to quantify each resource’s
relative exposure to each type of risk.11 This allows us to
establish a composite risk score for each resource (with the
highest score indicating the highest risk) and rank them
according to their relative composite risk pro le (Figure ES-3).
HIGHEST COMPOSITE RISK 
LOWEST COMPOSITE RISK 
Nuclear
Pulverized Coal
Coal IGCC-CCS
Nuclear w/ incentives
Coal IGCC
Coal IGCC-CCS w/ incentives
Natural Gas CC-CCS
Biomass
Coal IGCC w/ incentives
Natural Gas CC
Biomass w/ incentives
Geothermal
Biomass Co- ring
Geothermal w/ incentives
Solar Thermal
Solar Thermal w/ incentives
Large Solar PV
Large Solar PV w/ incentives
Onshore Wind
Solar—Distributed
Onshore Wind w/ incentives
Ef ciency
HIGHEST LEVELIZED COST 
OF ELECTRICITY (2010)
LOWEST LEVELIZED COST 
OF ELECTRICITY (2010)
Solar Thermal
Solar—Distributed*
Large Solar PV*
Coal IGCC-CCS
Solar Thermal w/ incentives
Coal IGCC
Nuclear*
Coal IGCC-CCS w/ incentives
Coal IGCC w/ incentives
Large Solar PV w/ incentives*
Pulverized Coal
Nuclear w/ incentives*
Biomass
Geothermal
Biomass w/ incentives
Natural Gas CC-CCS
Geothermal w/ incentives
Onshore Wind*
Natural Gas CC
Onshore Wind w/ incentives*
Biomass Co- ring
Ef ciency
I Figure ES-2 I Figure ES-3
* Cost ranking based on 2010 data. Does not re ect recent cost increases for nuclear or cost decreases for solar PV and wind.
RELATIVE COST RANKING OF
NEW GENERATION RESOURCES
RELATIVE RISK RANKING OF 
NEW GENERATION RESOURCES
APPENDIX A 9 
12    Resources are assumed to come online in 2015.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I Figure ES-4
The risk ranking differs from the cost ranking in several
important ways. First, the risk ranking shows a clear division
between renewable resources and non-renewable resources.
Second, nuclear generation moves from the middle of the
cost ranking to the top of the risk ranking. Notably, energy
ef ciency ranks lowest in both cost and risk.
With largely consensus quantitative LCOE data, and having
developed indicative composite risk scores for each resource,
we can summarize relative risks and costs of utility
generation resources in a single graph (Figure ES-4).12
I
While this report focuses on new generation
resources, the approach to “risk-aware regulation”
described herein works equally well for the “retire 
or retro t” decisions concerning existing coal plants
facing regulators and utilities in many states.
While this report focuses on new generation resources, the
approach to “risk-aware regulation” described herein works
equally well for the “retire or retro t” decisions concerning
existing coal plants facing regulators and utilities in many
states. The question for regulators is whether to approve coal
plant closures in the face of new and future EPA regulations,
or to approve utility investments in costly pollution controls to
keep the plants running. Regulators should treat this much
like an IRP proceeding: utilities should be required to present
multiple scenarios differing in their disposition of the coal
plants. The cost and risk of each scenario should be tested
using sensitivities for fuel costs, environmental requirements,
cost of capital, and so forth. In the end, regulators should
enter a decision that addresses all of the relevant risks.
PROJECTED UTILITY GENERATION RESOURCES IN 2015
Relative Cost and Relative Risk
INCREASING RISK      
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13    For example, the use of CWIP  nancing in Florida could result in Progress Energy customers paying the utility more than $1 billion for a new nuclear plant (the Levy County Nuclear Power Plant) that
may never be built. Florida state law prohibits ratepayers from recouping their investment in Levy or other CWIP- nanced projects.
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DIVERSIFYING UTILITY SUPPLY PORTFOLIOS with an emphasis on low-carbon resources and
energy ef ciency. Diversi cation—investing in different asset classes with different risk pro les—
is what allows investors to reduce risk (or “volatility”) in their investment portfolios. Similarly,
diversifying a utility portfolio by including various supply and demand-side resources that behave
independently from each other in different future scenarios reduces the portfolio’s overall risk. 
UTILIZING ROBUST PLANNING PROCESSES for all utility investment. In many vertically
integrated markets and in some organized markets, regulators use “integrated resource planning”
(IRP) to oversee utilities’ capital investments. IRP is an important tool to ensure that the utilities,
regulators and other stakeholders have a common understanding of a full spectrum of utility
resource options; that the options are examined in a structured, disciplined way; that demand-side
resources get equal consideration alongside supply-side resources; and that the  nal resource plan
is understood by all.
EMPLOYING TRANSPARENT RATEMAKING PRACTICES that reveal risk. For example,
allowing a current return on construction work in progress (CWIP) to enable utilities to  nance large
projects doesn’t actually reduce risk but rather transfers it from the utility to consumers.13 While
analysts and some regulators favor this approach, its use can obscure a project’s risk and create 
a “moral hazard” for utilities to undertake more risky investments. Utility investment in the lowest-
cost and lowest-risk resource, energy ef ciency, requires regulatory adjustments that may include
decoupling utility revenues from sales and performance-based  nancial incentives.
USING FINANCIAL AND PHYSICAL HEDGES, including long-term contracts. These allow utilities to
lock in a price (e.g., for fuel), thereby avoiding the risk of higher market prices later. But these options
must be used carefully since using them can foreclose an opportunity to enjoy lower market prices.
HOLDING UTILITIES ACCOUNTABLE for their obligations and commitments. This helps to
create a consistent, stable regulatory environment, which is highly valued in the marketplace and
ensures that agreed-upon resource plans become reality.
OPERATING IN ACTIVE, “LEGISLATIVE” MODE, continually seeking out and addressing risk.
In “judicial mode,” a regulator takes in evidence in formal settings and resolves disputes; in
contrast, a regulator operating in “legislative mode” proactively seeks to gather all relevant
information and to  nd solutions to future challenges.
REFORMING AND RE-INVENTING RATEMAKING POLICIES as appropriate. Today’s energy
industry faces disruptions similar to those experienced by the telecommunications industry over the
past two decades, which led regulators to modernize their tools and experiment with various types
of incentive regulation. One area where electricity regulators might pro tably question existing
practices is rate design; existing pricing structures should be reviewed for the incentives they
provide for customers and the outcomes they create for utilities.
PRACTICING RISK-AWARE REGULATION: 
SEVEN ESSENTIAL STRATEGIES FOR STATE REGULATORS
MANAGING RISK INTELLIGENTLY IS ARGUABLY THE MAIN DUTY OF REGULATORS
WHO OVERSEE UTILITY INVESTMENT. EFFECTIVELY MANAGING RISK IS NOT SIMPLY
ACHIEVING THE LEAST COST TODAY, BUT RATHER IS PART OF A STRATEGY TO
MINIMIZE OVERALL COSTS OVER THE LONG TERM. WE IDENTIFY SEVEN ESSENTIAL
STRATEGIES THAT REGULATORS SHOULD EMPLOY TO MANAGE AND MINIMIZE RISK:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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14    Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), TVA’s Environmental and Energy Future (Knoxville, TN: Tennessee Valley Authority, 2011), 161,
http://www.tva.com/environment/reports/irp/pdf/Final_IRP_complete.pdf.
15    As of spring 2010, TVA’s generation mix consisted mainly of coal (40 percent), natural gas (25 percent) and nuclear (18 percent) (TVA, 73). 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Careful planning is the regulator’s primary risk management
tool. A recently completed IRP by the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) illustrates how robust planning enables risk-
aware resource choices and avoids higher-cost, higher-risk
supply portfolios. TVA considered  ve resource strategies and
subjected each to extensive scenario analysis. Figure ES-5
shows how these strategies mapped out along an “ef cient
frontier” according to TVA’s analysis of cost and risk.14 The
highest-cost, highest-risk strategies were those that
maintained TVA’s current resource portfolio15 or emphasized
new nuclear plant construction. The lowest-cost, lowest-risk
strategies were the ones that diversi ed TVA’s resource
portfolio by increasing TVA’s investment in energy ef ciency
and renewable energy. The TVA analysis is careful and
deliberate; analyses by other utilities that reach signi cantly
different thematic conclusions must be scrutinized carefully
to examine whether the costs and risks of all resources have
been properly evaluated.
Strategy A: Limited Change in Current Resource Portfolio
Updating traditional practices will require effort and
commitment from regulators and regulatory staff. Is it worth
it? This report identi es numerous bene ts from practicing
“risk-aware regulation”:
( Consumer bene ts from improved regulatory decision-
making and risk management, leading to greater utility
investment in lower-cost, lower-risk resources; 
( Utility bene ts in the form of a more stable, predictable
business environment that enhances long-term planning
capabilities;
( Investor bene ts resulting from lowered threats to utility
cost recovery, which simultaneously preserves utility
credit quality and capital markets access and keeps
 nancing costs low, bene tting all stakeholders;
( Systemic regulatory bene ts resulting from expanded
transparency, inclusion and sophistication in the
regulatory process, thereby strengthening stakeholder
relationships, building trust and improving policy maker
understanding of energy options—all of which enhances
regulators’ ability to do their jobs;
( Broad societal bene ts  owing from a cleaner, smarter,
more resilient electricity system.
With two trillion dollars on the line, both the stakes and the
potential bene ts are high. If history is a guide, fewer than
700 state regulators will serve in of ce during the next 20
years. Practicing risk-aware regulation will enable them to
avoid expensive mistakes and identify the most important
utility investments for realizing the promise of an advanced
21st century electricity system.
TVA ANALYSIS OF RESOURCE PLAN COSTS & FINANCIAL RISK
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I
Effectively managing risk is not simply achieving 
the least cost today, but rather is part of a strategy 
to minimize overall costs over the long term.
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CONCLUSIONS &
RECOMMENDATIONS
( The U.S. electric utility industry has entered what may
be the most uncertain, complex and risky period in its
history. Several forces will conspire to make the next two
decades especially challenging for electric utilities: large
investment requirements, stricter environmental controls,
decarbonization, changing energy economics, rapidly
evolving technologies and reduced load growth. Succeeding
with this investment challenge—building a smarter,
cleaner, more resilient electric system for the 21st century
at the lowest overall risk and cost—will require
commitment, collaboration, shared understanding,
transparency and accountability among regulators, policy
makers, utilities and a wide range of stakeholders. 
( These challenges call for new utility business models
and new regulatory paradigms. Both regulators and
utilities need to evolve beyond historical practice. Today’s
electricity industry presents challenges that traditional
electricity regulation did not anticipate and cannot fully
address. Similarly, the constraints and opportunities for
electric utilities going forward are very different than they
were a century ago, when the traditional (and still
predominant) utility business model emerged. 
Regulators must recognize the incentives and biases that
attend traditional regulation, and should review and reform
their approaches to resource planning, ratemaking and
utility cost recovery accordingly. Utilities must endorse
regulatory efforts to minimize investment risks on behalf
of consumers and utility shareholders. This means
promoting an inclusive and transparent planning process,
diversifying resource portfolios, supporting forward-looking
regulatory policies, continually reevaluating their strategies
and shaking off “we’ve always done it that way” thinking. 
( Avoiding expensive utility investment mistakes will
require improved approaches to risk management 
in the regulatory process. One of the most important
duties of a 21st century electricity regulator is to
understand, examine and manage the risk inherent in
utility resource selection. Existing regulatory tools often
lack the sophistication to do this effectively.
Higher risk for a resource or portfolio means that more
value is at stake or that the likelihood of a  nancial loss is
greater, or both. Our analysis across seven major risk
categories reveals that, almost without exception, the
riskiest resources—the ones that could cause the most
 nancial harm—are large base load fossil and nuclear
plants. It is therefore especially important that regulators
and utilities explicitly address and manage risk when
considering the development of these resources.
Regulators practicing “risk-aware regulation” must exhaust
lower-risk investment options like energy ef ciency before
allowing utilities to commit huge sums to higher-risk
projects. Regulators should immediately notify regulated
utilities of their intention to address risks more directly,
and then begin explicitly to include risk assessment in all
decisions about utility resource acquisition.
( More than ever, ratepayer funding is a precious resource.
Large investment requirements coupled with  at or
decreasing load growth will mean higher utility rates for
consumers. Increased consumer and political resistance
to rising electricity bills, and especially to paying for
expensive mistakes, leaves much less room for error in
resource investment decisions and could pose a threat 
to utility earnings.
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( Risk shifting is not risk minimization. Some regulatory
practices that are commonly perceived to reduce risk
(e.g., construction work in progress  nancing, or “CWIP”)
merely transfer risk from the utility to consumers. This
risk shifting can inhibit the deployment of attractive lower-
cost, lower-risk resources. Regulatory practices that shift
risk must be closely scrutinized to see if they actually
increase risk—for consumers in the short term, and for
utilities and shareholders in the longer term.
( Investors are more vulnerable than in the past. During
the 1980s, power plant construction cost overruns and
 ndings of utility mismanagement led regulators to disallow
more than six percent of utilities’ overall capital investment,
costing shareholders roughly $19 billion. There will be
even less tolerance for errors in the upcoming build cycle
and more pressure on regulators to protect consumers.
Investors should closely monitor utilities’ large capex
decisions and consider how the regulatory practice
addresses the risk of these investments. Investors should
also observe how the business models and resource
portfolios of speci c utilities are changing, and consider
engaging with utility managements on their business
strategies going forward.
( Cost recovery mechanisms currently viewed positively
by the investment community including the rating
agencies could pose longer-term threats to utilities 
and investors. Mechanisms like CWIP provide utilities
with the assurance of cost recovery before the outlay is
made. This could incentivize utilities to take on higher-
risk projects, possibly threatening ultimate cost recovery
and deteriorating the utility’s regulatory and business
environment in the long run.
( Some successful strategies for managing risk are
already evident. Regulators and utilities should pursue
diversi cation of utility portfolios, adding energy ef ciency,
demand response, and renewable energy resources to the
portfolio mix. Including a mix of supply and demand-side
resources, distributed and centralized resources, and
fossil and non-fossil generation provides important risk
management bene ts to resource portfolios because each
type of resource behaves independently from the others
in different future scenarios. In the other direction, failing
to diversify resources, “betting the farm” on a narrow set
of large resources, and ignoring potentially disruptive
future scenarios is asking for trouble.
I
Including a mix of supply and demand-side resources,
distributed and centralized resources, and fossil 
and non-fossil generation provides important risk
management bene ts to resource portfolios because
each type of resource behaves independently from
the others in different future scenarios.
( Regulators have important tools at their disposal.
Careful planning is the regulator’s primary tool for risk
mitigation. This is true for regulators in both vertically-
integrated and restructured electricity markets. Effective
resource planning considers a wide variety of resources,
examines possible future scenarios and considers the risk
of various portfolios. Regulators should employ transparent
ratemaking practices that reveal and do not obscure the
level of risk inherent in a resource choice; they should
selectively apply  nancial and physical hedges, including
long-term contracts. Importantly, they must hold utilities
accountable for their obligations and commitments.
APPENDIX A16    See footnote 2.
17    Peter Fox-Penner, Smart Power (Washington DC: Island Press, 2010). The “ rst revolution” was triggered by George Westinghouse, Thomas Edison, Nicola Tesla, Samuel Insull and others more than
a century ago.  
18    Small and Frantzis, The 21st Century Electric Utility, 28.
19    See U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Electric Power Industry Overview 2007,” http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/prim2/toc2.html; National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 
“Co-op Facts and Figures,” http://www.nreca.coop/members/Co-opFacts/Pages/default.aspx; Edison Electric Institute, “Industry Data,”
http://www.eei.org/whatwedo/DataAnalysis/IndustryData/Pages/default.aspx. Note that these numbers do not include investment by non-utility generators.
20    Edison Electric Institute, 2010 Financial Review, 18.
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INCREASING CAPITAL INVESTMENT BY U.S. ELECTRIC UTILITIES
AMID HISTORIC UNCERTAINTY & RISK
U.S. ELECTRIC UTILITIES ARE FACING A SET OF CHALLENGES UNPARALLELED IN THE INDUSTRY’S
HISTORY, PROVIDING MANY REASONS TO CONCLUDE THAT THE TRADITIONAL PRACTICES OF
UTILITIES AND THEIR REGULATORS MUST BE UPDATED TO ADD A SHARPER FOCUS ON RISK
MANAGEMENT IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS. 
Consider the forces acting on the electricity sector in 2012:
( an aging generation  eet;
( infrastructure upgrades to the distribution system;
( increasingly stringent environmental regulation limiting
pollutants and greenhouse gases;16
( disruptive changes in the economics of coal and natural gas;
( new transmission investments;
( rapidly evolving smart grid technologies enabling greater
customer control and choice;
( increased policy maker emphasis on demand-side
resources requiring new regulatory approaches and utility
business models;
( competition from growth in distributed generation;
( slow demand growth due to protracted economic
recovery and high unemployment;
( tight credit in a dif cult economy and substantially
weakened industry  nancial metrics and credit ratings.
In a recent book, Peter Fox-Penner, principal and chairman
emeritus of the Brattle Group, concluded that the sum of
these forces is leading to a “second revolution” in the electric
power industry.17 Navigant Consulting has observed that “the
changes underway in the 21st century electric power sector
create a level and complexity of risks that is perhaps
unprecedented in the industry’s history.”18
THE INVESTMENT CHALLENGE
The United States electric utility industry is a network of
approximately 3,300 investor-owned utilities (IOUs), cooperative
associations and government entities. In addition, about 1,100
independent power producers sell power to utilities, either
under contract or through auction markets. The net asset value
of the plant in service for all U.S. electric utilities in 2010 was
about $1.1 trillion, broken down as $765 billion for IOUs, about
$200 billion for municipal (publicly-owned) utilities (or “munis”),
and $112 billion for rural electric cooperatives (or “co-ops”).19
IOUs therefore constitute the largest segment of the U.S.
electric power industry, serving roughly 70 percent of the
U.S. population. Figure 1 illustrates IOUs’ capital
expenditures from 2000-2010 and captures the start of the
current “build cycle,” beginning in 2006.20 Between 2006
and 2010, capital spending by IOUs—for generation,
transmission and distribution systems—was about 10 percent
of the  rms’ net plant in service.
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES BY U.S. INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITIES, 
2000-2010
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21    Chupka et al., Transforming America’s Power Industry, vi. Brattle’s investment estimates apply to the entire U.S. electric utility industry, including IOUs, electric cooperatives and government-owned
utilities. The range in Brattle’s investment estimate is due to its varying assumptions about U.S. climate policy enactment.
22    U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Today in Energy: Age of electric power generators varies widely,” June 16, 2011, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=1830.
23    U.S. Supreme Court, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/06pdf/05-1120.pdf.  
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In 2008, the Brattle Group projected that the collected U.S.
electric utility industry—IOUs, munis, and co-ops—would
need to invest capital at historic levels between 2010 and
2030 to replace aging infrastructure, deploy new
technologies, and meet future consumer needs and
government policy requirements. In all, Brattle predicted that
total industry-wide capital expenditures from 2010 to 2030
would amount to between $1.5 trillion and $2.0 trillion.21
Assuming that the U.S. implements a policy limiting
greenhouse gas emissions, the collected utility industry may
be expected to invest at roughly the same elevated annual
rate as in the 2006-2010 period each year for 20 years.
I
If the U.S. utility industry adds $100 billion each year
between 2010 and 2030, the net value of utility plant
in service will grow from today’s $1.1 trillion to more
than $2.0 trillion—a doubling of net invested capital.
If the U.S. utility industry adds $100 billion each year between
2010 and 2030, the net value of utility plant in service will
grow from today’s $1.1 trillion to more than $2.0 trillion—
a doubling of net invested capital. This growth is considerably
faster than the country has seen in many decades. 
To understand the seriousness of the investment challenge
facing the industry, consider the age of the existing generation
 eet. About 70 percent of U.S. electric generating capacity is
at least 30 years old (Figure 2).22 Much of this older capacity
is coal-based generation subject to signi cant pressure from
the Clean Air Act (CAA) because of its emissions of traditional
pollutants such as nitrous oxides, sulfur dioxides, mercury
and particulates. Moreover, following a landmark Supreme
Court ruling, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
is beginning to regulate as pollutants carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gas emissions from power plants.23 These
regulations will put even more pressure on coal plants, which
produce the most greenhouse gas emissions of any electric
generating technology. The nuclear capacity of the U.S.,
approximately 100,000 megawatts, was built mainly in the
1970s and 80s, with original licenses of 40 years. While the
lives of many nuclear plants are being extended with
additional investment, some of these plants will face
retirement within the next two decades.
APPENDIX AFigure 3 shows the Brattle Group’s investment projections for
new generating capacity for different U.S. regions,24 while
Figure 4 predicts capacity additions for selected U.S. states.
Importantly, the Brattle Group noted that some of this
investment in new power plants could be avoided if regulators
and utilities pursued maximum levels of energy ef ciency.
DRIVERS OF UTILITY INVESTMENT
Technological change, market pressures and policy imperatives
are driving these historic levels of utility investment. As we will
see, these same forces are interacting to create unprecedented
uncertainty, risk and complexity for utilities and regulators. 
I Figure 3
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24    Chupka et al., Transforming America’s Power Industry, x. Brattle’s Prism RAP Scenario “assumes there is a new federal policy to constrain carbon emissions, and captures the cost of EPRI’s [Electric
Power Research Institute] Prism Analysis projections for generation investments (nuclear, advanced coal, renewables, etc.) that will reduce the growth in carbon emissions. This scenario further
assumes the implementation of RAP [realistically achievable potential] EE/DR programs” (ibid., vi). Brattle used EPRI’s original Prism analysis, published in September 2007; that document and
subsequent updates are available online at http://my.epri.com/portal/server.pt?open=512&objID=216&&PageID=229721&mode=2.
25    State capacity addition predictions are based on Brattle’s regional projections and assume that new capital expenditures will be made in proportion to existing investment levels.
26     State generating capacity data: U.S. Energy Information Administration, “State Electricity Pro les,” January 30, 2012, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/. Percentage is rounded to the nearest whole number.
I Figure 4
PROJECTED GENERATION CAPEX BY REGION
Regional Capacity Additions & Generation Capital Costs 
In Prism RAP Scenario with Carbon Policy (2010-2030)
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Texas 23,400 22%
Florida  12,200 21%
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PROJECTED CAPACITY ADDITIONS BY STATE & 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF 2010 GENERATING CAPACITY
Here are eight factors driving the large investment
requirements: 
THE NEED TO REPLACE AGING GENERATING UNITS. As
mentioned earlier, the average U.S. generating plant 
is more than 30 years old. Many plants, including base
load coal and nuclear plants, are reaching the end of
their lives, necessitating either life-extending investments
or replacement.
ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS. Today’s Clean Air Act
(CAA) traces its lineage to a series of federal laws dating
back to 1955. Until recent years, the CAA has enjoyed
broad bipartisan support as it steadily tightened controls
on emissions from U.S. electric power plants. These
actions were taken to achieve science-based health
improvements for people and the human habitat. While
the current set of EPA rules enforcing the CAA has
elicited political resistance, it is unlikely that the  ve-
decade long movement in the United States to reduce
acid rain, smog, ground ozone, particulates and mercury,
among other toxic pollutants, will be derailed. Owners of
many fossil-fueled plants will be forced to decide whether
to make signi cant capital investments to clean up
emissions and manage available water, or shutter the
plants. Since the capacity is needed to serve consumers’
demand for power (or “load”), these clean air and clean
water policies will stimulate the need for new construction.
1
2
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27    Edison Electric Institute, EEI Survey of Transmission Investment (Washington DC: Edison Electric Institute, 2005), 3, http://www.eei.org/ourissues/ElectricityTransmission/Documents/Trans_Survey_Web.pdf.
28    U.S. Energy Information Administration, AEO2012 Early Release Overview (Washington DC: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2012), 9, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er(2012).pdf.
29    Source: Standard & Poor’s Ratings Service.
30    The difference in the interest rate on an “A” rated utility and BBB is on average over time rarely more than 100 basis points. By contrast, equity  nancing typically costs a utility at least 200 basis
points more than debt  nancing.
31    Companies in the sector include IOUs, utility holding companies and non-regulated af liates.
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NEW TRANSMISSION LINES AND UPGRADES. Utility
investment in transmission facilities slowed signi cantly
from 1975 to 1998.27 In recent years, especially after the
creation of deregulated generation markets in about half
of the U.S., it has become clear that the transmission
de cit will have to be  lled. Adding to the need for more
transmission investment is the construction of wind, solar
and geothermal generation resources, far from customers
in areas with little or no existing generation or transmission.
Regional transmission planning groups have formed
across the country to coordinate the expected push for
new transmission capacity.
NETWORK MODERNIZATION/SMART GRID. The internet is
coming to the electric power industry. From synchrophasors
on the transmission system (which enable system-wide
data measurement in real time), to automated substations;
from smart meters, smart appliances, to new customer
web-based energy management, investments to
“smarten” the grid are fundamentally changing the way
electricity is delivered and used. While much of today’s
activity results from “push” by utilities and regulators,
many observers think a “pull” will evolve as consumers
engage more fully in managing their own energy use.
Additionally, “hardening” the grid against disasters and to
enhance national security will drive further investment in
distribution infrastructure.
HIGHER PRICES FOR CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS. Concrete
and steel are now priced in a world market. The demand
from developing nations is pushing up the cost of materials
needed to build power plants and transmission and
distribution facilities. 
DEMAND GROWTH. Overall U.S. demand for electric power
has slowed with the recent economic recession and is
projected to grow minimally in the intermediate term
(though some areas, like the U.S. Southwest and
Southeast, still project moderate growth). Further, the
expected shift toward electric vehicles has the potential 
to reshape utility load curves, expanding the amount of
energy needed in off-peak hours. 
DEPLOYING NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND SUPPORTING R&D.
To meet future environmental requirements, especially
steep reductions of greenhouse gas emissions by 2050,
utilities will need to develop and deploy new technologies
at many points in the grid. Either directly or indirectly,
utilities will be involved in funding for R&D on carbon
capture and storage, new renewable and ef ciency
technologies, and electric storage.
NATURAL GAS PRICE OUTLOOK. Natural gas prices have
fallen sharply as estimates of U.S. natural gas reserves
jumped with the development of drilling technologies that
can economically recover gas from shale formations.
Longer-term price estimates have also dropped, inducing
many utilities to consider replacing aging coal units with
new gas- red units. But in January 2012, the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA) sharply revised downward
its estimates of U.S. shale gas reserves by more than 40
percent and its estimates of shale gas from the Marcellus
region by two-thirds.28 Reduced long-term supplies and 
a signi cant commitment to natural gas for new electric
generation could obviously lead to upward pressure on
natural gas prices.
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
The credit quality and  nancial  exibility of U.S. investor-
owned electric utilities has declined over the past 40 years,
and especially over the last decade (Figure 5, p. 18).29 The
industry’s  nancial position today is materially weaker than 
it was during the last major “build cycle” that was led by
vertically-integrated utilities, in the 1970s and 80s. Then the
vast majority of IOUs had credit ratings of “A” or higher;
today the average credit rating has fallen to “BBB.”
I
While it is rare for utilities to experience multiple
notch downgrades in a short period of time, the
heightened event risk inherent in the approaching
sizable capital spending cycle could cause the rating
agencies to pursue more aggressive rating actions.
This erosion of credit quality is mainly the result of intentional
decisions by regulators and utility managements, who
determined that maintaining an “A” or “AA” balance sheet
wasn’t worth the additional cost.30 And while there isn’t reason
to believe that most utilities’ capital markets access will
become signi cantly constrained in the near future, the fact
remains that more than a quarter of companies in the sector
are now one notch above non-investment grade status (also
called “Non-IG,” “high yield” or “junk”), and nearly half of the
companies in the sector are rated only two or three notches
above this threshold.31 While it is rare for utilities to experience
multiple notch downgrades in a short period of time, the
heightened event risk inherent in the approaching sizable
capital spending cycle could cause the rating agencies to
pursue more aggressive rating actions. Dropping below
3
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32    Cortright, “Testimony.”
33    Standard & Poor’s, The Top 10 Investor Questions for U.S. Regulated Electric Utilities in 2012 (New York: Standard & Poor’s, 2012).
34    Moody’s Investors Service, Industry Outlook: Annual Outlook (New York: Moody’s Investors Service, 2011). 
35    Moody’s Investors Service, Industry Outlook: Annual Outlook (New York: Moody’s Investors Service, 2010).
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investment grade (or “IG”) triggers a marked rise in interest
rates for debt issuers and a marked drop in demand from
institutional investors, who are largely prohibited from investing
in junk bonds under the investment criteria set by their boards.
According to a Standard & Poor’s analyst, utilities’ capital
expenditure programs will invariably cause them to become
increasingly cash  ow negative, pressuring company balance
sheets,  nancial metrics and credit ratings: “In other words,
utilities will be entering the capital markets for substantial
amounts of both debt and equity to support their infrastructure
investments as operating cash  ows will not come close to
satisfying these infrastructure needs.”32 Speci c utilities that
S&P has identi ed as particularly challenged are companies—
such as Ameren, Dominion, FirstEnergy, and PPL—that have
both regulated and merchant generation businesses and must
rely on market pricing to recover environmental capital
expenditures for their merchant  eets.33
Appendix 1 of this report presents an overview of utility  nance.
I
While the growth of rate base presents an earnings
opportunity for regulated utilities and their investors,
the corresponding increase in customer bills could
greatly exacerbate the political and regulatory risks
that threaten utilities’ cost recovery. 
CUSTOMER IMPACTS
The surge in IOU capital investment will translate directly into
higher electric rates paid by consumers. Increased capital
investment means higher annual depreciation expenses as
 rms seek to recover their investment. Greater levels of
investment mean higher revenue requirements calculated to
yield a return on the investment. And since electric sales may
not grow much or at all during the coming two decades, it is
likely that unit prices for electricity will rise sharply.
While the growth of rate base presents an earnings opportunity
for regulated utilities and their investors, the corresponding
increase in customer bills could greatly exacerbate the political
and regulatory risks that threaten utilities’ cost recovery. The
rating agency Moody’s Investors Service has noted that
“consumer tolerance to rising rates is a primary concern”34
and has identi ed political and regulatory risks as key longer-
term challenges facing the sector.35 
Further, Moody’s anticipates an “in ection point” where
consumers revolt as electricity bills consume a greater share
of disposable income (Figure 6, p. 19),36 pressuring
legislators and regulators to withhold from utilities the
recovery of even prudently incurred expenses.
S&P Credit Ratings Distribution, U.S. Shareholder-Owned Electric Utilities
U.S. ELECTRIC IOUs CREDIT RATINGS HISTORY, 1970 – 2010
I Figure 5
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THE IMPORTANCE OF REGULATORS
With this background, the challenge becomes clear: how to
ensure that the large level of capital invested by utilities over
the next two decades is deployed wisely? How to give U.S.
ratepayers, taxpayers and investors the assurance that 
$2 trillion will be spent in the best manner possible? There
are two parts to the answer: effective regulators and the right
incentives for utilities.
If history is a guide, fewer than 700 state regulators will 
serve in of ce during the next 20 years. Each regulator will,
on average, vote to approve more than $6.5 billion of utility
capital investment during his or her term.37 It is essential that
regulators understand the risks involved in resource
selection, correct for the biases facing utility regulation and
keep in mind the impact their decisions will have on
consumers and society.
Are U.S. regulatory institutions prepared? Consumers,
lawmakers and the  nancial markets are counting on it. 
The authors are con dent that well-informed, focused state
regulators are up to the task. But energy regulation in the
coming decades will be quite different from much of its
history. The 21st century regulator must be willing to look
outside the boundaries established by regulatory tradition.
Effective regulators must be informed, active, consistent,
curious and often courageous.
This report focuses on techniques to address the risk
associated with utility resource selection. It provides
regulators with some tools needed to understand, identify
and minimize the risks inherent in the industry’s investment
challenge. In short, we hope to help regulators become more
“risk-aware.”
I
If history is a guide, fewer than 700 state 
regulators will serve in of ce during the next 
20 years. Each regulator will, on average, vote 
to approve more than $6.5 billion of utility capital
investment during his or her term.
MOODY’S PROJECTED “INFLECTION POINT” OF CONSUMER INTOLERANCE FOR RISING ELECTRICITY BILLS
I Figure 6
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RISK INHERENT IN 
UTILITY RESOURCE SELECTION
Risk arises when there is potential harm from an adverse
event that can occur with some degree of probability. Risk
accumulates from multiple sources. In mathematical terms:
Risk =  i Eventi x (Probability of Eventi)
for a situation in which a set of independent events will
cause a loss with some probability. In English, this means
that risk is the sum of each possible loss times the probability
of that loss, assuming the events are independent of each
other. If a  nancial instrument valued at $100 million would
be worth $60 million in bankruptcy, and the probability of
bankruptcy is 2 percent, then the bankruptcy risk associated
with that instrument is said to be ($100 million - $60 million)
x 2%, or $800,000. Thus, risk is the expected value of a
potential loss. There is an obvious tie to insurance premiums;
leaving aside transaction costs and the time value of money,
an investor would be willing to pay up to $800,000 to insure
against the potential bankruptcy loss just described.
Higher risk for a resource or portfolio means a larger expected
value of a potential loss. In other words, higher risk means
that more value is at stake or that the likelihood of a  nancial
loss is greater, or both.
Uncertainty is similar to risk in that it describes a situation
where a deviation from the expected can occur, but it differs
in two respects. First, the probability of the unexpected event
cannot feasibly be determined with any precision. Consider
the potential of much higher costs for natural gas used as 
a generation resource for an electric utility. Such an outcome
is certainly possible (and perhaps even likely, given the
potential for an increased rate of construction of new natural
gas generation). But the likelihood and scope of such a
change would be dif cult to assess in terms of mathematical
probabilities. Second, unlike risk, uncertainty can result in
2. CHALLENGES 
TO EFFECTIVE REGULATION
THE CHALLENGE FOR U.S. ELECTRIC UTILITIES IS TO RAISE, SPEND AND RECOVER A HISTORIC
AMOUNT OF CAPITAL DURING A PERIOD OF UNPRECEDENTED UNCERTAINTY. THE CHALLENGE FOR
STATE REGULATORS IS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THAT UTILITIES’ INVESTMENTS
ARE MADE WISELY. TO DO THIS EFFECTIVELY, REGULATORS WILL NEED TO BE ESPECIALLY
ATTENTIVE TO TWO AREAS: IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING RISK, AND OVERCOMING REGULATORY
BIASES. THIS SECTION DISCUSSES RISK AND BIAS IN MORE DETAIL.
The Historical Basis for Utility Regulation
Utilities aren’t like other private sector businesses. Their
services are essential in today’s world, and society expects
utilities to set up costly infrastructure networks supported
by revenue from electric rates and to serve everyone
without discrimination. Because of their special attributes,
we say that investor-owned utilities are private companies
that are “affected with the public interest.” Indeed, this is
often the statutory de nition of utilities in state law.
Utility infrastructure networks include very long-lived
assets. Power plants and transmission lines are designed
to last decades; some U.S. transmission facilities are
approaching 100 years old. The high cost of market entry
makes competition impractical, uneconomic or impossible
in many sectors of these markets. And because society
requires universal service, it made economic sense to
grant monopoly status to the owners of these essential
facilities and then to regulate them. 
State regulatory utility commissioners began administering 
a system of oversight for utilities at about the turn of the 20th
century,  lling a role that had previously been accorded to
state legislatures. Regulatory commissions were tasked with
creating a stable business environment for investment while
assuring that customers would be treated “justly and
reasonably” by monopoly utilities. Then as now, consumers
wanted good utility services and didn’t want to pay too
much for them. Rules for accounting were supplemented
by regulatory expectations, which were then followed by a
body of precedents associated with cost recovery. 
Because the sector’s complexity and risks have evolved
considerably since many regulatory precedents were
established, today’s regulators are well-advised to “think
outside the box” and consider reforming past precedent
where appropriate. The last section of this report,
“Practicing Risk-Aware Regulation,” contains speci c
ideas and recommendations in this regard.
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either upside or downside changes. As we will see later,
uncertainty should be identi ed, modeled and treated much
like risk when considering utility resource selection. In this
report we will focus on risk and the negative aspect of
uncertainty, and we will simplify by using the term “risk” to
apply to both concepts.
The risks associated with utility resource selection are many
and varied and arise from many possible events, as shown in
Figure 7. There are several ways to classify these risks. One
helpful distinction is made between cost-related risks and
time-related risks. 
Cost risks re ect the possibility that an investment will not
cost what one expects, or that cost recovery for the
investment will differ from expectations. Construction costs
for a project can increase between regulatory approval and
project completion. Transmission projects are notorious for
this phenomenon due to unexpected obstacles in siting, 
or to unexpected changes in raw material costs. 
Costs can change unexpectedly at any time. For example, 
a catastrophic equipment failure or the adoption of a new
standard for pollution control could present unforeseen costs
that a utility may not be willing to pay to keep an asset
operating. Planned-for cost recovery can be disrupted by
changes in costs for which regulators are unwilling to burden
customers, or for other reasons. If an asset becomes
obsolete, useless or uneconomic before the end of its
predicted economic life, a regulator could  nd that it is no
longer “used and useful” to consumers and remove it from
the utility rate base. In these ways, decisions made by
utilities and their regulators may turn out to be much more
costly than initially expected. For this reason, it is especially
important that regulators and utilities consider a full range of
options and resources at the time a major investment
decision is made. 
Time risks re ect the possibility that circumstances will
change over the life of the investment and materially affect
both the cost of the investment and the degree to which it
bene ts consumers. Sometimes this risk can manifest itself
even between the time a utility makes a decision and the
time approval is sought. For example, anticipated load
growth may not materialize, so that a planned generation
resource is not needed, at least not now. 
Time risks also re ect the fact that, for some investments,
some essential condition may not occur on a schedule
necessary for the investment to be approved and
constructed. Consider the dilemma of the developer who
wishes to build a low cost wind farm in an area with weak
electric transmission. The wind project might require three 
to four years to build, but the transmission capacity needed
to move the power to market may take  ve to seven years to
build—if the development goes relatively smoothly. Investors
may forego the wind farm due to uncertainty that the
transmission will be built, while at the same time the
transmission might not be built because, without the wind
farm, it is simply too speculative.
I
Decisions made by utilities and their regulators
may turn out to be much more costly than initially
expected. For this reason, it is especially important
that regulators and utilities consider a full range 
of options and resources at the time a major
investment decision is made.
In the power sector, investments are so long-lived that time
can be measured in generations. Generally speaking,
regulators consider it most fair if the generation of consumers
that uses an asset is the same one that pays for the asset.
Burdening customers before or after an asset is useful is
often seen as violating the “just and reasonable” standard.
The challenge to the utility, therefore, is to  t cost recovery
for an asset into the timeframe in which it is used. Otherwise,
the utility may bear the risk that regulators or consumers
push back on assuming responsibility for the cost. 
I Figure 7
VARIETIES OF RISK FOR UTILITY RESOURCE INVESTMENT
Cost-related Time-related
 Construction costs higher than anticipated  Construction delays occur
 Availability and cost of capital underestimated  Competitive pressures; market changes
 Operation costs higher than anticipated  Environmental rules change
 Fuel costs exceed original estimates, or alternative fuel costs drop  Load grows less than expected; excess capacity
 Investment so large that it threatens a  rm  Better supply options materialize
 Imprudent management practices occur  Catastrophic loss of plant occurs
 Resource constraints (e.g., water)  Auxiliary resources (e.g., transmission) delayed
 Rate shock: regulators won’t put costs into rates  Other government policy and  scal changes
APPENDIX A 22 
PRACTICING RISK-AWARE ELECTRICITY REGULATION
ELECTRICITY MARKET 
STRUCTURE AND RISK
Much has changed since non-utility power producers led the
most recent industry build cycle in the 1990s and early
2000s. To begin with,  nancial reforms from Sarbanes-Oxley
legislation, other “Enron  xes,” and now the Dodd-Frank Act
have substantially changed some accounting and corporate
disclosure rules. Investors now receive more detailed and
transparent information about asset value (which is “marked
to market”) and possible risks in contracts with counter-parties. 
These changes, which protect investors, may have the
associated effect of discouraging investments if cumulative
risks are judged to be outsized for the circumstances. This is
especially relevant for markets served by the competitive
generation system that now supplies power to about half of
U.S. consumers. It is unclear whether independent generators
have the tolerance to take on large, risky investments;
experience indicates that there is a frontier beyond which
these companies and their backers may not go. 
This dynamic could raise important questions for regulators
in restructured markets, who need to be aware of the degree
to which investment options might be limited by these
concerns. In vertically-integrated markets, regulators’
concern should be not to expose utilities, customers and
investors to undue risk by approving large projects that
informed market players would not pursue in the absence 
of regulatory approval.
One potentially risky but necessary area of investment is in
low carbon generation technologies. The U.S. power sector,
which has embraced generation competition, is required to
develop these technologies. Some promising technologies—
including coal- red generation with carbon capture and
storage or sequestration (CCS), advanced nuclear power
technologies and offshore wind—have not reached a
commercial stage or become available at a commercial price. 
Risks requiring special attention are those associated with
investments that “bet the company” on their success.
Gigawatt-sized investments in any generation technology 
may trigger this concern, as can a thousand-mile extra high
voltage transmission line. Any investment measured in
billions of dollars can be proportionately out of scale with
what a utility can endure if things go awry. Regulators should
avoid a situation where the only choices left are a utility
bankruptcy or a waiving of regulatory principles on prudence
and cost recovery in order to save the utility, placing a
necessary but unreasonable cost burden on consumers.
REGULATORS, RATING 
AGENCIES AND RISK
Investor-owned utilities sometimes attempt to get out in front of
the event risk inherent in large investment projects by seeking
pre-approval or automatic rate increase mechanisms. As
discussed later, these approaches don’t actually reduce risk,
but instead shift it to consumers. This may give companies and
investors a false sense of security and induce them to take on
excessive risk. In the long run this could prove problematic for
investors; large projects can trigger correspondingly large rate
increases years later, when regulators may not be as invested
in the initial deal or as willing to burden consumers with the
full rate increase.
Given the in uence of regulators on the operations and  nances
of IOUs, ratings agencies and investors closely monitor the
interactions between utility executives and regulators.
Constructive relationships between management and regulators
are viewed as credit positive; less-than-constructive
relationships, which can result from regulators’ concerns about
the competence or integrity of utility management, are seen
as a credit negative and harmful to a utility’s business prospects. 
Analysts de ne a constructive regulatory climate as one that
is likely to produce stable, predictable regulatory outcomes
over time. “Constructive,” then, refers as much to the quality
Perspectives on Risk
Risk means different things to different stakeholders. 
For example:
• For utility management, risks are a threat to the company’s
 nancial health, its growth, even its existence; a threat to the
 rm’s competitiveness, to the  rm’s image, and to its legacy.
• For customers, risk threatens household disposable
income, the pro tability of businesses, the quality of
energy service, and even comfort and entertainment.
• Investors focus on the safety of the income, value of the
investment (stock or bond holders), or performance of the 
contract (counterparties). In addition, investors value utility
investments based on their expectations of performance.
• Employees are uniquely connected to the utility. Their
employment, safety and welfare is directly related to their
company’s ability to succeed and to avoid  nancial
catastrophes. 
• Society generally has expectations for utilities ranging from
providing reliable, universal service, to aiding in economic
development, to achieving satisfactory environmental and
safety performance. Risk threatens these goals. 
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of regulatory decision-making as it does to the  nancial
reward for the utility. Regulatory decisions that seem overly
generous to utilities could raise red  ags for analysts, since
these decisions could draw  re and destabilize the regulatory
climate. Analysts may also become concerned about the
credit quality of a company if the state regulatory process
appears to become unduly politicized. 
While they intend only to observe and report, ratings agencies
can exert a discipline on utility managements not unlike that
imposed more formally by regulators. For example, ratings
agencies can reveal to utility managements the range of
factors they should consider when formulating an investment
strategy, thereby in uencing utility decision-making. Both
regulators and ratings agencies set long-term standards and
expectations that utilities are wise to mind; both can provide
utilities with feedback that would discourage one investment
strategy or another.
Since ratings re ect the issuer’s perceived ability to repay
investors over time, the ratings agencies look negatively on
anything that increases event risk. The larger an undertaking
(e.g., large conventional generation investments), the larger
the fallout if an unforeseen event undermines the project.
The pressure to maintain healthy  nancial metrics may, in
practice, serve to limit utilities’ capital expenditure programs
and thus the size of rate increase requests to regulators. 
NATURAL BIASES AFFECTING 
UTILITY REGULATION
Notwithstanding economic theory, we must admit that utilities
are not perfectly rational actors and that their regulation is not
textbook-perfect, either. Utility regulation faces several built-in
biases, which one can think of as headwinds against which
regulation must sail. For example, under traditional cost-of-
service regulation, a considerable portion of  xed costs (i.e.,
investment in rate base) is often recovered through variable
charges to consumers. In this circumstance, one would expect
utilities to have a bias toward promoting sales of the product
once rates are established—even if increasing sales might
result in increased  nancial, reliability, or environmental risks
and mean the inef cient use of consumer dollars. 
Here are  ve natural biases that effective utility regulation
must acknowledge and correct for:
( Information asymmetry. Regulators are typically
handicapped by not having the same information that 
is available to the regulated companies. This becomes
especially signi cant for the utility planning process,
where regulators need to know the full range of potential
options for meeting electric demand in future periods. In
the same vein, regulators do not normally have adequate
information to assess market risks. These are the
considerations of CFOs and boardrooms, and not
routinely available to regulators. Finally, operating utilities
often exist in a holding company with af liated interests.
The regulator does not have insight into the interplay of
the parent and subsidiary company—the role played by
the utility in the context of the holding company. 
( The Averch-Johnson effect. A second bias is recognized
in the economic literature as the tendency of utilities to
over-invest in capital compared to labor. This effect is
known by the name of the economists who  rst identi ed
the bias: the Averch-Johnson effect (or simply the “A-J
effect”). The short form of the A-J effect is that permitting
TAKEAWAYS ABOUT RISK
Here are three observations about risk that should 
be stressed:
1. RISK CANNOT BE ELIMINATED—BUT IT CAN BE
MANAGED AND MINIMIZED. Because risks are de ned in
terms of probabilities, it is (by de nition) probable that some risk
materializes. In utility resource selection, this means that risk will
eventually  nd its way into costs and then into prices for electricity.
Thus, taking on risk is inevitable, and risk will translate into
consumer or investor costs—into dollars—sooner or later. Later
in this report, we present recommendations to enable regulators
to practice their trade in a “risk-aware” manner—incorporating
the notion of risk into every decision.
2. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT CONSUMERS WILL BEAR THE
FULL COST OF POOR UTILITY RESOURCE INVESTMENT
DECISIONS. Put another way, it is likely that utility investors
(speci cally shareholders) will be more exposed to losses resulting
from poor utility investments than in years past. In utility regulation,
risk is shared between investors and customers in a complex
manner. To begin, the existence of regulation and a group of
customers who depend on utility service is what makes investors
willing to lend utilities massive amounts of money (since most
customers have few if any choices and must pay for utility service).
But the actualization of a risk, a loss, may be apportioned by
regulators to utility investors, utility consumers, or a combination 
of both. The very large amount of capital investment that’s being
contemplated and the resulting upward pressure on electricity rates
will make it very unappealing (or simply untenable) for regulators
to make ratepayers pay for the full cost of utility mistakes.
3. IGNORING RISK IS NOT A VIABLE STRATEGY.
Regulators (and utilities) cannot avoid risk by failing to make
decisions or by relying on fate. In utility regulation, perhaps
more so than anywhere else, making no choice is itself making
a choice. Following a practice just because “it’s always been
done that way,” instead of making a fresh assessment of risk
and attempting to limit that risk, is asking for trouble.
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a rate of return on investment will have the predictable
effect of encouraging more investment than is optimal.
This can manifest itself in the “build versus buy”
decisions of integrated utilities and is often cited as a
reason utilities might “gold plate” their assets. This effect
can also be observed in the “invest versus conserve”
decisions that utilities face. Under traditional regulatory
rules, most utilities do not naturally turn toward energy
ef ciency investment, even though such investments are
usually least cost for customers.
( The throughput incentive. A third bias that can be
observed with utilities is the bias for throughput—selling
more electricity. This is undoubtedly grounded in the vision
that most utilities have traditionally had for themselves:
providers of electricity. Importantly, the regulatory
apparatus in most states reinforces the motivation to sell
more electricity: a utility’s short-run pro tability and its
ability to cover  xed costs is directly related to the utility’s
level of sales. The price of the marginal unit of electricity
often recovers more than marginal costs, so utilities make
more if they sell more. Only in recent years has the
concept of an energy services provider developed in which
the utility provides or enables energy ef ciency, in addition
to providing energy.
( Rent-seeking. A fourth bias often cited in the literature is
“rent seeking,” where the regulated company attempts to
use the regulatory or legislative processes as a means of
increasing pro tability (rather than improving its own
operational ef ciency or competitive position). This can
occur when  rms use law or regulation to protect markets
that should be open to competition, or to impose costs 
on competitors. 
( “Bigger-is-better” syndrome. Another bias, related to the
Averch-Johnson effect, might be called the “bigger is
better” syndrome. Utilities tend to be conservative
organizations that rely on past strategies and practices.
Making large investments in relatively few resources had
been the rule through the 1980s and into the 1990s.
Because of this history, utilities may not naturally support
smaller scale resources, distributed resources or
programmatic solutions to energy ef ciency.38
Regulation can compensate for these biases by conducting
clear-headed analysis, using processes that bring forth 
a maximum of relevant information and, very importantly,
identifying the risk that these biases might introduce into
utility resource acquisition. In the next section, we will take 
a close look at the many risks facing generation resource
investments, which involve some of the most important and
complex decisions that regulators and utilities make.
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3. COSTS AND RISKS 
In this section we’ll take an in-depth look at costs and risks 
of new generation resources, for several reasons: 
( Generation investment will be the largest share of utility
spending in the current build cycle; this is where the
largest amount of consumer and investor dollars will 
be at stake. 
( Today’s decisions about generation investment can shape
tomorrow’s decisions about transmission and distribution
investment (by reducing or increasing the need for such
investment). 
( Technology breakthroughs—in energy storage, grid
management, solar PV, and elsewhere—could radically
transform our need for base load power within the useful
lives of power plants being built today. 
( Generation resources are among utilities’ most visible and
controversial investments and can be a lightning rod for
protest and media attention, intensifying scrutiny on
regulatory and corporate decision-makers. 
( The industry’s familiarity with traditional generating
resources (e.g., large centralized fossil and nuclear
plants) and relative lack of familiarity with newer
alternatives (e.g., demand-side resources such as energy
ef ciency and demand response, or smaller, modular
generating resources like combined heat and power)
could lead regulators and utilities to underestimate risks
associated with traditional resources and overestimate
risks of newer resources. 
( Finally, investment decisions about generation resources
(especially nuclear power) during the last major build
cycle that was led by vertically-integrated utilities, in the
1970s and 80s, destroyed tens of billions of dollars of
consumer and shareholder wealth. 
For these and other reasons, a comprehensive look at risks
and costs of today’s generation resources is in order.
While this discussion is most directly applicable to regulators
(and other parties) in vertically-integrated states where electric
utilities build and own generation, it also has implications for
regulators (and other parties) in restructured states. For
example, regulators in some restructured states (e.g.,
Massachusetts) are beginning to allow transmission and
distribution (T&D) utilities to own generation again, speci cally
small-scale renewable generation to comprise a certain
percentage of a larger renewable portfolio standard. Further,
enhanced appreciation of the risks embedded in T&D utilities’
supply portfolios could induce regulators to require utilities to
employ best practices with regard to portfolio management,
thereby reducing the risks and costs of providing electricity
service.39 Finally, regulators in all states can direct electric
utilities to invest in cost-effective demand-side resources,
which, as the following discussion makes clear, are utilities’
lowest-cost and lowest-risk resources.
PAST AS PROLOGUE: FINANCIAL
DISASTERS FROM THE 1980s
The last time regulated U.S. utilities played a central role in
building signi cant new generating capacity additions as part 
of a major industry-wide build cycle was during the 1970s and
80s.40 At the time the industry’s overwhelming focus was on
nuclear power, with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
licensing construction of more than 200 nuclear power plants. 
The dif culties the industry experienced were numerous 
and well-known: more than 100 nuclear plants abandoned 
in various stages of development;41 cost overruns so high 
that the average plant cost three times initial estimates;42 and
total “above-market” costs to society—ratepayers, taxpayers
and shareholders—estimated at more than $200 billion.43
OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES
THE CAPITAL INVESTED BY U.S. ELECTRIC UTILITIES TO BUILD A SMARTER, CLEANER, MORE
RESILIENT ELECTRICITY SYSTEM OVER THE NEXT TWO DECADES WILL GO TOWARDS UTILITIES’
GENERATION, TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS. 
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While the vast majority of these losses were borne by
ratepayers and taxpayers, utility shareholders were not
immune. Between 1981 and 1991, U.S. regulators
disallowed about $19 billion of investment in power plants by
regulated utilities (Figure 8).44 During this time, the industry
invested approximately $288 billion, so that the
disallowances equated to about 6.6 percent of total
investment. The majority of the disallowances were related to
nuclear plant construction, and most could be traced to a
 nding by regulators that utility management was to blame. 
To put this in perspective for the current build cycle,
consider Figure 9. For illustrative purposes, it shows what
disallowances of 6.6 percent of IOU investment would look
like for shareholders in the current build cycle, using
Brattle’s investment projections for the 2010-2030 timeframe
referenced earlier. The table also shows what shareholder
losses would be if regulators were to disallow investment a) at
half the rate of disallowances of the 1981-91 period; and b)
at twice the rate of that period.45
Obviously, the average disallowance ratio from the 1980s
doesn’t tell the full story. A few companies bore the brunt of
the regulatory action. One of the largest disallowances was for
New York’s Nine Mile Point 2 nuclear plant, where the
$2 billion-plus disallowance was estimated to be 34 percent of
the project’s original capital cost.46 When Niagara Mohawk, the
lead utility partner in the project, wrote down its investment in
the project by $890 million, Standard & Poor’s lowered the
company’s credit rating by two notches, from A- to BBB. Thus
the risk inherent in building the Nine Mile Point 2 plant was
visited on investors, who experienced a loss of value of at least
$890 million, and consumers, who faced potentially higher
interest rates going forward. A major theme of this paper is
how consumer and investor interests are intertwined, and how
both are served by strategies that limit risk.
Another large disallowance was levied on Paci c Gas and
Electric for the Diablo Canyon nuclear station in California. The
disallowance took the form of a “performance plan” that set
consumers’ price for power at a level that was independent of
the plant’s actual cost. In its 1988 decision, the California
Public Utilities Commission approved a settlement whereby
PG&E would collect $2 billion less, calculated on a net present
value basis, than it had spent to build the plant. The CPUC’s
decision to approve the disallowance was controversial, and
some felt it didn’t go far enough. The California Division of
Ratepayer Advocate (DRA) calculated PG&E’s actual
“imprudence” to be $4.4 billion (about 75 percent of the
plant’s  nal cost), and concluded that customers ultimately
paid $2.4 billion more than was prudent for the plant—even
after the $2 billion disallowance.47
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A major theme of this paper is how consumer 
and investor interests are intertwined, and how both
are served by strategies that limit risk.
These two large disallowances could be joined by many other
examples where unrecognized risk “came home to roost.”
Consider the destruction of shareholder equity that occurred
when Public Service of New Hampshire (PSNH) declared
bankruptcy in 1988 because of the burden of its investment
in the Seabrook Nuclear Unit, or the enormous debt burden
placed on ratepayers by the failure of New York’s largest utility,
Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO), or the 1983 multi-
billion dollar municipal bond default by the Washington Public
Power Supply System (WPPSS) when it abandoned attempts
to construct  ve nuclear units in southeast Washington.
U.S. UTILITY GENERATION INVESTMENT DISALLOWED 
BY REGULATORS, 1981-1991
ILLUSTRATIVE PROSPECTIVE SHAREHOLDER LOSSES 
DUE TO REGULATORY DISALLOWANCES, 2010-2030
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All of these  nancial disasters share four important traits: 
• a weak planning process;
• the attempted development of large, capital-intensive
central generation resources;
• utility management’s rigid commitment to a preferred
investment course; and
• regulators’ unwillingness to burden consumers with costs
judged retrospectively to be imprudent.
We do not propose to assess blame twenty- ve years later,
but we do question whether the regulatory process correctly
interpreted the risk involved in the construction of these
plants—whether, with all risks accounted for, these plants
should actually have been part of a “least cost” portfolio for
these utilities. The lesson is clear: both investors and
customers would have been much better served if the
regulators had practiced “risk-aware” regulation.
Finally, while the  nancial calamities mentioned here rank
among the industry’s worst, the potential for negative
consequences is probably higher today. Since the 1980s,
electric demand has grown signi cantly while the
environmental risks associated with utility operations, the costs
of developing new generation resources, and the pace of
technology development have all increased substantially. And,
as noted earlier, electric utilities have entered the current build
cycle with lower  nancial ratings than they had in the 1980s.
CHARACTERISTICS OF 
GENERATION RESOURCES
A utility’s generation portfolio typically consists of a variety of
resources that vary in their costs and operating characteristics.
Some plants have high capital costs but lower fuel costs (e.g.,
coal and nuclear) or no fuel costs (e.g., hydro, wind, solar PV).
Other plants have lower capital costs but relatively high fuel
and operating costs (e.g., natural gas combined cycle). Some
plants are designed to operate continuously in “base load”
mode, while others are designed to run relatively few hours
each year, ramping up and down quickly. 
Some resources (including demand response) offer  rm
capacity in the sense that they are able to be called upon, 
or “dispatchable,” in real time, while other resources are 
not dispatchable or under the control of the utility or system
operator (e.g., some hydro, wind, solar PV). 
Generation resources also vary widely in their design lives and
exposure to climate regulations, among other differences. 
None of these characteristics per se makes a resource more or
less useful in a utility’s resource “stack.” Some utility systems
operate with a large percentage of generation provided by
base load plants. Other systems employ a large amount of
non-dispatchable generation like wind energy, combined with
 exible gas or hydro generation to supply capacity. What’s
important is how the resources combine in a portfolio.
For example, in 2008 the Colorado Public Utilities Commission
determined that an optimum portfolio for Xcel Energy would
include a large amount of wind production, mixed in with
natural gas generation and older base load coal plants. Xcel
has learned how to manage its system to accommodate large
amounts of wind production even though wind is not a “ rm”
resource. In October 2011, Xcel Energy set a world record for
wind energy deployment by an integrated utility: in a one-hour
period, wind power provided 55.6 percent of the energy
delivered on the Xcel Colorado system.48
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DECIPHERING THE LEVELIZED 
COST OF ELECTRICITY
Despite the differences between generation resources, it’s
possible to summarize and compare their respective costs 
in a single numerical measure. This quantity, called the
“levelized cost of electricity,” or “LCOE,” indicates the cost
per megawatt-hour for electricity over the life of the plant.
LCOE encompasses all expected costs over the life of the
plant, including costs for capital, operations and
maintenance (O&M) and fuel.
Three of the most commonly cited sources of LCOE data for
new U.S. generation resources are the Energy Information
Administration (EIA); the California Energy Commission
(CEC); and the international advisory and asset management
 rm Lazard. In a recent publication, the Union of Concerned
Scientists (UCS) combined the largely consensus LCOE
estimates from these three sources to produce a graphic
illustrating LCOE for a range of resources (Figure 10).49 The
data is expressed in dollars per megawatt-hour, in 2010
dollars, for resources assumed to be online in 2015. 
The UCS chart allows a visual comparison of the relative LCOEs
among the selected group of resources. The width of the bars in
the chart re ects the uncertainty in the cost of each resource,
including the variation in LCOE that can result in different
regions of the U.S. The UCS report also shows the resources’
relative exposure to future carbon costs—not surprisingly,
coal-based generation would be most heavily affected—as
well as their dependence on federal investment incentives.50
LEVELIZED COST OF ELECTRICITY FOR VARIOUS GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES IN 2015 (2010$)
Source: Union of Concerned Scientists
I Figure 10
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We’ll use these LCOE estimates to illustrate the combined
attributes of cost and risk for new generation resources. To do
this, we’ll take the midpoint of the cost ranges (including a
medium estimate for costs associated with carbon controls)
for each technology and create an indicative ranking of these
resources by highest to lowest LCOE (Figure 11).
For consistency, we use UCS’s data compilation, which is based
on 2010 cost estimates, without modi cation. But the actual
cost of nuclear power in 2015 is likely to be sharply higher than
this estimate following the Fukushima nuclear accident and
recent experience with new nuclear projects. For wind and
photovoltaic power, the actual costs in 2015 are likely to be
lower than the estimate due to recent sharp cost declines and
the 2011 market prices for these resources.51
Several observations are in order about this ranking. First, some
of the technologies show a very wide range of costs, notably
geothermal, large solar PV and solar thermal. The breadth of the
range represents, in part, the variation in performance of the
technology in various regions of the country. In other words, the
underlying cost estimates incorporate geographically varying
geothermal and solar energy levels.
Second, the estimates used in this ranking are sensitive to
many assumptions; the use of the midpoint to represent a
technology in this ranking may suggest greater precision than
is warranted. For this reason, the ranking shown in Figure 11
should be considered an indicative ranking. Two resources
that are adjacent in the ranking might switch places under
modest changes in the assumptions. That said, the ranking
is useful for visualizing the relative magnitude of costs
associated with various technologies and how those are
projected to compare in the next few years.
Finally, the LCOE ranking tells only part of the story. The
main point of this paper is that the price for any resource
does not take into account the relative risk of acquiring it. In
the next section we will examine these same technologies
and estimate the composite risk to consumers, the utility and
its investors for each technology.
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any resource does not take into account the relative
risk of acquiring it.
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RELATIVE COST RANKING OF 
NEW GENERATION RESOURCES
HIGHEST LEVELIZED COST 
OF ELECTRICITY (2010)
LOWEST LEVELIZED COST 
OF ELECTRICITY (2010)
Solar Thermal
Solar—Distributed*
Large Solar PV*
Coal IGCC-CCS
Solar Thermal w/ incentives
Coal IGCC
Nuclear*
Coal IGCC-CCS w/ incentives
Coal IGCC w/ incentives
Large Solar PV w/ incentives*
Pulverized Coal
Nuclear w/ incentives*
Biomass
Geothermal
Biomass w/ incentives
Natural Gas CC-CCS
Geothermal w/ incentives
Onshore Wind*
Natural Gas CC
Onshore Wind w/ incentives*
Biomass Co- ring
Ef ciency
* Cost ranking based on 2010 data. 
Does not re ect recent cost increases
for nuclear or cost decreases for solar
PV and wind.
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RELATIVE RISK OF 
NEW GENERATION RESOURCES
In Figure 7 on p. 21, we identi ed many of the time-related
and cost-related risks that attach to a decision to choose a
utility resource. We will now examine various generation
resource choices in light of these risks, grouping those
examples of risk into seven categories:
( Construction Cost Risk: includes unplanned cost
increases, delays and imprudent utility actions
( Fuel and Operating Cost Risk: includes fuel cost and
availability, as well as O&M cost risks
( New Regulation Risk: includes air and water quality
rules, waste disposal, land use, and zoning
( Carbon Price Risk: includes state or federal limits on
greenhouse gas emissions
( Water Constraint Risk: includes the availability and cost
of cooling and process water
( Capital Shock Risk: includes availability and cost of
capital, and risk to  rm due to project size 
( Planning Risk: includes risk of inaccurate load forecasts,
competitive pressure
These risks are discussed in detail below.
CONSTRUCTION COST RISK
Construction cost risk is the risk that the cost to develop,
 nance and construct a generation resource will exceed
initial estimates. This risk depends on several factors,
including the size of the project, the complexity of the
technology, and the experience with developing and building
such projects. The riskiest generation resources in this
regard are technologies still in development, such as
advanced nuclear and fossil- red plants with carbon capture
and storage. Construction cost risk is especially relevant for
nuclear plants due to their very large size and long lead
times. (Recall that a large percentage of the disallowed
investment during the 1980s was for nuclear plants.)
Transmission line projects are also subject to cost overruns,
as are other large generation facilities. For example, Duke
Energy’s Edwardsport coal gasi cation power plant in Indiana
has experienced billion-dollar cost overruns that have raised
the installed cost to $5,593 per kilowatt, up from an original
estimate of $3,364 per kilowatt.52
The lowest construction cost risk attaches to energy ef ciency
and to renewable technologies with known cost histories. In
the middle will be technologies that are variations on known
technologies (e.g., biomass) and resources with familiar
construction regimes (e.g., gas and coal thermal plants).
FUEL AND OPERATING COST RISK
Fossil-fueled and nuclear generation is assigned “medium
risk” for the potential upward trend of costs and the volatility
familiar to natural gas supply.53 Ef ciency and renewable
generation have no “fuel” risk. Biomass is assigned “medium”
in this risk category because of a degree of uncertainty about
the cost and environmental assessment of that fuel. Plants
with higher labor components (e.g., nuclear, coal) have
higher exposure to in ationary impacts on labor costs.
Analysts are split on the question of the future price of
natural gas. The large reserves in shale formations and the
ability to tap those resources economically through new
applications of technology suggest that the price of natural
gas may remain relatively low for the future and that the
traditional volatility of natural gas prices will dampen. On the
other hand, there remains substantial uncertainty about the
quantity of economically recoverable shale gas reserves and
controversy about the industrial processes used to develop
these unconventional resources.
Intermittency vs. Risk
Certain resources, like wind, solar, and some hydropower
facilities, are termed “intermittent” or “variable” resources.
This means that while the power produced by them can
be well characterized over the long run and successfully
predicted in the short run, it cannot be precisely scheduled
or dispatched. For that reason, variable resources are
assigned a relatively low “capacity value” compared to base
load power plants. The operating characteristics of any
resource affect how it is integrated into a generation
portfolio, and how its output is balanced by other resources.  
This characteristic, intermittency, should not be confused
with the concept of risk. Recall that risk is the expected
value of a loss. In this case, the “loss” would be that the
plant does not perform as expected—that it does not ful ll
its role in a generation portfolio. For wind or solar resources,
intermittency is expected and is accommodated in the
portfolio design. Thus, while individual wind towers might be
highly intermittent, and a collection of towers in a wind farm
less so, a wind farm can also be termed highly reliable and
present low risk because it will likely operate as predicted. 
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There is also signi cant debate at the moment about the
future price of coal. Some sources of low-sulfur coal are
being depleted, raising the specter of higher production costs.
Further, U.S. exports to China and other countries suggest
upward pressure on this traditionally stable-priced fuel. 
In this report we have steered a middle course on natural gas
and coal prices, assuming that the risk of future surprises in
natural gas and coal availability and price to be “medium.” This
is consistent with the price projection for these two generation
fuels used by the Energy Information Administration in its
current long-term energy forecast. In its most recent estimate,
EIA assumes a real annual price escalation between 2010 
and 2035 of about 1.3 percent for coal at the mine mouth and
1.8 percent for natural gas at the wellhead.54
Finally, operating cost risk includes the potential for
catastrophic failure of a resource. This is especially signi cant
for systems that could be taken down by a single point of
failure. Contrast the impact of the failure of a turbine at a large
steam plant as compared to the failure of a single turbine 
at a 100-turbine wind farm. The  rst failure causes the
unavailability of 100 percent of capacity; the second failure
causes a 1 percent reduction in capacity availability. Even if
the probabilities of the failures are widely different, the size of
the loss (risk) has cost implications for the reserve capacity
(insurance) that must be carried on the large plant. Small
outages are much easier to accommodate than large ones.55
I
Intermittency should not be confused with the
concept of risk… For wind or solar resources,
intermittency is expected and is accommodated 
in the portfolio design.
Modularity and unit size are also relevant to demand-side
resources that are, by their nature, diverse. Designing good
energy ef ciency programs involves scrutinizing individual
measures for the potential that they may not deliver the
expected level of energy savings over time. This estimate can
be factored into expectations for overall program performance
so that the resource performs as expected. Since it would be
extremely unlikely for individual measure failures to produce
a catastrophic loss of the resource, diverse demand-side
resources are, on this measure, less risky than large
generation-side resources.
NEW REGULATION RISK
Nuclear generation is famously affected by accidents and the
resulting changes in regulations. The recent accident at
Fukushima in Japan illustrates how even a seemingly settled
technology—in this case, GE boiling water reactors—can
receive increased regulatory scrutiny. Further, the future of
nuclear waste disposal remains unclear, even though the
current  eet of reactors is buffered by reserves that are
designed to cover this contingency. For these reasons, we
consider nuclear power to face a high risk of future regulations.
Carbon sequestration and storage (CCS) appears to be
subject to similar elevated risks regarding liability. The
ownership and responsibility for long-term maintenance and
monitoring for carbon storage sites will remain an unknown
risk factor in coal and gas generation proposed with CCS. 
Other thermal generation (e.g., biomass and geothermal) are
also given a “medium” probability due to potential air regulations
and land use regulations. Finally, as noted above, the price of
natural gas, especially shale gas produced using “fracking”
techniques, is at risk of future environmental regulation.
CARBON PRICE RISK
Fossil generation without CCS has a high risk of being
affected by future carbon emission limits. Although there is
no political agreement on the policy mechanism to place a
cost on carbon (i.e., tax or cap), the authors expect that the
scienti c evidence of climate change will eventually compel
concerted federal action and that greenhouse gas emissions
will be costly for fossil-fueled generation. Energy ef ciency,
renewable and nuclear resources have no exposure to
carbon risk, at least with respect to emissions at the plant.56
A more complex story appears when we consider the
emissions related to the full life-cycle of generation
technologies and their fuel cycles. For example, nuclear 
fuel production is an energy-intensive and carbon-intensive
process on its own. As the cost of emitting carbon rises, 
we should expect the cost of nuclear fuel to rise.
Similar comments could apply to renewable facilities that
require raw materials and fabrication that will, at least in the
near-term, involve carbon-emitting production processes.
However, these effects are second-order and much smaller
than the carbon impact of primary generation fuels or motive
power (e.g., coal, gas, wind, sun, nuclear reactions). The
exposure of biomass to carbon constraints will depend on 
the eventual interpretation of carbon offsets and life-cycle
analyses. For that reason, biomass and co- ring with
biomass is assigned a non-zero risk of “low.”
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57    J.F. Kenny et al., “Estimated use of water in the United States in 2005,” U.S. Geological Survey Circular 1344 (Reston, VA: U.S. Geological Survey, 2009), http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1344/pdf/c1344.pdf.
58    For a discussion of freshwater use by U.S. power plants, see Kristen Averyt et al., Freshwater Use by U.S. Power Plants (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, 2011),
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/ew3/ew3-freshwater-use-by-us-power-plants.pdf.
59    Bernstein Research, U.S. Utilities: Coal-Fired Generation is Squeezed in the Vice of EPA Regulation; Who Wins and Who Loses? (New York: Bernstein Research, 2010), 69.
60    “U.S. Utility Survey Respondents Believe Energy Prices Will Rise Signi cantly, Place Emphasis on Growing Nexus of Water and Energy Challenge,” Black & Veatch press release, June 13, 2011,
http://www.bv.com/wcm/press_release/06132011_9417.aspx.
61    National Drought Mitigation Center, “U.S. Drought Monitor: Texas,” August 2, 2011, http://droughtmonitor.unl.edu/archive/20110802/pdfs/TX_dm_110802.pdf.
62    Samantha Bryant, “ERCOT examines grid management during high heat, drought conditions,” Community Impact Newspaper, October 14, 2011, http://impactnews.com/articles/ercot-examines-
grid-management-during-high-heat,-drought-conditions.
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WATER CONSTRAINT RISK
Electric power generation—speci cally the cooling of power
plants—consumes about 40 percent of all U.S. freshwater
withdrawals.57 The availability and cost of water required for
electricity generation will vary with geography but attaches to
all of the thermal resources.58 The recent promulgation by
the EPA of the “once-through” cooling rule illustrates the
impact that federal regulation can have on thermal facilities;
one estimate predicts that more than 400 generating plants
providing 27 percent of the nation’s generating capacity may
need to install costly cooling towers to minimize impacts on
water resources.59 One potential approach, especially for
solar thermal, is the use of air-cooling, which signi cantly
lowers water use at a moderate cost to ef ciency. Non-
thermal generation and energy ef ciency have no exposure
to this category of risk.
Water emerged as a signi cant issue for the U.S. electric
power sector in 2011. A survey of more than 700 U.S. utility
leaders by Black & Veatch indicated “water management was
rated as the business issue that could have the greatest
impact on the utility industry.”60 Texas suffered from record
drought in 2011 at the same time that it experienced all-time
highs in electricity demand. Figure 12 depicts widespread
“exceptional drought” conditions in Texas on August 2, 2011,61
the day before the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT)
experienced record-breaking peak demand. ERCOT managed
to avoid rolling blackouts but warned that continued drought
and lack of suf cient cooling water could lead to generation
outages totaling “several thousand megawatts.”62
I Figure 12
DROUGHT CONDITIONS IN TEXAS, AUGUST 2, 2011
  D0 Abnormally Dry
  D1 Drought - Moderate
  D2 Drought - Severe
  D3 Drought - Extreme
  D4 Drought - Exceptional
http://drought.unl.edu/dm
“Retire or Retro t” Decisions for Coal-Fired Plants
In this report, we’ve stressed how risk-aware regulation
can improve the outcomes of utility selection of new
resources. But many regulators will be focusing on
existing power plants during the next few years. A key
question facing the industry is whether to close coal plants
in the face of new and future EPA regulations, or spend
money on control systems to clean up some of the plant
emissions and keep them running.
States and utilities are just coming to grips with these sorts
of decisions. In 2010, Colorado implemented the new
Clean Air Clean Jobs Act, under which the Colorado PUC
examined Xcel Energy’s entire coal  eet. The Colorado
Commission entered a single decision addressing the fate
of ten coal units.  Some were closed, some were retro tted
with pollution controls, and others were converted to burn
natural gas. Elsewhere, Progress Energy Carolinas moved
decisively to address the same issue with eleven coal units
in North Carolina.
We expect that three types of coal plants will emerge in
these analyses: plants that should obviously be closed;
newer coal plants that should be retro tted and continue
to run; and “plants in the middle.” Decisions about these
plants in the middle will require regulators to assess the
risk of future fuel prices, customer growth, environmental
regulations, capital and variable costs for replacement
capacity, etc.  In short, state commissions will be asked to
assess the risks of various paths forward for the plants for
which the economics are subject to debate.
The tools we describe in this report for new resources
apply equally well to these situations. Regulators should
treat this much like an IRP proceeding (see “Utilizing
Robust Planning Processes” on p. 40). Utilities should be
required to present multiple different scenarios for their
disposition of coal plants. The cost and risk of each
scenario should be tested using sensitivities for fuel costs,
environmental requirements, cost of capital, and so forth.
At the end, regulators should enter a decision that
addresses all of the relevant risks.
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63    For a discussion of how water scarcity could impact municipal water and electric utilities and their bondholders, see Sharlene Leurig, The Ripple Effect: Water Risk in the Municipal Bond Market
(Boston, MA: Ceres, 2010), http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/water-bonds/at_download/ le. For a framework for managing corporate water risk, see Brooke Barton et al., The Ceres Aqua
Gauge: A Framework for 21st Century Water Risk Management (Boston, MA: Ceres, 2011), http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/aqua-gauge/at_download/ le.
64    North American Electric Reliability Corporation, Winter Reliability Assessment 2011/2012 (Atlanta, GA: North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2011), 29,
http://www.nerc.com/ les/2011WA_Report_FINAL.pdf.
65    David Shaffer, “Brand new power plant is idled by economy,” Minneapolis StarTribune, January 9, 2012, http://www.startribune.com/business/134647533.html.
III. COSTS AND RISKS OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES
In addition to drought, water rights could be an issue for
electricity generators in Texas (and elsewhere).63 The North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) points out
that in an extreme scenario, up to 9,000 MW of Texas’
generation capacity—over 10 percent of ERCOT’s total
installed capacity—could be at risk of curtailment if
generators’ water rights were recalled.64
CAPITAL SHOCK RISK
This risk is generally proportional to the size of the capital
outlay and the time required for construction of a generating
unit. Simply put, the larger the capital outlay and the longer
that cost recovery is uncertain, the higher the risk to
investors. In this regard, nuclear installations and large new
coal facilities with CCS face the highest risk. Smaller, more
modular additions to capacity and especially resources that
are typically acquired through purchase power agreements
record less risk. Finally, distributed solar generation,
modi cations to enable biomass co- ring and ef ciency 
are accorded low exposure to the risk of capital shock.
PLANNING RISK
This risk relates to the possibility that the underlying
assumptions justifying the choice of a resource may change,
sometimes even before the resource is deployed. This can
occur, for example, when electric demand growth is weaker
than forecast, which can result in a portion of the capacity of
the new resource being excess. In January 2012, lower-than-
anticipated electricity demand, combined with unexpectedly
low natural gas prices, led Minnesota-based wholesale
cooperative Great River Energy to mothball its brand-new,
$437 million Spiritwood coal- red power plant immediately
upon the plant’s completion. The utility will pay an estimated
$30 million next year in maintenance and debt service for
the idled plant.65
Generation projects with a high ratio of  xed costs and long
construction lead times are most susceptible to planning risk.
This means that the exposure of base load plants is higher
than peaking units, and larger capacity units have more
exposure than smaller plants.
In addition to macroeconomic factors like recessions, the
electric industry of the early 21st century poses four
important unknown factors affecting energy planning. These
are 1) the rate of adoption of electric vehicles; 2) the pace of
energy ef ciency and demand response deployment; 3) the
rate of growth of customer-owned distributed generation; and
4) progress toward energy storage. These four unknowns
affect various resources in different ways. 
Electric vehicles could increase peak demand if customers
routinely charge their cars after work, during the remaining
hours of the afternoon electrical peak. On the other hand, if
electric vehicle use is coupled with time-of-use pricing, this
new load has the opportunity to provide relatively desirable
nighttime energy loads, making wind generation and nuclear
generation and underutilized fossil generation more valuable
in many parts of the country. 
Energy ef ciency (EE) and demand response (DR) affect
both electricity (kilowatt-hours) and demand (kilowatts). 
EE and DR programs differ in relatively how much electricity
or demand they conserve. Depending on portfolio design, 
EE and DR may improve or worsen utility load factors, shifting
toward more peaking resources and away from base load
plants. Changing customer habits and new “behavioral” EE
efforts add to the dif culty in forecasting demand over time.
Distributed generation, especially small solar installation, 
is expanding rapidly, spurred by new  nancing models that
have lowered the capital outlay from consumers. In addition,
we may expect commercial and industrial customers to
continue to pursue combined heat and power applications,
especially if retail electricity rates continue to rise. Both of
these trends will have hard-to-predict impacts on aggregate
utility demand and the relative value of different generation
resources, but also impacts on primary and secondary
distribution investment.
Finally, electric storage at reasonable prices would be 
a proverbial game-changer, increasing the relative value 
of intermittent resources such as wind and solar. Microgrids
with local generation would also be boosted by low-cost
battery storage.
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ESTABLISHING COMPOSITE RISK
In line with the foregoing discussion, the table in Figure 13
summarizes the degree of exposure of various generation
technologies to these seven categories of risk. The
technologies listed are taken from UCS’s LCOE ranking in
Figure 10 on p. 28, plus three more: natural gas combined
cycle with CCS, biomass co- ring and distributed solar PV
generation. The chart estimates the degree of risk for each
resource across seven major categories of risk, with
estimates ranging from “None” to “Very High.”
Three comments are in order. First, these assignments of
relative risk were made by the authors, and while they are
informed they are also subjective. As we discuss later,
regulators should conduct their own robust examination of
the relative costs and risks including those that are unique to
their jurisdiction. Second, the assessment of risk for each
resource is intended to be relative to each other, and not
absolute in a quantitative sense. Third, while there are likely
some correlations between these risk categories—resources
with low fuel risk will have low carbon price exposure, for
example—other variables exhibit substantial independence. 
I Figure 13
RELATIVE RISK EXPOSURE OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES
Resource Initial Cost Risk Fuel, O&M 
Cost Risk
New Regulation
Risk
Carbon 
Price Risk
Water 
Constraint Risk
Capital Shock 
Risk Planning Risk
Biomass Medium Medium Medium Medium High Medium Medium
Biomass w/ incentives Medium Medium Medium Medium High Low Medium
Biomass Co- ring Low Low Medium Low High Low Low
Coal IGCC High Medium Medium Medium High Medium Medium
Coal IGCC w/ incentives High Medium Medium Medium High Low Medium
Coal IGCC-CCS High Medium Medium Low High High High
Coal IGCC-CCS w/ incentives High Medium Medium Low High Medium High
Ef ciency Low None Low None None Low None
Geothermal Medium None Medium None High Medium Medium
Geothermal w/ incentives Medium None Medium None High Low Medium
Large Solar PV Low None Low None None Medium Low
Large Solar PV w/ incentives Low None Low None None Low Low
Natural Gas CC Medium High Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium
Natural Gas CC-CCS High Medium Medium Low High High Medium
Nuclear Very High Medium High None High Very High High
Nuclear w/ incentives Very High Medium High None High High Medium
Onshore Wind Low None Low None None Low Low
Onshore Wind w/ incentives Low None Low None None None Low
Pulverized Coal Medium Medium High Very High High Medium Medium
Solar - Distributed Low None Low None None Low Low
Solar Thermal Medium None Low None High Medium Medium
Solar Thermal w/ incentives Medium None Low None High Low Medium
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I Figure 15 I Figure 14
RELATIVE COST AND RISK RANKINGS OF 
NEW GENERATION RESOURCES WITHOUT INCENTIVES
HIGHEST LEVELIZED COST 
OF ELECTRICITY (2010)
LOWEST LEVELIZED COST 
OF ELECTRICITY (2010)
HIGHEST COMPOSITE RISK
LOWEST COMPOSITE RISK
Solar Thermal
Solar–Distributed*
Large Solar PV*
Coal IGCC-CCS
Coal IGCC
Nuclear*
Pulverized Coal
Biomass
Geothermal
Natural Gas CC-CCS
Onshore Wind*
Natural Gas CC
Biomass Co- ring
Ef ciency
Nuclear
Pulverized Coal
Coal IGCC-CCS
Coal IGCC
Natural Gas CC-CCS
Biomass
Natural Gas CC
Geothermal
Biomass Co- ring
Solar Thermal
Large Solar PV
Onshore Wind
Solar–Distributed
Ef ciency
To derive a ranking of these resources with respect to risk, 
we assigned numeric values to the estimated degrees of risk
(None=0, Very High=4) and totaled the rating for each
resource. The scores were then renormalized so that the score
of the highest-risk resource is 100 and the others are adjusted
accordingly. The composite relative risk ranking that emerges
is shown in Figure 14, which, for ease of comparison, we
present alongside the relative cost ranking from Figure 11.
The risk ranking differs from the cost ranking in several
important ways. First, the risk ranking shows a clear
difference between renewable resources and non-renewable
resources. Second, nuclear generation moves from the
middle of the cost ranking to the top of the risk ranking.
Notably, energy ef ciency ranks lowest in both cost and risk.
To illustrate how resources stack up against each other in more
general terms, and for simplicity of viewing, Figure 15 presents
those same rankings without information about incentives.
* Cost ranking based on 2010 data. Does not re ect recent cost increases for nuclear or
cost decreases for solar PV and wind.
* Cost ranking based on 2010 data. Does not re ect recent cost increases for nuclear or
cost decreases for solar PV and wind.
RELATIVE COST RANKING AND RELATIVE RISK RANKING 
OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES
HIGHEST COMPOSITE RISK 
LOWEST COMPOSITE RISK 
Nuclear
Pulverized Coal
Coal IGCC-CCS
Nuclear w/ incentives
Coal IGCC
Coal IGCC-CCS w/ incentives
Natural Gas CC-CCS
Biomass
Coal IGCC w/ incentives
Natural Gas CC
Biomass w/ incentives
Geothermal
Biomass Co- ring
Geothermal w/ incentives
Solar Thermal
Solar Thermal w/ incentives
Large Solar PV
Large Solar PV w/ incentives
Onshore Wind
Solar—Distributed
Onshore Wind w/ incentives
Ef ciency
HIGHEST LEVELIZED COST 
OF ELECTRICITY (2010)
LOWEST LEVELIZED COST 
OF ELECTRICITY (2010)
Solar Thermal
Solar—Distributed*
Large Solar PV*
Coal IGCC-CCS
Solar Thermal w/ incentives
Coal IGCC
Nuclear*
Coal IGCC-CCS w/ incentives
Coal IGCC w/ incentives
Large Solar PV w/ incentives*
Pulverized Coal
Nuclear w/ incentives*
Biomass
Geothermal
Biomass w/ incentives
Natural Gas CC-CCS
Geothermal w/ incentives
Onshore Wind*
Natural Gas CC
Onshore Wind w/ incentives*
Biomass Co- ring
Ef ciency
I
The risk ranking shows a clear difference between
renewable resources and non-renewable resources.
Nuclear generation moves from the middle of the
cost ranking to the top of the risk ranking. Notably,
energy ef ciency ranks lowest in both cost and risk.
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To test the robustness of the composite risk ranking, we 
also examined two rankings where the scores were weighted.
In one case, the environmental factors were given double
weight; in the other, the cost factors were given double
weight. As before, the scores were renormalized so that the
highest-scoring resource is set to 100. The results of the
unweighted ranking, together with the two weighted rankings,
are shown in Figure 16. By inspection, one can see that the
rank order changes very little across the three methods, so
that the risk ranking in Figure 14 appears to be relatively
robust. Once again, we emphasize that these  gures are
intended to show the relative risk among the resources, 
not to be absolute measures of risk.66
I Figure 16
SUMMARY OF RISK SCORES FOR NEW GENERATION RESOURCES
Resource Composite 
Score
Environmental
Weighted 
Score
Cost 
Weighted 
Score
Biomass 79 79 72
Biomass w/ incentives 74 76 66
Biomass Co- ring 53 57 44
Coal IGCC 84 83 79
Coal IGCC w/ incentives 79 79 72
Coal IGCC-CCS 89 84 87
Coal IGCC-CCS w/ incentives 84 81 80
Ef ciency 16 14 16
Geothermal 58 59 52
Geothermal w/ incentives 53 55 46
Large Solar PV 26 22 28
Large Solar PV w/ incentives 21 19 21
Natural Gas CC 79 76 75
Natural Gas CC-CCS 84 79 82
Nuclear 100 91 100
Nuclear w/ incentives 89 83 89
Onshore Wind 21 19 21
Onshore Wind w/ incentives 16 16 15
Pulverized Coal 95 100 82
Solar - Distributed 21 19 21
Solar Thermal 53 52 49
Solar Thermal w/ incentives 47 48 43
66    Dr. Mark Cooper, a longtime utility sector analyst and supporter of consumer interests, recently arrived at similar conclusions about composite risk; see Cooper, Least-Cost Planning For 21st Century
Electricity Supply (So. Royalton, VT: Vermont Law School, 2011), http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/21st%20Century%20Least%20Cost%20Planning.pdf. Cooper’s analysis incorporated not
only variations in “risk” and “uncertainty,” but also the degrees of “ignorance” and “ambiguity” associated with various resources and the universe of possible future energy scenarios.
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III. COSTS AND RISKS OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES
Finally, we can combine the information in the cost ranking
and the risk ranking into a single chart. Figure 17 shows
how resources compare with each other in the two
dimensions of cost and risk. The position of a resource along
the horizontal axis denotes the relative risk of each resource,
while the position on the vertical axis shows the relative cost
of the resource.
I Figure 17
PROJECTED UTILITY GENERATION RESOURCES IN 2015
Relative Cost and Relative Risk
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SEVEN ESSENTIAL STRATEGIES FOR STATE REGULATORS
UTILITY REGULATORS ARE FAMILIAR WITH A SCENE THAT PLAYS OUT IN THE HEARING ROOM:
DIFFERENT INTERESTS—UTILITIES, INVESTORS, CUSTOMER GROUPS, ENVIRONMENTAL
ADVOCATES AND OTHERS—COMPETE TO REDUCE COST AND RISK FOR THEIR SECTOR AT THE
EXPENSE OF THE OTHERS. WHILE THE ADVERSARIAL PROCESS MAY MAKE THIS COMPETITION
SEEM INEVITABLE, AN OVERLOOKED STRATEGY (THAT USUALLY LACKS AN ADVOCATE) IS TO
REDUCE OVERALL RISK TO EVERYONE. MINIMIZING RISK IN THE WAYS DISCUSSED IN THIS
SECTION WILL HELP ENSURE THAT ONLY THE UNAVOIDABLE BATTLES COME BEFORE
REGULATORS AND THAT THE PUBLIC INTEREST IS SERVED FIRST.
Managing risk intelligently is arguably the main duty of
regulators who oversee utility investment. But minimizing risk
isn’t simply achieving the least cost today. It is part of a
strategy to minimize overall long term costs. And, as noted
earlier, while minimizing risk is a worthy goal, eliminating risk
is not an achievable goal. The regulatory process must
provide balance for the interests of utilities, consumers and
investors in the presence of risk.
One of the goals of “risk-aware” regulation is avoiding the kind
of big, costly mistakes in utility resource acquisition that we’ve
seen in the past. But there is another, more af rmative goal:
ensuring that society’s limited resources (and consumers’
limited dollars) are spent wisely. By routinely examining and
addressing risk in every major decision, regulators will produce
lower cost outcomes in the long run, serving consumers and
the public interest in a very fundamental way.
WE IDENTIFY SEVEN ESSENTIAL
STRATEGIES THAT REGULATORS
CAN EMPLOY TO MINIMIZE RISK:
DIVERSIFYING UTILITY SUPPLY PORTFOLIOS
with an emphasis on low-carbon resources;
UTILIZING ROBUST PLANNING PROCESSES for all
utility investment (i.e., generation, transmission, distribution,
and demand-side resources like energy ef ciency);
EMPLOYING TRANSPARENT RATEMAKING
PRACTICES that reveal risk; 
USING FINANCIAL AND PHYSICAL HEDGES, 
including long-term contracts;
HOLDING UTILITIES ACCOUNTABLE for their
obligations and commitments;
OPERATING IN ACTIVE, “LEGISLATIVE” MODE,
continually seeking out and addressing risk;
REFORMING AND RE-INVENTING RATEMAKING
POLICIES as appropriate.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
4. PRACTICING RISK-
AWARE REGULATION:
I
An overlooked strategy (that usually lacks an
advocate) is to reduce overall risk to everyone.
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IV. PRACTICING RISK-AWARE REGULATION: SEVEN ESSENTIAL STRATEGIES FOR STATE REGULATORS
RISK/RETURN RELATIONSHIPS AMONG DIFFERENT FINANCIAL PORTFOLIOS 
(Illustrative)
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B: 0% stocks, 100% bonds
D: 50% stocks, 50% bonds
E: 60% stocks, 40% bonds
C: 70% stocks, 30% bonds
A: 80% stocks, 20% bonds
75% stocks, 25% bonds
100% stocks, 0% bonds
I Figure 18
67    TVA, a corporation owned by the federal government, provides electricity to nine million people in seven southeastern U.S. states; see http://www.tva.com/abouttva/index.htm.
68    As of spring 2010, TVA’s generation mix consisted mainly of coal (40 percent), natural gas (25 percent) and nuclear (18 percent); see TVA, 73.
We now discuss each of these strategies in more detail.
1. DIVERSIFYING UTILITY SUPPLY PORTFOLIOS
The concept of diversi cation plays an important role in
 nance theory. Diversi cation—investing in different asset
classes with different risk pro les—is what allows a pension
fund, for example, to reduce portfolio volatility and shield it
from outsized swings in value. 
Properly chosen elements in a diversi ed portfolio can increase
return for the same level of risk, or, conversely, can reduce risk
for a desired level of return. The simple illustration in Figure 18
allows us to consider the relative risk and return for several
portfolios consisting of stocks and bonds. Portfolio A (80%
stocks, 20% bonds) provides a higher predicted return than
Portfolio B (0% stocks, 100% bonds) even though both
portfolios have the same degree of risk. Similarly, Portfolios C
and D produce different returns at an identical level of risk that
is lower than A and B. Portfolio E (60% stocks, 40% bonds) has
the lowest risk, but at the cost of a lower return than Portfolios A
and C. The curve in Figure 18 (and the corresponding surface
in higher dimensions) is called an ef cient frontier.
We could complicate the example—by looking at investments
in cash, real estate, physical assets, commodities or credit
default swaps, say, or by distinguishing between domestic and
international stocks, or between bonds of various maturities—
but the general lesson would be the same: diversi cation helps
to lower the risk in a portfolio. 
Portfolios of utility investments and resource mixes can be
analyzed similarly. Instead of return and risk, the analysis
would examine cost and risk. And instead of stocks, bonds,
real estate and gold, the elements of a utility portfolio are
different types of power plants, energy ef ciency, purchased
power agreements, and distributed generation, among many
other potential elements. Each of these elements can be
further distinguished by type of fuel, size of plant, length of
contract, operating characteristics, degree of utility dispatch
control, and so forth. Diversi cation in a utility portfolio means
including various supply and demand-side resources that
behave independently from each other in different future
scenarios. Later we will consider these attributes in greater
detail and discuss what constitutes a diversi ed utility portfolio. 
For a real-world illustration of how diversifying resources
lowers cost and risk in utility portfolios, consider the  ndings
of the integrated resource plan recently completed by the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).67 TVA evaluated  ve
resource strategies that were ultimately re ned into a single
“recommended planning direction” that will guide TVA’s resource
investments. The resource strategies that TVA considered were:
( Strategy A: Limited Change in Current Resource Portfolio68
( Strategy B: Baseline Plan Resource Portfolio
( Strategy C: Diversity Focused Resource Portfolio
( Strategy D: Nuclear Focused Resource Portfolio
( Strategy E: EEDR (Energy Ef ciency/Demand Response)
and Renewables Focused Resource Portfolio
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69    TVA, 161.
70    In the end, TVA settled on a “recommended planning direction” that calls for demand reductions of 3,600 to 5,100 MW, energy ef ciency savings of 11,400 to 14,400 GWh, and renewable
generating capacity additions of 1,500 to 2,500 MW by 2020. At the same time, TVA plans to retire 2,400 to 4,700 MW of coal- red capacity by 2017. See TVA, 156.
71    For an example of an IRP that uses sophisticated risk modeling tools, see Paci Corp, 2011 Integrated Resource Plan (Portland, OR: Paci Corp, 2011),
http://www.paci corp.com/content/dam/paci corp/doc/Energy_Sources/Integrated_Resource_Plan/2011IRP/2011IRP-MainDocFinal_Vol1-FINAL.pdf.
Figure 19 illustrates how these strategies mapped out along an
“ef cient frontier” according to TVA’s analysis of cost and risk.69
The lowest-cost, lowest-risk strategies were the ones that
diversi ed TVA’s resource portfolio by increasing TVA’s
investment in energy ef ciency and renewable energy.70 The
highest-cost, highest-risk strategies were those that maintained
TVA’s current resource portfolio (mostly coal, natural gas and
nuclear) or emphasized new nuclear plant construction. 
The TVA analysis is very careful and deliberate. To the extent
that other analyses reached conclusions thematically different
from TVA’s, we would question whether the costs and risks of
all resources had been properly evaluated. We would also posit
that resource investment strategies that differ directionally from
TVA’s “recommended planning direction” would likely expose
customers (and, to some extent, investors) to undue risk.
Finally, given the industry’s familiarity with traditional
resources—and the possibility that regulators and utilities
may therefore underestimate the costs and risks of those
resources—the TVA example illustrates how careful planning
reveals the costs and risks of maintaining resource portfolios
that rely heavily on large base load fossil and nuclear plants. 
Robust planning processes like TVA’s are therefore essential
to making risk-aware resource choices. It is to these planning
processes that we now turn.
2. UTILIZING ROBUST PLANNING PROCESSES
In the U.S., there are two basic utility market structures:
areas where utilities own or control their own generating
resources (the “vertically integrated” model), and areas
where competitive processes establish wholesale prices (the
“organized market” model). 
In many vertically integrated markets and in some organized
markets, regulators oversee the capital investments of utilities
with a process called “integrated resource planning,” or IRP.
Begun in the 1980s, integrated resource planning is a tool to
ensure that the utilities, regulators and other stakeholders
have a common understanding of a full spectrum of possible
utility resources; that the options are examined in a
structured, disciplined way in administrative proceedings;
that demand-side resources get equal consideration
alongside supply-side resources; and that the  nal resource
plan is understood (if not necessarily accepted) by all.
Elements of a Robust IRP Process
IRP oversight varies in sophistication, importance and
outcomes across the states. Because a robust IRP process is
critical to managing risk in a utility, we describe a model IRP
process that is designed to produce utility portfolios that are
lower risk and lower cost.71
These elements characterize a robust IRP process:
• The terms and signi cance of the IRP approval (including
implications for cost recovery) are clearly stated at the
outset, often in statute or in a regulatory commission’s rules.
• The regulator reviews and approves the modeling inputs
used by the utility (e.g., demand and energy forecasts,
fuel cost projections,  nancial assumptions, discount rate,
plant costs, fuel costs, energy policy changes, etc.).
• The regulator provides guidance to utility as to the 
policy goals of the IRP, perhaps shaping the set of
portfolios examined.
• Utility analysis produces a set of resource portfolios and
analysis of parameters such as future revenue
requirement, risk, emissions pro le, and sensitivities
around input assumptions.
• In a transparent public process, the regulator examines
competing portfolios, considering the utility’s analysis as
well as input from other interested parties. 
• Demand resources such as energy ef ciency and demand
response are accorded equal status with supply resources.
• The regulator approves a plan and the utility is awarded a
“presumption of prudence” for actions that are consistent
with the approved IRP.
• The utility acquires (i.e., builds or buys) the resources
approved in the IRP, possibly through a competitive
bidding regime.
• Future challenges to prudence of utility actions are limited
to the execution of the IRP, not to the selection of resources
approved by the regulator.
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APPENDIX AA few of these elements deserve more elaboration.
( Signi cance. The IRP must be meaningful and
enforceable; there must be something valuable at stake for
the utility and for other parties. From the regulator’s point of
view, the resource planning process must review a wide
variety of portfolio choices whose robustness is tested and
compared under different assumptions about the future.
From the utilities’ perspective, acceptance or approval of an
IRP should convey that regulators support the plan’s
direction, even though speci c elements may evolve as
circumstances change. If a utility ignores the approved IRP
or takes actions that are inconsistent with an IRP without
adequate justi cation, such actions may receive extra
scrutiny at the point where the utility seeks cost recovery.
( Multiple scenarios. Many different scenarios will allow a
utility to meet its future load obligations to customers. These
scenarios will differ in cost, risk, generation characteristics,
fuel mix, levels of energy ef ciency, types of resources,
sensitivity to changes in fuel cost, and so forth. While one
scenario might apparently be lowest cost under baseline
assumptions, it may not be very resilient under different
input assumptions. Further, scenarios will differ in levels of
risk and how that risk may be apportioned to different parties
(e.g., consumers or shareholders). Regulators, with input
from interested parties, should specify the types of scenarios
that utilities should model and require utilities to perform
sensitivity analyses, manipulating key variables. 
( Consistent, active regulation. An IRP proceeding can be
a large, complex undertaking that occurs every two or three
years, or even less frequently. It is critical that regulators
become active early in the process and stay active throughout.
The regulator’s involvement should be consistent, even-
handed and focused on the big-ticket items. Of course, details
matter, but the process is most valuable when it ensures that
the utility is headed in the right direction and that its planning
avoids major errors. The regulator should then monitor a
utility’s performance and the utility should be able to trust the
regulator’s commitment to the path forward laid out in the IRP.
( Stakeholder involvement. There are at least two good
reasons to encourage broad stakeholder involvement in an IRP
process. First, parties besides the utility will bring new ideas,
close scrutiny and contrasting analysis to the IRP case, all of
which helps the regulator to make an informed, independent
decision. Second, effective stakeholder involvement can build
support for the IRP that is ultimately approved, heading off
collateral attacks and judicial appeals. An approved IRP will
affect the fortunes of many and will signal the direction that
the regulator wishes the utility to take with its supply-side and
demand-side resources. Because an IRP decision is something
of a political document in addition to being a working plan,
regulators will be well-served to include as broad a group of
stakeholders as possible when developing the IRP. 
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An approved IRP will affect the fortunes of many 
and will signal the direction that the regulator wishes
the utility to take with its supply-side and demand-
side resources… [R]egulators will be well-served 
to include as broad a group of stakeholders as
possible when developing the IRP.
( Transparency. Regulators must ensure that, to the greatest
extent possible, all parties participating in the IRP process
have timely access to utility data. Certain data may be
competitively sensitive and there is often pressure on the
regulator to restrict unduly the access to such data. One
possible solution to this challenge is to use an “independent
evaluator” who works for the commission, is trusted by all
parties and has access to all the data, including proprietary
data. The independent evaluator can verify the modeling of
the utility and assist the regulator in making an informed
decision. The cost of an independent evaluator will be small
in comparison to the bene ts (or avoided mistakes) that the
evaluator will enable. An independent evaluator will also add
 41 
IV. PRACTICING RISK-AWARE REGULATION: SEVEN ESSENTIAL STRATEGIES FOR STATE REGULATORS
IRP: “Accepted” vs. “Approved” Plans
There are two varieties of IRP plans: “accepted plans” 
and “approved plans.” Accepted plans are those where
regulators examine the utility’s process for developing its
proposed plan. This can be a thorough review in which 
the Commission solicits the opinion of other parties as 
to whether the utility undertook a transparent, inclusive,
and interactive process. If the regulator is convinced, the
regulator “accepts” the utility’s plan. This allows the utility
to proceed but does not include any presumption about
the Commission’s future judgment concerning the
prudence of actions taken under the plan.
With an “approved plan” the regulator undertakes a
thorough review of the utility’s preferred plan, possibly
along with competing IRP plans submitted by other
parties. Typically the scrutiny is more detailed and time-
consuming in this version of IRP and the regulatory
agency is immersed in the details of competing plans. At
the end of the process, the regulator “approves” an IRP
plan. This approval typically carries with it a presumption
that actions taken by the utility consistent with the plan
(including its approved amendments) are prudent. Over
time, a Commission that approves an IRP plan will
typically also examine proposed changes to the plan
necessitated by changing circumstances.
In this report, we will focus on the “approved plan”
process, although many of our  ndings apply equally to
regulators that employ the “accepted plan” process. 
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PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS ON ONE PAGE
How Energy Ef ciency Can Substitute for Generation Resources
Generic coal, gas and nuclear units are
shown at typical project sizes—more
units could be built at comparable cost. 
credibility to the regulators’ decision. In any event, the integrity
of the IRP process will depend on regulators’ ability to craft
processes that are trusted to produce unbiased results.
( Competitive bidding. A successful IRP will lower risk in the
design of a utility resource portfolio. After the planning process,
utilities begin acquiring approved resources. Some states have
found it bene cial to require the utility to undertake
competitive bidding for all resources acquired by a utility
pursuant to an IRP. If the utility will build the resource itself,
the regulator may require the utility to join the bidding process
or commit to a cap on the construction cost of the asset.72
( Role of Energy Ef ciency. A robust IRP process will fully
consider the appropriate levels of energy ef ciency, including
demand response and load management, that a utility should
undertake. Properly viewed and planned for, energy ef ciency
can be considered as equivalent to a generation resource.
Regulators in some states list projected energy ef ciency
savings on the “loads and resources table” of the utility,
adjacent to base load and peaking power plants. In Colorado,
energy ef ciency is accorded a “reserve margin” in the
integrated resource plan, as is done with generation resources.73
Since its inception in 1980, the Northwest Power and
Conservation Council, which develops and maintains a
regional power plan for the Paci c Northwest, has stressed the
role of energy ef ciency in meeting customers’ energy needs.
Figure 20 shows the Council’s analysis, demonstrating the
elements of a diversi ed energy portfolio and the role that
energy ef ciency (or “conservation”) can play in substituting
for generation resources at various levels of cost.74
Appendix 2 contains additional discussion of some of the
modeling tools available to regulators.
3. EMPLOYING TRANSPARENT RATEMAKING PRACTICES
Economist Alfred Kahn famously observed that “all regulation
is incentive regulation,” meaning that any type of economic
regulation provides a  rm with incentives to make certain
choices. Indeed, utility rate regulation’s greatest effect may
not be its ability to limit prices for consumers in the short run,
but rather the incentives it creates for utilities in the longer run.
I Figure 20
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72    For a discussion of the use of competitive bidding in resource acquisition, see Susan F. Tierney and Todd Schatzki, Competitive Procurement of Retail Electricity Supply: Recent Trends in State
Policies and Utility Practices (Boston, MA: Analysis Group, 2008), http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/Competitive_Procurement.pdf.
73    For Xcel Energy in Colorado, energy ef ciency is listed on the “loads and resources” table as a resource.  As such, it is logical that some fraction of the planned-for load reduction might not
materialize.  That portion is then assigned the standard resource reserve margin of approximately 15 percent.  The planning reserve margin is added to the projected peak load, which must be
covered by the combined supply-side and demand-side resources in the table.
74    Tom Eckman, “The 6th Power Plan… and You” (presentation at the Bonneville Power Administration Utility Energy Ef ciency Summit, Portland, Ore., March 17, 2010),
http://www.bpa.gov/Energy/N/utilities_sharing_ee/Energy_Smart_Awareness/pdf/0A_EESummit_Gen-Session_Public_Power.pdf.
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There have been many debates through the years about the
incentives that utility cost of service regulation provides. These
range from the academic and formal (e.g., the aforementioned
Averch-Johnson effect, which says that rate-regulated
companies will have an inef ciently high ratio of capital to
labor) to the common sense (e.g., price cap regulation can
induce companies to reduce quality of service; the throughput
incentive discourages electric utilities from pursuing energy
ef ciency, etc.).
While regulators may want to limit their role to being a
substitute for the competition that is missing in certain parts
of the electric industry, it is rarely possible to limit regulation’s
effects that way. The question is usually not how to eliminate
stray incentives in decisions, but rather which ones to accept
and address.
To contain risk and meet the daunting investment challenges
facing the electric industry, regulators should take care to
examine exactly what incentives are being conveyed by 
the details of the regulation they practice. We examine 
four components of cost of service regulation that affect 
a utility’s perception of risk, and likely affect its preference 
for different resources.
Current Return on Construction Work in Progress. There is
a long-standing debate about whether a utility commission
should allow a utility to include in its rates investment in 
a plant during the years of its construction. Construction
Work in Progress, or “CWIP,” is universally favored by utility
companies and by some regulators, but almost universally
opposed by advocates for small and large consumers and 
by other regulators. CWIP is against the law in some states,
mandated by law in others.
The main argument against CWIP is that it requires
consumers to pay for a plant often years before it is “used
and useful,” so that there isn’t a careful match between the
customers who pay for a plant and those who bene t from 
it. Proponents of CWIP point out that permitting a current
return on CWIP lessens the need for the utility to issue debt
and equity, arguably saving customers money, and that 
CWIP eases in the rate increase, compared to the case
where customers feel the full costs of an expensive plant
when the plant enters service. Opponents counter by noting
that customers typically have a higher discount rate than the
utilities’ return on rate base, so that delaying a rate hike is
preferred by consumers, even if the utility borrows more
money to  nance the plant until it enters service.
Setting aside the near-religious debate about the equity 
of permitting CWIP in rate base, there is another relevant
consideration. Because CWIP can help utilities secure
 nancing and phase in rate increases, CWIP is often
misunderstood as a tool for reducing risk. This is not true.
CWIP does nothing to actually reduce the risks associated
with the projects it helps to  nance. Construction cost
overruns can and do still occur (see the text box about
Progress Energy’s Levy County nuclear power plant); O&M
costs for the plant can still be unexpectedly high; anticipated
customer load may not actually materialize; and so forth.
What CWIP does is to reallocate part of the risk from utilities
(and would-be bondholders) to customers. CWIP therefore
provides utilities with both the incentive and the means to
undertake a riskier investment than if CWIP were unavailable.
CWIP, Risk Shifting and Progress Energy’s Levy Nuclear Plant
In late 2006, Progress Energy announced plans to build a
new nuclear facility in Levy County, Florida, a few months
after the state legislature approved construction work in
progress (CWIP) customer  nancing. The site is about 90
miles north of Tampa, near the Gulf of Mexico. In 2009,
Progress customers began paying for the Levy plant,
which was expected to begin service in 2016 and be built
at a cost of $4-6 billion. By the end of 2011, Progress
customers had paid $545 million toward Levy’s
construction expenses.
The Levy plant is now projected to cost up to $22 billion,
roughly four times initial estimates, and that number could
keep climbing. (In March 2012, Progress Energy’s market
value as a company was almost $16 billion; the combined
market value of Duke Energy and Progress Energy, which
are seeking to merge and are pursuing construction of  ve
nuclear facilities between them, is about $44 billion.) Levy’s
expected in-service date has pushed beyond 2021 and
possibly as late as 2027—eighteen years after Progress
customers began paying for the plant. Progress has
estimated that by 2020, Levy-related expenses could add
roughly $50 to the average residential customer’s monthly bill.
The Levy plant’s development appeared to take a step
forward in December 2011 when the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission approved its reactor design. But in February
2012, the Florida Public Service Commission approved 
a settlement agreement allowing Progress to suspend or
cancel Levy’s construction and recover $350 million from
customers through 2017. 
It is unclear whether Levy will ever be built. If the plant is
canceled, Progress customers will have paid more than 
$1 billion in rates for no electricity generation, and Florida
state law prohibits their recouping any portion of that
investment. Such an outcome could help to deteriorate
the political and regulatory climate in which Progress
operates, which could ultimately impact credit ratings and
shareholder value.  
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75    Moody’s Investors Service, Decoupling and 21st Century Rate Making (New York: Moody’s Investors Service, 2011), 4.
76    For a discussion of regulatory approaches to align utility incentives with energy ef ciency investment, see Val Jensen, Aligning Utility Incentives with Investment in Energy Ef ciency, ICF International
(Washington, DC: National Action Plan for Energy Ef ciency, 2007), http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/suca/incentives.pdf.
Regulators must be mindful of the implications of allowing 
a current return on CWIP, and should consider limiting its
use to narrow circumstances and carefully drawn conditions
of oversight. Regulators should also pay close attention to
how thoroughly utility management has evaluated the risks
associated with the projects for which it requests CWIP.
Regardless of CWIP’s other merits or faults, an important and
too-often unacknowledged downside is that it can obscure 
a project’s risk by shifting, not reducing, that risk.
Use of Rider Recovery Mechanisms. Another regulatory
issue is the use by utilities of rate “riders” to collect
investment or expenses. This practice speeds up cash  ow
for utilities, providing repayment of capital or expense outlays
more rapidly than would traditional cost of service regulation.
This allows utilities to begin collecting expenses and
recovering capital without needing to capitalize carrying costs
or  le a rate case. Once again, regulators must consider
whether these mechanisms could encourage a utility to
undertake a project with higher risk, for the simple reason
that cost recovery is assured even before the outlay is made. 
Allowing a current return on CWIP, combined with revenue
riders, is favored by many debt and equity analysts, who
perceive these practices as generally bene cial to investors. And
indeed, these mechanisms allow bondholders and stock owners
to feel more assured of a return of their investment. And they
might marginally reduce the utility’s cost of debt and equity. 
But these mechanisms (which, again, transfer risk rather than
actually reducing it) could create a “moral hazard” for utilities to
undertake more risky investments. A utility might, for example,
proceed with a costly construction project, enabled by CWIP
 nancing, instead of pursuing market purchases of power or
energy ef ciency projects that would reduce or at least delay
the need for the project. If negative  nancial consequences
of such risky decisions extended beyond customers and
reached investors, the resulting losses would be partially
attributable the same risk-shifting mechanisms that analysts
and investors originally perceived as bene cial.
Construction Cost Caps. Some regulatory agencies approve
a utility’s proposed infrastructure investments only after a
cap is established for the amount of investment or expense
that will be allowed in rates. Assuming the regulator sticks to
the deal, this action will apportion the risk between consumers
and investors. We wouldn’t conclude that this actually reduces
risk except in the sense that working under a cap might
ensure that utility management stays focused on the project,
avoiding lapses into mismanagement that would raise costs
and likely strain relationships with regulators and stakeholders.
Rewarding Energy Ef ciency. Another relevant regulatory
practice concerns the treatment of demand-side resources
like energy ef ciency and demand response. It is well
understood that the “throughput incentive” can work to keep 
a utility from giving proper consideration to energy ef ciency;
to the extent that a utility collects more than marginal costs in
its unit price for electricity, selling more electricity builds the
bottom line while selling less electricity hurts pro tability. There
are several adjustments regulation can make, from decoupling
revenues from sales, to giving utilities expedited cost recovery
and incentives for energy ef ciency performance. Decoupling,
which guarantees that a utility will recover its authorized  xed
costs regardless of its sales volumes, is generally viewed by
ef ciency experts and advocates as a superior approach
because it neutralizes the “throughput incentive” and enables
utilities to dramatically scale up energy ef ciency investment
without threatening pro tability. Ratings agencies view
decoupling mechanisms as credit positive because they provide
assurance of cost recovery, and Moody’s recently observed 
“a marked reduction in a company’s gross pro t volatility in the
years after implementing a decoupling type mechanism.”75
Whatever the chosen approach, the takeaway here is that
without regulatory intervention, energy ef ciency will not likely
be accorded its correct role as a low cost and low risk strategy.76
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Without regulatory intervention, energy ef ciency 
will not likely be accorded its correct role as 
a low cost and low risk strategy.
4. USING FINANCIAL AND PHYSICAL HEDGES
Another method for limiting risk is the use of  nancial and
physical hedges. These provide the utility an opportunity to
lock in a price, thereby avoiding the risk of higher market
prices later. Of course, this means the utility also foregoes the
opportunity for a lower market price, while paying some
premium to obtain this certainty.
Financial hedges are instruments such as puts, calls, and
other options that a utility can purchase to limit its price
exposure (e.g., for commodity fuels) to a certain pro le. 
If the price of a commodity goes up, the call option pays off;
if the price goes down, the put option pays off. Putting such
a collar around risk is, of course, not free: the price of an
option includes transaction costs plus a premium re ecting
the instrument’s value to the purchaser. Collectively these
costs can be viewed as a type of insurance payment. 
Another example of a  nancial hedge is a “temperature”
hedge that can limit a utility’s exposure to the natural gas
price spikes that can accompany extreme weather
conditions. A utility may contract with a counter-party so that,
for an agreed price, the counter-party agrees to pay a utility if
the number of heating-degree-days exceeds a certain level
during a certain winter period. If the event never happens,
APPENDIX A 45 
IV. PRACTICING RISK-AWARE REGULATION: SEVEN ESSENTIAL STRATEGIES FOR STATE REGULATORS
the utility forfeits the payment made for the hedge. If the
event does happen, the utility might still need to purchase
natural gas at an in ated price; even so, the hedge would
pay off because it has reduced the company’s total outlay.
Simply stated,  nancial hedges can be used by a utility to
preserve an expected value.
An illustration of a physical hedge would be when a utility
purchases natural gas at a certain price and places it into
storage. The cost of that commodity is now immune to future
 uctuations in the market price. Of course, there is a cost to
the utility for the storage, and the utility forgoes the possible
advantage of a future lower price. But in this case the payment
(storage cost) is justi able because of the protection it affords
against the risk of a price increase.
Long-term contracts can also serve to reduce risk. These
instruments have been used for many years to hedge against
price increases or supply interruptions for coal. Similarly,
long-term contracts are used by utilities to lock in prices paid
to independent power producers. Many power purchase
agreements (PPAs) between distribution utilities and third
party generators lock in the price of capacity, possibly with 
a mutually-agreed price escalator. But due to possible fuel
price  uctuations (especially with natural gas), the fuel-based
portion of the energy charge is not  xed in these contracts.
So PPAs can shield utilities from some of the risks of owning
the plants, but they do not hedge the most volatile portion 
of natural gas generation: the cost of fuel.
Regulated utilities and their regulators must come to an
understanding about whether and how utilities will utilize
these options to manage risk, since using them can foreclose
an opportunity to enjoy lower prices. 
5. HOLDING UTILITIES ACCOUNTABLE
From the market’s perspective, one of the most important
characteristics of a public utilities commission is its
consistency. Consumers don’t like surprises, and neither do
investors. Financial analysts who rate regulatory climates
across the states typically rank stability as one of the highest
virtues for regulators. Indeed, this quality is often viewed to
be as important as the absolute level of return on equity
approved by a commission.
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Consumers don’t like surprises, and neither do
investors. Financial analysts who rate regulatory
climates across the states typically rank stability 
as one of the highest virtues for regulators.
Effective regulation—regulation that is consistent, predictable,
forward-thinking and “risk-aware”—requires that regulators
hold utilities accountable for their actions. Earlier, we stressed
the value of regulators being actively involved in the utility
resource planning process. But this tool works well only if
regulators follow through—by requiring utilities to comply with
the resource plan, to amend the resource plan if circumstances
change, to live within an investment cap, to adhere to a
construction schedule, and so forth. If the utility doesn’t satisfy
performance standards, regulatory action will be necessary.
This level of activity requires a signi cant commitment of
resources by the regulatory agency. Utility resource acquisition
plans typically span ten years or more, and a regulator must
establish an oversight administrative structure that spans the
terms of sitting commissioners in addition to clear expectations
for the regulated companies and well-de ned responsibilities
for the regulatory staff. 
6. OPERATING IN ACTIVE, “LEGISLATIVE” MODE
As every commissioner knows, public utility regulation requires
regulators to exercise a combination of judicial and legislative
duties. In “judicial mode,” a regulator takes in evidence in
formal settings, applies rules of evidence, and decides
questions like the interpretation of a contract or the level of
damages in a complaint case. In contrast, a regulator
operating in “legislative mode” seeks to gather all information
relevant to the inquiry at hand and to  nd solutions to future
challenges. Judicial mode looks to the past, legislative mode 
Long-term Contracts for Natural Gas
In recent decades, utilities have mostly used  nancial
instruments to hedge against volatile natural gas prices,
and natural gas supply used for power generation has not
been sold under long-term contracts. An exception is a
recent long-term contract for natural gas purchased by
Xcel Energy in Colorado. The gas will be used to fuel new
combined cycle units that will replace coal generating
units. The contract between Xcel Energy and Anadarko
contained a formula for pricing that was independent of
the market price of natural gas and runs for 10 years.
The long-term natural gas contract between Xcel Energy 
and Anadarko was made possible by a change in Colorado’s
regulatory law. For years, utilities and gas suppliers had
expressed concern that a long-term contract, even if
approved initially as prudent, might be subject to a reopened
regulatory review if the price paid for gas under the contract
was, at some future date, above the prevailing market price.
Colorado regulators supported legislation making it clear in
law that a  nding of prudence at the outset of a contract
would not be subject to future review if the contract price
was later “out of the money.” An exception to this protection
would be misrepresentation by the contracting parties.
APPENDIX A77    Ashley Brown, “The Over-judicialization of Regulatory Decision Making,” Natural Resources and Environment Vol. 5, No. 2 (Fall 1990), 15-16.
78    See, e.g., U.S. Supreme Court, Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876),  http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/94/113/case.html.
79    Scott Hempling, Preside or Lead? The Attributes and Actions of Effective Regulators (Silver Spring, MD: National Regulatory Research Institute, 2011), 22.
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to the future. In his 1990 essay, former Ohio utilities regulator
Ashley Brown put it this way:
Gathering and processing information is vastly
different in judicial and legislative models. Legislating,
when properly conducted, seeks the broadest data
base possible. Information and opinions are received
and/or sought, heard, and carefully analyzed. The
process occurs at both formal (e.g., hearings) and
informal (e.g., private conversation) levels. The goal is
to provide the decision maker with as much
information from as many perspectives as possible so
that an informed decision can be made. Outside
entities can enhance, but never be in a position to
limit or preclude, the  ow of information. The decision
maker is free to be both a passive recipient of
information and an active solicitor thereof. The latter
is of particular importance in light of the fact that
many of the interests affected by a decision are not
likely to be present in the decision making forum.77
Being a risk-aware regulator requires operating in legislative
mode in regulatory proceedings, and especially in policy-
making proceedings such as rulemakings. But the courts have
also found that ratemaking is a proper legislative function of
the states.78 And since this state legislative authority is typically
delegated by legislatures to state regulators, this means that,
to some extent, regulators may exercise “legislative” initiative
even in rate-setting cases.
In a recent set of essays, Scott Hempling, the former executive
director of the National Regulatory Research Institute, contrasts
regulatory and judicial functions and calls for active regulation
to serve the public interest:
Courts and commissions do have commonalities. Both
make decisions that bind parties. Both base decisions
on evidentiary records created through adversarial
truth-testing. Both exercise powers bounded by
legislative line-drawing. But courts do not seek
problems to solve; they wait for parties’ complaints.
In contrast, a commission’s public interest mandate
means it literally looks for trouble. Courts are
con ned to violations of law, but commissions are
compelled to advance the public welfare.79
Utility resource planning is one of the best examples of the need
for a regulator to operate in legislative mode. When examining
utilities’ plans for acquiring new resources, regulators must seek
to become as educated as possible. Up to a point, the more
choices the better. The regulator should insist that the utility
present and analyze multiple alternatives. These alternatives
should be characterized fully, fairly, and without bias. The
planning process should seek to discover as much as possible
about future conditions, and the door should be opened to
interveners of all stripes. Knowing all of the options—not
simply the ones that the utility brings forward—is essential 
to making informed, risk-aware regulatory decisions.
I
The planning process should seek to discover as
much as possible about future conditions, and the
door should be opened to interveners of all stripes.
Knowing all of the options—not simply the ones that
the utility brings forward—is essential to making
informed, risk-aware regulatory decisions.
7. REFORM AND RE-INVENT RATEMAKING PRACTICES 
It is increasingly clear that a set of forces is reshaping the
electric utility business model. In addition to the substantial
investment challenge discussed in this report, utilities are
facing challenges from stricter environmental standards,
growth in distributed generation, opportunities and
challenges with the creation of a smarter grid, new load from
electric vehicles, pressure to ramp up energy ef ciency
efforts—just to mention a few. As electric utilities change,
regulators must be open to new ways of doing things, too. 
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Today’s energy industry faces disruptions similar to those
experienced by the telecommunications industry over the
past two decades. To deal with the digital revolution in
telecommunications and the liberalization of those markets,
regulators modernized their tools to include various types of
incentive regulation, pricing  exibility, lessened regulation in
some markets and a renewed emphasis on quality of service
and customer education.  
One area where electric utility regulators might pro tably
question existing practices is rate design. Costing and pricing
decisions, especially for residential and small business
customers, have remained virtually unchanged for decades.
The experience in other industries (e.g., telecommunications,
entertainment, music) shows that innovations in pricing are
possible and acceptable to consumers. Existing pricing
structures should be reviewed for the incentives they provide
for customers and the outcomes they create for utilities.
The risk-aware regulator must be willing to think “way
outside the box” when it comes to the techniques and
strategies of effective regulation. Earlier we observed that
effective regulators must be informed, active, consistent,
curious and often courageous. These qualities will be
essential for a regulator to constructively question status quo
regulatory practice in the 21st century.
THE BENEFITS OF 
“RISK-AWARE REGULATION”
We have stressed throughout this report that effective utility
regulators must undertake a lot of hard work and evolve
beyond traditional practice to succeed in a world of changing
energy services, evolving utility companies and consumer
and environmental needs. What can regulators and utilities
reasonably expect from all this effort? What’s the payback if
regulators actively practice “risk-aware regulation”?
( FIRST, there will be bene ts to consumers. A risk-aware
regulator is much less likely to enter major regulatory
decisions that turn out wrong and hurt consumers. The
most costly regulatory lapses over the decades have been
approval of large investments that cost too much, failed to
operate properly, or weren’t needed once they were built.
It’s too late for any regulator to  x the problem once the
resulting cost jolts consumers.
( SECOND, there will be bene ts to regulated utilities. Risk
aware regulation will create a more stable, predictable
business environment for utilities and eliminate most
regulatory surprises. It will be easier for these companies
to plan for the longer-term. If regulators use a well-
designed planning process, examining all options and
assessing risks, utilities and their stakeholders will have
greater reliance on the long-term effect of a decision. 
( THIRD, investors will gain as well. Steering utilities away
from costly mistakes, holding the companies responsible
for their commitments and, most importantly, maintaining
a consistent approach across the decades will be “credit-
positive,” reducing threats to cost-recovery. Ratings
agencies will take notice, lowering the cost of debt,
bene tting all stakeholders.
( FOURTH, governmental regulation itself will bene t.
Active, risk-aware regulators will involve a wide range of
stakeholders in the regulatory process, building support
for the regulators’ decision. Consistent, transparent,
active regulation will help other state of cials—governors
and legislators—develop a clearer vision of the options 
for the state’s energy economy.
( FINALLY, our entire society will bene t as utilities and
their regulators develop a cleaner, smarter, more resilient
electricity system. Regulation that faithfully considers all
risks, including the future environmental risks of various
utility investments, will help society spend its limited
resources most productively. In other words, risk-aware
regulation can improve the economic outcome of these
large investments. 
With two trillion dollars on the line, both the stakes and the
potential bene ts are high. If history is a guide, fewer than
700 state regulators will serve in of ce during the next 20
years. Practicing risk-aware regulation will enable them to
avoid expensive mistakes and identify the most important
utility investments for realizing the promise of an advanced
21st century electricity system.
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APPENDIX 1: 
UNDERSTANDING UTILITY FINANCE
MOST INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITIES (IOUS) IN THE UNITED STATES ARE IN A CONSTRUCTION
CYCLE OWING TO THE NEED TO COMPLY WITH MORE STRINGENT AND EVOLVING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND TO IMPROVE AGING INFRASTRUCTURE. NEW INFRASTRUCTURE
PROJECTS INCLUDE SMART GRID, NEW GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION. THE IOUS,
THEREFORE, WILL BE LOOKING TO THE CAPITAL MARKETS TO HELP FINANCE THEIR RATHER
LARGE CAPITAL EXPENDITURE PROGRAMS.
DEBT FINANCING 
While the IOUs will be issuing some additional equity, a
higher percentage of the new investment will be  nanced
with debt. In general, utilities tend to be more leveraged than
comparably-rated companies in other sectors (see the Rating
Agencies section below). The electric utility sector’s debt is
primarily publicly issued bonds, including both  rst mortgage
bonds (FMB) and senior unsecured bonds. While the utilities
also issue preferred stock and hybrid debt securities, these
instruments tend to represent a small portion of a company’s
capital structure. Non-recourse project  nance is rare for
utilities, but it is commonly used by unregulated af liates. 
Most regulated IOUs in the U.S. are owned by holding
companies whose assets are primarily their equity interests 
in their respective subsidiaries. These operating company
subsidiaries are typically wholly owned by the parent, so that
all publicly-held stock is issued by the parent. Because most
of these holding companies are quite large, the market for 
a holding company’s stock is usually highly liquid. 
In contrast to equity, bonds are issued by both the utility
holding company and individual operating subsidiaries.
Typically, holding and operating company bonds are non-
recourse to af liates. This means that each bond issuer within
the corporate family will have its own credit pro le that affects
the price of the respective bonds. To illustrate this point,
compare two American Electric Power subsidiaries, Ohio
Power and Indiana Michigan. The companies have different
regulators, generation mix, customer bases and, consequently,
different senior unsecured Moody’s bond ratings of Baa1 and
Baa2, respectively. For this reason, each bond issuance of the
corporate family trades somewhat independently.
Utility bonds trade in secondary markets and are traded over-
the-counter rather than in exchanges like equities. For bond
issuance of less than $300 million, the secondary market is
illiquid and not very robust. Smaller utilities are frequently
forced into the private placement market with their small
issuances and accordingly pay higher interest rates compared
to similarly-rated larger companies. Even if these smaller
issues are placed in the public market, there is a premium
for the expected lack of liquidity. 
Secured debt in the form of FMBs is common in the electric
utility sector. Such bonds are usually secured by an undivided
lien on almost all of the assets of an operating utility. Bond
documentation (called an “indenture”) prohibits the issuance
of such bonds in an amount that exceeds a speci ed
percentage (usually in the range of 60 percent) of the asset
value of the collateral. The maturities of these bonds are
frequently as long as 30 years, and in rare occasions longer).
While the lien on assets may limit a company’s  nancing
 exibility, the interest rate paid to investors is lower than for
unsecured debt. The proceeds from FMBs are usually used
to  nance or re nance long-lived assets. 
Senior unsecured bonds can be issued at any maturity, 
but terms of  ve and ten years are most common. These
instruments are “junior” to FMBs, so that, in an event of
default, these debt holders would be repaid only after the
secured debt. But these bonds are “senior” to hybrids and
preferred stock. In a bankruptcy, senior unsecured bonds
are usually deemed equal in standing with trade obligations,
such as unpaid fuel and material bills. 
Utilities typically have “negative trade cycles,” meaning that
cash receipts tend to lag outlays. IOUs’ short-term payables
such as fuel purchases, salaries and employee bene ts are
due in a matter of days after the obligation is incurred. In
contrast, the utility’s largest short-term assets are usually
customer receivables which are not due for 45—60 days
after the gas or electricity is delivered. Therefore, utilities
have short term cash needs referred to as “working capital”
needs. To  nance these short term needs utilities have bank
credit lines and sometimes trade receivable facilities. 
For larger utility corporate families, these bank lines can
amount to billions of dollars. For example, American Electric
Power has two large bank lines of $1.5 and $1.7 billion that
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mature in 2015 and 2016, respectively. AEP’s lines and most
of those of other utilities are revolving in nature. While
termination dates typically range from one to  ve years for
these lines, the utility usually pays down borrowings in a few
months and accesses the line again when needed. 
Interest on bank lines of credit is paid only when the lines are
used, with a much lower fee paid on the unused portion of
the lines. For  nancially weak utility companies, banks often
require security for bank lines . But because utility operating
companies are rarely rated below BBB-/Baa3, bank lines are,
for the most part, unsecured. 
Some larger utilities have receivable facilities in addition to
revolving bank lines. The lender in a receivables facility usually
purchases the customer receivables. There is an assumed
interest expense in these transactions which is usually lower
than the rate charged by banks for unsecured revolving lines. 
Although preferred stock is a form of equity, it is usually
purchased by a bond investor who is comfortable with the
credit quality of the issuer and willing to take a junior position
in order to get a higher return on its investment. There are also
hybrid securities. Although they are technically debt
instruments, they are so deeply subordinate and with such
long repayment periods that investors and the rating agencies
view these instruments much like equities. Frequently, hybrids
allow the issuer to defer interest payments for a number of
years. Some hybrids can be converted to equity at either the
issuer’s or investor’s option. 
S&P is the most rigorous of the rating agencies in treating the
 xed component of power purchase agreements (PPA) as
debt-like in nature. Also, some Wall Street analysts look at
PPAs as liabilities with debt-like attributes. That being said,
those analysts who do not consider PPAs as debt-like still
incorporate in their analysis the credit implications of these
frequently large obligations. 
EQUITY FINANCING
In order to maintain debt ratings and the goodwill of  xed
income investors, utility managers must  nance some portion
of their projects with equity. Managements are usually reluctant
to go to market with large new stock issuances. Equity investors
often see new stock as being dilutive to their interests, resulting
in a decrease in the market price of the stock. But if a utility has
a large capital expenditure program it may have no choice but
to issue equity in order maintain its credit pro le. 
For more modest capital expenditure programs, a company
may be able to rely on incremental increases to equity to
maintain a desired debt to equity ratio. While the dividend
payout ratios are high in this sector, they are rarely 100
percent, so that for most companies, equity increases, at
least modestly, through retained earnings. Many companies
issue equity in small incremental amounts every year to ful ll
commitments to employee pension or rewards programs.
Also, many utility holding companies offer their existing
equity holders the opportunity to reinvest dividends in stock.
For larger companies these programs can add $300 - $500
million annually in additional equity. Since these programs
are incremental, stock prices are usually unaffected.
OTHER FINANCING
Project  nance (PF) can also be used to fund capital
expenditures. These instruments are usually asset-speci c and
non-recourse to the utility, so that the pricing is higher than
traditional investment-grade utility debt. Project  nance is usually
used by  nancially weaker non-regulated power developers. 
Some companies are looking to PF as a means of  nancing
large projects so that risk to the utility is reduced. However, the
potential of cost overruns, the long construction/development
periods and use of new technology will make it hard to  nd PF
 nancing for projects like new nuclear plants. This also applies
to carbon capture/sequestration projects, as the technology is
not seasoned enough for most PF investors. This means that,
utilities may need to  nance new nuclear and carbon capture/
sequestration projects using their existing balance sheets. 
In order to reduce risk, a utility can pursue projects in
partnership with other companies. Currently proposed large
gas transport and electric transmission projects are being
pursued by utility consortiums. Individual participants in gas
transport projects in particular have used Master Limited
Partnerships (MLPs) as a way to  nance their interests.
MLPs are owned by general and limited partners. Usually 
the general partner is the pipeline utility or a utility holding
company. Limited partner units are sold to passive investors
and are frequently traded on the same stock exchanges that
list the parent company’s common stock. One big difference
between the MLP and an operating company is that earnings
are not subject to corporate income tax. The unit holders pay
personal income tax on the pro ts. 
Companies have used both capital and operating lease
structures to  nance discrete projects, including power
plants. The primary difference between an operating and
capital lease is that the capital lease is re ected on the
company’s balance sheet. The commitment of the utility to
the holder of the operating lease is deemed weaker. Most
 xed income analysts, as well as the rating agencies, do not
view these instruments as being materially different and treat
operating leases for power plants as debt.
APPENDIX A 52 
80    Standard & Poor’s and Fitch use the same ratings nomenclature. It was designed by Fitch and sold to S&P. For entities rated between AA and CCC the agencies break down each rating category
further with a plus sign or a minus sign. For example, bonds in the BBB category can be rated BBB+, BBB and BBB-. Moody’s ratings nomenclature is slightly different. The corresponding ratings in
BBB category for Moody’s are Baa1, Baa2 and Baa3. The agencies will also provide each rating with an outlook that is stable, positive or negative.
PRACTICING RISK-AWARE ELECTRICITY REGULATION
TYPICAL UTILITY INVESTORS
The largest buyers of utility equities and  xed income
securities are large institutional investors such as insurance
companies, mutual funds and pension plans. As of September
2011, 65 percent of utility equities were owned by institutions.
While insurance companies and pension plans own utility
equities, both trail mutual funds in the level of utility stock
holdings. For example, the  ve largest holders of Exelon
stock are mutual fund complexes. 
Most retail investors own utility stock and bonds indirectly
through mutual funds and 401k plans. But many individual
investors also own utility equities directly, including utility
employees. Small investors tend not to buy utility bonds
because the secondary market in these instruments is rather
illiquid, especially if the transaction size is small.
Common stock mutual funds with more conservative
investment criteria are most interested in utility equities.
While the market price of these stocks can vary, there is a
very low probability of a catastrophic loss. Also, utility stocks
usually have high levels of current income through dividend
distributions. Another attractive attribute of these equities is
that they are highly liquid. Essentially all utilities in the U.S.
are owned by utility holding companies that issue common
stock. Due to extensive consolidation in the sector over the
past 20 years, these holding companies are large and have
signi cant market capitalization. For these reasons, utility
stocks are highly liquid and can be traded with limited
transaction costs. 
Utility  xed-income investments are far less liquid than equities.
Thus, the typical bond investor holds onto the instruments
much longer than the typical equity investor. Bonds are issued
both by the utility holding company and individual operating
subsidiaries. Because bonds are less liquid in the secondary
market, investors in these instruments, such as pension plans
and insurance companies, tend to have longer time horizons.
Four of the top  ve investors in Exelon Corp bonds due 2035
are pension plans and insurance companies. Mutual bond
funds tend to buy shorter-dated bonds. 
The buyers of  rst mortgage bonds (FMBs) are frequently
buy-and-hold investors. As FMBs are over-collateralized,
bondholders are comfortable that they will be less affected 
by unforeseen negative credit events. It is not unusual for 
a large insurance company to buy a large piece of an FMB
deal at issuance and hold it to maturity. Retail investors in
utility bonds also tend to be buy-and-hold investors, as it is
hard for them to divest their positions which are typically
small compared to the large institutions. The relative illiquidity
of utility bonds means that transaction costs can be high and
greatly reduce the net proceeds from a sale. 
Utility employees frequently own the stock of the companies
for which they work. Employees with de ned bene t
pensions, however, are not large holders of utility stocks
because pension plans hold little if any of an employer’s
stock owing to ERISA rules and prudent asset management
practices. Mid-level non-unionized employees frequently
have 401ks that are typically invested in mutual funds or
similar instruments. However, it is not unusual for company
matching of the employees’ 401k contributions to be in
company stock. Finally, senior management’s incentive
compensation is frequently paid in the company’s common
equity, in part to ensure that management’s interests are
aligned with those of the shareholders.
RATING AGENCIES
Most utilities have ratings from three rating agencies:
Moody’s Investors Services, Standard & Poor’s Ratings
Services, and Fitch Ratings. Having three ratings is unlike
other sectors, which frequently use two ratings—Moody’s 
or Standard & Poor’s. Most utility bonds are held by large
institutional investors who demand that issuers have at least
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s ratings. 
Failing to have two ratings would cause investors to demand
a very high premium on their investments, far more than the
cost to utilities of paying the agencies to rate them. Having a
third rating from Fitch usually slightly lowers the interest rate
further. While investors have become less comfortable with
the rating agencies’ evaluations of structured  nance
transactions, this dissatisfaction has not carried over greatly
into the corporate bond market, and especially not the utility
bond market. 
The agencies usually assign a rating for each company
referred to as an issuer rating. They also rate speci c debt
issues, which may be higher or lower than the issuer rating.
Typically a secured bond will have a higher rating than its
issuer; preferred stock is assigned a lower rating than the
issuer. Ratings range from AAA to D.80 The “AAA” rating is
reserved for entities that have virtually no probability of
default. A “D” rating indicates that the company is in default. 
The three agencies each take into account both the
probability of default, as well as the prospects of recovery for
the bond investor if there is a default. Utilities traditionally are
considered to have high recovery prospects because they are
asset-heavy companies. In other words, if liquidation were
necessary, bond holders would be protected because their
loans are backed by hard assets that could be sold to cover
the debt. Further, the probability of default is low because
utility rates are regulated, and regulators have frequently
increased rates when utilities have encountered  nancial
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problems owing to events outside of companies’ control.
However, there are a few notable instances where commissions
could not or would not raise rates to avoid defaults including
the bankruptcies of Public Service of New Hampshire and
Paci c Gas and Electric. 
It is unusual for a utility operating company to have a non-
investment grade rating (Non-IG, also referred to as high
yield, speculative grade, or junk). Typically Non-IG ratings
are the result of companies incurring sizable expenses for
which regulators are not willing or able to give timely or
adequate rate relief. Dropping below IG can be problematic
for utilities because interest rates increase markedly. Large
institutional investors have limited ability to purchase such
bonds under the investment criteria set by their boards.
Another problem with having an Non-IG rating is that the
cost of hedging rises owing to increased collateral
requirements as counterparties demand greater security
from the weakened credit. 
In developing their ratings, the agencies consider both
quantitative and more subjective factors. The quantitative
analysis tends to look at cash  ow “coverage” of total debt and
of annual  xed income payment obligations, as well as overall
debt levels. In contrast, the typical equity analyst focuses on
earnings. The rating agencies are less interested in the allowed
returns granted by regulators than they are in the size of any
rate decrease or increase and its effect on cash  ow. 
That said, the rating agency may look at allowed returns to
evaluate the “quality” of regulation in a given state. All things
being equal, they may give a higher rating to a company in a
state with “constructive” regulation than to a company in a state
with a less favorable regulatory climate. Constructive regulation
to most rating agencies is where regulatory process is
transparent and consistent across issuers in the state. Also, the
agencies favor regulatory constructs that use forward-looking
test years and timely recovery of prudently-incurred expenses.
The agencies consider tracking mechanisms for fuel and
purchased power costs as credit supportive because they help
smooth out cash  uctuations. The agencies believe that while
trackers result in periodic changes in rates for the customer,
these mechanisms are preferable for consumers than the
dramatic change in rates caused by fuel factors being lumped
in with other expenses in a rate case. 
Analysts also will look to see how utility managers interact
with regulators. The agencies deem it a credit positive if
management endeavors to develop construct relationships
with regulators. The agencies may become concerned about
the credit quality of a company if the state regulatory process
becomes overly politicized. This may occur if a commission
renders decisions with more of an eye toward making good
press than applying appropriate utility regulatory standards.
Politicized regulatory environments can also occur when 
a commission is professional and fair, but outside political
forces, such as governors, attorneys general or legislators
challenge a prudently decided case. 
The rating agencies themselves can at times act as de facto
regulators. Because utilities are more highly levered than
most any other sector, interest expenses can be a signi cant
part of a company’s cost structure. Ratings affect interest
rates. The agencies will look negatively at anything that
increases event risk. The larger an undertaking, the greater
the fallout if an unforeseen event undermines the project. 
A utility embarking on the development of a large facility like
a large generation or transmission project, especially if is not
preapproved by the regulators, might result in a heightened
focus on the company by the agencies. The rating action
could merely be change in outlook from stable to negative,
which could in turn have a negative impact on the market
price of outstanding bonds, interest rates on new issuances
and even on equity prices. Many utility stock investors are
conservative and pay more attention to rating agency
comments and actions than investors with holdings in more
speculative industries.
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Three examples of these models are Prosym, licensed by
Henwood Energy Services; Strategist, licensed by Ventyx;
and GE MAPS, licensed by General Electric.
A model typically creates a 20- or 40-year future utility
scenario, based on load projections provided by the user.
The utility’s energy and peak demand is projected for each
hour of the time period, using known relationships about
loads during different hours, days of the week and seasons of
the year. The model then “dispatches” the most economic
combination of existing or hypothetical new resources to
meet the load in every hour of that time period. 
The operating characteristics of each generating resource is
speci ed as to its availability, fuel ef ciency, fuel cost,
maintenance schedule, and, in some models, its emissions
pro le. The resources available to the model will be a mixture
of existing plants, taking note of their future retirement dates,
plus any hypothetical new resources required by load growth.
The model incorporates estimates of regional power purchases
and their price, transmission paths and their constraints, fuel
contracts, the retirement of existing facilities, etc.
In this way, the user of the model can test various
combinations (scenarios) of proposed new generating plants,
including base load plants, intermediate and peaking plants,
intermittent renewable resources, etc. The model will
calculate the utility’s revenue requirement, fuel costs, and
purchased power expenses in each scenario. The model
might be used to estimate the cost of operating the system
with a speci c hypothetical portfolio, predict the level of
emissions for a portfolio, measure the value of energy
ef ciency programs, test the relative value of different
resources, measure the reliability of the system, etc. 
The reader might analogize this modeling to “fantasy” baseball,
where hypothetical teams play hypothetical games, yielding
win-loss records, batting averages and pennant races.
As powerful as these modeling tools are, they are production
models,  rst and foremost. As such, they are not particularly
good at dealing with assumptions about energy ef ciency
and demand response. In using such models, the regulator
must insist that the utility gives appropriate treatment to
demand-side resources. It may be possible to re-work
models to do this, or it may be necessary to conduct extra
sensitivity analyses at varying levels of energy ef ciency and
demand response. 
IRP SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
A redispatch modeling tool allows a utility and the regulator
to test the resilience of portfolios against different possible
futures. For example, a regulator might want to know how
 ve different generation portfolios behave under situations of
high natural gas prices, or tougher environmental regulations.
By varying the input assumptions while monitoring the
relevant output (e.g., net present value of future revenue
requirements) the regulator can assess the risk that
contending portfolios pose to future rates if, for example, fuel
prices vary from their predicted levels. 
To illustrate this idea, consider the following material from a
case in Colorado. Figure Appendix - 1 is a page excerpted
from Xcel Energy’s 2009 analysis in support of a resource
plan  led before the Colorado Public Utilities Commission.
The page shows the results of sensitivity analyses for the
price of natural gas (high and low) and the cost of carbon
emissions (high and low) for twelve different portfolios being
considered by the Colorado PUC. 
In all, the Colorado PUC studied 48 different generation
portfolios in this IRP case. The portfolios differed based on
how much natural gas generation was added, how much
wind and solar generation was added, the schedule for
closing some existing coal- red power plants, the level of
energy ef ciency assumed, etc. (The actual generation units
in each portfolio are not identi ed in this public document.
TOOLS IN THE IRP PROCESS
REGULATORS HAVE SEVERAL TOOLS AT THEIR DISPOSAL IN THE IRP PROCESS. ONE OF THE MOST
IMPORTANT IS THE UTILITY REDISPATCH MODEL. THIS IS A COMPLEX COMPUTER PROGRAM THAT
SIMULATES THE OPERATION OF A UTILITY’S SYSTEM UNDER INPUT ASSUMPTIONS PROVIDED BY THE
USER. THE TERM “REDISPATCH” REFERS TO THE FACT THAT THE SOFTWARE MIMICS THE OPERATION
OF AN ACTUAL UTILITY SYSTEM, “DISPATCHING” THE HYPOTHETICAL GENERATION RESOURCES
AGAINST A MODEL LOAD SHAPE, OFTEN HOUR-BY-HOUR FOR MOST COMMONLY USED MODELS. 
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Otherwise, it would have created problems for the competitive
bidding process used to award contracts to supply the power
to the utility.)
Each column in the table represents a different portfolio,
numbered 1 to 12. Portfolio 2 is the Xcel’s preferred plan. The
rows show the modeling results for each portfolio. For example,
the Present Value of Revenue Requirements (PVRR) is
calculated for each portfolio and is shown the line indicated
by the  rst PVRR arrow, along with the ranking of that portfolio.
The lower half of the chart shows the cost of each portfolio
under different assumptions about the cost of carbon emissions
(higher or lower than base case predictions) and for natural gas
prices (higher or lower than base case predictions).
CAVEATS
Models are a terri c way to keep track of all the moving parts
in the operation of a utility portfolio. But it is one thing to
know that each resource has certain operating characteristics;
it is quite another to see these qualities interact with each
other in dynamic fashion. And while utility modeling tools,
such as production cost models can be helpful, care must 
be taken with their use. 
Obviously the models are helpful only to the extent that the
inputs are reasonable and cover the range of possibilities the
regulator wishes to examine. Load forecast must be developed
with care; assumptions about future fuel costs are really
educated guesses, and should be bracketed with ranges 
of sensitivity. 
Because there are so many possible combinations, variations
and sensitivities, the regulator in an IRP case must make a
decision early in the process about the scope of the portfolios
to be examined. The utility should be directed to analyze and
present all scenarios requested by the regulator, together
with any portfolios preferred by the utility. 
Finally, the model’s best use is to inform judgment, not
substitute for it. The amount of data produced by models can
be overwhelming and may give a false sense of accuracy. The
risk-aware regulator will always understand the fundamental
uncertainties that accompany projections of customer demand,
future fuel costs and future environmental requirements. 
EXAMPLE OF IRP SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
I Figure Appendix - 1
Portfolios
1-12
PVRR 
& Rank
PVRR 
& Rank
Base Scenario
Assumption: High Ef ciency,
Medium Solar
Representative 
of Preferred Plan
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INTRODUCTION	 ﾠ
Electric utility capital investments often entail significant risk.
1 They are typically large, irreversible 
investments, with long lifetimes and many alternatives.
2 They often lead to uncertain cost outcomes 
relative to investment alternatives.
3 In addition to this inherent risk, electric utilities and utility regulators 
face uncertainty regarding near-term and long-term fuel prices, demand growth, environmental 
regulations, climate policy, and technology development.
4 Given the $1.5 to $2 trillion dollars in capital 
investments that electric utilities are projected to make over the next 20 years, these conditions imply that 
electric utilities and utility regulators must make difficult decisions in an environment of significant 
uncertainty.
5 Poor investment decisions could cause ratepayers to face significant rate increases and 
potentially burden utilities with unrecoverable costs.   
Most electric utility planning methods in traditionally regulated, vertically integrated markets strive to 
determine the least-cost investment—or series of investments—to reliably meet load. To accomplish this 
goal, electricity generation planners typically use scenario analysis to account for a range of potential 
futures. However, determining optimal investments is difficult if least-cost investments vary widely 
across scenarios, as is often the case during a time of unprecedented uncertainty in the industry and given 
a wide range of potential market futures. An investment that is least cost in one scenario (or future) may 
be high cost and high risk in another. As a result, utilities and regulators may regret investments, and 
customers could be saddled with higher costs. The wrong investment can reverberate through the local 
economy and ultimately lead to shuttering of incumbent industries and failure to attract new customers.  
Perhaps the most prominent example of a regrettable electricity generation decision is the Shoreham 
nuclear power plant in New York. Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) conceived the project during 
the 1960s due to growing concerns with fossil fuel supplies. The plant took 20 years to construct and cost 
approximately $6 billion.
6 Nearly 100 times over budget, the plant was mothballed before entering 
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1	 ﾠRisk	 ﾠis	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠhere	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠloss	 ﾠor	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠan	 ﾠuncertain	 ﾠevent.	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠElectricity	 ﾠsector	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠinvestments	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlow	 ﾠsalvage	 ﾠvalues,	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠare	 ﾠsunk	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
unrecoverable	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠas	 ﾠplanned.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠElizabeth	 ﾠOlmsted	 ﾠTeisberg,	 ﾠ“Capital	 ﾠInvestment	 ﾠ
Strategies	 ﾠunder	 ﾠUncertain	 ﾠRegulation,”	 ﾠThe	 ﾠRAND	 ﾠJournal	 ﾠof	 ﾠEconomics	 ﾠ24,	 ﾠno.	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ(Winter	 ﾠ1993):	 ﾠ591-ﾭ‐604,	 ﾠ
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555747.	 ﾠAlso	 ﾠsee	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ8-ﾭ‐1,	 ﾠEPA's	 ﾠIPM	 ﾠBase	 ﾠCase	 ﾠv.4.10	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠAssumptions,	 ﾠU.S	 ﾠ
Environmental	 ﾠProtection	 ﾠAgency,	 ﾠhttp://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/epa-ﾭ‐ipm/docs/v410/Chapter8.pdf.	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠDalia	 ﾠPatino	 ﾠEcheverri	 ﾠand	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠHoppock,	 ﾠSoutheastern	 ﾠAssociation	 ﾠof	 ﾠRegulatory	 ﾠUtility	 ﾠCommissioners	 ﾠ2013	 ﾠ
Annual	 ﾠConference,	 ﾠAsheville,	 ﾠNorth	 ﾠCarolina,	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ9,	 ﾠ2013,	 ﾠ
http://www.naruc.org/Grants/Documents/SEARUC%202013%20Risk%20Workshop.pdf.	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠFuel	 ﾠprices:	 ﾠMark	 ﾠBolinger,	 ﾠRevisiting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLong-ﾭ‐Term	 ﾠHedge	 ﾠValue	 ﾠof	 ﾠWind	 ﾠPower	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠEra	 ﾠof	 ﾠLow	 ﾠNatural	 ﾠGas	 ﾠ
Prices,	 ﾠLawrence	 ﾠBerkeley	 ﾠNational	 ﾠLaboratory	 ﾠ(March	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠDemand	 ﾠgrowth:	 ﾠPeter	 ﾠFox-ﾭ‐Penner,	 ﾠSmart	 ﾠPower:	 ﾠ
Climate	 ﾠChange,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSmart	 ﾠGrid,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFuture	 ﾠof	 ﾠElectric	 ﾠUtilities	 ﾠ(Washington	 ﾠD.C.:	 ﾠIsland	 ﾠPress,	 ﾠ2011);	 ﾠGregory	 ﾠ
Aliff,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠMath	 ﾠDoes	 ﾠNot	 ﾠLie:	 ﾠFactoring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFuture	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠU.S.	 ﾠElectric	 ﾠPower	 ﾠIndustry,	 ﾠDeloitte	 ﾠCenter	 ﾠfor	 ﾠEnergy	 ﾠ
Solutions	 ﾠ(2012).	 ﾠEnvironmental	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠand	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠpolicy:	 ﾠRon	 ﾠBinz,	 ﾠRichard	 ﾠSedano,	 ﾠDenise	 ﾠFurey,	 ﾠand	 ﾠDan	 ﾠ
Mullen,	 ﾠPracticing	 ﾠRisk-ﾭ‐Aware	 ﾠElectricity	 ﾠRegulation:	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠEvery	 ﾠState	 ﾠRegulator	 ﾠNeeds	 ﾠto	 ﾠKnow	 ﾠ(Boston:	 ﾠCERES,	 ﾠ
2012).	 ﾠTechnology	 ﾠdevelopment:	 ﾠGregory	 ﾠAliff,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠMath	 ﾠDoes	 ﾠNot	 ﾠLie.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠNARUC	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠPhilip	 ﾠJones,	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠNARUC	 ﾠAnnual	 ﾠConference,	 ﾠ
http://www.narucmeetings.org/Presentations/2012jonesspeech.pdf.	 ﾠRon	 ﾠBinz	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.,	 ﾠPracticing	 ﾠRisk-ﾭ‐Aware	 ﾠ
Electricity	 ﾠRegulation.	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠMassoud	 ﾠSimnad,	 ﾠ“Has	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNuclear	 ﾠPower	 ﾠIndustry	 ﾠRisen	 ﾠand	 ﾠFallen	 ﾠor	 ﾠWill	 ﾠIt	 ﾠRise	 ﾠAgain?”	 ﾠEnergy	 ﾠ21	 ﾠ(1996):	 ﾠ
1095–1111.	 ﾠ
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commercial operation.
7 By the time it was decommissioned in 1995, electricity rates for LILCO 
customers had increased to among the highest in the country. As a result, LILCO was dissolved into 
several entities, including the Long Island Power Authority.
8 Customers are still paying off an estimated 
$3.5 billion worth of debt related to the project.
9  
Given current risks and uncertainties, the potential for today’s generation decisions to have similarly 
long-lasting negative impacts is high. For example, the decision to invest in an existing coal plant to 
comply with environmental regulations may be least cost in the near term but high cost over a longer 
horizon, depending on how the federal government regulates greenhouse gas emissions. Similarly, an 
investment in a natural gas plant may be least cost, assuming low natural gas price projections are 
realized, but the investment can significantly increase electricity rates if natural gas prices spike or return 
to the price volatility seen 5 to 10 years ago (Figure 1). Utilities can make investments in renewable 
generation, for example, to hedge against fuel price and other risks, but these investments are often 
relatively high cost in the near term. Moreover, estimating their hedging value with traditional utility 
planning methods is challenging.
10  
	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠLevelized	 ﾠannual	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠgas	 ﾠcombined	 ﾠcycles	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠand	 ﾠlow	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠgas	 ﾠ
fuel	 ﾠprice	 ﾠforecasts.	 ﾠA	 ﾠ500	 ﾠMW	 ﾠcombined	 ﾠcycle	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠat	 ﾠ60%	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠwould	 ﾠcost	 ﾠ$216	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠ
annually	 ﾠif	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠprices	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnergy	 ﾠInformation	 ﾠAdministration’s	 ﾠ(EIA)	 ﾠAEO2013	 ﾠReference	 ﾠCase	 ﾠare	 ﾠrealized.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠcomparison,	 ﾠannual	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠare	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠ$100	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠgas	 ﾠprices	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEIA’s	 ﾠAEO2010	 ﾠ“No	 ﾠ
New	 ﾠTight	 ﾠGas	 ﾠand	 ﾠShale	 ﾠDrilling	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ2009”	 ﾠscenario.	 ﾠ
To deal with a range of least-cost investments across scenarios, decision makers sometimes assign greater 
weight to certain scenarios, ignore results from scenarios they view as less likely, or choose the 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠMalcolm	 ﾠGrimston.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠImportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠPolitics	 ﾠto	 ﾠNuclear	 ﾠNew	 ﾠBuild	 ﾠ(London:	 ﾠChatham	 ﾠHouse,	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠH.	 ﾠCarl	 ﾠMcCall,	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠStudy:	 ﾠDisposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShoreham	 ﾠNuclear	 ﾠPower	 ﾠPlant,	 ﾠState	 ﾠof	 ﾠNew	 ﾠYork	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
State	 ﾠComptroller	 ﾠDivision	 ﾠof	 ﾠManagement	 ﾠAudit,	 ﾠReport	 ﾠ95-ﾭ‐D-ﾭ‐38,	 ﾠ1995.	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠAbby	 ﾠGruen,	 ﾠ“Rating	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠto	 ﾠNY	 ﾠgovernor	 ﾠon	 ﾠLIPA	 ﾠprivatization:	 ﾠDo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmath,”	 ﾠSNL	 ﾠEnergy,	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ9,	 ﾠ2013.	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠ	 ﾠMark	 ﾠBolinger,	 ﾠRevisiting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLong-ﾭ‐Term	 ﾠHedge	 ﾠValue	 ﾠof	 ﾠWind	 ﾠPower	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠEra	 ﾠof	 ﾠLow	 ﾠNatural	 ﾠGas	 ﾠPrices,	 ﾠ
Lawrence	 ﾠBerkeley	 ﾠNational	 ﾠLaboratory,	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2013. 
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investment option that is least cost (or low cost) over the greatest range of scenarios. However, an 
investment option that is least cost over a range of scenarios can create considerable risk in one or more 
of the remaining scenarios.   
One option for overcoming the uncertainty associated with identifying optimal investments is to change 
the planning objective from least cost to a metric that accounts for the wide range of potential outcomes. 
A least-risk metric that also assures low relative costs by “minimizing the maximum regret” of generation 
plans is a potentially attractive alternative approach. Identifying investments for generation plans that are 
low cost and low risk across all scenarios is a strategy utility planners—including those at the Tennessee 
Valley Authority— have begun to use to avoid making decisions that could cause significant regret in the 
future.
11 Given the current environment of economic and regulatory uncertainty, utility planners and state 
utility regulators may want to supplement their existing planning methods with a least-risk approach to 
determine optimal generation plans.  
ALTERNATIVES	 ﾠTO	 ﾠTRADITIONAL	 ﾠSCENARIO	 ﾠANALYSIS	 ﾠPLANNING	 ﾠ
To overcome the difficulties associated with traditional scenario analysis and decision making under 
uncertainty, utility planning experts, academics, and others have developed methodologies and other tools 
to optimize decision making under uncertainty while quantifying and minimizing risks. These tools 
include robust decision making, real options analysis, utility scenario planning for least-risk outcomes, 
expected value analysis using probabilities, and other stochastic optimization methods.
12 Some of these 
methods require utility planners and regulators to learn new processes and models.
13 The least-risk metric 
introduced here can complement current planning methods and is compatible with existing models and 
traditional scenario analysis. 
Utility planners and regulators can create a simple metric to estimate the risk of a decision by calculating 
the “regret” of a decision for each scenario using the outputs of traditional scenario analysis. Minimizing 
the maximum regret is a decision analysis methodology that minimizes forecast regret for the range of 
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11	 ﾠIn	 ﾠits	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠIntegrated	 ﾠResource	 ﾠPlan,	 ﾠTVA	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠ“When	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠlike	 ﾠplanning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠ20	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘no-ﾭ‐regrets’	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠframework	 ﾠis	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠapproach.	 ﾠA	 ﾠ‘no-ﾭ‐regrets’	 ﾠ
framework	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠmakers…	 ﾠweigh	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠand	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠcould	 ﾠsurface	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠsound	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠstates	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld.”	 ﾠ
TVA,	 ﾠIntegrated	 ﾠResource	 ﾠPlan:	 ﾠTVA’s	 ﾠEnvironmental	 ﾠ&	 ﾠEnergy	 ﾠFuture	 ﾠ(2011),	 ﾠ
http://www.tva.com/environment/reports/irp/pdf/Final_IRP_complete.pdf.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠRobust	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making:	 ﾠRobert	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠLembert,	 ﾠSteven	 ﾠW.	 ﾠPopper,	 ﾠand	 ﾠSteven	 ﾠC.	 ﾠBanks,	 ﾠShaping	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNext	 ﾠ100	 ﾠYears	 ﾠ
New	 ﾠMethods	 ﾠfor	 ﾠLong-ﾭ‐Term,	 ﾠQuantitative	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠAnalysis	 ﾠ(Santa	 ﾠMonica,	 ﾠCA:	 ﾠRAND,	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠReal	 ﾠoptions	 ﾠanalysis:	 ﾠ
Avinosh	 ﾠK.	 ﾠDixit	 ﾠand	 ﾠRobert	 ﾠS.	 ﾠPindyck,	 ﾠInvestment	 ﾠunder	 ﾠUncertainty	 ﾠ(Princeton,	 ﾠNJ:	 ﾠPrinceton	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠPress,	 ﾠ
1994).	 ﾠUtility	 ﾠscenario	 ﾠplanning:	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠM.	 ﾠBoonin,	 ﾠUtility	 ﾠScenario	 ﾠPlanning:	 ﾠAlways	 ﾠAcceptable	 ﾠvs.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOptimal	 ﾠ
Solution,	 ﾠNational	 ﾠRegulatory	 ﾠResearch	 ﾠInstitute	 ﾠ(March	 ﾠ2011),	 ﾠ
http://www.nrri.org/pubs/multiutility/NRRI_utility_scenario_planning_mar11-ﾭ‐07.pdf.	 ﾠExpected	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠ
using	 ﾠprobabilities:	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠHoppock,	 ﾠDalia	 ﾠPatino	 ﾠEcheverri,	 ﾠand	 ﾠEtan	 ﾠGumerman,	 ﾠDetermining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLeast-ﾭ‐Cost	 ﾠ
Investment	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠExisting	 ﾠCoal	 ﾠPlant	 ﾠto	 ﾠComply	 ﾠwith	 ﾠEPA	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠunder	 ﾠUncertainty,	 ﾠNicholas	 ﾠInstitute	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Environmental	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠSolutions	 ﾠat	 ﾠDuke	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠ(February	 ﾠ2012),	 ﾠ
http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/lowcarbontech/determining-ﾭ‐the-ﾭ‐least-ﾭ‐cost-ﾭ‐investment-ﾭ‐for-ﾭ‐an-ﾭ‐existing-ﾭ‐
coal-ﾭ‐plant-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐comply-ﾭ‐with-ﾭ‐epa-ﾭ‐regulations-ﾭ‐under-ﾭ‐uncertainty#.UdTWY9LvtJQ.	 ﾠ
13	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠutility	 ﾠsector	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscale	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠdecisions,	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
methodologies	 ﾠand	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠexploring.	 ﾠ
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investment options and scenarios analyzed.
14 In other words, minimizing the maximum (minimax) regret 
identifies a generation plan that is relatively low cost for the utility—and ultimately, ratepayers—no 
matter how the future unfolds.   
Decision theory states that investment decisions should reflect the risk preferences of the decision 
maker.
15 Therefore, minimizing potential regrets is a particularly attractive approach for regulated utilities 
and is compatible with their objectives and those of utility regulators. In traditionally regulated states, 
utility rates of return on capital investments are 
authorized by state regulators and assessed on prudently 
incurred investments.
16 Because the utility’s return on 
investment is set by the state and based on costs and 
performance, the objective of the utility is to minimize 
the total cost of service while maintaining a high level of 
reliability, rather than attempting to maximize profit. 
Moreover, electric utilities provide an essential service to 
society and the economy. The expected and required 
reliability of the bulk power system in the United States 
makes end-use customers and utility regulators wary of 
high-risk investments and is important in attracting low-
cost capital for investments. Thus, traditionally regulated 
utilities are typically risk averse, because their 
investments are capital intensive, long lived, and subject 
to scrutiny by regulators and ratepayers, including post-
investment prudency review.  
Minimax regret analysis is considered a sound decision-
making method under uncertainty, because it is neither 
too optimistic nor too pessimistic about future 
outcomes.
17 Some utilities have begun moving toward 
this method of planning. For example, the 2011 
Integrated Resource Plan of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA) used a similar “no regrets” analysis 
that “balances competing objectives while reducing costs 
and risk and retaining the flexibility to respond to future 
risks and opportunities.”
18 The approach overcomes the 
decision-making dilemma many utilities and regulators 
face when evaluating numerous scenarios and 
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14	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠR.	 ﾠAnderson,	 ﾠDennis	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠSweeney,	 ﾠThomas	 ﾠA.	 ﾠWilliams,	 ﾠand	 ﾠKipp	 ﾠMartin,	 ﾠAn	 ﾠIntroduction	 ﾠto	 ﾠManagement	 ﾠ
Science:	 ﾠQuantitative	 ﾠApproaches	 ﾠto	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠMaking,	 ﾠ12th	 ﾠed.	 ﾠ(Mason,	 ﾠOhio:	 ﾠThomson	 ﾠSouth-ﾭ‐western,	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠ
15	 ﾠRobert	 ﾠT.	 ﾠClemen	 ﾠand	 ﾠTerence	 ﾠReilly,	 ﾠMaking	 ﾠHard	 ﾠDecisions	 ﾠ(Pacific	 ﾠGrove,	 ﾠCA:	 ﾠDuxbury,	 ﾠ2001).	 ﾠ
16	 ﾠUtility	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠset	 ﾠa	 ﾠguaranteed	 ﾠprofit;	 ﾠthey	 ﾠset	 ﾠa	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠtest	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠActual	 ﾠreturns	 ﾠ
vary	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠsales	 ﾠand	 ﾠcumulative	 ﾠcosts.	 ﾠ
17	 ﾠA.	 ﾠColman,	 ﾠGame	 ﾠTheory	 ﾠand	 ﾠIts	 ﾠApplications	 ﾠ(New	 ﾠYork:	 ﾠRoutledge	 ﾠPress,	 ﾠ1995).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
18	 ﾠTVA.	 ﾠIntegrated	 ﾠResource	 ﾠPlan:	 ﾠTVA’s	 ﾠEnvironmental	 ﾠand	 ﾠEnergy	 ﾠFuture	 ﾠ(2011),	 ﾠ
http://www.tva.com/environment/reports/irp/pdf/Final_IRP_complete.pdf.	 ﾠ
Minimizing the Maximum Regret 
Step 1: Calculate the net present value 
of total system cost (net present value 
revenue requirement) for each 
investment option or investment 
portfolio across all scenarios. 
Step 2: Create a matrix of total costs 
for each investment option in every 
scenario. Determine the least-cost 
investment option in each scenario. 
Step 3: Calculate a regret score for 
each investment option across all 
scenarios by subtracting the least-cost 
option from each investment option 
within each scenario. Create a matrix 
of regret scores. 
Step 4: Determine the maximum 
regret of each investment option by 
selecting the maximum regret score 
for each investment option across all 
scenarios. Determine the investment 
option with the lowest maximum 
regret. This option minimizes the 
maximum forecast regret. 
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investment alternatives: is this significant investment in the best interest of our ratepayers, or will we 
come to regret the decision?  
MINIMIZING	 ﾠMAXIMUM	 ﾠREGRET	 ﾠ
Although utilities and state regulators typically evaluate large electric system investment decisions using 
scenario analysis, they do not use the scenario analysis outputs to forecast potential regrets, even though 
the calculation is relatively easy. A simplified example illustrates the methodology. In this example, a 
utility evaluates three investment alternatives across four scenarios of future market conditions.
19 It 
simulates system operations resulting from Investment A in scenarios 1-4, and then those for investments 
B and C. Utility planners then typically create a matrix populated with the net present value (NPV) total 
system costs over 20 years for each investment and scenario combination (Table 1).   
Table	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠAn	 ﾠexample	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠtypical	 ﾠutility	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠplanning	 ﾠscenario	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠoutput,	 ﾠdepicting	 ﾠNPV	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ
costs	 ﾠover	 ﾠ20	 ﾠyears	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠscenario	 ﾠcombination.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In Table 1, Investment A appears to be the best choice, because it is the least-cost option in three of the 
four scenarios. Investment B is never the least-cost alternative, and Investment C is only least cost in one 
scenario.   
The utility in this simplified example has several investment options—but in reality, utilities choose from 
dozens if not hundreds of generation plan alternatives. Although they can choose their investments, they 
cannot control future market conditions, and therein lies the uncertainty and decision maker’s dilemma. 
Although Investment A is the least-cost alternative in three of the four scenarios, is it really the utility’s 
best choice?  
Manipulating the matrix with a minimax regret analysis to determine the lower-risk, least regrettable 
decision yields a different answer. To calculate the regrets of each investment, utility planners would 
identify the least-cost outcome in each scenario (Table 2).  
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19	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfour	 ﾠscenarios	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠand	 ﾠforecasts	 ﾠfor	 ﾠkey	 ﾠvariables,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠprices,	 ﾠ
environmental	 ﾠregulations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠelectricity	 ﾠdemand.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Scenario	 ﾠ1 Scenario	 ﾠ2 Scenario	 ﾠ3 Scenario	 ﾠ4
Investment	 ﾠA $	 ﾠ100	 ﾠB $120	 ﾠB $125	 ﾠB $140	 ﾠB
Investment	 ﾠB $103	 ﾠB $123	 ﾠB $127	 ﾠB $131	 ﾠB
Investment	 ﾠC $110	 ﾠB $125	 ﾠB $128	 ﾠB $130	 ﾠB
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Table	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠleast-ﾭ‐cost	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠscenario	 ﾠis	 ﾠhighlighted	 ﾠin	 ﾠred.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The regret of each investment in a scenario is calculated as the difference between an investment’s cost 
and the lowest-cost option in the same scenario. For example, Investment A has a regret of $0 in Scenario 
1, because it resulted in the best possible outcome for that particular future ($100 B – $100 B). 
Investment B yields a $3 billion regret ($103 B – $100 B), and Investment C results in a $10 billion regret 
($110 B – $100 B). In other words, if the utility made Investment B or C, and the future ends up as 
forecast in Scenario 1, it would regret the decision, because a cheaper alternative existed, and ratepayers 
ultimately paid higher prices than they could have.   
Populating a regret matrix makes identifying potential risks relatively easy. Although Investment A is the 
least-cost option in three scenarios, Table 3 shows that it can also result in a maximum regret of $10 
billion. Investment C is the least-cost option in the remaining scenario, but it can also result in a regret of 
up to $10 billion. Costs for Investment B, on the other hand, never deviate significantly from the least-
cost option and do not exceed a regret of $3 billion. Therefore, according to a minimax regret analysis, 
Investment B is the optimal investment, because it minimizes the maximum regret of the decision. It may 
not be the least-cost option, but its additional cost acts as a hedge and results in stable, relatively 
predictable costs for customers. 
Table	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠA	 ﾠregrets	 ﾠ(additional	 ﾠcost	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠscenario)	 ﾠtable	 ﾠderived	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtables	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ2	 ﾠquantifies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠand	 ﾠidentifies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠthat	 ﾠminimizes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
maximum	 ﾠregret.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Applying	 ﾠminimax	 ﾠregret	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠto	 ﾠutility	 ﾠplanning	 ﾠ
Minimizing the maximum regret is not only a simple approach compatible with existing tools and data, 
but also a useful method for identifying trends, risks, and opportunities related to various generation plans 
(such as building new units and retiring others) and future market conditions. The value of this planning 
method can be illustrated with a more detailed set of generation plan options and scenarios for a 
hypothetical electric utility.  
Scenario	 ﾠ1 Scenario	 ﾠ2 Scenario	 ﾠ3 Scenario	 ﾠ4
Investment	 ﾠA $	 ﾠ100	 ﾠB $120	 ﾠB $125	 ﾠB $140	 ﾠB
Investment	 ﾠB $103	 ﾠB $123	 ﾠB $127	 ﾠB $131	 ﾠB
Investment	 ﾠC $110	 ﾠB $125	 ﾠB $128	 ﾠB $130	 ﾠB
Scenario	 ﾠ1 Scenario	 ﾠ2 Scenario	 ﾠ3 Scenario	 ﾠ4
Maximum	 ﾠRegret	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Each	 ﾠInvestment
Investment	 ﾠA $	 ﾠ0	 ﾠB $0	 ﾠB $0	 ﾠB $10	 ﾠB $10	 ﾠB
Investment	 ﾠB $3	 ﾠB $3	 ﾠB $2	 ﾠB $1	 ﾠB $3	 ﾠB
Investment	 ﾠC $10	 ﾠB $5	 ﾠB $3	 ﾠB $0	 ﾠB $10	 ﾠB
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Model	 ﾠBackground	 ﾠand	 ﾠAssumptions	 ﾠ
For this example, the 20-year NPV total system costs of four generation plans is calculated for four 
scenarios for a total of 16 assessments. The total costs are the discounted revenue requirements for the 
utility, which include system production costs (fuel, variable operations and maintenance, emissions) and 
fixed costs (costs of new power plants or retrofits, including financing charges to cover debt payments 
and returns for equity investors). Utilities simulate their systems and quantify their costs in this manner. 
After a total cost matrix is created, a regret matrix is developed to compare generation plans and 
understand risks and opportunities associated with different assets.  
For this analysis, a simplified production cost model was developed using Microsoft Excel’s Solver 
tool.
20 The resulting linear program optimizes the economic dispatch of a generation portfolio to minimize 
annual production costs over a 20-year period given a set of unit characteristics and 8,760 hours/year load 
data. Unit characteristics include heat rate, variable operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, emissions 
rate, and availability (to account for annual maintenance and outage rates, or in the case of solar and 
wind, the availability of the resource). Fuel and emissions costs assumptions were included to develop 
different scenarios and to calculate each unit’s production cost rate in dollars per megawatt-hour 
($/MWh). The optimization was subject to constraints of unit availability and needed to meet load 
obligations while maintaining a 15% reserve margin.    
Following each model run, the annual production cost output was added to the annual fixed costs for the 
electricity generating system. Fixed costs include fixed O&M for existing and new units and the annual 
stream of revenue required for building and financing new power plants or environmental controls. 
Assumptions for unit characteristics, new unit capital costs and O&M, and environmental control costs 
were based on Energy Information Administration (EIA) and Edison Electric Institute estimates.
21 The 
annual sum of fixed and variable revenue requirements was discounted by a weighted after-tax cost of 
capital of 8.36% to determine the 20-year NPV of total system costs for the utility and its ratepayers.
22  
The hypothetical electric utility included 29 units with a total installed capacity of about 6,800 megawatts 
(MW) in 2013. Unit types included coal, nuclear, diesel combustion turbines (CTs), natural gas CTs, 
natural gas combined cycle turbines (CCs), wind, solar, hydro, and demand-side resources. Wind capacity 
and solar capacity were discounted for reserve margin purposes to account for their intermittency and 
probable availability during peak demand periods.
23  
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20	 ﾠThe	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠproprietary	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠcost	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠused	 ﾠby	 ﾠelectric	 ﾠutilities.	 ﾠ
21	 ﾠEIA	 ﾠunit	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠare	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠUpdated	 ﾠCapital	 ﾠCost	 ﾠEstimates	 ﾠfor	 ﾠUtility	 ﾠScale	 ﾠElectricity	 ﾠGenerating	 ﾠPlants	 ﾠ
(2013),	 ﾠhttp://www.eia.gov/forecasts/capitalcost/pdf/updated_capcost.pdf.	 ﾠEEI	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠcost	 ﾠ
assumptions	 ﾠare	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠEEI/ICF,	 ﾠPotential	 ﾠImpacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠEnvironmental	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠU.S.	 ﾠGeneration	 ﾠFleet	 ﾠ(2011),	 ﾠ
http://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pacificorp/doc/Energy_Sources/Integrated_Resource_Plan/2011IRP/EEI
ModelingReportFinal-ﾭ‐28January2011.pdf.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
22	 ﾠThe	 ﾠafter-ﾭ‐tax	 ﾠweighted	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠassumes	 ﾠa	 ﾠ50:50	 ﾠratio	 ﾠof	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠand	 ﾠequity	 ﾠfinancing,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ6%	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠ
rate,	 ﾠ13%	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠon	 ﾠequity,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠ38%	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠtax	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
23	 ﾠInstalled	 ﾠwind	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠ15%	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreserve	 ﾠmargin,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsolar	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠ35%	 ﾠcredit.	 ﾠ
See	 ﾠhttp://www.wind-ﾭ‐energy-ﾭ‐the-ﾭ‐facts.org/en/part-ﾭ‐2-ﾭ‐grid-ﾭ‐integration/chapter-ﾭ‐6-ﾭ‐wind-ﾭ‐power-ﾭ‐contribution-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐
system-ﾭ‐adequacy/capacity-ﾭ‐credit-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐wind-ﾭ‐power/capacity-ﾭ‐credit-ﾭ‐values-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐wind-ﾭ‐power.html	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample	 ﾠwind	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠcredits	 ﾠin	 ﾠGermany.	 ﾠAn	 ﾠEvaluation	 ﾠof	 ﾠSolar	 ﾠValuation	 ﾠMethods	 ﾠUsed	 ﾠin	 ﾠUtility	 ﾠPlanning	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Procurement	 ﾠProcesses	 ﾠ(LBNL	 ﾠ2012)	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠsolar	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠcredits	 ﾠused	 ﾠby	 ﾠU.S.	 ﾠutilities	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠ
planning	 ﾠdocuments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Using several years of publicly available load data from the PJM interconnection, an indicative 8,760 
hourly load shape was developed for the hypothetical system.
24 For all scenarios, peak demand was 
assumed to be 5,500 MW in 2013 and to grow 0.5% annually.    
Generation	 ﾠPlans	 ﾠEvaluated	 ﾠ
Four generation plans were developed to simulate the wide variety of choices available to utilities and to 
identify a low-risk plan. Because peak demand in each scenario remains static, each generation plan adds 
the same amount of reserve margin capacity during the same periods. For risk-based assessments like this, 
utilities typically analyze only their near- to medium-term generation decisions, for example, a decision in 
2013 to build a combined cycle unit that comes online in 2018 or a nuclear unit that begins commercial 
operation in 2020. Decisions about what to build to satisfy expected demand far in the future are deferred 
to allow the utility to adapt to changing market conditions. However, to simplify the present analysis and 
to illustrate the impacts of shifting to distinct generation portfolios over time, expansion plan decisions 
are exogenously determined for later years. 
The four generation plans vary in terms of coal retirements and types and quantities of resources added in 
the future (Table 4). Generation plans 1 and 3 rely solely on natural gas units to satisfy future needs. 
Generation plans 2 and 4 have more diversified expansion plans that augment new natural gas capacity 
with other resources. Generation Plan 2 adds new wind, nuclear, energy efficiency, and demand response 
as well as natural gas CCs and CTs. Generation Plan 4 does not build new nuclear capacity, and instead 
supplements the portfolio with greater wind, solar, energy efficiency, and demand response, along with 
new natural gas capacity.  
Table	 ﾠ4.	 ﾠGeneration	 ﾠplan	 ﾠassumptions.	 ﾠFGD	 ﾠ=	 ﾠflue	 ﾠgas	 ﾠdesulfurization;	 ﾠSCR	 ﾠ=	 ﾠselective	 ﾠcatalytic	 ﾠreduction;	 ﾠCCR	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ
coal	 ﾠcombustion	 ﾠresiduals.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The capacity mix of each generation plan changes significantly over the 20-year study period (Figure 2) 
even though natural gas-fired capacity dominates the mix from the beginning to the end of each plan. The 
resource diversity differences among plans are evident when comparing plans 1 and 3 with plans 2 and 4. 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
24	 ﾠHourly	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠload	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPJM	 ﾠInterconnection	 ﾠand	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠelectric	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠcompanies	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
available	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠhttp://www.pjm.com/markets-ﾭ‐and-ﾭ‐operations/ops-ﾭ‐analysis/historical-ﾭ‐load-ﾭ‐data.aspx.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Generation	 ﾠPlan	 ﾠ1 Generation	 ﾠPlan	 ﾠ2 Generation	 ﾠPlan	 ﾠ3 Generation	 ﾠPlan	 ﾠ4
850	 ﾠMW	 ﾠRetire	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2015 850	 ﾠMW	 ﾠRetire	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2015 1275	 ﾠMW	 ﾠRetire	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2015 1275	 ﾠMW	 ﾠRetire	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2015
425	 ﾠMW	 ﾠInstall	 ﾠSCR/FGD	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2016 425	 ﾠMW	 ﾠInstall	 ﾠSCR/FGD	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2016 500	 ﾠMW	 ﾠCCR	 ﾠUpgrades	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2018 500	 ﾠMW	 ﾠCCR	 ﾠUpgrades	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2018
925	 ﾠMW	 ﾠCCR	 ﾠUpgrades	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2018 925	 ﾠMW	 ﾠCCR	 ﾠUpgrades	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2018
300	 ﾠMW	 ﾠNatural	 ﾠGas	 ﾠCT 275	 ﾠMW	 ﾠNatural	 ﾠGas	 ﾠCT 400	 ﾠMW	 ﾠNatural	 ﾠGas	 ﾠCT 600	 ﾠMW	 ﾠNatural	 ﾠGas	 ﾠCT
700	 ﾠMW	 ﾠNatural	 ﾠGas	 ﾠCC 600	 ﾠMW	 ﾠNatural	 ﾠGas	 ﾠCC 1000	 ﾠMW	 ﾠNatural	 ﾠGas	 ﾠCC 475	 ﾠMW	 ﾠNatural	 ﾠGas	 ﾠCC
250	 ﾠMW	 ﾠWind 50	 ﾠMW	 ﾠSolar
50	 ﾠMW	 ﾠEnergy	 ﾠEfficiency 200	 ﾠMW	 ﾠWind
50	 ﾠMW	 ﾠDemand	 ﾠResponse 125	 ﾠMW	 ﾠEnergy	 ﾠEfficiency
150	 ﾠMW	 ﾠDemand	 ﾠResponse
300	 ﾠMW	 ﾠNatural	 ﾠGas	 ﾠCC 300	 ﾠMW	 ﾠNuclear 300	 ﾠMW	 ﾠNatural	 ﾠGas	 ﾠCC 100	 ﾠMW	 ﾠDemand	 ﾠResponse
150	 ﾠMW	 ﾠEnergy	 ﾠEfficiency
100	 ﾠMW	 ﾠSolar
300	 ﾠMW	 ﾠWind
150	 ﾠMW	 ﾠNatural	 ﾠGas	 ﾠCT 150	 ﾠMW	 ﾠNatural	 ﾠGas	 ﾠCT 150	 ﾠMW	 ﾠNatural	 ﾠGas	 ﾠCT 50	 ﾠMW	 ﾠEnergy	 ﾠEfficiency
100	 ﾠMW	 ﾠNatural	 ﾠGas	 ﾠCT
Coal	 ﾠfleet	 ﾠ
assumptions
New	 ﾠUnit	 ﾠAssumptions
2016
2020
2029
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 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠInstalled	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠmix	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2013	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2030	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠplan.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Scenarios	 ﾠ
Scenario selection is important in minimax regret analysis, because if the selected scenarios do not 
capture the plausible range of futures for all investment options, the inclusion or exclusion of certain 
scenarios can predetermine the regret calculations. For example, a minimax regret analysis with a high 
natural gas price scenario but without a scenario with nuclear cost escalation or other implementation 
difficulties would lead to high regret scores for natural gas generation investments and likely to low regret 
scores for a nuclear investment. Therefore, evaluating a wide range of potential scenarios that fully 
capture the realistic range of all relevant sources of uncertainty is critical. 
To simplify the present analysis, each generation plan was simulated through four scenarios of future 
market conditions. The scenarios and their associated fuel and emissions price data are from the EIA’s 
Annual Energy Outlook 2013 (AEO).
25 The first scenario is the AEO “Reference Case,” which portrays a 
business-as-usual future. Because natural gas prices are having a profound impact on the electric industry 
and will play a growing role in the sector, the analysis includes two scenarios with natural gas prices 
above and below the Reference Case prices. These scenarios are based on the AEO “High Oil & Gas 
Potential” case and “Low Oil & Gas Potential” case. Also included is the AEO “Greenhouse Gas $25” 
case. This scenario shows the indicative impacts of carbon prices. 
Results	 ﾠ
To simulate how each generation plan performs in each potential future, scenario fuel and emissions price 
assumptions were embedded into the production cost model, along with each generation plan, resulting in 
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
25	 ﾠEIA,	 ﾠAnnual	 ﾠEnergy	 ﾠOutlook	 ﾠ2013,	 ﾠhttp://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2013).pdf.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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16-generation plan-scenario combination model runs. For example, the analysis “hard codes” Generation 
Plan 1 into the production cost model and then optimizes its economic dispatch in a Reference Case 
world, in high and low natural gas price environments, and with a GHG policy. The process is repeated 
with each generation plan, and the subsequent production cost outputs are added to each generation plan’s 
fixed costs to calculate a 20-year NPV of total cost—or revenue requirements (Table 5).  
Table	 ﾠ5.	 ﾠTwenty-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠNPV	 ﾠof	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠcost	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠplan	 ﾠand	 ﾠscenario	 ﾠcombination.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Determining the least-cost option among the four plan options would be difficult if cost were the only 
consideration. Generation Plan 3 is the least-cost option in the Reference Case and in the low natural gas 
price environment, whereas Generation Plan 4 is the least cost option in the remaining two scenarios. 
Utility planners and regulators may approve Generation Plan 3, because they view the Reference Case 
and low gas price scenarios as most plausible. However, low-probability events—“black swans”—
typically have greater impacts. By failing to account for the less plausible high gas price and greenhouse 
gas price scenarios, the utility and its regulators may leave customers at risk for higher costs in the 
future.
26   
To quantify the risks of regret for each generation plan, a regrets matrix is created by subtracting the 
lowest-cost plan in every scenario from the cost of each generation plan in that same scenario (Table 6).  
Generation Plan 1, for example, can result in a regret of $180 million given the Reference Case future. 
The regret is the additional cost borne by ratepayers as a result of the utility not choosing the optimal plan 
for that particular future. This method reveals that the maximum regret for generation plans 1, 2, 3, and 4 
are $850 million, $1.44 billion, $560 million, and $470 million, respectively, for the given scenarios.   
 
 
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
26	 ﾠNassim	 ﾠNicholas	 ﾠTaleb,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠBlack	 ﾠSwan	 ﾠ(New	 ﾠYork:	 ﾠRandom	 ﾠHouse,	 ﾠ2007).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
AEO	 ﾠ2013	 ﾠ
Reference	 ﾠCase
AEO	 ﾠ2013	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠOil	 ﾠ
&	 ﾠGas	 ﾠResources	 ﾠ
(Low	 ﾠPrices)
AEO	 ﾠ2013	 ﾠLow	 ﾠOil	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ
Gas	 ﾠResources	 ﾠ
(High	 ﾠPrices)
AEO	 ﾠ2013	 ﾠ
Greenhouse	 ﾠGas	 ﾠ
$25
Generation	 ﾠPlan	 ﾠ1 14,130,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 12,050,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 15,590,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 20,570,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Generation	 ﾠPlan	 ﾠ2 15,000,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 13,230,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 16,220,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 20,860,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Generation	 ﾠPlan	 ﾠ3 13,950,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 11,790,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 15,610,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 20,280,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Generation	 ﾠPlan	 ﾠ4 14,050,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 12,260,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 15,430,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 19,720,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Least-ﾭ‐Cost	 ﾠ
Generation	 ﾠPlan	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Each	 ﾠScenario
13,950,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 11,790,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 15,430,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 19,720,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Table	 ﾠ6.	 ﾠRegrets	 ﾠmatrix	 ﾠshowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠof	 ﾠincremental	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠ(regrets)	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠplan.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Therefore, Generation Plan 4 is the optimal investment, because it has the lowest possible regret across 
the scenarios. Moving forward with this plan may not yield the lowest cost in a reference case or low gas 
price environment, but its costs do not deviate widely from the lowest-cost option, and it will not yield the 
highest costs.   
Why does Generation Plan 4 perform well across all scenarios? The diversity and flexibility of its 
resources. A minimax regret analysis essentially optimizes the system to create a portfolio that hedges 
against a range of risks and avoids the perils that can arise from overreliance on a particular resource.
27 
Generation Plan 4 allows the utility to respond to changing market conditions by switching generation 
from one fuel resource to another. Thus, the utility can mitigate risks associated with rising fuel prices or 
take advantage of falling fuel prices. Generation Plan 4 does not build enough natural gas capacity to take 
full advantage of a low gas price environment, but it does offer protection against rising fuel prices and 
potential GHG rules. The portfolio in essence becomes a hedge. The additional costs of Generation Plan 4 
in certain scenarios can be viewed as an insurance premium for cost certainty and reduced cost volatility. 
Using this methodology also ensures a balance between capital cost and operating cost risks. The majority 
of risks with fossil fuel plants like coal and natural gas are on the operating side of the equation.  If 
natural gas prices increase, customers will pay higher prices. With renewables like wind and solar, 
however, the risk is on the capital cost, because production costs are predictable and close to $0/MWh. 
Because the analysis takes into account the total costs of building and operating an electric system, it 
ensures that utilities and their regulators do not overbuild wind and solar resources. Doing so would 
increase the capital cost requirements of their plan and potentially lead to regrets, as evidenced by 
Generation Plan 2, which called for an expansion plan similar to that of Generation Plan 4. However, 
Generation Plan 2 included a nuclear investment, which increased the capital costs and total cost of the 
plan, leading to greater possible regrets than Generation Plan 4. 
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27	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠminimizing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaximum	 ﾠregret	 ﾠanalysis,	 ﾠfailing	 ﾠto	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠscenarios	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
uncertainties	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠoptions	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠportfolios	 ﾠwill	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠundervaluation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
select	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠoptions	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠportfolios.	 ﾠ
AEO	 ﾠ2013	 ﾠ
Reference	 ﾠCase
AEO	 ﾠ2013	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠOil	 ﾠ
&	 ﾠGas	 ﾠResources	 ﾠ
(Low	 ﾠPrices)
AEO	 ﾠ2013	 ﾠLow	 ﾠOil	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ
Gas	 ﾠResources	 ﾠ
(High	 ﾠPrices)
AEO	 ﾠ2013	 ﾠ
Greenhouse	 ﾠGas	 ﾠ
$25
Maximum	 ﾠRegret	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Each	 ﾠGeneration	 ﾠ
Plan
Generation	 ﾠPlan	 ﾠ1 180,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 260,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 160,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 850,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 850,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Generation	 ﾠPlan	 ﾠ2 1,050,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 1,440,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 790,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 1,140,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 1,440,000,000 $	 ﾠ
Generation	 ﾠPlan	 ﾠ3 -ﾭ‐ $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐ $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 180,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 560,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 560,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Generation	 ﾠPlan	 ﾠ4 100,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 470,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐ $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐ $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 470,000,000 $	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Generation Plan 4 reflects the optimal mix of renewables, energy efficiency, and traditional resources as 
well as the optimal mix of capital and operating costs. It highlights the innate hedging capabilities of 
wind, solar, and energy efficiency resources—capabilities that regret scores can quantify, unlike 
traditional scenario analysis. By capturing the hedging value of wind, solar, and energy efficiency, a 
minimax regret analysis can increase adoption of these resources.    
CONCLUSIONS	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Current lowest-cost planning techniques adopted by utilities and utility regulators may inadequately 
account for potential future cost risks. Identifying a single least-cost plan using traditional planning 
methods is often impossible given uncertain and quickly evolving conditions in the electric power sector. 
The least-cost plan in one scenario can lead to high costs in another scenario. Utilities and their regulators 
may come to regret some of the investments they make today and ultimately saddle ratepayers with higher 
costs than they otherwise would have. 
Shifting the planning approach from a lowest-cost metric to a lowest-risk metric can reduce risks of 
regrets and incremental ratepayer costs. Some uncertainty planning methods, such as stochastic 
optimization and robust decision-making, require new tools and methodologies. By contrast, a minimax 
regret analysis is compatible with existing planning techniques. It takes outputs, such as production costs 
and fixed costs, from existing scenario analyses and evaluates them in light of a balance of low-cost and 
low-risk considerations, rather than from the perspective of a least-cost objective.   
The example above shows how utilities and regulators can adopt this method and indicates the benefits of 
doing so. By analyzing several potential generation plan options across a wide range (such as 10 to 15) 
scenarios, utilities and regulators can avoid making investments that reduce the flexibility of the electric 
system to respond to changing market conditions. Utilities and regulators may find minimax regret 
analysis is an attractive approach to supplement their current planning efforts.  
Minimax regret analysis can identify the optimal blend of resources to create a diverse, resilient portfolio 
that ensures utilities do not rely too heavily on one resource over another. Even if the optimal plan in a 
minimax regret analysis does not result in the lowest-cost option, it will give utilities, regulators, and 
ratepayers increased price certainty, because it will reduce cost volatility. Moreover, that cost certainty 
can help attract new businesses and industries by allowing them to efficiently plan their own investments. 
Minimizing the maximum regret is also a useful tool for assessing the risk-reduction benefits of energy 
efficiency programs, renewable resources like wind and solar, and generation diversity in general. In 
some regions, these investments have difficulty overcoming the least-cost barrier due to their upfront 
capital costs, which are higher than those of traditional electricity generating facilities. The minimax 
regret analysis accounts for these higher capital costs but also highlights the value that the investments 
add by hedging fuel price risks and creating a resilient system.  
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A
n integrated resource plan is a utility plan for 
meeting forecasted annual peak and energy 
demand, plus some established reserve margin, 
through a combination of supply-side and 
demand-side resources over a specified future period. 
For utilities, integrated resource planning is often quite 
time- and resource-intensive. Its benefits are so great, 
however, particularly to consumers, that utilities are 
frequently required by state legislation or regulation to 
undertake planning efforts that are then reviewed by state 
public utilities commissions (PUCs). (In this document, 
the acronym IRP is used, depending on the context, to 
denote either an integrated resource plan or the process of 
integrated resource planning.)
IRP rules governing utilities have been created in a 
number of ways. Bills that mandate integrated resource 
planning have been passed into law by state legislatures; 
rules have been codified under state administrative code; 
and state utility commissions have adopted IRP regulations 
as part of their administrative rules, or have ordered it to be 
done as a result of docketed proceedings. Although some 
state IRP rules have remained unchanged since they were 
first implemented, other states have amended, repealed, 
and in some cases reinstated their IRP rules. Examples can 
be found in the rules of Arizona, Colorado, and Oregon. 
Rules that have been amended recently often reflect current 
concerns in the electric industry—e.g., fuel costs and 
Executive Summary
volatility, the effects of power generation on air and water, 
issues of national security, electricity market conditions, 
and climate change, as well as individual state concerns. 
There are, however, certain subject-matter areas 
that are essential to resource planning on which state 
regulations are silent. Utilities must use their discretion 
in determining how best to address these areas in their 
resource plans. This paper provides utilities, commissions, 
and legislatures  with guidance on these subject-matter 
areas. Section III summarizes three recent utility IRPs 
from the states mentioned above, in an effort to determine 
both best practices in integrated resource planning 
and ways in which utilities can improve their planning 
processes and outcomes. Section IV then presents a series 
of recommendations, developed from these examples, for 
integrated resource planning and its resulting plans.
For an IRP process to be deemed successful, it should 
include both a meaningful stakeholder process and 
oversight from an engaged public utilities commission. 
A successful utility’s resource plan should include 
consideration in detail of the following elements: a load 
forecast, reserves and reliability, demand-side management, 
supply options, fuel prices, environmental costs and 
constraints, evaluation of existing resources, integrated 
analysis, time frame, uncertainty, valuing and selecting 
plans, action plan, and documentation. Section IV describes 
in detail the elements of both the process and the plan.
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A
s energy demand across the United States rises 
and falls and the generation fleet ages, utilities 
must plan to add and retire resources in the most 
cost-effective manner while meeting regional 
reliability standards. Integrated resource planning began 
in the late 1980s, as states looked for a way to respond to 
the oil embargos and nuclear cost overruns of the previous 
decade—and ever since, it has been an accepted way in 
which utilities can create long-term resource plans. State 
requirements for resource plans vary in terms, among 
other things, of planning horizon, the frequency with 
which plans must be updated, the resources required to be 
considered, stakeholder involvement, and the actions that 
public utilities commissions should take in reference to the 
plan (review, acknowledge, and accept or reject the plan). 
As the electric industry began to restructure in the mid-
1990s, integrated resource planning rules in many states 
were repealed or ignored. Some states have since made 
an effort to update IRP rules to make them applicable 
to current industry conditions, while other states have 
continued to use rules that are now out of date. This 
report describes IRP requirements in three states that have 
recently updated their regulations governing the planning 
process, and it reviews the most recent resource plan 
Introduction
from the largest utility in each of those states. Rules from 
Arizona, Colorado and Oregon are described in detail, 
in order to demonstrate ways in which states can require 
comprehensive planning processes and resource plan 
outcomes from the utilities under their jurisdictions. 
These particular states were chosen not only because 
their rules have recently been updated, but also because the 
guidance they provide to electric utilities offers examples 
of best practices in integrated resource planning. The 
updated rules have been designed to give thoughtful 
consideration to specific resources that have traditionally 
been ignored, and to produce outcomes that are in the 
best interests of both ratepayers and society as a whole. 
Utility resource plans from Arizona Public Service, Public 
Service Company of Colorado, and PacifiCorp utilize 
progressive methodologies and contain modern elements 
that contribute to the production of high-quality plans that 
are useful examples of superior resource planning efforts. 
This report is intended to be helpful to policymakers, 
public utility commissions and their staff, ratepayer 
advocates, and the general public as they each consider the 
ways in which utility resource planning can best serve the 
public interest.
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A
n integrated resource plan, or IRP, is a utility 
plan for meeting forecasted annual peak and 
energy demand, plus some established reserve 
margin, through a combination of supply-side 
and demand-side resources over a specified future period. 
Steps taken in the creation of an IRP include: 
•  forecasting future loads, 
•  identifying potential resource options to meet those 
future loads, 
•  determining the optimal mix of resources based on 
the goal of minimizing future electric system costs, 
•  receiving and responding to public participation 
(where applicable), and 
•  creating and implementing the resource plan. 
Figure 1 shows these steps in a flow chart.
I.  The Purpose and Use of 
Integrated Resource Planning
 Integrated resource planning has many benefits 
to consumers, and other positive impacts on the 
environment. This is a planning process that, if correctly 
implemented, locates the lowest practical costs at which a 
utility can deliver reliable energy services to its customers. 
IRP differs from traditional planning in that it requires 
utilities to use analytical tools that are capable of fairly 
evaluating and comparing the costs and benefits of both 
demand- and supply-side resources.2 The result is an 
opportunity to achieve lower overall costs than might 
result from considering only supply-side options. In 
particular, the inclusion of demand-side options presents 
more possibilities for saving fuel and reducing negative 
environmental impacts than might be possible if only 
supply-side options were considered.3  
Figure 1
Flow Chart for Integrated Resource Planning1
1  Hirst, E. A Good Integrated Resource 
Plan: Guidelines for Electric Utilities 
and Regulators. Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory. December 1992. Page 
5. As it appears in Harrington, C., 
Moskovitz, D., Austin, T., Weinberg, 
C., & Holt, E.  Integrated Resource 
Planning for State Utility Regulators. 
The Regulatory Assistance Project. 
June 1994.
2  Integrated Resource Planning for 
State Utility Regulators. Available at: 
http://www.raponline.org/document/
download/id/817
3  Kushler, M. & York, D. Utility Initia-
tives: Integrated Resource Planning. 
July 2010. American Council for an 
Energy-Efficient Economy. Available 
at: http://aceee.org/policy-brief/util-
ity-initiatives-integrated-resource-
planning
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4  Id footnote 2. 
5  Hopper, C. & Goldman, N. Review of Utility Resource 
Plans in the West. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. 
Presentation at the New Mexico PRC IRP Workshop, Santa 
Fe. June 8, 2006. Slide 17.
In general, IRP focuses on minimizing customers’ bills 
rather than on rates—but an overall reduction in total 
resource cost achieved through the efficient use of energy 
will lower average energy bills. As a result, all customers 
benefit from the lower system costs that IRP achieves.4 
Alternatives examined by system planners in an IRP set-
ting include adding generating capacity (thermal, renewable, 
customer-owned, or combined heat and power), adding 
transmission and distribution lines, and implementing ener-
gy efficiency (EE) and demand response programs. Common 
risks that are addressed by scenario or sensitivity analyses 
Figure 2
States with Integrated Resource Planning or Similar Processes
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
Delaware
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska Nevada
NH
MA
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North
Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Rhode Island
South
Carolina
South
Dakota
Tennessee
Utah
VT
CT
Virginia
Washington
West
Virginia
Wyoming
Alaska
Hawaii
California
Florida
Michigan
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Texas
Wisconsin
State has an IRP rule and filing requirement
State is developing or revising an IRP rule and filing 
requirement
State has a filing requirement for long-term plans
State does not have filing requirements for long-term plans
in IRPs include fuel prices (coal, oil, and natural gas), load 
growth, electricity spot prices, variability of hydro resources, 
market structure, environmental regulations, and regulations 
on carbon dioxide (CO2) and other emissions.5
Resource planning requirements exist in many states, 
but may differ significantly from state to state. Utilities that 
create more than one resource plan in the same state may 
have different processes for creating those plans and may 
arrive at significantly different conclusions, despite being 
governed by the same regulations. Figure 2 shows the states 
that have IRP or long-term planning requirements.6
6  For a complete list of the rules and regulations associated with 
integrated resource planning in the states, see Appendix 1.
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S
tate IRP rules have been established in a number 
of ways. In certain states, legislatures have passed 
bills into law mandating that utilities engage in 
resource planning; in others, IRP rules have been 
codified under state administrative code. Some state utility 
commissions have adopted integrated resource planning 
regulations as part of their administrative rules, or have 
ordered it through docketed proceedings. Rules can also 
be developed through a combination of these processes. 
Various state IRP rules and their individual requirements 
are discussed in the sections below.
A.  IRP Planning Horizons
Integrated resource plans are long-term in nature, but 
these planning periods vary according to state regulations. 
Table 1 lists the length of planning horizons typically found 
in IRP rules, as well as the states that have implemented 
II. Examples of State Integrated Resource 
Planning Statutes and Regulations
Table 1
Planning Horizons Found in IRP Rules
Planning Horizon
10 years
15 years
20 years
Multiple periods
Utility determined
Not specified
Planning Horizon
Every two years
Every three years
Every four years
Every five years
Not specified
States with Specified Planning Horizon
Arkansas, Delaware, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, Wyoming
Arizona, Kentucky, Minnesota, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, 
Utah, Vermont, Washington
Montana
Colorado
New Hampshire
States with Specified Planning Horizon
Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, 
Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, 
Washington
Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Montana, Missouri, Nevada, 
New Mexico, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Vermont
Colorado
Nebraska
Wyoming
these various planning horizons as a part of their rules.
The most common planning horizon spans a 20 year 
period, with half of the IRP states mandating this planning 
period. 
B.  Frequency of Updates
Utility integrated resource plans must be updated 
periodically to reflect changing conditions with respect to 
load forecasts, fuel prices, capital costs, conditions in the 
electricity markets, environmental regulations, and other 
factors. IRP updates are typically required every two to 
three years, as shown in Table 2, below.
Montana appears twice in Table 2, as traditional utilities 
are required to file IRPs every two years, while restructured 
utilities are required to file updates every three years. There 
are some exceptions to the typical update requirements of 
Table 2
Frequency of IRP Updates, as 
Determined by State Rules
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two to three years. Nebraska, for example, has a five year 
requirement for updates and is the only state to be made up 
entirely of public power utilities, many of which are custom-
ers of the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA).  
Pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 1992, municipally-
owned utilities are required to prepare resource plans every 
five years, but do not have to make those plans publicly 
available. Most Nebraska utilities must comply with both 
WAPA IRP requirements as well as state IRP requirements. 
C.  Resources Evaluated in Integrated 
Resource Planning
Generally, state rules mandate that utilities consider 
all feasible supply-side, demand-side, and transmission 
resources that are expected to be available within the 
specified planning period. Many state IRP requirements 
make no specifications for resources that must be evaluated 
beyond this. Other states have gone into further detail 
about the resources that should be investigated, including:
•  Delaware – utilities shall identify and evaluate 
all resource options, including: generation and 
transmission service; supply contracts; short and long-
term procurement from demand-side management 
(DSM), demand response (DR) and customer sited 
generation; resources that utilize new or innovative 
baseload technologies; resources that provide short 
or long-term environmental benefits; facilities that 
have existing fuel and transmission infrastructure; 
facilities that utilize existing brownfield or industrial 
sites; resources that promote fuel diversity; resources 
or facilities that support or improve reliability; and 
resources that encourage price stability.7
•  Indiana – utilities shall examine: all existing supply 
and demand-side resources and existing transmission; 
all potential new utility electric plant options and trans-
mission facilities; all technologies and designs expected 
to be available within the twenty-year planning period, 
either on a commercial scale or demonstration scale; 
and a comprehensive array of demand side measures, 
including innovative rate design.8
•  Kentucky – utilities shall evaluate improvements in 
operating efficiency of existing facilities, demand-
side programs, nonutility sources of generation, new 
power plants, transmission improvements, bulk 
power purchases and sales, and interconnections with 
other utilities.9
There are state IRP rules that specify not only the resourc-
es that must be evaluated, but also the amount of weight 
given to a particular resource by either the utilities or the 
Public Service/Utilities Commissions. Colorado is one such 
state, and is described in more detail in later sections.
In almost all cases, state integrated resource planning 
rules have specific requirements for the planning horizons 
that should be covered, the frequency with which utility 
plans must be updated, and the generating resources that 
should be considered. Some states require nothing more, 
while others might also require, for example: 1) a certain  
number or a certain type of scenario analysis; 2) that 
certain types of resource cost tests be used to evaluate 
demand-side management policies; or  3) that externalities 
be considered by utilities when creating resource plans. 
Requirements for generating unit retirements and 
associated decommissioning costs are another example of 
something that some states might include in integrated 
resource planning rules, while others might not. The next 
section describes the discussion of this type of requirement 
in state IRP regulations.
D.  Retirements and Decommissioning
Integrated resource planning is generally understood to 
be primarily concerned with the addition of resources in 
order to meet growing demand for electricity, and very few 
IRP rules mandate that utilities address end-of-life issues 
for generating units in their resource plans. In a summary 
document on integrated resource planning, the Regulatory 
Assistance Project states that “as utilities compare the cost 
of each supply- and demand-side option, they need to 
capture the entire life-cycle cost. This life-cycle cost means 
the fixed and variable costs incurred over the life of the 
investments: construction, operation, maintenance, and 
fuel costs.”10 This description does not represent the full 
7  HB 6, the Delaware Electric Utility Retail Customer Supply 
Act of 2006.
8  170 Indiana Administrative Code 4-7-1: Guidelines for 
Integrated Resource Planning by an Electric Utility.
9  Kentucky Administrative Regulation 807 KAR 5:058: 
Integrated resource planning by electric utilities. 
10  Harrington, et al. Integrated Resource Planning for State 
Utility Regulators.  The Regulatory Assistance Project. June 
1994. Page 14.
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life of the investment, however, as it does not specifically 
include the costs associated with the retirement and 
decommissioning of a resource.
State IRP rules and utility filings reflect this incomplete 
assessment of life-cycle costs. Twenty-seven states have 
IRP rules and 20 of them are silent with respect to unit 
retirements. Utah and Colorado require that utility filings 
include information about the life expectancies of the 
generating units in the resource plans. Three states – New 
Mexico, North Carolina, and South Dakota – are slightly 
more specific, and mandate that utilities provide expected 
retirement dates for generating facilities. Specifically, the 
utilities in each of the states are required to do the following:
•  Utah – include the life expectancy of generating 
resources
•  Colorado – provide the estimated remaining 
useful lives of existing generation facilities without 
significant new investment or maintenance expense
•  New Mexico – give the expected retirement dates for 
existing generating units
•  North Carolina – provide a list of units to be retired 
from service (applies to both existing and planned 
generating facilities), with the location, capacity and 
expected date of retirement
•  South Dakota – include those facilities to be 
removed from service during the planning period, 
along with the projected date of removal from service 
and the reason for removal
There are only two state rules that make any mention of 
decommissioning costs:
•  Arizona rules state that if the discontinuation, 
decommissioning, or mothballing of any power source 
or the permanent derating of any generating facility is 
expected, the utility must provide: 
“i.  Identification of each power source or generating 
unit involved, 
ii.  The costs and spending schedule for each 
discontinuation, decommissioning, mothballing, 
or derating, and 
iii.  The reasons for each discontinuation, 
decommissioning, mothballing, or derating.”11
•  Georgia laws and rules state that “Total cost estimates 
for proposed projects must include construction 
and non-construction related costs incurred through 
commercial operation, including decommissioning/
dismantlement costs.”12
Rather than being addressed in utility integrated 
resource plans, generating unit retirements and associated 
decommissioning costs are largely left to be dealt with in 
other cases and proceedings that are brought before Public 
Utilities/Service Commissions.
E.  Long-term Procurement Planning 
Requirements
As the electric industry began to restructure in the mid-
1990s, many states that had integrated resource planning 
requirements either repealed them with restructuring laws, 
or simply began to ignore them. Some states eventually 
replaced integrated resource planning laws with rules for 
resource procurement plans. A document designed to 
inform California’s 2010 Long-Term Procurement Plan 
(LTPP) requirement surveys the ways in which utilities 
in other states create their resource plans. The document 
states that “[w]hile California utilities have not undertaken 
a full integrated resource planning effort in many years, 
the 2010 LTPP proceeding is considering the appropriate 
role of utility resource planning in procuring the resources 
needed to meet state policy goals.”13 
Requirements for procurement plan filings differ from 
requirements for integrated resource plans. Planning 
periods are typically ten years, with some states requiring 
only a five year planning period. Procurement plans are 
usually required to be updated every year. Because utilities 
11  Arizona Corporation Commission Decision No. 71722, in 
Docket No. RE-00000A-09-0249. June 3, 2010. Page 13. 
Amends Arizona Administrative Code Title 14, Chapter 2, 
Article 7, “Resource Planning.” Available at: http://images.
edocket.azcc.gov/docketpdf/0000112475.pdf
12  Integrated Resource Planning Act of 1991 (O.C.G.A. § 
46-3A-1), Amended. See also: Georgia Public Service 
Commission, General Rules, Integrated Resource 
Planning 515-3-4. Available at: http://rules.sos.state.
ga.us/cgi-bin/page.cgi?g=GEORGIA_PUBLIC_SERVICE_
COMMISSION%2FGENERAL_RULES%2FINTEGRATED_
RESOURCE_PLANNING%2Findex.html&d=1
13  Aspen Environmental Group and Energy and Environmental 
Economics, Inc. Survey of Utility Resource Planning and 
Procurement Practices for Application to Long-Term 
Procurement Planning in California -  DRAFT. Prepared for 
the California Public Utilities Commission. September 2008. 
Page 1.
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in these states operate in a deregulated market and do not 
own generation, procurement plans evaluate purchases for 
capacity and energy, as well as energy efficiency and other 
demand-side management programs.
Connecticut is one such state that used to have an 
integrated resource planning requirement, and now has 
a requirement for procurement plans. The state had IRP 
regulations in place by the late 1980s, but this requirement 
was repealed when the restructuring law (Public Act 98-28) 
was passed in 1998. A long-term procurement planning 
law then became effective in 2007 (Public Act 07-242). 
Plans submitted to the Connecticut Energy Advisory Board 
in compliance with the 2007 law have much in common 
with utility IRPs and have even been called “Integrated 
Resource Plans,” though they are technically long-term 
procurement plans.
The following section describes the ways in which IRP 
rules have been made in Arizona, Colorado, and Oregon, 
and presents some of the specifics of each of those rules.
1.  Arizona
The Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC) has 
been given both constitutional and statutory authority to 
oversee the operations of electric utilities, and to engage 
in rulemaking that includes the establishment of IRP 
regulations. Article 15 of the Arizona Constitution created 
the ACC, which oversees the operations of all public service 
corporations in the state, including investor-owned electric 
utilities. The Commission is given exclusive authority to 
establish rates, enact rules that are reasonably necessary 
in ratemaking, and determine what sort of regulation 
is reasonably necessary for effective ratemaking,14 as 
established in Article 15, §3:
The Corporation Commission shall have full power to, 
and shall, prescribe just and reasonable classifications to 
be used and just and reasonable rates and charges to be 
made and collected, by public service corporations within 
the State for service rendered therein, and make reasonable 
rules, regulations, and orders, by which such corporations 
shall be governed in the transaction of business within the 
State…and make and enforce reasonable rules, regulations, 
and orders for the convenience, comfort, and safety, and the 
preservation of the health, of the employees and patrons of 
such corporations…
Utility practices in Arizona are not governed by 
legislation or by statute, but rather through administrative 
code created by rulemaking proceedings of the Arizona 
Corporation Commission. Renewable energy requirements, 
distributed energy resource requirements, and integrated 
resource planning reporting requirements have all been 
established in this way.
The ACC has the authority to require that electric 
utilities provide reports concerning both past business 
activities and future plans. Integrated resource plans 
fall into this category. Article 15, §13 of the Arizona 
Constitution states that “[a]ll public service corporations…
shall make such reports to the Corporation Commission, 
under oath, and provide such information concerning their 
acts and operations as may be required by law, or by the 
Corporation Commission.” Arizona Revised Statute §40-
204(A) expands on this requirement, stating that:
Every public service corporation shall furnish to the 
Commission, in the form and detail the Commission 
prescribes, tabulations, computations, annual reports, 
monthly or periodical reports of earnings and expenses, and 
all other information required by it to carry into effect the 
provisions of this title and shall make specific answers to all 
questions submitted by the Commission.
Regulating and requesting information regarding the 
resource portfolios of electric utilities is one way in which 
the ACC meets its constitutional and statutory obligations 
to ensure that just and reasonable rates are being charged to 
consumers of electricity. In this pursuit, the ACC adopted 
the state’s first Resource Planning and Procurement Rules 
in February 1989, requiring that utilities owning electric 
generation facilities file historical data every year, and 
10-year resource plans every three years. The rules also 
provide for a Commission hearing to review these filings. 
In accordance with the rules, the first round of utility 
IRPs were filed in 1992 and hearings were held. In 1995, 
however, the Commission suspended the obligation of the 
electric utilities to file future resource plans until IRP rules 
could be modified to be consistent with impending electric 
industry competition and the passage of the retail electric 
competition rules.15 
14  Arizona Corporation Comm’n v. Woods, 171 Ariz. 286, 294 
(“Woods”).
15  The Commission adopted retail electric competition rules in 
Decision No. 59943, dated December 26, 1996.
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In revising the IRP rules, Commission staff were 
required to hold workshops, open to all stakeholders and 
to the public, on specific resource planning topics. These 
workshops:
Were to focus on developing needed infrastructure and a 
flexible, timely, and fair competitive procurement process; 
and were to consider whether and to what extent competitive 
procurement should include consideration of a diverse 
portfolio of purchased power, utility-owned generation, 
renewables, demand-side management, and distributed 
generation.16
Following the workshops, a docket was opened for 
proposed rulemaking regarding resource planning, and 
on June 3, 2010 in Decision No. 71722, the Commission 
amended the Arizona Administrative Code Title 14, 
Chapter 2, Article 7, Resource Planning. In the most 
significant changes, compared to the original rules, the 
revised IRP rules:
• Extend the forecasting and planning horizon from 10 
years to 15 years;
• Require submissions of utility IRPs every even-
numbered year rather than every third year;
• Require load-serving entities to include, in their IRP, 
data regarding air emissions, water consumption, and 
tons of coal ash produced;
• Require that environmental impacts related to air 
emissions, solid waste, and other environmental 
factors and reduction of water consumption be 
analyzed and addressed in utility plans;
• Require that plans address costs for compliance with 
current and projected environmental regulations;
• Require that the resource plans include energy 
efficiency, to meet Commission-specified percentages;
• Require that the resource plans include renewable 
resources, to meet the specified percentages in 
Arizona Administrative Code R14-2-1804;
• Require that the resource plans include distributed 
energy resources, to meet the specified percentages in 
Arizona Administrative Code R14-2-1805;
• Require that utilities submit a work plan in every 
odd year that outlines the upcoming 15-year 
resource plan, and lays out: 1) the utility’s method 
for assessing potential resources; 2) the sources of 
its current assumptions; and 3) a general outline of 
the procedures it will follow for public input, which 
includes an outline of the timing and extent of public 
participation and advisory group meetings that will 
be held before the resource plan is completed and 
filed.17 Before they file the resource plan, utilities are 
required to provide an opportunity for public input. 
ACC practice also allows for public comment on the 
completed resource plan after it has been filed by the 
utility.
In the revised rulemaking proceedings emphasis was 
placed on diversifying the resource base in utilities’ 
generation portfolios; on lowering costs through decreased 
reliance on volatile fossil-fuel based generation; and on 
considering and addressing environmental impacts, such 
as air emissions, coal ash, and water consumption.18 
Utilities must also submit a set of analyses to identify 
and assess the errors, risks, and uncertainties in: demand 
forecasts; the costs of DSM measures and power supply; 
the availability of sources of power; the costs of compliance 
with current and future environmental regulations; fuel 
prices and availability; construction costs, capital costs and 
operating costs; and any other factors the utility wishes to 
consider. This assessment should be done using sensitivity 
analysis and probabilistic modeling analysis.19 The utility 
should provide a description of the ways in which these 
errors, risks, and uncertainties can be managed (e.g., by 
obtaining additional information, liming risk exposure, 
using incentives, creating additional options, incorporating 
flexibility, and participating in regional generation and 
transmission projects), along with a plan to do so.20
Following the review of the utility IRP, the Commission 
is required to file an order that either acknowledges the 
resource plan (with or without amendment) or states the 
reasons for not acknowledging it.
The first electric utility IRPs filed under the revised 
rules were submitted to the ACC in 2012. The filing from 
Arizona Public Service (APS) is discussed in later sections.
16  Arizona Corporation Commission. Decision No. 71722. 
Docket No. RE-00000A-09-0249. June 3, 2010.
17 Id.
18  Id. Page 12.
19  Arizona Corporation Commission. Decision No. 71722. 
Docket No. RE-00000A-09-0249. June 3, 2010. Exhibit A: 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. Page 42.
20  Id. Page 43.
APPENDIX A11
Best Practices in Electric Utility Integrated Resource Planning
2.  Colorado
Title 40 of the Colorado Revised Statutes establishes the 
state Public Utilities Commission and gives it authority 
to regulate the public utilities located within the state, 
specifically with regard to “the adequacy, installation, and 
extension of the power services and the facilities necessary 
to supply, extend, and connect the same.”21 Title 40 also 
contains all of the legislative requirements with which 
Colorado’s public utilities must comply, and prescribes 
the general methods by which the PUC should evaluate 
compliance.
The evaluation process is described in more detail 
in 4 Code of Colorado Regulations (CCR) 723-3: Rules 
Regulating Electric Utilities. This section of the code 
describes the rules promulgated by the Public Utilities 
Commission to establish the process for determining the 
need for additional electric resources by those electric 
utilities subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction, and 
for developing cost-effective resource portfolios to meet 
such need reliably.22 The rules, in their current form, were 
adopted in 2003 and were referred to as least-cost planning 
rules. Beginning in 2003, utilities were required to file 
resource plans every four years, and may file an interim 
plan if changed circumstances justify the filing. 
Utilities may choose their own planning period, but 
that period must be at least 20 and no more than 40 years. 
Utilities may also specify the resource acquisition period 
they will follow, which will be between the first six and ten 
years of the planning period. The planning period is both 
the time frame for which the resource plan is developed, 
and the long-term period over which the net present 
value of revenue requirements is calculated. The resource 
acquisition period represents the near-term period in which 
the utility must actually acquire resources to meet system 
energy and demand requirements. For any resources they 
propose to acquire, utilities file needs assessments and 
draft requests for proposals (RFPs). The PUC may approve, 
deny, or order modifications to utility plans. Following 
PUC approval, utilities then begin the competitive bidding 
process to acquire the new resources needed to meet load 
and reserve requirements.
Over the past decade, the PUC has opened several 
docketed proceedings and issued emergency rules 
revising the least-cost planning rules to provide specific 
guidelines for utilities, and to ensure compliance with 
new legislation adopted by Colorado state government. 
In Decision No. C07-0829 of September 19, 2007, the 
PUC adopted emergency rules modifying LCP rules as 
required by bills enacted in the 2006 and 2007 sessions of 
the Colorado Legislature. In general, these bills required 
the PUC to consider not only the costs of new generation 
resources as prescribed in least-cost planning rules, but 
also various benefits, requiring more technical expertise 
and involvement from the PUC in the resource selection 
process.23 
Specifically, the following bills required the associated 
changes:
• HB07-1037 establishes requirements for energy 
efficiency and demand-side management resources, 
and requires the PUC to shift from a least-cost 
planning standard to a more subjective consideration 
of multiple criteria “which will require substantially 
more Commission involvement in the resource 
selection process.”24 The criteria shift applies to the 
evaluation of all resources, not only demand-side 
management (DSM)25 measures.
• HB07-1281 increases the renewable energy resources 
that electric utilities must acquire, necessitating 
greater integration between the resource planning 
rules and the new Renewable Energy Standards.
• SB07-100 is intended to improve the economic 
viability of rural renewable resources. The bill 
provides for the designation of energy resource zones, 
and for the construction of transmission infrastructure 
to bring energy from these zones to load centers.
• HB06-1281 requires the Commission “to give the 
fullest possible consideration to new clean and 
energy efficient technologies…(and) provides an 
21  Colorado Revised Statutes 40-1-103.
22  4 Code of Colorado Regulations 723-3. Part 3: Rules 
Regulating Electric Utilities. Electric Resource Planning: 
3601.
23  Colorado Public Utilities Commission. Decision No. C07-
0829. Docket No. 07R-0368E. September 19, 2007.
24  Id. Page 7.
25  Demand-side management , or DSM, measures involve 
reducing electricity use through activities or programs that 
promote electric energy efficiency or conservation, or more 
efficient management of electric energy loads. 
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example of how the Commission can give such 
consideration to resources that may be in the public 
interest when accounting for the benefits of advancing 
the development of a particular resource, or when 
accounting for other benefits outside of a strict cost 
perspective.”26
The statutory language describes some of those benefits: 
The Commission shall give the fullest possible 
consideration to the cost-effective implementation of 
new clean energy and energy-efficient technologies in its 
consideration of generation acquisitions for electric utilities, 
bearing in mind the beneficial contributions such technologies 
make to Colorado’s energy security, economic prosperity, 
environmental protection, and insulation from fuel price 
increases. The Commission shall consider utility investments 
in energy efficiency to be an acceptable use of ratepayer 
moneys.27
As a result of the various bills described above, the PUC 
chose to strike the term “least-cost” from the rules in all 
instances, changing their title to Resource Planning Rules. 
It also introduced the term cost-effective into the rules, 
defining it as “the reasonableness of costs and rate impacts 
in consideration of the benefits offered by new clean energy 
and energy-efficient technologies.”28 These and other 
emergency rules were adopted on a permanent basis in 
Decision No. C07-1101 in Docket No. 07R-419E.
Other significant changes to the Resource Planning 
Rules were adopted by the PUC in 2010 in response to the 
passage of HB10-1365, known as the Clean Air-Clean Jobs 
Act (CACJA). The legislative declaration of the Act states 
that:
The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and 
declares that the federal “Clean Air Act,” 42 U.S.C. sec. 
7401 et seq., will likely require reductions in emissions from 
coal-fired power plants operated by rate-regulated utilities 
in Colorado. A coordinated plan of emission reductions from 
these coal-fired power plants will enable Colorado rate-
regulated utilities to meet the requirements of the federal act 
and protect public health and the environment at a lower cost 
than a piecemeal approach. A coordinated plan of reduction 
of emissions for Colorado’s rate-regulated utilities will also 
result in reductions in many air pollutants and promote the 
use of natural gas and other low-emitting resources to meet 
Colorado’s electricity needs, which will in turn promote 
development of Colorado’s economy and industry.29
The Act required that all utilities owning or operating 
coal-fired generating units in Colorado file an emissions 
reductions plan, which may include the following elements: 
emission control equipment, retirement of coal-fired units, 
conversion of coal units to natural gas, long-term fuel 
agreements, new natural gas pipelines, increased utilization 
of existing natural gas resources, and new transmission 
infrastructure. The CO Department of Public Health and 
the Environment and the PUC were tasked with reviewing 
the utility filings. 
Approval of the plans is contingent on several factors, 
including whether required emissions reductions would 
be achieved; whether the plan promotes economic 
development in the state; whether reliable electric service 
is preserved; and the degree to which the plan increases 
the utilization of natural gas or relies on energy efficiency 
or other low-emitting resources. Plans were to be filed by 
August 15, 2010, and full implementation is to occur by 
December 31, 2017.30
While required emissions reduction plans were separate 
from Electric Resource Plans, the PUC opted to revise and 
clarify Electric Resource Planning (ERP) rules to make them 
more consistent with the CACJA. The PUC adopted revised 
rules on July 29, 2010 in Decision No. C10-0958 as part 
of Docket No. 10R-214E. Significant changes to the rules 
include:
• Adoption as the policy of the state of Colorado that 
the PUC give the fullest possible consideration to the 
cost-effective implementation of new clean energy and 
energy-efficient technologies.
• Inclusion in the resource plan of the annual water 
withdrawals and consumption for each new resource, 
and the water intensity of the generating system as a 
whole.
• Inclusion of the projected emissions of sulfur dioxide, 
nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, mercury, and 
26  Id. Page 9.
27  Colorado Revised Statutes 40-2-123(1)(a).
28  Colorado Public Utilities Commission. Decision No. C07-
0829. Docket No. 07R-0368E. September 19, 2007. Page 20.
29  Colorado Revised Statutes 40-3.2-203(1).
30  General Assembly of the State of Colorado. House Bill 10-
1365.
APPENDIX A13
Best Practices in Electric Utility Integrated Resource Planning
31  Colorado Public Utilities Commission. Decision No. C10-
0958. Docket No. 10R-214E. July 29, 2010.
32  4 Code of Colorado Regulations 723-3. Part 3: Rules Regu-
lating Electric Utilities. Electric Resource Planning: 3613(b).
33  4 Code of Colorado Regulations 723-3. Part 3: Rules Regu-
lating Electric Utilities. Electric Resource Planning: 3613(e).
34  Public Utility Commission of Oregon. Order No. 89-507. 
Docket No. UM 180. April 20, 1989.
35  Id. Page 3.
36  Id. Page 7.
carbon dioxide for new and existing generating 
resources.
• The Commission must consider the likelihood of new 
environmental regulations, and the risk of higher 
future costs associated with greenhouse gases, when it 
considers utility proposals.
• Descriptions of at least three alternate resources plans 
that meet the same resource need as the base plan 
but include proportionally more renewable energy 
or demand-side resources. For the purpose of risk 
analysis, a range of possible future scenarios and 
input sensitivities should be proposed for testing the 
robustness of the alternative plans.
• Permission for the utilities to implement cost-effective 
demand-side resources to reduce the need for 
additional resources that would otherwise need to be 
obtained through a competitive acquisition process.31
Colorado’s IRP rules do not mandate public participation 
prior to the filing of the IRP. The rules are, however, unique 
in requiring that the utility, Commission staff, and the 
Office of Consumer Counsel agree upon an entity to act 
as an independent evaluator (paid for by the utility) and 
advisor to the Commission. The independent evaluator 
reviews all documents and data used by the utility in 
developing its resource plan, and submits a report to the 
Commission that contains its analysis of “whether the 
utility conducted a fair bid solicitation and bid evaluation 
process, with any deficiencies specifically reported.”32 
Following the filing of the utility’s resource plan, the IRP 
rules state that parties in the proceeding have 45 days to file 
comments on the plan and on the independent evaluator’s 
report. The utility has a chance to respond to comments, 
after which the Commission is required to issue a written 
decision approving, conditioning, modifying, or rejecting 
the utility’s preferred cost-effective resource plan, “which 
decision shall establish the final cost-effective resource 
plan.”33 In 2011 the Colorado electric utilities filed the first 
electric resource plans that were consistent with these revised 
rules. The plan from Public Service Company of Colorado 
(“Public Service”) is discussed in section III of this report.
3.  Oregon
Oregon’s IRP rules are the most straightforward of the 
three states examined here. The state first established 
resource planning rules in 1989, in Public Utility 
Commission Order 89-507. The order directs all energy 
utilities in Oregon to undertake least-cost planning, which 
the Commission defines in a somewhat unique way, stating 
that: 
Least-cost planning differs from traditional planning in 
three major respects. It requires integration of supply and 
demand side options. It requires consideration of other than 
internal costs to the utility in determining what is least-cost. 
And it involves the Commission, the customers, and the public 
prior to the making of resource decisions rather than after the 
fact. …Least-cost planning as mandated by this order will 
allow the public as well as the Commission to participate in 
the planning process at its earliest stages.34
The PUC thus identifies one of the key procedural 
elements of least-cost planning as allowance for significant 
involvement from the public and other utilities in 
the preparation of the resource plan, which includes 
opportunities for the public to contribute information and 
ideas as well as to receive information. The Commission’s 
order states that “the open and collaborative character of 
least-cost planning may foster elevated confidence among 
those affected by the decisions and may make the process 
more responsive to demonstrated needs.”35 Substantive 
elements of least-cost planning are similar to those found 
in other states, with the PUC emphasizing the evaluation of 
conservation in a manner that is consistent and comparable 
to that of supply-side resources,36 and with the analysis of 
economic, environmental, and social uncertainties.
The order also includes a concurring opinion from 
Commissioner Myron B. Katz, in which he discusses 
whether commissions, in the context of least-cost planning, 
should be interested in costs to utilities and ratepayers 
alone, or in overall costs to society. Katz suggests that 
utilities should seek to determine the costs for resources 
that include any externalities associated with those 
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resources, stating that “[a] resource should be deemed cost-
effective and thus eligible for selection if its costs are lower 
than the costs of alternative resources assuming a market in 
which all costs, including environmental costs, are reflected 
in resource price tags.”37
Subsequent PUC Orders 07-002, 08-339, and 09-041 
(which became O.A.R. 860-027-0400) updated planning 
guidelines and requirements, and changed least-cost 
planning terminology to integrated resource planning, 
in recognition of the fact that there are many risks and 
uncertainties associated with any portfolio that must be 
weighed, and that least-cost is not the only criterion for 
selecting the best resource portfolio. This emphasis on the 
importance of risk in integrated resource planning is one 
way in which Oregon differs from some other states. The 
emphasis is placed in the forefront of the revised rules, 
with Guideline 1(b) stating that “(r)isk and uncertainty 
must be considered.”38 Risk is defined as a measure of 
the bad outcomes associated with a resource plan, while 
uncertainty is a measure of the quality of information about 
an event or outcome. Recognizing risks that are general to 
the electric industry and those that are specific to Oregon, 
the rules specify that, at a minimum, the following sources 
of risk must be considered in utility resource plans: load 
requirements, hydroelectric generation, plant forced 
outages, fuel prices, electricity prices, and costs to comply 
with any regulation of greenhouse gases, as well as any 
additional sources of risk and uncertainty.39 
In order to quantify these risks, utilities should calculate 
two different measures of the present value of revenue 
requirement risk (PVRR). The first should measure the 
variability of resulting PVRR costs under the different 
scenarios, and the second should measure the severity of 
any bad outcomes.40 The primary goal of Oregon’s IRP 
planning process is thus “the selection of a portfolio of 
resources with the best combination of expected costs 
and associated risks and uncertainties for the utility and 
its customers.”41 A portfolio of resources with the lowest 
expected cost before the inclusion of various risks may in 
fact have higher costs than other resource portfolios once 
those risks are considered. 
The goal of the Oregon PUC in amending its rules was 
for utilities to identify the lowest-cost resource plan over 
the specified planning horizon by balancing both cost 
and risk. The Commission declines to mandate how the 
measures of PVRR risk be defined, instead leaving it up to 
37  Id. Page 12.
38  Public Utility Commission of Oregon. Order No. 07-002. 
Docket No. UM 1056. January 8, 2007. Appendix A. Page 1.
39 Id.
40  Id. Appendix A. Page 2.
41  Id. Appendix A. Pages 1-2.
42  Id. Page 7.
43  From zero to $40 (1990$), as established in Order No. 93-695.
44  Public Utility Commission of Oregon. Order No. 07-002. 
Docket No. UM 1056. January 8, 2007.
45  Id. Page 8.
the utilities and to “the interactive process of developing 
an IRP to make the best assessment of appropriate risk 
measures.”42 Unlike in Arizona, which requires that utilities 
create a plan to manage specific risks, Oregon requires that 
utilities take risks, their probabilities of occurrence, and the 
likelihood of bad outcomes into their choice of preferred 
resource plan.
These subsequent orders make few other substantive 
changes to the rules established in order 89-507, but 
instead add detail on the information and analysis that 
the PUC wanted in order to acknowledge utility resource 
plans. Notable changes include:
• The requirement that each utility ensure that a 
conservation potential study is done periodically for 
its entire service territory.
• The requirement that demand response and 
distributed generation be evaluated similarly to more 
traditional supply-side resources.
• The requirement that utilities include the expected 
regulatory compliance costs for various pollutants, 
that a range of potential CO2 costs be analyzed,43 and 
that sensitivity analyses be performed on a range of 
costs for nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, and mercury, 
if applicable.44
Order 07-002 also details the nature of public 
involvement in the IRP process, stating that the public and 
other utilities should be allowed significant involvement 
in the preparation of an IRP—that they should be allowed 
to contribute information and ideas, and to make relevant 
inquiries of the utility formulating the plan. The utility 
should also make a draft IRP available for public review 
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and comment before filing a final version with the PUC.45
Following submission of the integrated resource plan, 
intervening parties and Commission staff have six months 
to complete and file written comments on it. In advance 
of the deadline for written comments, the utility must also 
present the results of its resource plan to the Commission 
at a public meeting. The Commission then acknowledges 
the plan or returns it to the utility with comments. It may 
allow the utility to revise its resource plan before issuing an 
acknowledgement order.46 
The IRP rules are careful to point out that 
acknowledgement of the IRP does not guarantee 
favorable ratemaking treatment later on, but that 
the acknowledgement simply means the plan 
seemed reasonable at the time it was reviewed by the 
Commission.47 PacifiCorp, operating in Oregon as Pacific 
Power, is expected to file its 2013 IRP this year, but that 
plan was not available in time for inclusion in this paper. 
PacifiCorp’s 2011 IRP is discussed in later sections.
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III.  Examples of Best Practices in 
Utility Integrated Resource Plans
A. Arizona Public Service
A
rizona Public Service (APS) is the state’s largest 
electric utility, and has been serving retail and 
wholesale consumers since 1886. In March 
2012, APS filed the first formal resource plan in 
17 years with the Arizona Corporation Commission. This 
IRP was also the first to be filed under the ACC’s revised 
rules, as described in section II.A. 
From the time when the Corporation Commission issued 
the final IRP rules to the date that APS filed its resource 
plan, the utility was “engaging key stakeholders to gain an 
understanding and appreciate of their areas of concern.”48  
A series of workshops held during 2010 and 2011 
sought to both inform and gather input from interested 
stakeholders on future resource decisions. The workshop 
topics included the resource fleet and transmission system; 
load forecasts; energy efficiency; smart grid; demand 
response; utility water consumption; fuel supplies and 
markets; technology options and costs; externalities; 
resource procurement; portfolios and sensitivities; and 
metrics and monetization costs for water, sulfur oxides, 
particulate matter, and nitrogen oxides. Approximately 35 
to 50 stakeholders participated in each meeting, and several 
stakeholders were also invited to give presentations in some 
of the topic areas mentioned above.49 
APS also contracted with the Morrison Institute at 
Arizona State University to conduct a series of four 
“Informed Perception Project” surveys on customer 
preferences and concerns regarding the energy resource 
options available to APS. Results showed that APS 
customers “favored an increase in the use of renewable 
energy resources, such as solar and wind, and were 
interested in both the environmental impacts and reliability 
of energy choices.”50
Over the course of the 15-year planning period, with 
the assumption that migration to the state and individual 
electricity consumption will return to historic highs, 
APS has forecast 3% average annual growth in nominal 
electricity requirements through 2027. Energy efficiency 
and distributed generation, in the form of rooftop solar 
installations, will help offset some of this growth, but APS 
expects that it will need to add additional conventional 
supply-side resources, in the form of natural gas-fired 
generation, in 2019. APS created four resource portfolios 
to evaluate: a base case, a “four corners contingency,” an 
“enhanced renewable” case, and a “coal retirement” case. 
Figure 3 shows the details of those plans.
Each of the resource plans created by APS were analyzed 
using a production simulation model, PROMOD IV, which 
dispatches the energy resources in each of the portfolios 
and generates system costs, or the likely future revenue 
requirements, associated with each. Calculation of system 
revenue requirements demonstrated that the APS base case 
portfolio was the most cost-effective of the resource plans 
evaluated. APS also monitors specific metrics to provide 
a context for comparing and evaluating the portfolios. In 
addition to revenue requirements, those metrics include 
fuel diversity, capital expenditures, natural gas burn, water 
use, and CO2 emissions.
APS selected major cost inputs and evaluated several 
sensitivity scenarios, setting the assumptions for these 
variables higher and/or lower to test the impacts on the 
specific metrics being evaluated. These major cost inputs 
include natural gas prices, CO2 prices, production and 
investment tax credits for renewable resources, energy 
efficiency costs, and monetization of SO2, NOx, PM, and 
water. APS also created low-cost and high-cost scenarios, 
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51  Id. Page 44. Arizona Public Service Company hired Black 
and Veatch Corporation to conduct a Solar Photovoltaic (PV) 
Integration Cost Study report that provides the company 
with an estimate for the incremental operating reserves 
necessary to integrate geographically diverse PV development 
in the APS service territory, and quantifies the anticipated 
incremental cost to provide the reserve capacity and energy 
services. “Solar Photovoltaic Integration Cost Study,” B&V 
Project No. 174880 (November 2012).
Description
Nuclear
Coal
Natural Gas and 
Demand Response
Renewable Energy 
(RE) & Distributed 
Energy (DE)
Energy Efficiency 
(EE)
Base Case  
(2012 Resource Plan)
Plan includes APS closing 
Four Corners units 1-3 and 
purchasing SCE’s share of 
units 4-5; continues the 
current trajectory of EE 
and RE compliance
1,146 MW
18.7%MWh
1,932 MW
26% MWh
7,424 MW
26.3% MWh
1,141 MW
13.7% MWh
1,525 MW
15.4% MWh
Four Corners 
Contingency
Contingency plan depicting 
the retirement of the 
Four Corners coal-fired 
plant; energy replaced 
by additional natural gas 
resources
1,146 MW
18.7% MWh
962 MW
12.7% MWh
8,394 MW
39.6% MWh
1,141 MW
13.7% MWh
1,525 MW
15.4% MWh
Enhanced 
Renewable
Assumes 30%  
(after EE/DE) of energy 
needs met by renewable 
resources; include the 
consummation of the 
Four Corners transaction
1,146 MW
18.7% MWh
1,932 MW
26% MWh
7,138 MW
20.7%MWh
1,427 MW
22.8% MWh
1,525 MW
15.4% MWh
Coal 
Retirement
Assumes APS retires all 
coal-fired generation; 
energy replaced with a 
combination of natural 
gas and renewable 
resources
1,146 MW
18.7% MWh
0MW
0MWh
9,188 MW
46.3% MWh
1,308 MW
19.7% MWh
1,525 MW
15.4% MWh
Resource Contributions (2027 Peak Capacity Contribution/ % Energy Mix)
which incorporate the low and high values for all of the 
variables mentioned above rather than testing them on 
an individual basis. The results of the sensitivity analysis 
showed that the four corners contingency and coal 
retirement portfolios have the most variability in terms of 
net present value of revenue requirements, which fluctuate 
11-12% as compared to 6-7% for the base case and 
enhanced renewable portfolios. Natural gas price changes 
caused the largest impact on sensitivity results.
Under the base case plan, APS achieves compliance 
with energy efficiency requirements and slightly exceeds 
compliance levels for renewable energy. Consistent with 
the intent of the revised rules, APS’s reliance on coal-fired 
generating resources drops by 12% between 2012 and 
2027. Use of natural gas increases slightly over the course 
of the planning period under this scenario, but by 2027, no 
single fuel source makes up more than approximately 26% 
of the APS resource mix. Figure 4 shows the energy mix in 
2027 compared to 2012 under the base case portfolio.
Figure 3: 
Portfolios Considered in the APS 2012 IRP51
APS had approximately 600 MW of excess capacity 
in 2012, heading into the summer peak. In the short 
term—over the next three years—the company planned to 
continue to pursue energy efficiency and renewable energy 
resources. During the intermediate term, years four to 15 
of the planning period, APS plans to add 3,700 MW of 
natural gas capacity and 749 MW of renewable capacity. 
However, “[i]n the event that solar, wind, geothermal, or 
other renewable resources change in value and become a 
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more viable and cost-effect option than natural gas, future 
resource plans may reflect a balance more commensurate to 
the enhanced renewable portfolio.”53
APS should be commended for several elements of 
its 2012 IRP. The first of those is the comprehensive 
stakeholder process, which included workshops covering 
most, if not all, of the topic areas that are vital to 
comprehensive integrated resource plans. Not only were 
stakeholders invited to listen and offer feedback, they were 
also invited to present their points of view on a subset of 
these important issues. In the IRP itself, APS provides all 
non-confidential input and output data for stakeholder 
review. 
Second, APS continues to pursue energy efficiency, 
renewable energy, and distributed generation resources 
in each of the resource portfolios it analyzed, meeting or 
exceeding ACC-specified goals and consistent with the 
Commission finding that: 
Continued reliance on fossil generation resources without 
the addition of renewable generation resources is inadequate 
and insufficient to promote and safeguard the security, 
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Figure 4
Energy Mix Under The APS Base Case Portfolio52
EE
RE & DE
Nuclear
Gas
Coal
4.7%
4.9%
28.8%
23.7%
38.0%
15.4%
13.7%
18.7%
26.3%
26.0%
2012 2027
52  Id. Page 45.
53  Id. Page 64.
54  Arizona Public Service. 2012 Integrated Resource Plan.  
Page 13.
55  Id. Page 18.
convenience, health, and safety of electric utilities’ customers 
and the Arizona public and is thus unjust, unreasonable, 
unsafe, and improper.54
APS has also analyzed portfolios that meet the 
Commission goals of promoting fuel and technology 
diversity as the utility lowers its reliance on coal-fired 
generation and increases its use of energy efficiency and 
renewable energy resources. 
Third, APS takes environmental costs into account 
when evaluating its resource plans. The company uses a 
CO2 adder consistent with the assumption that federal 
regulation of CO2 will occur within the 15-year planning 
period. In sensitivity scenarios, APS analyzes alternative 
prices for CO2 emissions, and also includes adders for 
SO2, NOx, PM, and water. Emissions cost and water 
consumption are also two metrics by which APS evaluates 
its resource portfolios. Water in particular is a resource that 
has not been given much consideration in utility integrated 
resource planning in past decades, in this and in other 
jurisdictions—but it is especially important for Arizona 
and other states in the arid parts of the country, as it may 
at times act as a constraining resource on electric power 
generation.
While APS has indeed done an admirable job in its 2012 
Integrated Resource Plan, there are several areas in which 
the utility can still improve. The first is with respect to its 
load forecast. APS assumes a return to very high levels of 
load growth, at 3% per year for a total of 55% growth in 
energy consumption over the planning period. Load growth 
is one variable that can be highly uncertain. APS even 
states that “weather, population growth, economic trends, 
and energy consumptions behaviors are among the key 
variables that impact the Company’s view of future resource 
needs. Accurately forecasting any one of these variables 
over a 15-year period is a challenge. Accurately forecasting 
them all is impossible.”55 
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Changes in the forecast can lead to significant changes 
in the quantity and type of resources needed in a utility’s 
portfolio. For this reason, utilities engaged in resource 
planning typically analyze sensitivity cases that use at 
least two (low and high) alternative load forecasts. APS 
admitted that “a challenge more specific to the APS service 
territory is load-growth uncertainty,”56 and yet the company 
analyzed only a single load forecast—one that the company 
admits is more than triple the average growth of electricity 
demand in the United States.57
The second improvement that APS could make to its 
IRP process relates to the creation of the utility’s resource 
portfolios. Often, in integrated resource planning, utilities 
will use resource optimization models—e.g., EGEAS, 
Strategist, or System Optimizer—to create resource 
portfolios. The user inputs data on peak and energy 
demand, reserve margins, fuel prices, emissions prices, 
capital and operating cost of both supply and demand 
resources, etc., and the optimization model will select 
the number and type of resources to be added over time 
to make up the least-cost plan. These models will also 
perform a simplified system dispatch in order to generate 
system revenue requirements over the planning period. 
Rather than using an optimization model to select the 
ideal resource portfolios, APS hand-selected the resource 
mix for each portfolio. Under this method, it is possible 
that a lower-cost resource plan exists that APS has not 
identified. 
This is particularly true in the sensitivity analyses 
that the company conducted. As described above, 
natural gas prices led to the greatest variance in system 
revenue requirements in the sensitivity analyses. Had an 
optimization model been used to evaluate scenarios with 
high natural gas prices, one might see the model select 
fewer natural gas-fired resources in favor of increased 
renewable or energy efficiency. Similarly, in sensitivity 
scenarios that look at decreased costs for energy efficiency, 
an optimization model might select additional quantities 
of energy efficiency to be added to the resource mix. Some 
of the supply-side resources selected using base EE costs 
might then not be required, as additional EE would lower 
both peak and energy demand. 
On page 104 of its IRP, APS presents a table of residential 
and non-residential EE programs that were rejected because 
program costs were higher than benefits. In sensitivity 
scenarios where lower EE costs were evaluated, some of 
these measures that were rejected may have met cost-
effectiveness tests and been selected for inclusion in utility 
resource portfolios.
B. Public Service Company of Colorado
The October 2011 IRP filing from Public Service 
Company of Colorado (“Public Service”) was filed shortly 
after the company’s filing that addressed the Clean Air-
Clean Jobs Act. In the CACJA plan ultimately approved 
by the Colorado PUC, Public Service will retire 600 MW 
of base-load coal generation, fuel switch from coal to 
natural gas at another 450 MW of coal generation, and 
install emission controls at three other coal units by the 
year 2017. Additionally, as part of two separate filings, 
the company planned for the installation of 900 MW of 
additional wind and 30 MW of new solar by the end of 
2012. These additions, repowerings, and retirements, along 
with the current weak growth in Colorado’s economy, led 
Public Service to project a resource need of only 292 MW 
of additional generation capacity by 2018.
Public Service developed a “least-cost baseline case” 
resource portfolio, designed to meet resource needs during 
the Resource Acquisition Period from 2012 to 2018 at 
the lowest measurement of present value of revenue 
requirements. The utility also developed eight alternative 
plans that evaluate increasing amounts of renewable and 
distributed generation resources. These resource portfolios 
were evaluated using the Strategist model from the period 
of 2011-2050, and are shown in Figure 5.
Public Service evaluated the baseline case and the eight 
alternative cases under several sensitivity scenarios, altering 
the price of CO2 emissions, renewable tax incentives, 
natural gas prices, and level of sales. Figure 6 shows the 
results of the analysis for the first three variables.
Public Service concludes from its analysis that existing 
and planned resources would be sufficient to meet the 
forecasted energy requirements of its system, but that 
natural gas-fired combustion turbines (CTs) would be 
required to provide the capacity necessary to maintain 
reserve margins. The company also concludes that adding 
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Figure 5
Least-Cost Baseline Case and Alternative Plans During the Resource Acquisition Period (RAP) 
From Public Service Company of Colorado’s 2011 IRP58
Figure 6
Sensitivity Results for Co2, Tax Incentives, and Gas Prices From 
Public Service Company of Colorado’s 2011 IRP59
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58  Public Service Company of Colorado. 2011 Electric 
Resource Plan: Volume 1. October 31, 2011. Pp. 1-38.
59  Id. Pp. 1-41.
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renewable generating resources would increase system 
costs under both baseline and sensitivity assumptions.60 
The results of the sensitivity analysis shown in Figure 6 
seem to indicate, however, that if the production tax credit 
(PTC)61 for wind were to be extended, there would be some 
benefit to adding additional wind generation, as shown by 
the decline in present value of revenue requirements in this 
scenario relative to the base case.
Given the results of the resource analysis, Public Service 
proposes to utilize a competitive All-Source Solicitation 
to acquire the resources needed to meet planning reserve 
margin targets. The solicitation would seek both short-
term and long-term power supply proposals, with a 
preference for short-term contracts. Public Service lists 
several uncertainties that it will face over the coming years: 
future environmental regulations, changing technology 
costs, tax credits that impact the relative costs of generation 
alternatives, fuel prices, and economic growth in its service 
territory.62 Given these uncertainties and the relatively 
small resource need, the shorter-term power urchase 
agreements would allow the utility to wait and see if and 
how uncertainties can be resolved before adding new 
generation facilities to its resource mix. The company will 
also offer enough self-build power supply proposals into 
the solicitation process to meet the needs over the resource 
acquisition period. 
These proposals would ensure that at least one portfolio 
could be developed with company-owned facilities, and 
that generating capacity will be expanded at existing sites. 
Public Service requests that the PUC allow it to conduct 
periodic solicitations for additional renewable energy, if 
and when markets become most favorable to customers; 
but it reports no plans to add additional renewables over 
the acquisition period. The company states that, “[t]o the 
extent the Commission desires to see portfolios from the 
Phase 2 process that contain increasing levels of renewable 
or Section 123 Resources the Commission should direct the 
Company to do so in its Phase 1 order.”63
Public Service’s 2011 IRP is comprehensive, thorough, 
and a good example of effective resource planning. 
Resource planning in Colorado is driven by: 1) the state 
Legislature, as statutes dictate the content of state IRP rules; 
2) by interveners, whose comments and suggestions during 
IRP processes can lead to changes in both rules and content 
of utility resource plans; and 3) by the PUC, which oversees 
the process and may require that utilities revise resource 
60  Id. Pp. 1-43.
61  The federal renewable energy production tax credit (PTC) 
provides a per-kilowatt-hour tax credit for electricity 
generating by various types of renewable energy resources 
and sold by the taxpayer to an unrelated person during the 
taxable year. The PTC was originally enacted in 1992 and has 
been extended several times, most recently in January 2013 
as part of the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (H.R. 6, 
Sec 407). Currently, the PTC for wind resources for which 
construction began prior to December 31, 2013 is 2.3 cents/
kWh.
62  Id. Pp. 1-5.
63  Id. Pp. 1-49.
64  Id. Pp. 1-59.
plans in specific ways prior to receiving Commission 
approval. The input and oversight from these three entities, 
combined with the utilities’ expertise, leads to the inclusion 
of several notable elements in the resource plan that 
demonstrate additional issues of concern in Colorado. 
First, recognizing that acquiring necessary resources 
does not always go according to plan, the utility creates 
and describes a series of the more common contingency 
events—e.g., bidders withdrawing proposals, transmission 
development delays, higher than anticipated electric 
demand, etc.—and develops plans to address them if they 
occur.64 
Second, Public Service acknowledges that its planned 
volume of wind installations (2,100 MW by 2012) creates 
specific challenges and requirements that much lower 
volumes of renewables would not. Because wind output 
can be variable and uncertain, there may be additional 
flexibility requirements on an electric system—i.e., there 
must be a certain amount of generation that can be brought 
on-line within a 30-minute period in order to respond to 
changes in renewable output. Public Service conducts an 
assessment of the need for flexible resources in its IRP’s 
general assessment of need. 
Flexibility studies are not a part of traditional integrated 
resource planning, but Public Service is responding 
to unique circumstances in its service territory by 
incorporating this type of study in its resource planning. 
Utilities sometimes cite the variability and uncertainty of 
wind and other renewables as reasons not to pursue these 
types of resources in their portfolios; Public Service shows, 
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67  Wyoming does not have its own IRP obligation, but instead 
mandates that any utility serving in the state that is required 
to submit an IRP in another jurisdiction also file that IRP 
with the Wyoming PSC.
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however, that these challenges can be planned for in a 
reasonable way and are not a reason to avoid renewable 
additions. 
Finally, traditional integrated resource planning does not 
pursue short-term strategies, such as market purchases that 
may buy time in the hope that some uncertainties will be 
resolved.”65 The Public Service IRP does just that, however, 
by making shorter-term resource acquisition decisions and 
preserving “decisions involving new generation facilities to 
a point in the future when we see how these uncertainties 
are resolved.”66
While Public Service should be applauded for its 
integration of renewables to date, it is unclear from the 
company’s IRP whether it truly views renewable generating 
technologies as a system resource as opposed to an 
obligation established by the state legislature and the 
PUC. As mentioned above, Public Service has no plans 
to pursue additional renewable acquisitions during the 
next seven years, even though sensitivity analyses show 
that additional wind generation may be beneficial to 
ratepayers if the production tax credit were to be extended. 
The company does ask that it be granted permission to 
conduct solicitations for renewables outside of the resource 
planning process if it determines that market conditions are 
“favorable,” but it gives no indication as to what favorable 
market conditions might look like. An evaluation of the 
market conditions favorable to renewables would be very 
helpful in the context of resource planning, and could be 
included in future IRPs or updates from Public Service.
C. PacifiCorp
Of the three utilities examined here, PacifiCorp is unique 
in that it operates across six states—Oregon, Washington, 
California, Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming, five of which have 
IRP or other long-term planning requirements.67 This 
gives PacifiCorp the additional challenge of planning on 
a system-wide basis while meeting each of the resource-
acquisition mandates and policies in the states where it 
operates. The company evaluates a 20-year study period, 
but focuses on the first ten years (2011-2020) in its 
assessment of resource need. 
In that ten-year planning period, PacifiCorp forecasts 
that system peak load will grow at 2.1% per year (2.4% for 
  Capacity (MW)
Resource  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020  Total
CCCT  F  Class  - - -  625  -  597  - - - - 1,222
CCCT  H  Class  - - - - - - - -  475  - 475
Coal Plan Turbine Upgrades  12  19  6  -  -  18  -  8  -  -  63
Wind,  Wyoming  - - - - - - -  300  300  200  800
CHP-Biomass  5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5  50
DSM,  Class  1  6  70  57  20  97  - - - - - 250
DSM,  Class  2  108 114 110 118 122 124 126 120 122 125  1,189
Oregon  Solar  Programs  4 4 4 3 3 - - - - -  18
Micro  Solar  –  Water  Heating  - 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 - -  28
Firm  Market  Purchases  350  1,240  1,429  1,190  1,149  775 822 967 695 995  N/A
Figure 7
Resource Additions in the Preferred Portfolio—PacifiCorp’s 2011 IRP68
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the eastern system peak and 1.4% for the western system 
peak), and that energy requirements will grow by 1.8% 
per year. Resource deficits will begin in the first year, with 
PacifiCorp being short 326 MW in 2011. This deficit grows 
to 3,852 MW by 2020. In the near-term, shortages will 
be met with DSM, renewables, and market purchases, but 
new baseload and intermediate generating units begin to 
be added to the resource mix in 2014.69 Figure 7 shows the 
proposed resource additions.
If PacifiCorp were to proceed with these proposed 
resource additions, by 2020 its capacity mix would be as 
shown in Figure 8. In this scenario, traditional thermal 
resources still make up two-thirds of PacifiCorp’s capacity 
mix; DSM makes up just over 13%, and renewables make 
up 2.6%.
As Figure 9 shows, PacifiCorp’s energy mix looks slightly 
different under its preferred portfolio. The percentage of 
total energy generated from coal-fired resources drops 
by 26% between 2011 and 2020, while the amount of 
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Figure 8
Capacity Mix Under the PacifiCorp 
Preferred  Portfolio70
Figure 9
Energy Mix Under the PacifiCorp 
Preferred  Portfolio71
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energy from gas-fired resources more than doubles. Even 
with the significant drop in generation from coal, energy 
from thermal resources makes up 61% of PacifiCorp’s 
total energy. DSM makes up 11% of the energy mix, 
with another 11% coming from renewable resources. 
Hydroelectric power and energy purchases make up the 
bulk of the remaining energy.
Of the three utilities examined in this report, PacifiCorp’s 
portfolio modeling process is the most comprehensive. 
It uses a model called System Optimizer, which has the 
capability to determine capacity expansion plans, to run a 
production cost simulation of each optimized portfolio, and 
to perform a risk assessment on these portfolios. 
0.1% 0.3%
0.8%
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Altogether, PacifiCorp defined 67 input scenarios 
for portfolio development. These looked at alternative 
transmission configurations, CO2 price levels and 
regulation types, natural gas prices, and renewable resource 
policies. Sensitivity cases examined additional incremental 
costs for coal plants, alternative load forecasts, renewable 
generation costs and incentives, and DSM resource 
availability. Top resource portfolios were determined on the 
basis of the combination of lowest average portfolio cost 
and worst-case portfolio cost resulting from 100 simulation 
runs. Final portfolios were selected after considering such 
Figure 10
Pacificorp Modeling and Risk Analysis Process73
criteria as risk-adjusted portfolio cost, 10-year customer 
rate impact, CO2 emissions, supply reliability, resource 
diversity, and uncertainty and risk surrounding greenhouse 
gas and RPS policies.72 
Figure 10 shows PacifiCorp’s schematic of its modeling 
process. PacifiCorp is one of the only utilities in the 
country that models energy efficiency resources as supply-
side resources, rather than as load modifiers. The utility 
provides the model with specific quantities of energy 
efficiency at given costs, and allows those efficiency 
resources to compete against the other resources from 
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which the model is able to select. PacifiCorp’s efficiency 
resource information in its 2011 IRP is based on a 2010 
energy efficiency potential study that provided an estimate 
of the size, type, timing, location, and cost of the demand-
side resources that are technically available in PacifiCorp’s 
service territory. Data for more than 18,000 measures were 
available after the resources were separated by customer 
segment, facility type, and unique EE measures. 
Energy efficiency measures are called Class 2 DSM, 
while capacity-based measures are separated into two 
categories: Class 1 DSM includes dispatchable demand-
response programs, and Class 3 DSM includes pricing 
programs. Focusing on Class 2 DSM measures, PacifiCorp 
consolidated them into nine cost bundles grouped by 
levelized cost for inclusion in the modeling, and 1,400 
supply curves were modeled for the IRP.74 
Energy efficiency measures performed well in the 
modeling, representing the largest resource added through 
2030 across all portfolios with cumulative capacity 
additions exceeding 2,500 MW in the preferred portfolio. 
The inclusion of such large quantities of energy efficiency 
creates huge cost savings to ratepayers. If energy efficiency 
were not included in PacifiCorp’s resource portfolio, the 
utility would have to meet electric load by adding 2,500 
MW of supply-side resources at much greater cost.
Although PacifiCorp’s portfolio modeling process 
is comprehensive and well-executed, system resource 
modeling in general is only as good as the input assumptions 
used to generate the portfolios. The most significant area 
in need of improvement in the PacifiCorp IRP process 
relates to the input assumptions and analysis regarding 
the company’s coal fleet—or, rather, the lack of analysis 
presented on this in the IRP. This lack of analysis began 
during the stakeholder process. In comments that it 
submitted, the Sierra Club states that it actively participated 
in the stakeholder input process, and raised many of the 
issues discussed in those comments. “The company did 
not respond to any requests for data related to the topics 
addressed in these comments, choosing instead to provide 
only a small amount of materials in the final draft, just days 
before the company submitted the final IRP.”75 
PacifiCorp’s 26 coal-fired boilers make up almost two 
thirds of its generation. To keep these units running 
while meeting stricter federal air pollution standards, 
the company would have to spend $1.57 billion in 
environmental capital cost from 2011 to 2020, in addition 
to $1.2 billion that it invested before 2011. Operating costs 
would raise the total cost to customers to $4.2 billion, or 
$360 million on an annual basis by 2030.76 PacifiCorp, 
however, makes no mention of these current compliance 
obligations or any future costs in the 2011 IRP or its 
appendices. The utility failed to disclose the costs that 
would be faced by its coal fleet in its 2011 IRP, and failed 
to do a comprehensive analysis of the economics of each 
of its coal-fired generating units. Absent this analysis, the 
resource portfolios analyzed by the company cannot be 
considered to be truly “optimized.”
It is highly likely that PacifiCorp could add additional 
renewable resources to its portfolio. As discussed above, 
Public Service Company of Colorado had 2,100 MW of 
wind capacity alone on its system at the end of 2012, 
and they are a single utility operating in one state. 
PacifiCorp’s territory covers portions of six states, many 
with large amounts of renewable potential. PacifiCorp’s 
service territory also borders other states with large 
amounts of renewable potential, and the company could 
enter into long-term contracts for renewable energy. The 
company states in the IRP that it commissioned a study 
on geothermal potential, yet its resource portfolio does 
not include any anticipated geothermal energy or capacity 
during the study period.
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IV. Recommendations for 
Prudent Integrated Resource Planning
P
rudent integrated resource planning involves both 
the process of creating and sharing the resource 
plan with stakeholders, and the elements that 
are analyzed and included in the plan itself. 
This section provides recommendations, for both the IRP 
process and the resulting resource plan, that are designed to 
result in responsible and comprehensive utility integrated 
resource plans.
A. Integrated Resource Planning Process
Integrated resource planning processes differ from state 
to state. The ideal process begins with the determination 
of the IRP guidelines or rules. Integrated resource planning 
rules were first established in many states in the late 1980s 
or early 1990s; Oregon’s first rules, for example, were 
established by PUC order in 1989. Significant changes have 
occurred since then. During the mid- to late 1990s, electric 
restructuring moved many utilities away from traditional 
resource planning in favor of market-based provision of 
electric supply; and today, climate change, national security, 
and volatility in fuel and commodity markets can make 
it difficult to determine the best way in which to supply 
electricity to consumers. Integrated resource planning rules 
should thus be reexamined periodically, to make sure they 
reflect the current conditions and challenges associated 
with providing reliable electric service at reasonable costs. 
Arizona began the process of changing its rules after 
retail competition was instituted in the state by the 
Corporation Commission—and although the rules took 
over a decade to be revised and put into effect, the current 
regulations have been designed to address the issues that 
are of concern today. When IRP rules are reexamined, state 
commissions should open proceedings that are open to 
the public, and stakeholders should be allowed to offer 
input on the ways in which rules should be revised, as 
well as to review and comment on any draft documents 
that are issued. All three of the state IRP rules examined 
here have gone through this process, and in drafting 
revised rules, each of the state commissions carefully 
considered the feedback offered by interveners and adopted 
recommendations from both public interest groups and 
utilities.
1. Resource Plan Development
Stakeholder group involvement is equally important 
when it is time for a utility to develop its integrated 
resource plan. As was discussed in section III.A., APS 
detailed its stakeholder process in its 2012 IRP. During the 
two-year period that preceded the filing of the plan, the 
utility held various workshops where stakeholders received 
updates on the inputs to be used, and were able to offer 
feedback and even give presentations on these various 
inputs. Stakeholders were also surveyed to determine their 
preferences with regard to the energy resources selected 
by APS. Not only does this stakeholder process inform the 
content of the resource plan that is ultimately filed by the 
utility; it can also help to inform the review process once 
the filing has been made. 
Other states have also recognized the benefits of 
stakeholder involvement in IRP and developed model 
processes. In its Resource Planning Guidelines for Electric 
Utilities, the Arkansas Public Service Commission 
suggests that utilities establish a Stakeholder Committee 
to assist in preparing resource plans that “should be 
broadly representative of retail and wholesale customers, 
independent power suppliers, marketers, and other 
interested entities in the service area.”77 The members 
of this committee would review utility objectives, 
assumptions, and estimated needs early in the planning 
cycle, and would submit a report along with the utility’s 
resource plan. Committee members may also submit 
additional comments to the Commission, which may 
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require the utility to re-evaluate its plan to address these 
comments.78
In Hawaii, IRP rules were designed to attempt to 
maximize public participation in the planning process. In 
each county within its service territory, the utility is required 
to organize advisory groups made up of representatives of 
public and private entities whose interests are affected by the 
utility’s resource plan—including state and county agencies 
and environmental, cultural, business, and community 
interest groups. The rules specify that “(a)n advisory group 
should be representative of as broad a spectrum of interests 
as possible.”79
Whether required by IRP rules or not, it is good practice 
for a utility to convene a stakeholder group, or to hold 
public meetings that are open to all interested parties, 
before creating and submitting its resource plan. These 
meetings are useful both to provide information and invite  
feedback on the input assumptions and the process that the 
utility is using in its resource planning, and to help ensure 
that the resulting plan is relevant and reflects the interests 
of ratepayers and the general public. 
2. Resource Plan Review
Many state utility commissions are quasi-judicial boards 
that rely on the rules of civil procedure and allow for 
participation and intervention from different organizations 
and members of the public (provided they have standing 
in the proceeding, or an ability to assist the commission 
in making decisions). After a utility has filed its resource 
plan, the state PUC should open a proceeding that allows 
stakeholders to review and submit written comments on 
the filing. This feedback should be taken into account 
during the review by the PUC and its staff. Commissions 
should take an active role in assessing the validity of the 
inputs used by the utilities in their filings, the resulting 
outcomes, and whether these are consistent with both the 
IRP rules and the state’s energy policies and goals. 
In Kentucky, for example, the IRP rules specify that once 
a utility’s IRP has been received, the Commission should 
develop a procedural schedule allowing for submission 
of written interrogatories to the utility by commission 
staff and any interveners, written comments by staff and 
interveners, and responses to these interrogatories and 
comments by the utility. The Commission may convene 
conferences to discuss the filed IRP if it wishes to do so. 
Following a review of the plan and intervener comments, 
Commission staff will issue a report summarizing its review 
and offering recommendations to the utility for subsequent 
IRP filings.80
Of the states examined in this report, the Colorado 
PUC has taken on a particularly active role in determining 
whether utility resource choices were in the public interest. 
The PUC did so, for example, in its review of Public Service 
Company of Colorado’s 2010 DSM Plan, when it rejected 
the energy efficiency goals proposed by the company and 
instead asked that the utility adopt goals recommended by 
an intervener—the Southwest Energy Efficiency Project—
that were approximately 130% of the goals in place at the 
time.81 These EE goals were then incorporated into the 
2011 IRP, in the calculation of resource need as one of the 
input modeling assumptions.82
Many states, though not all, require that utility plans 
be available to interveners and/or members of the public 
for review and participation in resource planning dockets. 
This signals to both stakeholders and utilities that the IRP 
process should be collaborative, and that stakeholders 
can and do offer valuable insights and opinions into 
resource planning that should be taken into account by 
utilities when developing their plans. Active oversight 
and participation by the state PUC is critical to ensuring 
that comments and proposals by interveners are reviewed, 
considered fully, and incorporated into utility resource 
plans when reasonable.
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83  State and Local Energy Efficiency Action Network. Using 
Integrated Resource Planning to Encourage Investment in Cost-
Effective Energy Efficiency Measures. September 2011. Page 5.
84  Public Service Company of Colorado. 2011 Electric Resource 
Plan: Volume 1. October 31, 2011. Pp. 1-5.
85  Biewald, B. & Bernow, S. Electric Utility System Reliability 
Analysis: Determining the Need for Generating Capacity. Boston: 
Energy Systems Research Group. 1988.
B. Integrated Resource Plans
A good electric system IRP should include, at a 
minimum:
Load forecast
A company’s load forecast (annual peak and energy) 
is one of the major determinants of the quantity and 
type of resources that must be added in a utility’s service 
territory over a given time period, and has always been 
the starting point for resource planning. Projections of 
future load should be based on realistic assumptions about 
local population changes and local economic factors83 and 
should be fully documented. Resource needs can rise or fall 
dramatically over a short period of time, and frequent, up-
to-date load forecasts are necessary for utilities to be able 
to adequately assess the quantity and type of additional 
resources that might be needed in a specific planning 
period. 
In Colorado, for example, at the time of Public Service’s 
CACJA filing in mid-2010, the company was projecting 
a resource need of approximately 1,000 MW by 2018. At 
the time of its IRP filing in October 2011, the projection 
of resource need had dropped to 292 MW as a result of 
the economic recession and the success of DSM and solar 
programs.84 In order to help plan for any future changes 
in load, utilities should model a range of possible load 
forecasts, not just a reference case.
Reserves and reliability
Reliability is typically defined as having capacity equal to 
the forecasted peak demand, plus a reserve margin during 
the hours in which that peak demand is expected to occur. 
Reserve requirements should provide for adequate capacity 
based on a rigorous analysis of system characteristics and 
proper treatment of intermittent resources. The system 
characteristics affecting reliability and reserve requirements 
include load shape, generating unit forced-outage rates, 
generating unit maintenance-outage requirements, 
number and size of the generating units in a region or 
service territory, transmission interties with neighboring 
utilities, and availability and effectiveness of intervention 
procedures.85
Demand-Side Management
Many state IRP statutes or regulations include in the 
definition of integrated resource planning an evaluation 
of energy conservation and efficiency. Even so, “[w]hile 
demand-side resources have always been a conceptual part 
of IRP, in practice they have not always been an important 
focus.”86, 87 As generation from traditional supply-side 
resources is growing more costly and energy efficiency 
measures are becoming less expensive, however, demand-
side alternatives have gained a greater number of advocates 
across the United States. 
Not only is energy efficiency often the lowest-
cost resource available to system planners, it can also 
mitigate a variety of risks, such as that of impending 
carbon legislation and other environmental regulations 
affecting air and water quality. In addition to offsetting 
energy consumption, implementing EE measures can 
lead to a deferral in costly transmission and distribution 
investments.88
In the IRPs of most utilities, demand-side resources are 
included only up to the point that statutory goals are met, 
or mandatory levels of investment are included. Resource 
planners often incorporate the effects of those demand-side 
policies as adjustments (“decrements”) to their forecasts of 
future load requirements. However, 
86  Chupka, M., Murphy D. & Newell, S. Reviving Integrated 
Resource Planning for Electric Utilities: New Challenges and 
Innovative Approaches. Brattle Group. 2008. Page 3.
87  Demand response, which is another type of demand-side 
resource, is considered in utility IRPs even less frequently 
than is efficiency. A full discussion of how demand response 
is included or excluded in IRPs is beyond the scope of this 
report.
88  The Treatment of Energy Efficiency in Integrated Resource Plans. 
Page 15.
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89  State and Local Energy Efficiency Action Network. Using 
Integrated Resource Planning to Encourage Investment in 
Cost-Effective Energy Efficiency Measures. September 2011. 
Page 6.
90  Arizona Public Service. 2012 Integrated Resource Plan. 
March 2012. Page 36.
91  Arizona Corporation Commission. Decision No. 71819. 
Docket No. RE-00000C-09-0427. August 10, 2010.
92  Chapter 19.285 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW): 
Energy Independence Act.
93  The Northwest Power and Conservation Council (NWPCC) 
is a regional entity that helps the states in the Pacific 
“The best IRPs create levelized cost curves for 
demand-side resources that are comparable to the 
levelized cost curves for supply-side resources. …
By developing cost curves for demand-side options, 
planners allow the model to choose an optimum 
level of investment. So if demand-side resources can 
meet customer demand for less cost than supply-side 
resources, as is frequently the case, this approach may 
result in more than the minimum investment levels 
required under other policies.”89
The three integrated resource plans discussed in this 
report each deal with energy efficiency in different ways. In 
Arizona, the Corporation Commission has set a demand-
side management standard, and each of the portfolios 
analyzed in the IRP from Arizona Public Service assume 
full compliance with that standard.90 Public utilities are 
required to achieve annual energy savings of at least 
22% by 2020, and savings (measured as a percent of 
retail energy sales) should increase incrementally in each 
calendar year prior to 2020.91 In its IRP, APS has calculated 
the number of MWh of energy savings needed to be 
compliant with Commission standards, and has imported 
these targets into the IRP as a load decrement over the 
planning horizon.
Colorado’s Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) 
was established by Colorado House Bill 07-1037 and 
codified under the Code of Colorado Regulations §40-3.2-
104. The law requires that the Colorado Commission set 
savings goals for energy and peak demand for the state’s 
investor-owned utilities, but specifies minimum savings 
goals of at least 5% of both retail energy sales and peak 
demand from a 2006 baseline. Utilities are required to 
submit DSM plans, which are then reviewed and approved 
by the Commision, or approved with modifications. The 
plan that is ultimately approved may require levels of DSM 
that are higher than the minimum savings goals that have 
previously been established. Similar to APS, in its most 
recent IRP, Public Service took the most recent utility-
specific DSM goals approved by the Commission and 
imported them into the IRP process as a load decrement, 
reducing the resource need over the planning period.
PacifiCorp is subject to EERS requirements in 
Washington and California. In 2006 in Washington, 
voters passed Initiative 937, which requires that electric 
utilities serving more than 25,000 customers undertake 
all cost-effective energy conservation. Beginning in 2010, 
utilities must do an assessment of all the achievable cost-
effective conservation potential in even-numbered years.92 
Alternatively, efficiency targets may be based on a utility’s 
most recent integrated resource plan, provided that plan is 
consistent with the resource plan for the Northwest Power 
and Conservation Council.93 
California Assembly Bill 2021, enacted in 2006, called 
for a 10% reduction in electricity consumption within 
10 years. It also required that the California Energy 
Commission (CEC), California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC), and other interested parties develop a statewide 
estimate of all cost-effective electricity savings, develop 
efficiency and demand reduction targets for the next 10 
years, and update the study every three years. Goals were 
developed by the CPUC in 2008 for years 2012 through 
2020, and each of the three investor-owned utilities in the 
state has distinct requirements for electricity savings and 
demand reduction.94 
Northwest ensure an affordable and reliable energy system 
while maintaining fish and wildlife health in the Columbia 
River Basin. One responsibility of the NWPCC is to publish 
a 20-year electric plan that serves as a guide for Bonneville 
Power and its customer utilities in the region. The regional 
plan drives best practices in energy efficiency and is a 
reference against which utility plans may be measured. 
In the Sixth Power Plan, published in 2010, the NWPCC 
recommended that energy efficiency be deployed aggressively 
such that it meets 85% of new demand for electricity over 
the next 20 years.
94  California Public Utilities Commission. Decision 08-07-047. 
Rulemaking 06-04-010. July 31, 2008.
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In California, PacifiCorp is also subject to a separate 
“loading order” requirement that requires utilities to first 
meet growth in energy demand through energy efficiency 
and demand response. Only after all cost-effective demand-
side measures have been taken should the utilities consider 
adding conventional generation technologies.95 PacifiCorp’s 
2011 IRP creates levelized cost curves for demand-side 
resources, as described above and in previous sections, 
and is a good example of this type of energy efficiency 
modeling effort. This type of modeling may be too costly 
to be feasible for some utilities, but it is important that 
consideration of various levels of DSM savings be given in 
integrated resource planning in order to give stakeholders 
confidence that all cost-effective DSM has been included in 
utility resource plans.
Supply options
A full range of supply alternatives should be considered 
in utility IRPs, with reasonable assumptions about the 
costs, performance, and availability of each resource. There 
can be uncertainties regarding the availability and costs of 
raw materials and skilled labor, construction schedules, 
and future regulations. Because these cost uncertainties 
can affect technologies in different ways, it is prudent to 
model a range of possible costs and construction lead times 
for supply alternatives. And because planning periods 
examined in IRPs are typically a decade or more, it is 
also prudent to evaluate supply technologies that are not 
currently feasible from a cost perspective, but may become 
so later in the planning period.
Fuel prices
Coal prices have been on the rise in recent years, and 
natural gas prices have historically been quite volatile. 
Fuel prices can shift as a result of demand growth, climate 
legislation, development of export infrastructure, and 
supply conditions.96 It is thus extremely important to use 
reasonable, recent, and consistent projections of fuel prices 
in integrated resource planning.
Environmental costs and constraints 
Utility IRPs should include a projection of environmental 
compliance costs—including recognition, and evaluation 
where possible—of all reasonably expected future 
regulations. At this time, the EPA has announced several 
upcoming environmental regulations. A final version of the 
Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (the “MATS” Rule) has 
been released, and rules are pending for Coal Combustion 
Residuals (“CCR”), cooling water intake structures under 
the Clean Water Act (“316(b)”), updates to the National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”), and new 
Effluent Limitation Guidelines. 
Within the next three to five years, certain generating 
units may also become subject to new requirements under 
the Clean Air Act’s Regional Haze Program, sometimes 
known as the BART rule because it requires installation 
of “best available retrofit technology.” The Cross-State Air 
Pollution Rule, which would have required emissions 
reductions of SO2 and NOx in many states but was vacated 
by the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit in 2012, 
may return in a revised form at some point in the future.97 
Finally, greenhouse-gas emissions limits for electric 
generating units may come into effect in the next decade.98 
These rules, both individually and in combination, have 
the potential to dramatically change the electric power 
industry. Utilities, in their IRP filings, need to acknowledge 
these rules and prepare for them as best they can through 
evaluations of emissions allowance costs, emission controls, 
and changes to resource portfolios. Few utilities now 
do this in a comprehensive manner. Of those discussed 
here, APS does the best job in its IRP by providing a 
discussion of each of the rules and its potential impacts on 
APS operations. The process could be improved through 
analysis of different compliance strategy scenarios.
Existing resources
Examination of existing resources in utility IRPs has 
become especially important as the mandated emission 
95  See California Assembly Bills 1890 and 995. Similar loading 
order requirements exist in a few other states. See for 
example Connecticut Public Act No. 07-242, Section 51:  
An Act Concerning Electricity and Energy Efficiency.
96  Reviving Integrated Resource Planning. Page 6.
97  Colburn, K., et al. “Least-Risk Planning: The Homer City 
Decision Increases Uncertainty—but Rewards Forward 
Thinking.” Public Utilities Fortnightly, November 2012.
98  EPA has proposed but not yet finalized greenhouse gas 
emission limits for newly constructed power plants. After 
those rules are finalized, EPA is required under the Clean Air 
Act to develop standards for existing power plants.
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reductions associated with the MATS rule, discussed 
above, have led to utility decisions across the country to 
install pollution control retrofits, repower, or retire their 
coal units. PacifiCorp drew the ire of stakeholders and the 
Oregon PUC by not including this type of analysis for its 
coal-fired units in its 2011 IRP. All types of modifications to 
existing resources should be included in a utility’s analysis 
of the optimum resource portfolio.
Integrated analysis
There are various reasonable ways to model plans, 
generally requiring the use of optimization or simulation 
models. Common models used throughout the industry 
include Strategist, EGEAS, System Optimizer, MIDAS, 
AURORA, PROMOD, and Market Analytics. These models 
are supplied to utilities by various third-party vendors.
It is important that the integrated model does not 
inadvertently exclude combinations of options that deserve 
consideration. This might occur in one of two ways. The 
first is in the instances that future resource portfolios are 
user-defined, rather than selected by an industry model. 
This is one of the criticisms of the Arizona Public Service 
IRP: the use of production cost modeling without an 
optimization component may have resulted in a less than 
optimal addition of supply- and demand-side resources 
over time. 
The second way in which this may occur is if users 
constrain optimization models so that a model may not, 
given the cost, select the quantity of a specific resource that 
it may want. For example, a utility may constrain a model 
in such a way that it is only allowed to add 100 MW of 
wind generation over the resource planning period; but 
depending on the nature of the utility’s electric system, the 
model may want to add additional wind resources. In this 
way, a combination of resources that deserves consideration 
may be excluded.
Time frame
The study period for IRP analysis should be sufficiently 
long to incorporate much of the operating lives of any new 
resource options that may be added to a utility’s portfolio—
typically at least 20 years—and should consider an “end 
effects” period to avoid a bias against adding generating 
units late in the planning period. Arizona rules require 
a 15-year planning period, Oregon a 20-year planning 
period, and Colorado a utility-specified planning period of 
between 20 and 40 years. Of the rules examined here, only 
Oregon explicitly states that an end effects period should be 
considered.
Uncertainty
At a minimum, important and uncertain input 
assumptions should be tested with high and low cases 
to assess the sensitivity of results to changes in input 
values. These assumptions include, but are not limited 
to, load forecasts, fuel prices, emissions allowance prices, 
environmental regulatory regimes, costs and availability 
of demand-side management measures, and capital and 
operating costs for new generating units.99 The types of 
inputs listed are common to most utilities across the United 
States, but there are additional input assumptions that are 
regional or local in nature. 
As discussed in the section on Oregon’s IRP rules, its 
PUC requires utilities to model cases that vary the amount 
of hydroelectric output in the region. Utilities in states like 
Arizona, New Mexico, or Florida may want to examine 
99  Decisions in the face of uncertainty come with degrees of 
risk.  A recent study by CERES entitled, “Practicing Risk-
Aware Electricity Regulation: What Every State Regulator 
Needs to Know (How State Regulatory Policies Can 
Recognize and Address the Risk in Electric Utility Resource 
Selection) concludes that it is “essential that regulators 
understand the risks involved in resource selection, correct 
for biases inherent in utility regulation, and keep in mind 
the long-term impact that their decisions will have on 
consumers and society.  To do this, regulators must look 
outside the boundaries established by regulatory tradition.” 
According to CERES, “risk arises when there is potential 
harm from an adverse event that can occur with some degree 
of probability.”  Risks for electric system resources have 
both time-related (i.e., the possibility that circumstances 
will change over the life of the investment and materially 
affect both the cost of the investment and the degree to 
which it benefits consumers) and cost-related aspects (the 
possibility that an investment will not cost what one expects, 
or that cost recovery for the investment will differ from 
expectations). Practicing Risk-Aware Regulation (April 2012) 
at 20-21  http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/practicing-
risk-aware-electricity-regulation
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100 Reviving Integrated Resource Planning. Page 4.
cases that vary the amount of solar output when doing 
long-term planning. Utilities located in arid regions, or 
those owning a significant number of generation assets 
that are dependent on the availability of a water source 
for power plant cooling, may want to analyze scenarios 
where water is scarce or is at too high a temperature to be 
useful for cooling. Individual utilities must determine those 
input assumptions that are subject to variability, and model 
sensitivity cases accordingly to properly account for risks 
and uncertainties that they face.
Performing single-factor sensitivities may not, however, 
be very informative. Many cases may warrant more 
sophisticated techniques, such as probabilistic techniques 
or those that combine uncertainties. “Testing candidate 
resource solutions against scenarios that address the range 
of plausible future trajectories of external factors, and their 
interrelationships, can more effectively support planning in 
an uncertain environment.”100
Valuing and selecting plans
There are often multiple stages of running scenarios 
and screening in developing an IRP, and there are various 
reasonable ways to approach this. Traditionally, the present 
value of revenue requirements is the primary metric that is 
analyzed, and minimized, in utility IRPs. This metric alone 
may not, however, sufficiently address uncertainties. It may 
be useful also to evaluate plans along other dimensions 
like environmental cost or impact, fuel diversity, impact on 
reliability, rate or bill increases, or minimization of risk. 
It is essential that the IRP process be executed in a 
manner that applies the selected metrics in a reasonably 
transparent and logical manner, without inappropriately 
screening out resources options or plans that deserve 
consideration at the next stage. Note also that it is highly 
unlikely that a single resource portfolio will be the best 
choice on every metric evaluated. A resource portfolio that 
performs well across several metrics, but perhaps is not the 
top performer on any single metric, may in fact be the best 
choice for utility planners.
Action plan
Even though IRPs should have a longer study period, 
a good plan will include a specific discussion of the 
implications of the analysis for near-term decisions and 
actions, and will also include specific plans for getting those 
near-term items accomplished. Demand-side measures 
take time to implement, and supply-side resources require 
months or years of lead time to permit and construct. 
Utilities must thus provide a thorough discussion of the 
steps they plan to take to implement, acquire, or construct 
resources that will meet energy and peak demand needs 
in their service territories in the three- to five-year period 
after the plan is filed. The availability of these near-term 
resources has a direct effect on the resources needed 
throughout the remainder of the planning period; so it is 
prudent for the utility to detail the ways in which it will go 
about acquiring the resources described in its IRP.
Documentation
A proper IRP will include discussion of the inputs and 
results, and appendices with full technical details. Only 
items that are truly sensitive business information should 
be treated as confidential, because such treatment can 
hinder important stakeholder input processes.
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V.  Conclusion
U
tility integrated resource planning has been in 
effect in various parts of the United States for 
more than 25 years. While some utilities are 
regulated by the original IRP rules developed 
more than a decade ago, many states have updated their 
IRP rules to reflect current conditions and concerns in 
regional and national electricity markets. In states where 
this has occurred, IRPs filed by utilities tend to be more 
comprehensive and to exhibit more of the “best practices” 
in utility resource planning that have been described in this 
report. 
Nonetheless, there are still many ways in which utilities 
can improve both their resource planning processes and 
the plans that are generated as a result of these processes. 
Engaged stakeholders and state public utilities commissions 
can provide oversight to this process, helping to promote 
resource choices that lead to positive outcomes for society 
as a whole.
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Arizona
  Arizona Corporation Commission Decision No. 71722, in 
Docket No. RE-00000A-09-0249. June 3, 2010.101 
Arkansas
  Arkansas PSC. “Resource Planning Guidelines for Electric 
Utilities.” Approved in Docket 06-028-R. January 4, 2007.102 
Rules are currently under review and updates have been 
proposed.
Colorado
  Colorado PUC. 4 CCR 723-3, Part 3: Rules Regulating 
Electric Utilities. Decision No. C10-1111. Docket No. 
10R-214E. November 22, 2010.103
Delaware
  HB 6, the Delaware Electric Utility Retail Customer Supply 
Act of 2006.104
Georgia
  Integrated Resource Planning Act of 1991 (O.C.G.A. § 46-
3A-1), Amended.105
  Georgia Public Service Commission. General Rules. 
Integrated Resource Planning 515-3-4.106
Hawaii
  Public Utilities Commission, State of Hawaii, A Framework 
for Integrated Resource Planning, March 9, 1992.107 
Idaho
  Idaho Public Utilities Commission Order No. 22299, in  
Case No. U-1500-165.108
Indiana
  170 Indiana Administrative Code 4-7-1: Guidelines for 
Integrated Resource Planning by an Electric Utility.  New 
draft rules have been proposed in docket IURC RM 11-07.109
Kentucky
  KY Administrative Regulation 807 KAR 5:058. Integrated 
Resource Planning by Electric Utilities. Relates to KRS 
Chapter 278.110
Louisiana
  Louisiana Public Service Commission Corrected General 
Order. Docket No. R-30021. Decided at the Commission’s 
March 21, 2012 Business and Executive Session.111
Minnesota
  MN Statute §216B.2422.112
  MN Rules Part 7843.113
Missouri
  Rules of Dept. of Economic Development. Division 240 - 
PSC. Chapter 22—Electric Utility Resource Planning (4 CSR 
240.22).115
Montana
  Montana’s Integrated Least-Cost Resource Planning and 
Acquisition Act (§§ 69-3-1201-1206, Montana Code 
Annotated).116 
  Administrative Rules of Montana 38.5.2001-2016, adopted 
by the Montana PSC, for traditional utilities.117 
  Administrative Rules of Montana 38.5.8201-8227, adopted 
by the Montana PSC, for restructured utilities.118 
Nebraska
  Nebraska Revised Statute 66-1060.119
Nevada
  NRS 704.741.120
New Hampshire
  Title XXXIV Public Utilities, Chapter 378: Rates and Charges, 
Section 38: Least Cost Energy Planning.121
New Mexico
  Integrated Resource Plans for Electric Utilities, Title 17, 
Chapter 7, Part 3.122
North Carolina
  North Carolina Utilities Commission Rule R8-60: Integrated 
Resource Planning and Filings.123
North Dakota
  North Dakota PSC Order issued on January 27, 1987 in Case 
No. 10,799. Amended on March 11, 1992 in Case No. PU-
399-91-689.124
Oklahoma
  Title 165: Oklahoma Corporation Commission. Chapter 25: 
Electric Utility Rules, Subchapter 37: Integrated Resource 
Planning.125
Oregon
  Oregon PUC Order No. 07-002, Entered January 8, 2007.126
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101 This Decision amends Arizona Administrative Code, Title 
14, Chapter 2, Article 7: Resource Planning. It is available at: 
http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/docketpdf/0000112475.pdf
102 Arkansas guidelines available at: http://www.sosweb.state.
ar.us/elections/elections_pdfs/register/june_07/126.03.07-
003.pdf
103 Colorado PUC Decision available at: https://www.dora.state.
co.us/pls/efi/EFI.Show_Docket?p_session_id=&p_docket_
id=10R-214E
104 Delaware legislation available at: http://legis.delaware.gov/
LIS/lis143.nsf/vwLegislation/HB+6/$file/legis.html?open
105 Georgia annotated code available at: http://www.lexisnexis.
com/hottopics/gacode/Default.asp
106 Georgia PSC rules available at: http://rules.sos.state.
ga.us/cgi-bin/page.cgi?g=GEORGIA_PUBLIC_SERVICE_
COMMISSION%2FGENERAL_RULES%2FINTEGRATED_
RESOURCE_PLANNING%2Findex.html&d=1
107 Hawaii PUC Framework available at: http://www.heco.
com/vcmcontent/Integrated%20Resource/IRP/PDF/IRP_
Framework_052292.pdf
108 Idaho PUC Order available at: http://www.puc.state.id.us/
search/orders/dtsearch.html
109 Indiana Administrative Code available at: http://www.in.gov/
legislative/iac/title170.html
110 Indiana docket RM#11-07 available at: http://www.in.gov/
iurc/2689.htm
111 Kentucky Administrative Regulation available at: http://www.
lrc.ky.gov/kar/807/005/058.htm
112 Louisiana PUC Order available at: Rules from Arizona, 
Colorado and Oregon are described in detail in order to 
demonstrate ways in which states require comprehensive 
planning processes and resource plan outcomes from the 
utilities under their jurisdictions.
113 Minnesota Statute available at: https://www.revisor.mn.gov/
statutes/?id=216B.2422
114 Minnesota rules available at: https://www.revisor.mn.gov/
rules/?id=7843
115 Missouri rules available at: http://www.sos.mo.gov/adrules/
csr/current/4csr/4c240-22.pdf, Final Order of Rulemaking 
was issued on March 3, 2011, as part of the Missouri Public 
Service Commission Rulemaking Case No. EX-2010-0254. 
That amendment is available at: https://www.efis.psc.
mo.gov/mpsc/commoncomponents/view_itemno_details.
asp?caseno=EX-2010-0254&attach_id=2011015905
116 Montana Annotated Code available at: http://data.opi.mt.gov/
bills/mca_toc/69_3_12.htm
117 Montana Administrative Rules available at: http://www.
mtrules.org/gateway/ChapterHome.asp?Chapter=38.5
118 Montana Administrative Rules available at: http://www.
mtrules.org/gateway/ChapterHome.asp?Chapter=38.5
119 Nebraska Statute available at: http://nebraskalegislature.gov/
laws/statutes.php?statute=66-1060
120 Nevada Statute available at: http://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/
NRS-704.html#NRS704Sec741
121 New Hampshire Statute available at: http://www.gencourt.
state.nh.us/rsa/html/NHTOC/NHTOC-XXXIV-378.htm
South Carolina
  Code of Laws of South Carolina, Chapter 37, Section 58 37 
40. Integrated resource plans.127 
  Public Service Commission of South Carolina Order No.  
91-885 in Docket No. 87-223-E. October 21, 1991.128
South Dakota
  SL 1977, Ch. 390, § 23. Chapter 49-41B-3.129 
  Administrative Rule Chapter 20:10:21, Energy Facility 
Plans.130 
Utah
  Report and Order on Standards and Guidelines. Docket No. 
90-2035-01. Issued June 18, 1992.131
Vermont
  30VSA Sec 218c - Statute establishing least-cost integrated 
resource planning.132 
  Public Service Board Order of 4/16/1990 initiating the IRP 
progress (Docket No. 5270).133
  Public Service Board Order of 7/16/2002  
(Docket No. 6290).134 
Virginia
  Code of Virginia § 56-597 - § 56-599.135
Washington
  Washington Administrative Code 480-100-238: Integrated 
Resource Planning.136
Wyoming
  Wyoming Public Service Commission Rule 253 (submitted 
July 22, 2009), and associated Guidelines for Staff Review.137
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122 New Mexico PRC Rule available at: http://www.pnm.com/
regulatory/pdf_electricity/irp_electricity.pdf
123 North Carolina PUC Rule available at: http://ncrules.state.
nc.us/ncac/title%2004%20-%20commerce/chapter%20
11%20-%20utilities%20commission/04%20ncac%2011%20
r08-60.pdf
124 North Dakota PSC Order available at: http://www.raponline.
org/docs/RAP_NDElectricResourceLongRangePlanningSurvey 
2005_09_17.pdf
125 Oklahoma Rule available at: http://www.occeweb.com/rules/2
010Ch35ElectricpermanentMasterRuleseff7-11-10searchable.
pdf
126 Oregon PUC Order available at: http://apps.puc.state.or.us/
orders/2007ords/07-002.pdf
127 South Carolina Code available at: www.scstatehouse.gov/
code/t58c037.docx
128 South Carolina PSC Order available at: http://dms.psc.sc.gov/
pdf/orders/DF4FC4A9-EB41-2CB4-D44614AD02D02B8D.
pdf
129 South Dakota Statute available at: http://legis.state.sd.us/
statutes/DisplayStatute.aspx?Statute=49-41B-3&Type=Statute
130 South Dakota Rule available at: http://legis.state.sd.us/rules/
DisplayRule.aspx?Rule=20:10:21
131 Utah Order available at: http://www.airquality.utah.
gov/Public-Interest/Current-Issues/Regionalhazesip/
RegionalHazeTSDdocs/Utah_PSC_Integrated_Planning_
Rules.pdf
132 Vermont Statute available at: http://www.leg.state.vt.us/
statutes/fullsection.cfm?Title=30&Chapter=005&Section=00
218c
133 Public Service Board Orders issued prior to 1996 are not 
available online.
134 Vermont PSB Order available at: http://www.state.vt.us/psb/
orders/2002/files/6290phaseIIextensionorder.pdf
135 Virginia Statute - content begins at: http://leg1.state.va.us/
cgi-bin/legp504.exe?000+cod+56-597
136 Washington Administrative Code available at: http://apps.leg.
wa.gov/wac/default.aspx?cite=480-100-238
137 Wyoming PSC Rule available at: http://legisweb.state.
wy.us/ARULES/2009/AR09-043.htm; Guidelines for Staff 
Review available at: http://psc.state.wy.us/htdocs/electric/
ElectricIRPGuidelines7-10.pdf
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Executive Summary 
An integrated resource plan (IRP) is a long-range utility plan for meeting the forecasted demand for energy within 
a defined geographic area through a combination of supply side resources and demand side resources. Generally 
speaking, the goal of an IRP is to identify the mix of resources that will minimize future energy system costs while 
ensuring safe and reliable operation of the system. 
Thirty-four states currently require some sort of IRP process for electricity planning. Thirteen of those states also 
use IRP processes for natural gas planning. Significant variation exists concerning whether IRPs are acknowledged 
or approved by each state’s public utility commission (PUC) and the authority accorded to the plans. 
In the process of developing an IRP for electricity, planners may consider adding generation capacity, encouraging 
customer-owned generation and combined heat and power facilities, adding transmission and distribution lines, 
reducing line losses in the transmission and distribution system, implementing demand response programs, and 
investing in energy efficiency programs to reduce future demand. Analogous supply side and demand side options 
exist for natural gas planning.  
An IRP can be a powerful impetus for energy efficiency and other demand management alternatives to new 
supply, especially where the planning process is mandatory and overseen by a PUC, because the IRP may require 
utilities to consider demand side resources that benefit ratepayers even if those resources do not benefit utility 
shareholders. The availability of energy efficiency and other demand side resources at very low costs and in 
significant quantities was often ignored in traditional planning processes that focused exclusively on supply side 
resources. 
For an IRP process to successfully encourage all cost-effective energy efficiency, the process must at a minimum be 
built upon credible load forecasts; use credible information about the costs and availability of new generation 
assets, transmission and distribution lines, and demand side measures; and evaluate demand side resources 
equally and fairly in relation to supply side resources. In addition, the very best IRP processes employ most or all of 
the practices in the left-hand column of Table 1. The right-hand column shows resources for more information on 
the best practices. 
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Table 1. Best Practices to Encourage All Cost-Effective Energy Efficiency in an IRP Process 
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Federal and state policies can strongly influence the extent to which IRPs and other similar planning processes are 
used as well as how effective they are at promoting energy efficiency. As of the end of 2009, only six states had 
active policies in place that required fair consideration of demand side resources, not just in electric generation 
planning but also in electric transmission and distribution planning and natural gas planning. In addition to 
considering state policy changes, all stakeholders can seek to improve existing planning processes by replicating 
the best practices described above and by learning from successful examples of IRP processes in other 
jurisdictions. 
IRP processes are not appropriate for all utility types, but alternative planning processes exist to effectively 
promote energy efficiency services in those cases. In the fifteen states that have restructured their electric industry 
to promote retail competition, consumers may choose from whom to buy their power. Regulated distribution 
utilities —as the “default” provider or the “provider of last resort”—are typically responsible for procuring power 
on behalf of consumers who do not choose a competitive generation supplier. Because of the more limited 
responsibilities of utilities in competitive retail markets, comprehensive IRP processes are generally not 
appropriate. Instead, distribution utilities in these markets can effectively promote energy efficiency through at 
least three alternative, but similar, planning processes: 
  One option is for the distribution utility to use a “portfolio management” process for default services, 
whereby energy needs are planned for and procured by evaluating a variety of demand side and supply 
side resources, or energy suppliers are required to include demand side resources in their offers. Under 
this option, only default service customers may receive energy efficiency services.  
  A second option is for the distribution utility to employ a scaled-down version of IRP, where demand side 
resources are evaluated as alternatives to transmission and distribution facilities.  
  The third option is for the distribution utility to be responsible for implementing cost-effective energy 
efficiency programs relative to generation, transmission, and distribution facilities, regardless of the fact 
that generation services are provided through the competitive market. This option can be combined with 
the second option and enables all utility customers to participate in energy efficiency. 
Three successful efforts are summarized to provide examples of best practices.  
  The Northwest Power and Conservation Council developed an IRP in 2010 for the Bonneville Power 
Administration after evaluating the costs and risks of thousands of possible resource portfolios against 
750 different future scenarios, all over a 20-year planning horizon. Through the IRP process, the council 
determined that 85% of its projected growth in demand over the next 20 years can be met through 
energy efficiency. 
  PacifiCorp, a utility serving 1.7 million customers, filed its latest IRP with regulators in six western states in 
2011. This IRP is based on recent (2010) potential studies that developed levelized cost curves for the 
agricultural, residential, commercial, and industrial sectors specific to each state served by the company, 
and here again energy efficiency represents the largest resource added through 2030.  
  Con Edison provides an example of a successful alternative planning process from a distribution utility 
that operates in a competitive retail market. In 2003, Con Edison saw that specific parts of its distribution 
network were approaching capacity limits while load continued to grow. Even though the utility was not 
subject to an IRP or similar planning mandate, managers decided that demand side resources should be 
compared on an equal basis to supply side resources. Following a request for proposals, Con Edison 
contracted with energy service companies that succeeded in procuring 89 megawatts (MW) of targeted 
savings and saved over $223 million in capital expenditures. 
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The Purpose and Use of Integrated Resource Planning 
The National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (the Action Plan) was developed by a broad group of stakeholders in 
2008 because “improving the energy efficiency of homes, businesses, schools, governments, and industries—
which consume more than 70% of the natural gas and electricity used in the United States—is one of the most 
constructive, cost-effective ways to address the challenges of high energy prices, energy security and 
independence, environmental concerns, and global climate change in the near term.”
1 The State and Local Energy 
Efficiency Action Network (SEE Action) builds on the foundation of the Action Plan and broadens the effort, with a 
goal of taking energy efficiency to scale and achieving all cost-effective energy efficiency by 2020. The primary goal 
of this paper is to explain how integrated resource planning can serve as an effective tool for promoting energy 
efficiency and other demand side resources. Some of the alternatives to an integrated resource plan (IRP) that 
have proven effective in states with competitive retail markets are also briefly explained. 
What is an Integrated Resource Plan? 
An IRP is a long-range utility plan for meeting the forecasted demand for energy within a defined geographic area 
through a combination of supply side resources and demand side resources.
2 Generally speaking, the goal of an IRP 
is to identify the mix of resources that will minimize future energy system costs while ensuring safe and reliable 
operation of the system. 
IRP processes are commonly used to analyze alternatives for meeting future demand for electricity. Less 
commonly, IRP processes are used to ensure that adequate, reliable, and affordable supplies of natural gas will be 
available as well. Because the planning process is more complex with respect to electricity, most of the emphasis in 
this paper will be on IRPs for electricity. 
An IRP may be developed by a utility or power marketing administration for its service territory in one or more 
states, by a utility commission for its entire state, or by a regional transmission organization or independent 
transmission system operator (ISO) for a multistate region. In some states, utility plans serve as a blueprint for 
resource acquisition decisions and are subject to approval by the public utility commission (PUC). Plans covering a 
multistate area are more likely to be used for educational purposes only.  
What Kinds of Alternatives are Considered in an IRP? 
In the process of developing an IRP, planners may consider a wide range of alternatives to meet future energy 
needs. For electricity plans, the alternatives can include adding generation capacity, encouraging customer-owned 
generation and combined heat and power facilities, adding transmission and distribution lines, reducing line losses 
in the transmission and distribution system, and implementing demand response programs. But the primary focus 
of this paper is another alternative, which is now included in IRP processes in more than 30 states, and that is 
investing in energy efficiency programs to reduce future demand when it is cost effective to do so. Analogous 
supply side and demand side options exist for natural gas planning.
3  
In planning to meet future energy needs, nearly all utilities and utility regulators across the country have practiced 
least-cost resource planning for decades. In many cases, these least-cost resource plans exclusively considered 
procurement of supply side resources. The availability of energy efficiency and other demand side resources at 
very low costs and in significant quantities was often ignored in the planning process. An IRP can be very similar to 
a traditional least-cost resource plan, with the distinction that a process or plan that doesn’t consider demand side 
resources is not an IRP. 
                                                 
1 National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency, Vision for 2025: A Framework for Change, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/suca/vision.pdf.  
2 Demand side resources can include energy efficiency, demand response, and customer-owned generation sized to meet the customer’s 
needs. The term demand side management (DSM) has essentially the same meaning and is commonly used, but that term may hinder one of 
the goals of this paper, which is to encourage planners to treat demand side and supply side resources equally. 
3 Not every IRP considers every alternative listed. The alternatives considered will vary based on state and local regulatory requirements and 
based on what type of entity is developing the plan. 
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Distinction between Uses of IRP as a Regulatory or Non-regulatory Planning Tool 
Resource planning requirements are not consistent across the United States. Some states require utilities to 
develop IRPs, whereas others do not. Planning requirements may be embodied in state statutes, administrative 
rules, or PUC orders. It should also be understood that all utilities do some sort of long-range planning based on 
least-cost procurement of resources, and some may develop an IRP even in the absence of a regulatory 
requirement. Figure 1 indicates those states that have adopted IRP requirements. 
The 34 states shown in blue in Figure 1 require IRP or some sort of similar process for electricity planning. Although 
not indicated on the map, thirteen (13) of those states also use IRP processes for natural gas planning.
4 
Figure 1. States with integrated resource planning or similar processes
5 
 
In states that require some form of IRP, there is significant variation in the role assigned to the PUC. The PUC may 
perform any of the following: 
                                                 
4 Some of the states that do not require an IRP process nevertheless have strong energy efficiency policies. IRP is only one of many effective 
policy tools for encouraging energy efficiency. 
5 Source: http://raponline.org/document/download/id/4447. Because actual requirements vary widely from state to state, readers are 
encouraged to refer to the source document for details. 
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  Develop an IRP based on data provided by utilities 
  Acknowledge receipt of IRPs developed by utilities  
  Approve IRPs filed by utilities, with modifications if necessary 
  Convene an IRP process with opportunities for stakeholders to intervene prior to a PUC decision 
Another area of significant variation is the official status or treatment of an IRP that has been approved or 
acknowledged by a PUC. At one end of the spectrum is Nevada, where PUC approval of an IRP is tantamount to 
approval for the utility to construct or acquire the resources (supply side or demand side) described in the plan.  
More commonly, IRP approval by the PUC does not relieve a utility from the need to ultimately demonstrate that 
its investments are optimal and consistent with the plan given actual (as opposed to forecast) conditions. PUC 
approval may, however, convey a rebuttable presumption that the projects described in the plan are necessary 
and prudent. In Oregon, for example: “Consistency with the plan may be evidence in support of favorable rate-
making treatment of the action, although it is not a guarantee of favorable treatment. Similarly, inconsistency with 
the plan will not necessarily lead to unfavorable rate-making treatment, although the utility will need to explain 
and justify why it took an action inconsistent with the plan.”
6 Similarly, in Idaho the PUC stated that it would 
"continue to hold that the plans are not to be given the force and effect of law, [but] we presume that utilities 
intend to follow the plans after they have been filed for our acceptance. Deviations from the integrated resource 
plans must be explained. The appropriate place to determine the prudence of an electric utility's plan or the 
prudence of an electric utility's following or failing to follow a plan will be in general rate case or other proceeding 
in which the issue is noticed."
7 
Finally, there are states in which a PUC-acknowledged IRP serves more as a reference document than as an actual 
plan. In Wisconsin, for example, utility IRPs are not required, but funding levels for mandatory utility investments 
in energy efficiency are determined by the Public Service Commission through a quadrennial planning process. The 
results of that process are then incorporated into biennial, statewide Strategic Energy Assessments developed by 
the Commission with input from utilities and other stakeholders. These assessments evaluate most of the same 
supply, demand, and transmission questions that underlie an IRP. They guide the Commission in a variety of 
general policy discussions, and they provide the public with useful information. But utility supply side resource 
investments are reviewed in separate cases, and Wisconsin statutes ensure that the Strategic Energy Assessments 
have no binding significance in those cases. 
How IRPs Can Promote Energy Efficiency and other Demand Side Resources 
An IRP can be a powerful impetus for promoting energy efficiency and other demand management alternatives to 
new supply. Although the amount of available cost-effective energy efficiency will vary based on local 
circumstances, some quantity will probably always be available at a lower levelized cost per megawatt-hour than 
supply side alternatives.8 Thus, because of this basic economic fact, any planning process that requires utilities to 
consider demand side resources as part of an integrated strategy to meet customer demand is likely to promote 
energy efficiency. This is especially true where IRP processes are mandatory and overseen by a PUC, because the 
IRP requirement may require utilities to consider demand side programs that benefit ratepayers even if the 
programs do not benefit shareholders. In some circumstances, cost-effective energy efficiency measures may even 
be available in sufficient quantities to satisfy all of the projected load growth within the planning timeframe.
9 
                                                 
6 Oregon PUC Order No. 89-507 at 7. 
7 Order 25260 from Case #GNR-E-93-3. 
8 See, for example, the Lazard estimates presented to the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners in June 2008, available at 
http://www.narucmeetings.org/Presentations/2008%20EMP%20Levelized%20Cost%20of%20Energy%20-
%20Master%20June%202008%20(2).pdf.  
9 The Vermont Energy Investment Corporation, which administers ratepayer-funded programs throughout that state, reported in 2008 that 
energy efficiency measures had for the first time turned load growth negative in 2007. Since very few states even attempt to achieve all cost-
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Approaches for Including Demand Side Resources in an IRP 
Planners can use at least three different approaches for including demand side resources in an IRP. The first two 
approaches incorporate these resources in forecasts of future demand for energy, whereas the third approach 
treats these resources as assets that can be deployed to meet forecasted demand if doing so is less costly than 
deploying supply side resources. 
One way for planners to include demand side resources in the future load forecast is to build in the effects of an 
energy efficiency policy as a defined model input. For example, if a state has a requirement that utilities achieve 
annual energy savings equal to 1% of the prior year’s load, planners can adjust their future demand forecast to 
ensure that the results of the policy are included. This approach is the simplest of the three approaches described 
in this paper and may be the best option in cases where planners have limited information about the costs of 
demand side resources. This approach, however, will not necessarily result in the least-cost resource plan, because 
it presupposes a certain level of demand side resources before evaluating the cost-effectiveness of all options for 
meeting demand. It also will not encourage investments in energy efficiency beyond the minimum level specified 
by the policy. 
A better option for including demand side resources in the future load forecast is to evaluate supply side options 
against multiple load forecasts. For example, planners can develop one forecast based on the minimum level of 
efficiency investments required by state policies, another forecast based on increased investments, and a third 
based on investing in all cost-effective efficiency measures. The costs of “minimum efficiency,” “more efficiency,” 
or “all cost-effective efficiency” are then added to the costs of supply side resources to evaluate plans. This 
approach is preferable to the first option because it allows planners to consider the overall system cost 
implications of different levels of energy efficiency investments; it presupposes, however, that credible 
information is available on the costs of achieving each level of load reduction. 
Finally, planners can develop a forecast of future energy demand that assumes no demand side resource 
investments beyond the ongoing impacts of existing policies and programs. Instead, additional demand side 
investments are treated as resources that can “generate” negative energy and demand at specified costs. Thus, a 
kilowatt of demand or a kilowatt-hour of energy can be served through either demand side resources or supply 
side resources. This approach will not only result in a true least-cost plan and (in most cases) high levels of energy 
efficiency investment, it will also provide useful information about the true value of demand side resources as an 
alternative to supply side resources. This approach would normally be considered the best option, provided that 
cost curves are available for supply side and demand side resources alike.  
Recommendations for Successful Integrated Resource Planning 
The goal of the State and Local Energy Efficiency Action Network (SEE Action) is to achieve all cost-effective energy 
efficiency by 2020. Integrated resource planning is one way to take a comprehensive look at cost-effectiveness. In 
an IRP, the central question is not “does this efficiency measure pay for itself?” but rather “is efficiency likely to be 
less costly than other alternatives for meeting customer demand, taking into account uncertainty and risk?” 
Prerequisites for a Successful IRP 
The process of developing an IRP can be a powerful force for encouraging investment in demand side resources. It 
is perhaps noteworthy that 17 of the top 20 states, in terms of per capita utility investments in energy efficiency, 
                                                                                                                                                             
effective energy efficiency, it is not known how replicable that result might be. Refer to: 
http://eec.ucdavis.edu/ACEEE/2008/data/papers/10_355.pdf.  
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have IRP requirements.
10 For an IRP process to successfully encourage all cost-effective energy efficiency, however, 
there are certain prerequisites that must be met. 
Credible Load Forecasts 
To begin with, projections of future load should be based on realistic assumptions about local population changes 
and local economic factors. Because of demographic and economic considerations, load growth will vary across 
utility service territories, from state to state within a region, and from region to region across the country. Locally 
relevant data are needed. The load forecast used in an IRP process must also take into consideration policies and 
programs that are already on the books. In states where energy efficiency policies and programs are well 
established and stable, future load growth might look very similar to recent past load growth. But in states that 
have newly adopted demand side policies and programs, estimates of the impacts of those policies and programs 
must be developed and incorporated into future load forecasts. 
Credible Information about Costs and Availability of Resources 
In most cases, planners will determine that load is expected to grow and will find that current supply side and 
demand side resources are not sufficient to meet future energy needs. Additional resources will need to be 
acquired. To determine the types and amounts of resources to acquire, planners need the best possible 
information about the availability and expected costs of new generation assets, transmission and distribution lines, 
and demand side measures. In the case of energy efficiency, it is critically important to have a potential study or 
other assessment in order to know how much demand reduction can realistically be achieved.
11 
Fair and Equal Consideration of All Resources 
An IRP will not be truly integrated and won’t encourage energy efficiency unless demand side resources receive 
fair consideration. Most investor-owned utilities have the opportunity to earn a return on their investment when 
they build new supply side resources, but not when they purchase or fund demand side resources. Unless the IRP 
process itself is one that requires the utility to treat these resources equally, the utility might have an inherent 
preference for the more profitable supply side resources.
12 
IRP Best Practices 
The goal of an IRP is to identify the portfolio of resources that performs best with respect to a stated objective, 
such as “minimize net present value system cost while meeting all system reliability requirements,” under a wide 
variety of possible future scenarios.
13 To maximize the chance of successfully attaining this goal, it is not enough to 
merely satisfy the minimum prerequisites listed above. All of the following ideas can be replicated across the 
country to improve IRP processes. 
Load 
The best IRP processes model a range of possible load forecasts, not just the one most likely forecast (i.e., the 
“reference case”). Probabilities can be assigned to each forecast for risk analysis purposes. This is the most 
straightforward way to acknowledge and address uncertainty about future energy prices, and the induced effect 
on demand, as well as uncertainty about demographic and economic variables. The process need not be 
complicated; for example, planners can develop a low load growth forecast and a high load growth forecast as 
                                                 
10 http://www.cee1.org/ee-pe/docs/Table%206.pdf.  
11 For more information on this topic, see the National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency Guide for Conducting Energy Efficiency Potential 
Studies, available at http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-programs/suca/resources.html.  
12 The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners has long recognized the importance of overcoming a utility’s inherent 
disincentive to invest in energy efficiency, adopting a resolution in 1989 to “reform regulation so that successful implementation of a utility’s 
least-cost plan is its most profitable course of action.” For more information on this topic, see the National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency 
Aligning Utility Incentives with Investment in Energy Efficiency, available at http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-
programs/suca/resources.html. 
13 Because the optimum portfolio may vary from one scenario to the next, planners seek to identify a robust portfolio that performs relatively 
well across all scenarios. 
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alternatives to their reference case, making use of low-end and high-end estimates of local load growth in industry 
or government reports.
14  
Generation Resources 
Rather than using only a single reference value for the assumed cost and availability of each generation 
technology, the best IRP processes model a range of possible costs, considering uncertainties in the availability and 
costs of raw materials and skilled labor, construction schedules, and future regulations. A good IRP process will 
consider multiple scenarios entailing a range of possibilities.  
Transmission and Distribution Resources 
Some IRPs do not evaluate these resources on a comparable basis to generation or demand side resources. The 
best IRPs, however, not only consider new lines as a possible resource but also consider distribution system 
improvements as a way to reduce line losses and reduce the need for generation. 
Energy Efficiency and Other Demand Side Resources 
In many IRP processes, demand side resources are considered only to the extent that mandatory investments or 
standards are factored into future load forecasts. The very best IRPs either supplement this approach or take a 
completely different approach. Specifically, the best IRPs create levelized cost curves for demand side resources 
that are comparable to the levelized cost curves for supply side resources.
15 In the case of energy efficiency, these 
curves should be derived from recent, local potential studies developed consistent with the Action Plan Guide for 
Conducting Energy Efficiency Potential Studies.
16 Developing a locally specific potential study may be more costly 
than applying the results from a potential study for a broader geographic area, or a nearby area, but it can also 
produce data of much higher quality and value. By developing cost curves for demand side options, planners allow 
the model to choose an optimum level of investment.
17 So if demand side resources can meet customer demand 
for less cost than supply side resources, as is frequently the case, this approach may result in more than the 
minimum investment levels required under other policies. 
Model 
All IRP efforts use simulation models to identify a least-cost (in terms of net present value) resource portfolio 
based on assumptions about the future values of variables, i.e., the reference case. In most cases, planners will 
then evaluate multiple alternative scenarios, with each scenario representing a different set of assumptions about 
some of the model inputs that have more uncertain future values. This consideration of multiple scenarios allows 
planners to identify a portfolio of resources that has low costs across most or all scenarios, instead of 
automatically choosing the one portfolio that looks best under the reference case. The very best IRP efforts, 
however, take this idea even further. The best efforts use simulation models that evaluate the cost and risk of 
multiple possible portfolios under dozens or even hundreds of future scenarios. Risk, in this context, might be 
measured by looking at how often each portfolio ends up being one of the most expensive of all the portfolios. 
With this kind of modeling, planners can choose a resource portfolio that is “robust” in the sense that its average 
cost across all scenarios is low, and in very few scenarios does it fare much worse than other possible portfolios.  
                                                 
14 Note that the multiple load forecasts described here are based solely on different economic and demographic assumptions for the 
geographic area covered by the IRP. Variations in load that might arise from assumptions about demand side investments will be discussed 
separately. 
15 Recent experience with energy efficiency cost curves indicates that the costs of some measures can vary significantly depending on program 
design and delivery methods. For example, the cost of an integrated, whole-building approach to energy efficiency retrofits may differ from the 
aggregated costs of discreet building efficiency measures. Economies of scale may also affect cost curves. Planners and other stakeholders 
should seek to understand any assumptions about program design, delivery, or scale that are built into the cost curves. 
16 http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/suca/potential_guide.pdf.  
17 Potential studies will normally distinguish between the technical or theoretical potential for energy savings, the economic or cost-effective 
potential, and the achievable potential considering real-world practicalities. Determining what level of savings is realistically achievable can be a 
contentious issue. If the cost curves are based on technical or economic potential, the model may identify an optimum level of investment that 
exceeds achievable potential. In this case, planners may feel that it is necessary to include a suboptimal level of energy efficiency in the 
portfolio, whereas some stakeholders may feel that such a decision undermines the results.  
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Environmental Regulations 
Rather than assuming that the regulatory landscape never changes, or assuming that future regulations are utterly 
predictable, the best IRPs are developed after considering a range of possible future regulations. For example, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is currently considering whether to regulate coal ash as a hazardous waste. 
If EPA does so, the cost of disposing coal ash may be significantly greater than otherwise. Another obvious example 
relates to the stringency of future federal or state greenhouse gas regulations. These regulations will make fossil 
fuel generation more expensive in at least some cases, but it is too early to know which sources will be affected 
and how costly it will be to comply. Although planners cannot know for sure what future regulations will be 
implemented, the best efforts assess the potential costs of a range of possibilities and consider those costs in their 
modeling. 
Stakeholder Participation 
The best IRP processes provide opportunities for consumer advocates and other stakeholders to review the 
modeling assumptions and the list of scenarios to be modeled and suggest changes or additions. These 
stakeholders frequently identify problems and opportunities that planners may have overlooked. Furthermore, 
stakeholders should have the chance to review modeling results before the IRP is finalized and (where applicable) 
approved by regulators. In general, the entire process should be conducted with a reasonable level of 
transparency, while of course respecting any confidential utility information that is included. Without transparency 
and stakeholder participation, public confidence in the IRP may be in jeopardy, and this could have negative 
ramifications when the plan is implemented. 
Scale 
With few exceptions, utilities operate within the context of a regional electricity grid where the cost and value of 
supply side and demand side resources cross service territories and state boundaries. The optimal way to meet 
customer demand for an entire regional electricity grid is likely to be different from what appears to be optimal 
when planning occurs only at the utility or state level. Because of this simple fact, regional resource planning 
represents another best practice, provided that it is done in a way that complements rather than supersedes more 
localized planning. 
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The Impact of Applying IRP Best Practices 
An IRP process that is based on the best practices described above is very likely to result in the selection of a 
portfolio that includes a substantial amount of energy efficiency, if not all cost-effective efficiency. There are two 
factors above all others that lead to that result. First, some amount of energy efficiency is virtually always 
achievable at a cost that is less expensive than new generation resources. When given a chance to compete on a 
fair basis with supply side resources, those energy efficiency measures will emerge as a preferred resource on cost 
alone. In fact, any IRP process that does not allow demand side resources to compete fairly is unlikely to identify a 
true “least-cost” portfolio. Second, the models that evaluate risk tend to find that demand side resources are much 
less risky than supply side options.  
Finally, it is important to note that an IRP process that fairly considers demand side resources will help planners 
and stakeholders see those resources in a new light. For many utilities, investments in energy efficiency get 
expensed and end up as a rider on retail rates. It is typical and understandable in these cases for some 
stakeholders to resist such investments on the argument that retail rates will increase in the near term. What the 
best IRP processes do, however, is demonstrate in a rigorous fashion that investments in energy efficiency can play 
a large role in the “least-cost” resource portfolio for the long term. In other words, when energy efficiency is 
treated as an add-on to the resource portfolio, via a rider added to the base rates, it appears to be unfavorable 
from a “least-rate” perspective. But when efficiency is treated as an integrated part of the resource portfolio via an 
IRP, it proves to be preferable from a more comprehensive “least-cost” perspective. 
Federal and State Policies that Create a Supportive Framework for Best Practice IRPs 
A number of states have adopted public policies – through statute, regulation, or PUC order – that require utilities 
or some other entity to engage in IRP or similar planning processes. In addition, federal laws and policies include 
similar requirements for some federally established regional power authorities. 
One of the metrics used to measure progress in implementing the Action Plan Vision for 2025 is to identify 
whether states have adopted policies that recognize energy efficiency as a high-priority resource. More 
specifically, progress is measured based on whether state policy requires energy efficiency to be integrated into an 
active IRP, portfolio management (PM), or other planning process; whether energy efficiency is procured as a 
resource for default service/standard offer customers in restructured markets; and whether energy efficiency is 
considered as an alternative to transmission based on a long-term transparent integrated resource planning or 
transmission system plan.
18 
As of the end of 2009, only six states had active policies in place that required fair consideration of energy 
efficiency not just in electric generation planning, but also in electric transmission and distribution planning and 
natural gas planning: California, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Vermont.
19 In terms of the 
comprehensive scope of the planning mandate, these states stand out as leaders in policy adoption. This does not 
necessarily mean that the IRP processes mandated in these states always conform to best practices. It may also be 
that the IRP processes in some other states are less comprehensive in scope but conform to best practices. 
A good example of federal policy affecting regional power authorities is the Pacific Northwest Electric Power 
Planning and Conservation Act of 1980, which gives an even more powerful boost to demand side resources in 
planning processes. That law requires the Northwest Power and Conservation Council to develop IRPs that don’t 
merely put demand side resources on an even footing with supply side resources but make energy efficiency the 
highest-priority resource for meeting electricity demand and assign it an assumed 10% cost advantage over supply 
side resources. 
                                                 
18 Refer to Appendix D at http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/suca/vision.pdf.  
19 Again refer to http://www.raponline.org/Feature.asp?select=116.  
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Alternatives to IRP in States with Competitive Retail Electricity Markets 
In the United States, individual states are sometimes referred to as having “restructured” or “competitive” retail 
electricity markets if the state allows consumers to choose from whom to buy their power.
20 Prior to restructuring, 
which began in the 1990s, consumers across the country had no choice but to buy electricity from their local 
electric utility, whose rates reflected the cost of generating (or purchasing) power as well as transmission and 
distribution costs. This is still the norm in the majority of states. But now, in restructured states, companies 
compete to serve the power needs of consumers, and the role of the utility is limited to delivering power from the 
supplier of choice to the consumer.
21 
In competitive retail markets, distribution utilities have an obligation to serve customers regardless of which 
supplier the consumer chooses. The investments, expenditures, and rates of distribution utilities are still regulated 
by PUCs, but those of competitive suppliers are not. In addition, distribution utilities are also required in most 
restructured states to offer “default service” to customers who, for whatever reason, do not actually choose a 
supplier or cannot obtain service from a competitive supplier.
22 The prices and terms of this default service are 
also regulated by the PUC. 
Because of the more limited responsibilities of utilities in competitive retail markets, comprehensive IRP processes 
are generally not appropriate. Instead, distribution utilities in these markets can promote energy efficiency 
through at least three different alternative processes, described below. 
One option is to consider energy efficiency as part of a default service PM process. In recent years, the term 
“portfolio management” has been used in the electric industry to describe approaches that can be used by 
distribution companies to plan for and procure default services by purchasing a mix of supply side and demand 
side resources, using contracts with varying terms. The concept of PM as applied to default services is based on the 
concept of portfolio management for financial investments; i.e., it is based on the theory that a balanced portfolio 
is likely to reduce the customer’s risk relative to placing all financial investments (or power purchases) into a very 
small, undiversified portfolio. In the context of power purchases, a balanced portfolio might mean, for example, (a) 
a mix of demand side and supply side resources; (b) a mix of short-term, medium-term, and long-term contracts; 
(c) a mix of fixed price contracts and indexed contracts; and (d) renewable contracts with fixed prices and fewer 
environmental risks. PM is based on the concept that many customers purchasing default service are not able or 
are not likely to switch to competitive retail suppliers, and, therefore, the distribution company has an obligation 
to provide those default customers with safe, reliable, low-cost power at stable prices. PM planning practices can 
resemble IRP practices in many ways, particularly in the way that demand side resources are compared on an 
equitable basis with supply side resources. Eight states with competitive retail markets currently require 
distribution utilities to procure energy efficiency as a resource for default service customers. In four of those 
states—Ohio, Delaware, Connecticut and Rhode Island—a PM or IRP approach is specifically required.
23 Under this 
option, only default service customers may receive energy efficiency services. 
Another option is to employ IRP practices to transmission and distribution facilities only. Distribution companies 
need to ensure that they can provide low-cost, reliable transmission and distribution services to their customers, 
regardless of whether they provide any form of generation service. Some utilities may view this obligation entirely 
from a perspective of the need to build, maintain, and operate distribution lines and substations. But an increasing 
number of distribution utilities are adopting IRP or planning practices where demand side resources are seen as a 
                                                 
20 Fifteen states plus the District of Columbia currently have competitive retail markets. Refer to 
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure_elect.html. In half of these restructured markets, some form of IRP or an 
alternative process is mandatory, whereas more than two-thirds of the unrestructured states require some form of planning. 
21 In nearly all cases in the United States, customer service and billing is managed by the distribution utility. The utility purchases power from 
the competitive supplier and adds that cost to its own costs on the consumer’s bill. 
22 Depending on the state, default service may be called “standard offer,” “provider of last resort,” or “basic generation service.” 
23 Based on Action Plan Policy Grid Updates compiled by Regulatory Assistance Project through 2009. Refer to 
http://www.raponline.org/Feature.asp?select=116.  
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11 
potential alternative to transmission and distribution facilities. One example of this, from Con Edison in New York, 
is summarized in the section “Examples of Successful IRP or Alternative Planning Efforts” below.  
A third option is for the distribution utility to be given full responsibility for implementing all energy efficiency 
resources that are cost-effective relative to generation, transmission, and distribution facilities. Although the 
distribution utility may have a limited role or no role at all in providing generation services (through default 
service), it is still considered appropriate for them to implement the energy efficiency associated with avoided 
generation costs as well as avoided transmission and distribution costs, because they are in the best position to 
implement those efficiency resources. Distribution companies can utilize a system benefits charge applied to all 
distribution customers, provide efficiency services to those same distribution customers, and act as a centralized, 
regulated agency with the public policy mandate to achieve all of the energy efficiency that is cost-effective for 
those customers. This approach has been used very successfully in California and Massachusetts, for example. It 
can be combined with the second option, and it enables all utility customers to participate in energy efficiency. 
In the case of a distribution utility operating in a competitive retail market, some of the IRP best practices 
described above will not always be fully applicable. What matters, however, is that the utility takes an integrated 
approach where demand side resources have the opportunity to compete on a cost and risk basis with supply side 
and transmission and distribution assets.
24 
Examples of Successful IRP or Alternative Planning Efforts 
Three very different examples of successful IRP efforts are noted below. They are presented to illustrate some of 
the concepts and all of the best practices described in this white paper. The processes and the results of these 
efforts will only be briefly summarized, but interested readers are encouraged to delve deeply into the documents 
referenced in footnotes for more detail and illumination. 
Northwest Power and Conservation Council 
As previously noted, the federal Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1980 requires 
the Northwest Power and Conservation Council, a regional planning organization, to develop IRPs for the BPA that 
don’t merely put demand side resources on an even footing with supply side resources but make energy efficiency 
the highest-priority resource for meeting electricity demand and assign it an assumed 10% cost advantage over 
supply side resources. These plans have a profound effect on the operations of BPA in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, 
and Montana.
25 
The council adopted its Sixth Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plan in February 2010 at the end of an 
IRP process that began in December 2007.
26 This plan provides an excellent example of all of the IRP best practices 
noted in this paper. 
To begin with, the council acknowledged uncertainty about demographic and economic variables by developing 
three separate forecasts of future load—a baseline case as well as “high-” and “low-” growth cases. Planners also 
tested how sensitive their results were to a range of possible adoption levels for electric vehicles. 
Detailed information was then developed about the levelized costs of generation, transmission, distribution, and 
energy storage resources, including consideration about cost uncertainties. Energy efficiency resource potential 
                                                 
24 From the perspective of state policymakers, it can be uncomfortable to feel no control over the resource mix serving the state. This has led 
restructured states like Illinois, Maryland, and New Jersey to consider initiatives that would give the state some role in resource planning and 
acquisition. 
25 The council is funded by wholesale power revenues from the BPA, the federal agency that markets the electricity generated at federal dams 
on the Columbia River. 
26 http://www.nwcouncil.org/energy/powerplan/6/final/SixthPowerPlan.pdf.  
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was estimated for the agricultural, residential, commercial, and industrial sectors, as well as for utility distribution 
systems and consumer electronics. Levelized cost curves were produced for each resource category. 
The council’s IRP included an evaluation of the costs and risks of thousands of possible resource portfolios against 
750 different future scenarios, all over a 20-year planning horizon. This analysis included consideration, for 
example, of many different scenarios for the cost of complying with greenhouse gas regulations—ranging from no 
regulation ($0 per ton of carbon dioxide emitted) to $100 per ton emitted. 
Finally, the planning effort was regional in scale, meetings were open to the public, documents were available on a 
Web site, and stakeholders were given the opportunity to review and comment on a draft plan before final 
decisions were made. 
Through the IRP process, the council determined that 85% of its projected growth in demand over the next 20 
years can be met through energy efficiency. On average, the council expects energy efficiency investments to cost 
just half as much as comparable supply side investments. The approved IRP includes 1,200 MW of energy 
efficiency savings in the first five years, and 5,900 MW over 20 years – the most aggressive targets in the nation. 
The council has good reason to be confident that the Sixth Plan is not overly optimistic. Its evaluation of efficiency 
efforts from 1980 through 2008 found that nearly 4,000 MW of savings had been achieved, cutting demand 
growth in half and saving consumers $1.8 billion on electric bills.  
PacifiCorp 
PacifiCorp is a large utility serving 1.7 million customers in six western states. Five of those states—Utah, 
Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and California—require utilities like PacifiCorp to file an IRP with the state PUC. 
Wyoming is an unusual case in that it requires utilities to file an IRP with the PUC only if the utility is required to file 
an IRP in another state, as is the case for PacifiCorp. So this company files its IRP in all six states. 
In March 2011, PacifiCorp filed its 11
th IRP with state regulators.
27 Although it is too soon to know how the latest 
plan will be received by regulators, the planning process offers a good illustration of some of the best practices 
noted in this paper.  
PacifiCorp, like the Northwest Power and Conservation Council, developed a baseline load growth forecast, along 
with low-growth and high-growth forecasts. For supply side resources, the company developed separate cost data 
for the eastern and western parts of its territory.  
In terms of demand side resources, the IRP is based on recent (2010) potential studies that developed levelized 
cost curves for the agricultural, residential, commercial, and industrial sectors. The cost information is specific to 
each state served by the company. The IRP process undertaken by PacifiCorp is also interesting because in most of 
its service territory it administers energy efficiency programs, whereas in Oregon those programs are administered 
by a third party. Consequently, PacifiCorp used a hybrid approach to evaluating energy efficiency potential, 
combining data from the Energy Trust of Oregon with a separate potential study it commissioned for the rest of its 
territory. 
PacifiCorp defined 67 separate scenarios for portfolio development, covering a range of alternative transmission 
configurations, greenhouse gas regulation costs, natural gas prices, renewable energy requirements and costs, 
load forecasts, and demand side resource availability. Each portfolio was modeled using three natural gas price 
forecasts. PacifiCorp then ran 100 simulations before selecting a preferred portfolio, based on low average cost 
(across runs), low worst-case cost, and other considerations. 
PacifiCorp provided numerous opportunities for stakeholder input into the IRP. Five meetings and three 
conference calls were open to the public. To encourage broad participation, meetings were held jointly in Salt Lake 
City and Portland, with telephone and videoconference access as well. 
                                                 
27 The 2011 Plan and the approved plan from 2008 are available at http://www.pacificorp.com/es/irp.html. 
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Finally, it is worth noting that PacifiCorp’s IRP had a regional perspective; it was not an aggregation of six different 
state-specific plans. 
The results of PacifiCorp’s 2011 IRP are eye-catching. Energy efficiency represents the largest resource added 
through 2030 across all portfolios, with cumulative capacity additions exceeding 2,500 MW in the preferred 
portfolio. The preferred portfolio also adds over 250 MW of demand response in the first five years.  
Con Edison 
Con Edison is an electric distribution utility in the New York City area that operates in a competitive retail market. 
In 2003, Con Edison saw that specific parts of its distribution network were approaching capacity limits while load 
continued to grow. Building new lines and substations promised to be an incredibly expensive engineering 
challenge. Instead, building on its experience delivering broad-based energy efficiency programs, Con Edison 
launched a targeted demand management program focused on the nearly overloaded portions of its network. 
Even though the utility was not subject to an IRP or similar planning mandate, managers decided that demand side 
resources should be compared on an equal basis to supply side resources. The decision was made that wherever 
energy efficiency proved to be more cost-effective than transmission and distribution system infrastructure 
investments, efficiency would be implemented as the one and only solution. 
Con Edison’s planners began by estimating potential future peak loads throughout the network. A plan was 
created to address any forecasted shortfalls at the transmission, subtransmission, and area substation levels 
through load relief projects, e.g., by installing transformer cooling or an entirely new substation. Planners 
estimated the cost of each such project and then issued a request for proposals for energy efficiency services 
targeted to address the same shortfalls. Where viable bids were received at a cost less than the cost of the 
infrastructure project, energy efficiency was procured through a contract. Otherwise, the infrastructure project 
was executed.  
Over the five years that followed, Con Edison contracted with energy service companies that succeeded in 
procuring 89 MW of targeted savings at a benefit/cost ratio of 2.8. These efforts saved the utility over $223 million 
in capital expenditures.
28 This example shows the value that utilities in competitive retail markets can derive from 
an IRP or similar planning process that values demand side resources, irrespective of any obligation to provide 
generation service. It is also a good example of best practices for looking at transmission, distribution, and demand 
side solutions in an integrated fashion. 
Interaction of IRP and Alternative Planning Processes with Other Energy 
Efficiency Policies and Program Designs 
The implementation of a best practice IRP process is compatible with mandatory energy savings targets, and it 
remains relevant in states where utilities do not administer energy efficiency programs.  
IRP Processes in States with Mandatory Energy Efficiency Goals or Mandatory Demand 
Response Programs 
In states that have mandatory demand side goals or programs, planners have options for how to develop an IRP 
that have already been mentioned. One good option is to include the effects of the mandates in load forecasts and 
then allow the model to consider supplemental demand side resources as an alternative to supply side resources. 
With this approach, it may be necessary to develop levelized cost curves that acknowledge potential differences 
between the mandated programs and the supplemental resources. An even better option is to include none of the 
demand side resources in the load forecasts but apply a single set of levelized cost curves to all the scenarios and 
                                                 
28 http://eec.ucdavis.edu/ACEEE/2010/data/papers/2059.pdf.  
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let the model determine the optimum level of investment. This approach can provide helpful insights to planners 
and policymakers, such as insights on which measures are most valuable in terms of total system costs. For 
example, this approach may reveal situations where a resource that reduces demand during peak hours, or in an 
area of congested transmission, is more valuable in terms of total system cost than a less expensive measure that 
saves an equal amount of energy in a different time or place.
29  
IRP Processes in States with Third Party-Administered Energy Efficiency Programs 
Some mandated energy efficiency programs are not administered by utilities but instead by a state entity or a third 
party that manages funds collected from utility ratepayers and/or taxpayers. New York offers the best known 
example of a state-run program, while Oregon, Vermont, and Hawaii offer examples of states that contract with a 
nongovernmental third party. Depending on the state, utilities may be specifically authorized to fully or partially 
opt out of the centralized program and administer their own program, or they may be authorized to supplement 
the centralized program with their own efforts.
30 
An IRP or PM process in these states need not be much different from those in states where utilities manage all of 
the energy efficiency programs. One difference is that planners will benefit from involving the program 
administrator in the development of model inputs, certainly with respect to cost curves and possibly with respect 
to load forecasts as well. For example, in Vermont the organization that currently administers efficiency programs 
(Vermont Energy Investment Corporation) also develops energy efficiency potential studies, which are a key input 
used by utilities in developing their mandatory IRPs. Another, more significant, difference may come if and when 
the IRP is implemented. If the IRP identifies an optimum portfolio that includes more energy efficiency than is 
mandated, a decision will need to be made as to whether the additional resources will be acquired by the utility 
independently or through the centralized program administrator. 
Conclusion  
IRP processes can stimulate investment in energy efficiency and other demand side resources by allowing those 
resources to compete on a fair and equal basis with supply side resources. The best IRP processes consider a range 
of possible values for the future cost and availability of all types of resources, as well as a range of possible future 
scenarios for demographic, economic, and regulatory changes.   
IRP processes are most often found in states that have not introduced retail electric competition, where it is 
mandated by the legislature or PUC. In states with competitive retail markets, similar planning processes can be 
used to encourage distribution utilities to evaluate demand side and supply side resources on a comparable basis. 
State policymakers can promote the Action Plan goal of all cost-effective energy efficiency by adopting IRP, PM, or 
other similar planning requirements where they do not currently exist or by improving existing planning processes 
to conform to best practices. 
Additional Resources 
The resources listed below may be useful to assist stakeholders with the integrated resource planning issues 
outlined in this paper.  
                                                 
29 Compare the relative impacts of an efficient air conditioner and an efficient light bulb. In terms of meeting a mandatory goal for energy 
savings, each kWh saved from each measure looks the same. But a resource planning perspective can reveal that a kilowatt-hour saved by the 
air conditioner on a hot summer day, when electric demand and costs are highest, is worth more than a kilowatt-hour saved by the light bulb 
on a cool fall evening, when demand and costs are low.  
30 In New York, responsibility for administering mandated programs is shared by NYSERDA (New York State Energy Research and Development 
Authority) and utilities. Hybrid models of shared responsibility are found in a few other states, and no states currently have a 100% 
government-administered program. 
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Webinar 
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Planning.” Hosted by the Regulatory Assistance Project. 
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Steinhurst, W.; White, D.; Roschelle, A.; Napoleon, A.; Hornby, R.; Biewald, B. (October 2006). “Energy Portfolio 
Management: Tools and Resources for State Public Utility Commissions.” Cambridge, MA: Synapse Energy 
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Setting Energy Savings Targets for Utilities. 
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The Driving Ratepayer-Funded Efficiency through Regulatory Policies Working Group of the State and Local Energy Efficiency Action Network 
is committed to taking action to increase investment in cost-effective energy efficiency. This document was developed under the guidance of 
and with input from the working group. The document does not necessarily represent an endorsement by the individuals or organizations of 
Driving Ratepayer-Funded Efficiency through Regulatory Policies Working Group members or the federal government. However, the working 
group members do urge consideration of these materials as they believe that the information contained within will promote the deployment of 
cost-effective energy efficiency. 
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Mr. Phillip O. Ellis 
Strategic Analysis & Government Affairs 
Public Service Commission 
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard 
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 
pellis@psc.state.fl.us 
 
CC: Traci Matthews 
tmatthew@psc.state.fl.us 
 
Re: Comments on 2013 Ten-Year Plan Submittals 
 
Dear Mr. Ellis and Ms Matthews: 
 
Thank you for accepting these comments on behalf of the Sierra Club and its nearly 27,000 Florida 
members and on behalf of Earthjustice.  We appreciated the opportunity to participate in the Public 
Service Commission (PSC)’s Ten-Year Plan review process in 2012, and are happy to continue our 
participation this year. 
 
In last year’s comments,
1 we asked that the PSC consider the implications of the retirement of Duke 
(then Progress) Energy’s Crystal River Units 1 & 2, and of Gulf Power’s Lansing Smith Units 1 & 2.  
We advised the PSC that the units had significant environmental compliance obligations which 
rendered them noneconomic to run in the near-term, but that neither company had included full 
analysis of that possibility in its submittal.   
 
We appreciate that the PSC addressed these retirement issues in its review of the 2012 plans. See, e.g., 
PSC, Review of the 2012 Ten-Year Site Plans (“2012 Review”) at 3.  We respectfully submit that that 
analysis should continue in further depth this year because both utilities have now confirmed our 
retirement predictions from last year.  Duke has committed to retiring Crystal River 1 & 2 for 
economic reasons and Gulf, though it has not made a final decision, has deferred further 
environmental compliance work on Lansing Smith and has requested PSC approval for transmission 
upgrades which would allow for Lansing Smith 1 & 2 to shut down. 
 
In its review, the PSC assumed that the capacity of these retiring units would be replaced by natural 
gas, which would increase natural gas’s share in Florida’s  electric generation to 62.9% by 2022 (up 
from 56.7% without the retirements, and from 57.7% in 2011). Id.  The PSC states that it views “the 
growing lack of fuel diversity” within Florida as a “major strategic concern.” Id. at 39.  Although we 
certainly welcome the retirements of these dangerous coal plants, we share this fuel diversity 
concern: Undue dependence on natural gas leaves the state overly vulnerable to fuel price volatility, 
even as potential LNG exports and other shifts in the gas market seem likely to increase gas prices in 
the medium term.  For this reason, we strongly suggest that the PSC consider planning scenarios 
which employ other, less risky, resources to make up some or all of the share of generation now 
served by the retiring plants.   
 
                                                           
1 Attached as Exhibits 1 & 2, for your reference. 
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In particular, we believe that demand-side management measures, including energy efficiency, other 
demand  response programs, and demand-side renewable energy, can make up a significant portion 
of any resource gap left by the likely retirements.  Increased supply side renewable energy can also 
increase the diversity of the state’s resource mix. Because the PSC will be considering new goals for 
both Duke and Gulf under the Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act (FEECA) this year, 
this is a particularly good time to develop the data needed for sensible planning. 
 
I.  Coal Retirements  
 
Both Duke and Gulf have confirmed that retirement is likely in the cards for their economically 
vulnerable plants, though Duke has gone further and confirmed that Crystal River 1 & 2 will 
certainly retire.  Duke appears to be planning to address these retirements largely through adding 
new generating capacity.  Gulf intends to rely on power imports in the near term. 
 
Duke/Progress  
 
Duke has confirmed “expected retirement of Crystal River 1 & 2 in 2016.” Duke TYSP at 3-2.  As 
Duke explains in testimony filed in the Environmental Cost Recovery Docket, the lifecycle projected 
system cost for retiring units 1 & 2 is far lower than the cost of retrofitting the units to comply with 
environmental compliance obligations: The difference between the retirement and retrofit scenarios 
is $ 1.32 billion in Duke’s base case analysis; retrofit is unfavorable only in the extremely unlikely 
case of very high gas prices and no CO2 regulation. Direct Testimony of Benjamin M. H. Borsch on 
Behalf of Progress Energy Florida (Apr. 1, 2013) at 4, Docket No. 130007-EI; see also Progress 
Energy Florida, Review of Integrated Clean Air Compliance Plan (Apr. 1, 2013) (“Duke Compliance Plan”) at 
25-26. 
 
To be sure, Duke has held out the option of making short-term fuel mix adjustments which might 
allow the units to continue operating, perhaps as long as 2020.  Duke Compliance Plan at 21.  
Continued operation would plainly be economically imprudent.  As we demonstrated in our 
comments and workshop presentation on last year’s plan, and as the figure below shows, the Crystal 
River units already verge on noneconomic when compared even against the substantial expense of 
constructing a new combined cycle natural gas plant to replace their capacity, much less against 
more sensible options, including demand side programs.
2 
 
                                                           
2 This figure is drawn from our 2012 workshop presentation and is based on work by Synapse Energy Economics, using 
public cost estimates from the Energy Information Administration’s cost reporting forms and the EPA’s Integrated 
Planning Model, developed by Sargent & Lundy.   
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Because Crystal River 1 & 2 are uneconomic by almost any measure (as Duke acknowledges), the 
pertinent question is how best to replace any portion of their 965 MW in nameplate capacity which 
will be required going forward.  (In practice, this lost capacity is smaller: both units have been 
relatively little used in recent years.)  Lost capacity from the 860 MW Crystal River 3, the retired 
nuclear unit at the site, will also play a substantial role in system planning, of course. 
 
Over the period from 2013 to 2022, Duke expects its firm summer peak demand to grow by 1287 
MW, TYSP at 3-7, and increase of just shy of 15% over the next decade, or about 1.5% per year. At 
present, Duke reports that it intends to make up necessary capacity to match this growth through 
“planned power purchases from 2016 through 2020 and planned installation of combined cycle 
facilities in 2018 and 2020 at undesignated sites.”  Id. at 3-2.  According to Duke, these energy 
imports are likely to grow an additional 1470 MW above its current ~ 1900 MW of imported 
capacity, id. at Schedule 7.1.  The addition of a 1307 MW (winter capacity) combined cycle facility in 
2018, and a second 1307 MW facility in 2020 then replaces these imports.   See id. at 3-7, 3-10 – 3-11.  
This additional capacity is 764 MW greater than the capacity which Duke is losing, leading to a 21% 
reserve margin by 2022. 
 
As we discuss below, Duke’s strategy of increasing its built generating capacity substantially in 
response to projected growth, and relying on natural gas generation to do so, is not the prudent one 
for either the company or for Florida.   
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Gulf Power 
 
As the figure above indicates, Lansing Smith 1 & 2 are even less economically attractive to operate 
than the uncontrolled Crystal River coal units.  Gulf has not yet committed to retirement publicly, 
but its filings in this docket and in the Environmental Cost Recovery docket make clear that it is 
preserving that option. 
 
Specifically, Gulf has requested the PSC approve a $77 million transmission upgrade project, which 
it explains is necessary to ensure that Lansing Smith is not a must run unit. Gulf Power, Third 
Supplemental Petition of Gulf Power Company Regarding its Environmental Compliance Program, Docket No. 
13007-EI (Mar. 29, 2013) at 8.  According to Gulf, these upgrades will allow Plant Smith to run at 
lower levels or to close, and would be “required if these units retire or are controlled as a result of 
[the mercury and air toxics rule].” Id. at 8.  Gulf, thus, maintains that it intends to “reserve the 
decision to install … controls or to retire the two units for a future time when more is known with 
regard to costs of compliance requirements associated with additional environmental regulations.” 
Id. 
 
Because Gulf Power – unlike Duke – has not shared cost information with the public comparing the 
cost of controlling versus retiring the plant, see Gulf Power, Environmental Compliance Program 
Update, Docket No. 13007-EI (Mar, 29, 2013) at 22-27, it is clear that it anticipates considerable 
additional compliance obligations at Plant Smith, including additional air, water, and waste rules. Id. 
at 22.   Although Gulf has not provided economic analysis of a retirement option, it is clear that 
operating costs from the mercury rule alone would “greatly increase the variable operating cost of 
Smith Units 1 and 2,” id. at 23, enough so that spending $77 million on transmission to reduce the 
operating need for the plant is more economic than continuing to run it, id. at 26.   
 
 We certainly agree that it is better to run Plant Smith less.  The truth, however, is that Plant Smith is 
not economic to run at all under current conditions.  It is certainly not economic to run going 
forward as environmental compliance costs increase.  The appropriate course for Gulf Power is to 
retire the facility, rather than simply building transmission which will allow it to operate the costly 
plant somewhat less.  Its transmission project, apparently, will enable that retirement, which remains 
an option.  We urge the PSC to continue to analyze retirement possibilities. 
 
In this regard, Gulf’s Ten Year Site Plan submission does not clearly discuss all the implications of 
Plant Smith.  It acknowledges, again, that “potential incremental capital expenditures for compliance 
may be substantial,” Gulf TYSP at 3, but does not yet appear to provide a straightforward 
retirement analysis.   Gulf anticipates 575 MW in summer peak demand growth by 2022 (about 20% 
growth over that period, or, according to Gulf, a 1.9% annual increase over the next decade). See 
Gulf TYSP at Schedule 3.1.  
 
Gulf’s plan indicates that capacity additions are not necessary to manage this projected growth.  Gulf 
reports that a power purchase agreement (PPA) which it has signed with Shell Energy for use of 885 
MW of capacity from an existing gas combined cycle plant will meet its needs through 2023, after 
which it will construct additional in-system capacity. Id. at 2-3.  For this reason, the PSC’s projection 
last year that Lansing Smith’s retirement will lead to gas generation increases in Florida appears to be 
incorrect in the near term.  As with Crystal River’s retirement, however, we believe that demand-side 
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options and other non-gas resources should be emphasized to meet any capacity needs that 
eventually arise. 
 
II.  Implications for the Ten-Year Plan and FEECA Goal-Setting Processes 
 
Because the PSC will shortly move fully into the FEECA goal-setting process for the next five years, 
this is a particularly appropriate time to consider alternate futures for the Duke and Gulf power 
networks, with an emphasis on resources which the Legislature designed FEECA to encourage.  The 
cost of adding new fossil capacity will almost always be higher than the cost of demand-side 
measures.  The savings possible through an efficiency-focused strategy, coupled with efficiency’s 
potential to help Florida avoid the undue dependence on natural gas which the PSC is seeking to 
avoid, argue strongly for a careful analysis of these questions in this year’s Ten-Year Site Plan 
Review. 
 
The Legislature has determined that it is “critical to utilize the most efficient and cost-effective 
demand-side renewable energy systems and conservation systems in order to protect the health, 
prosperity, and general welfare of the state and its citizens.” Section 366.81, F.S.  A study 
commissioned by the Legislature this past year confirmed these findings, concluding that “FEECA 
appears to provide a positive net benefit to ratepayers.”  Galligan et al., Evaluation of Florida’s Energy 
Efficiency and Conservation Act (Dec. 7, 2012) (“FEECA Study”) at 9. 
 
Despite these benefits, the PSC has, in the past, opted to suspend further program expansion for 
Duke and FPL, on cost grounds.  See, e.g., Re: Progress Energy Florida, Inc., Docket No. 1000160-EG, 
2001 WL 3659327 (Aug. 6, 2011).  The PSC should revisit this position during this year’s goal-
setting process in view of the positive findings of the legislative study, and the pressing need to 
address the retirements of vulnerable coal units in ways that best protect the ratepayers from further 
risk from fossil fuel price shifts and regulatory uncertainty.  Ratepayers will face costs associated 
with new capacity and loss of fuel supply diversity which are far greater than those imposed by 
demand-side programs --- programs which the legislative study have determined have net benefits. 
 
In particular, the PSC should view with skepticism Duke’s proposal to construct 2614 MW of 
natural gas generation in just the next few years in order to cope with a 1.5% annual average growth 
rate in its predicted demand.  Initially, Duke has a history of significant positive errors in its 
forecasts.  As the PSC explained in its 2012 Ten Year Site Plan Review, Duke overestimated net 
energy for load forecasts by 11.36% on average between 2007 and 2011, and by 6.17% between 
2006 and 2010.  2012 Review at 19.  Certainly the recession contributed to some of this overage, but 
the size of the error should give the PSC pause. 
 
More importantly, however, the 1.6% demand growth rate which Duke forecasts, even if accurate, is 
within the range of load growth rates which demand-side management can address.  According to 
the legislative FEECA study, many states require annual reductions far greater.  See FEECA Study at 
177-180.  States requiring savings of at least 1% a year, according to that study, include Arizona, 
Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, and Texas, with many other 
states not far behind (still other states, including California, are listed as having very large reduction 
goals, but a percentage reduction is not specified).  See id.  Such reduction rates would entirely offset 
Duke’s projected load growth, obviating the need for much, if not all, of its projected capacity needs 
in light of the Crystal River retirements.   
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Duke plainly has the potential to greatly expand its programs.  It reports that only 25% (405,000 
customers out of 1.6 million) take part in its demand response program, for instance. Duke TYSP at 
1-1.  This low participation is likely one reason  that Duke is well below its FEECA goals for 
summer MW and annual GWh reductions – missing the annual target by more than 60%. See PSC, 
Annual Report on Activities Pursuant to [FEECA] (Feb. 2013) at 19.  Duke has told the PSC that it was 
unable to reach its performance levels because “of the Commission decision to not approve a new 
DSM plan” for the company. Id. at 20.  Thus, if the PSC engages with Duke to approve an improved 
plan, Duke may well be able to increase efficiency programs sufficiently to greatly decrease its 
capacity needs. 
 
This analysis also applies to Gulf.  Although Gulf does not plan new capacity for the next decade, it, 
too, has potential for further improvements, failing to meet even its modest existing FEECA goal by 
12%. Id. at 19.  If Gulf were performing at the level of nationally leading utilities – saving more than 
1.5% of its demand per year – it could likely avoid those projected capacity additions. 
 
Such enhanced performance could help Florida, as a whole, to meet the Legislature’s directive in 
FEECA.  At present, Florida ranks in the bottom half of the states with regard to energy efficiency.  
See American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, State Scorecard 2012 (ranking Florida #29).
3  
The coal retirements before the PSC provide a strong incentive to do better. 
 
We understand that the PSC will be conducting substantial analysis on this front during its FEECA 
goal-setting process, see Section 366.82, F.S., which requires careful consideration of the “full 
technical potential” of demand-side programs.  We suggest that the PSC conduct that analysis in 
tandem with its Ten-Year Site Plan review, valuing demand-side programs as a resource which can 
be used to address capacity and energy issues arising from the coal retirements announced or likely 
in the site plan docket.  Thus, in its 2013 Ten-Year Site Plan Review, the PSC could profitably 
evaluate the several different scenarios post-retirement, including scenarios in which capacity is 
replaced with more aggressive demand side measures. Other scenarios should also, of course, 
explore the potential of other energy sources, including enhanced in-state renewables, including 
solar, and out-of-state PPAs for renewable (and hence zero fuel cost) energy.  In the FEECA 
process, meanwhile, the PSC can consider the costs and benefits of such measures, especially as 
compared with costly and risky new gas capacity.  The two processes can and should reinforce each 
other as the PSC works to find ways to minimize risks and costs to ratepayers. 
 
III.  Conclusion 
 
 
Last year, we cautioned that a significant amount of coal-fired capacity in Florida was set for 
retirement.  That process has continued.  To manage any ratepayer risk from these retirements and 
the possible over-dependence on natural gas which they may promote, the PSC should emphasize 
demand-side management options as alternatives to gas-fired capacity.  We look forward to working 
with the Commission to ensure that Florida ratepayers secure healthier air and a more reliable and 
efficient electricity system. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
                                                           
3 Available at: http://aceee.org/energy-efficiency-sector/state-policy/aceee-state-scorecard-ranking. 
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APPENDIX AThis fact sheet provides information and guidance on the 
solar photovoltaic (PV) power purchase agreement (PPA), 
which is a financing mechanism that state and local govern-
ment entities can use to acquire clean, renewable energy. We 
address the financial, logistical, and legal questions relevant 
to implementing a PPA, but we do not examine the technical 
details—those can be discussed later with the developer/con-
tractor. This fact sheet is written to support decision makers 
in U.S. state and local governments who are aware of solar 
PPAs and may have a cursory knowledge of their structure 
but they still require further information before committing 
to a particular project.
Overview of PPA Financing
The PPA financing model is a “third-party” ownership 
model, which requires a separate, taxable entity (“system 
owner”) to procure, install, and operate the solar PV system 
on a consumer’s premises (i.e., the government agency). 
The government agency enters into a long-term contract 
(typically referred to as the PPA) to purchase 100% of the 
electricity generated by the system from the system owner. 
Figure 1 illustrates the financial and power flows among the 
consumer, system owner, and the utility. Renewable energy 
certificates (RECs), interconnection, and net metering are dis-
cussed later. Basic terms for three example PPAs are included 
at the end of this fact sheet.
The system owner is often a third-party investor (“tax inves-
tor”) who provides investment capital to the project in return 
for tax benefits. The tax investor is usually a limited liability 
corporation (LLC) backed by one or more financial institu-
tions. In addition to receiving revenues from electricity sales, 
they can also benefit from federal tax incentives. These tax 
incentives can account for approximately 50% of the project’s 
financial return (Bolinger 2009, Rahus 2008). Without the 
PPA structure, the government agency could not benefit from 
these federal incentives due to its tax-exempt status.1 
The developer and the system owner often are distinct and 
separate legal entities. In this case, the developer structures 
the deal and is simply paid for its services.  However, the 
developer will make the ownership structure transparent to 
the government agency and will be the only contact through-
out the process. For this reason, this fact sheet will refer to 
“system owner” and developer as one in the same. 
While there are other mechanisms to finance solar PV 
systems, this publication focuses solely on PPA financing 
because of its important advantages:2
1.    No/low up-front cost.
2.   Ability for tax-exempt entity to enjoy lower 
electricity prices thanks to savings passed on from 
federal tax incentives.
3.    A predictable cost of electricity over 15–25 years.
4.   No need to deal with complex system design and 
permitting process.
5.    No operating and maintenance responsibilities.
1   Clean renewable energy bonds (CREBs) are also available to municipalities 
and other public entities as an alternative means of benefiting from federal tax 
benefits.
2   For a full discussion of alternative financing mechanisms, see Cory et al. 
2009.
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High-Level Project Plan for Solar PV with 
PPA Financing
Implementing power purchase agreements involves many 
facets of an organization: decision maker, energy manager, 
facilities manager, contracting officer, attorney, budget offi-
cial, real estate manager, environmental and safety experts, 
and potentially others (Shah 2009). While it is understood 
that some employees may hold several of these roles, it is 
important that all skill sets are engaged early in the process. 
Execution of a PPA requires the following project coordina-
tion efforts, although some may be concurrent:3
Step 1. Identify Potential Locations
Identify approximate area available for PV installation 
including any potential shading. The areas may be either 
on rooftops or on the ground. A general guideline for solar 
installations is 5–10 watts (W) per square foot of usable 
rooftop or other space.4 In the planning stages, it is useful to 
create a CD that contains site plans and to use Google Earth 
software to capture photos of the proposed sites (Pechman 
2008). In addition, it is helpful to identify current electricity 
costs. Estimating System Size (this page) discusses the online 
tools used to evaluate system performance for U.S. buildings. 
Step 2. Issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) to Competitively 
Select a Developer
If the aggregated sites are 500 kW or more in electricity 
demand, then the request for proposal (RFP) process will 
likely be the best way to proceed. If the aggregate demand is 
significantly less, then it may not receive sufficient response 
rates from developers or it may receive responses with 
expensive electricity pricing. For smaller sites, government 
entities should either 1) seek to aggregate multiple sites into 
a single RFP or 2) contact developers directly to receive bids 
without a formal RFP process (if legally permissible within 
the jurisdiction).
Links to sample RFP documents (and other useful docu-
ments) can be found at the end of this fact sheet. The materi-
als generated in Step 1 should be included in the RFP along 
with any language or requirements for the contract. In 
addition, the logistical information that bidders may require 
to create their proposals (described later) should be included. 
It is also worthwhile to create a process for site visits.
3   Adapted from a report by GreenTech Media (Guice 2008) and from conver-
sations with Bob Westby, NREL technology manager for the Federal Energy 
Management Program (FEMP).
4   This range represents both lower efficiency thin-film and higher efficiency 
crystalline solar installations. The location of the array (rooftop or ground) can 
also affect the power density. Source: http://www.solarbuzz.com/Consumer/
FastFacts.htm
Renewable industry associations can help identify Web sites 
that accept RFPs. Each bidder will respond with an initial 
proposal including a term sheet specifying estimated output, 
pricing terms, ownership of environmental attributes (i.e., 
RECs) and any perceived engineering issues. 
Step 3. Contract Development
After a winning bid is selected, the contracts must be negoti-
ated—this is a time-sensitive process. In addition to the PPA 
between the government agency and the system owner, there 
will be a lease or easement specifying terms for access to the 
property (both for construction and maintenance). REC sales 
may be included in the PPA or as an annex to it (see Page 6 
for details on RECs). Insurance and potential municipal law 
issues that may be pertinent to contract development are on 
Page 8.
Step 4. Permitting and Rebate Processing
The system owner (developer) will usually be responsible 
for filing permits and rebates in a timely manner. However, 
the government agency should note filing deadlines for 
state-level incentives because there may be limited windows 
or auction processes. The Database of State Incentives for 
Renewables and Efficiency (http:/ /www.dsireusa.org/) is a 
useful resource to help understand the process for your state.
Step 5. Project Design, Procurement, Construction, and 
Commissioning
The developer will complete a detailed design based on 
the term sheet and more precise measurements; it will then 
procure, install, and commission the solar PV equipment. The 
commissioning step certifies interconnection with the utility 
and permits system startup. Once again, this needs to be done 
within the timing determined by the state incentives. Failure 
to meet the deadlines may result in forfeiture of benefits, 
which will likely change the electricity price to the govern-
ment agency in the contract. The PPA should firmly establish 
realistic developer responsibilities along with a process for 
determining monetary damages for failure to perform.
Financial and Contractual Considerations
The developer’s proposal should include detailed projections 
of all financial considerations. This section helps the govern-
ment agency become a more informed purchaser by explain-
ing key components that are needed for a complete proposal.
Estimating System Size
One of the first steps for determining the financial feasibility 
of a PPA is to estimate the available roof and ground space, 
and to approximate the size of the PV system or systems. 
NREL provides a free online tool called In My Backyard 
(IMBY) to make this assessment—the program can be found 
at http:/ /www.nrel.gov/eis/imby/
Page 2
APPENDIX AThe IMBY tool, which uses a Google Maps interface, allows 
users to zoom-in on a particular building or location and 
trace the approximate perimeter of the potential solar array. 
From this information, IMBY simulates financial and tech-
nical aspects of the system; the results provide a first-level 
estimate and might not capture the exact situation (system 
performance, system cost, or utility bills) at a particular loca-
tion (an example is shown in Figure 2). IMBY estimates the 
system size and annual electricity production as well as the 
monetary value of the electricity generated by the photovol-
taic system. Users can adjust primary technical and financial 
inputs to simulate more specific conditions. The amount of 
electricity generated by the solar system can be compared to 
the facility’s monthly utility electric bills to estimate potential 
offset capacity of the PV system.5 
PPA Pricing
A key advantage of power purchase agreements is the 
predictable cost of electricity over the life of a 15- to 25-year 
contract. This avoids unpredictable price fluctuations from 
utility rates, which are typically dependent on fossil fuel 
prices in most of the United States. The approval of climate 
change legislation also may cause utility electricity rates to 
5   It is important to be cognizant of any planned or potential changes to the
facility that could affect the electrical demand (and, therefore, electricity 
offset) such as the additions to the facility.
increase significantly; thus, the projected savings may 
be further accentuated. In a PPA, the electricity rates are 
predetermined, explicitly spelled out in the contract, and 
legally binding with no dependency on fossil fuel or climate 
change legislation.
The most common PPA pricing scenarios are fixed price 
and fixed escalator. In a fixed-price scheme, electricity 
produced by the PV system is sold to the government agency 
at a fixed rate over the life of the contract (see Figure 3 for 
an example of this scenario). Note that it is possible for the 
PPA price to be higher than the utility rate at the beginning. 
However, over time, the utility rate is expected to overtake 
the PPA price such that the PPA generates positive savings 
over the life of the contract. This structure is most favorable 
when there is concern that the utility rates will increase 
significantly. 
In a fixed-escalator scheme, electricity produced by the sys-
tem is sold to the government agency at a price that increases 
at a predetermined rate, usually 2–5% (see Figure 4 for an 
example of this scenario). Some system owners will offer a 
rate structure that escalates for a time period (e.g., 10 years) 
and then remains fixed for the remainder of the contract. 
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A less common PPA pricing model involves the PPA price 
based on the utility rate with a predetermined discount. 
While this ensures that the PPA price is always lower than 
utility rates, it is complicated to structure and it undermines 
the price-predictability advantage of a PPA.
A recently emerging PPA structure has consumers either 1) 
prepay for a portion of the power to be generated by the PV 
system or 2) make certain investments at the site to lower 
the installed cost of the system. Either method can reduce 
the cost of electricity agreed to in the PPA itself. This struc-
ture takes advantage of a governmental entity’s ability to 
issue tax-exempt debt or to tap other sources of funding to 
buy-down the cost of the project. Prepayments can improve 
economics for both parties and provide greater price stability 
over the life of the contract. Boulder County exercised this 
option by making investments to lower the project costs (see 
the table on Page 10, which provides examples of PPA pricing 
and structures from state and local government projects in 
California and Colorado).
Interconnection and Net Metering
Interconnection to the existing electrical grid and net meter-
ing are important policies to consider.6 Interconnection 
standards vary according to state-mandated rules (and 
sometimes by utility), which regulate the process by which 
renewable energy systems are connected to the electrical 
grid. Federal policy mandates that utilities accept intercon-
nection from solar power stations, but each utility’s process 
varies. The system owner and utility develop an interconnec-
tion agreement, which spells out the conditions, equipment, 
and processes. Such conditions may include standby charges, 
which are fees that utilities impose on solar system owners to 
account for the cost of maintaining resources in case the solar 
system is not generating. Additionally, the project host and 
developer should consider utility tariff charges applicable to 
electricity purchased in backup mode—contact your local 
utility to fully comprehend the process of interconnection in 
the early stages of RFP development. The Interstate Renew-
able Energy Council has a report on state-specific intercon-
nection standards, which is available at http:/ /www.irecusa.
org/index.php?id=86.
6   The 2008 Edition of Freeing the Grid, issued by the Network for New Energy 
Choices, provides a listing of the best and worst practices in state net-meter-
ing policies and interconnection standards. Much of the report discusses 
the technical aspects, which your developer should be able to address. 
http://www.newenergychoices.org/uploads/FreeingTheGrid2008_report.pdf
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Net Metering
APPENDIX ANet metering is a policy that allows a solar-system owner 
to receive credit on his/her electricity bill for surplus solar 
electricity sent back to the utility. The electricity meter 
“spins backward,” accurately tracking the excess electricity. 
Net-metering regulations vary by state but typically include 
specifications for the amount of excess electricity that the 
utility can count, the rate at which the utility can produce the 
credit, and the duration of the agreement (Rahus Institute 
2008). States that do not have net-metering guidelines may 
require the system owner to install a second meter. 
States differ on their net-metering pricing scheme, but they 
fall into three basic categories: (1) retail rate (the rate consum-
ers pay), (2) the wholesale rate (market rate), or (3) the utili-
ties’ avoided-generation rate. Time of use (TOU) net metering 
is a system of indexing net-metering credits to the value of 
the power sold on the market during that time period. This 
is advantageous to solar power because it is strongest during 
electricity peak demand times (Rahus Institute 2008). Figure 
5 shows the states with net-metering policies in place. 
Sizing PV systems for specific locations/applications depends 
highly on energy demand schedules as well as net-metering 
laws. When sizing a PV system, it is important to avoid 
the potential for overproduction. If there are unanticipated 
changes in demand, or if electricity production is not coinci-
dent with electricity consumption at the site, the PV system 
may generate more electricity than the utility can credit the 
customer for—some net-metering laws cap this amount. 
The risk is overproducing and sending electricity to the 
grid without compensation. A facility can produce a 
disproportionate amount of energy during peak periods 
and may not make up for this discrepancy during off-peak 
periods (Pechman 2008).
Federal Tax Incentives for the System Owner
An important aspect of the PPA structure is that a system 
owner can take advantage of federal tax incentives that a tax-
exempt entity cannot. The two most significant tax benefits 
are the investment tax credit (ITC) and accelerated deprecia-
tion. The ITC offers tax-paying entities a 30% tax credit on the 
total cost of their solar system.7 Accelerated depreciation is an 
accounting practice used to allocate the cost of wear and tear 
on a piece of equipment over time – in this case, more quickly 
than the expected system life. The Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) allows a five-year modified accelerated cost recovery sys-
tem (MACRS) for commercial PV systems. Although a solar 
array may produce power during the entirety of a 20-year 
PPA, the system owner can take advantage of the entire tax 
benefit within the first five years. Both of these incentives 
7   Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act),
tax-paying entities can elect to recover the ITC using a Department of 
Treasury grant, once project construction is complete. This is expected 
to improve the financial benefits of the incentive.
alleviate a great deal of financial risk for system owners, 
encourage project development, and help make renewable 
energy an affordable alternative to fossil fuel energy sources. 
The Value of Renewable Energy Certificates
Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have imple-
mented renewable portfolio standard (RPS) policies. An RPS 
requires utilities to provide their customers with a minimum 
percentage of renewable generation by statutory target dates. 
Failure to meet these requirements usually results in compli-
ance penalties. Figure 6 shows these RPS policies by state. 
Utilities typically prove RPS compliance using renewable 
energy certificates (RECs), which represent 1 megawatt-hour 
(MWh) of electricity produced from a renewable source. In 
many states, RECs can be traded separately from the electric-
ity. In these cases, the RECs represent the environmental 
attributes of renewable energy. In addition, some states offer 
carve-outs for solar renewable energy certificates (SRECs) or 
distributed generation (DG) (see Figure 6). These states create 
separate markets for these RECs (usually at higher prices) or 
offer multiple credits for each megawatt-hour. For example, 
a 3x multiplier allows the utility to count each REC from 
solar electricity as 3 MWh for compliance purposes.8 
States with RPS policies are known as “compliance markets.” 
In these markets, utilities can include purchased RECs in 
demonstration of compliance with state energy mandates. 
This can provide an important source of cash flow to PV 
system owners. In addition, states with carve-outs for solar 
or DG can realize even higher prices for SRECs.
“Voluntary markets” also exist in which residential, commer-
cial, and industrial consumers can buy SRECs from system 
owners to claim their energy is produced from renewable 
technologies. The advantage is that consumers do not have 
to develop renewable projects but still can claim the environ-
mental benefits (Cory 2008).
In general, PPAs are structured so that the RECs remain with 
the system owner. However, the host can negotiate to buy the 
RECs along with the electricity. This will drive up the price 
per kilowatt-hour in the PPA to compensate the system owner 
for the RECs. If the host does not buy the RECs, it is important 
to manage the claims made regarding the PV system. The 
government agency can say it is hosting a renewable energy 
project but it cannot say that it is powered by renewable 
energy. One option is an SREC swap. In this case, the host 
would decide against buying the solar RECs from the PPA 
provider and instead buy cheaper replacement RECs (wind 
or biomass, for example) in the voluntary market (Coughlin 
2009). REC prices in the voluntary markets are substantially 
8   Under the Waxman-Markey bill (as of July 2009), Congress is considering
a federal solar multiplier of 3x for all distributed generation projects.
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lower than in the compliance market. This REC swap would 
allow the host to claim green power benefits (but not solar 
power because the replacement RECs were not SRECs).
State and Utility Cash Incentives
Other important state-level programs are those that provide 
cash incentives for system installation. These programs 
(often called “buy-down” or “rebate” programs) come in 
two varieties. The capacity-based incentive (CBI) provides a 
dollar amount per installed watt of PV. Incentives can also be 
structured as performance-based incentives (PBI). They do 
not provide up-front payments, but rather provide ongoing 
payments for each kilowatt-hour of electricity produced over 
a time period (e.g., five years). Consumers will normally pre-
fer CBIs because of the up-front cash. However, some states 
prefer PBIs because they encourage better performance. 
The downside of these more recent programs is that the 
government agency must finance a large part of system 
costs (if not under a solar PPA) and incur performance risk 
(Bolinger 2009).
Approximately 20 states and 100 utilities offer financial 
incentives for solar photovoltaic projects. Depending on the 
state and local programs, these incentives can cover 20-50% 
of a project’s cost (DSIRE 2009). Specifics for individual state 
programs can be found on the Database of State Incentives 
for Renewables and Efficiency (http:/ /www.dsireusa.org/). 
Additional government incentives include state tax credits, 
sales tax exemptions, and property tax exemptions, which 
can be important under the solar PPA model.
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Figure 6
States with Renewable Portfolio Standards (indicating solar/DG set-asides)
APPENDIX ASystem Purchase Options
If the host prefers, the solar PPA can include provisions for a 
consumer to buy the PV system. This can occur at any point 
during the life of the contract but almost always after the 
sixth year because of tax recapture issues related to the ITC. 
The buyout clause is phrased as the greater of fair market 
value (FMV) or some “termination” value (that is higher than 
the FMV). This termination value often includes the pres-
ent value of the electricity that would have been generated 
under the remaining life of the PPA. Buyout options are more 
readily available in third-party PPAs in which the investors 
are motivated by the tax incentives rather than long-term 
electricity revenues. A different set of investors may have 
a longer-term investment horizon and may be less likely to 
favor early system-purchase options.
When issuing RFPs and evaluating bids, it is important to 
understand the project goals of the potential developers 
and decide which most closely align with those of your 
organization. From the government agency’s point of view, 
there are both benefits and responsibilities that come with 
owning the system. The obvious benefit is that the electric-
ity generated by the PV system can now be consumed by 
the host at no cost (financing charges notwithstanding); the 
costs and responsibilities revolve around the need to operate 
and maintain the PV system. Owner’s costs include physical 
maintenance (including inverter replacement, which can be 
costly) and monitoring, as well as financial aspects such as 
insurance.
Although PPAs are inherently structured as a contract by 
which a government agency can buy electricity, system own-
ership may be a viable option at some point. If the buyout 
option is not available or not exercised by the end of the 
contract life, the government agency can purchase the system 
at “fair market value,” extend the PPA, or request the system 
owner remove the system (Rahus 2008). Government hosts 
may want to consider requiring (in the RPF and the PPA) that 
the system owner pay for the cost of equipment removal at 
contract maturity. 
Logistical Considerations
Appropriate roof or land areas must be identified, and there 
are also important logistical requirements to consider. The 
issues discussed in this section should be included in the 
RFP because they will allow the developer to provide a 
firmer bid with less assumptions and contingencies.
Rooftop Mounted Arrays
After the RFP, the winning bidder will conduct a structural 
analysis to determine whether the roof can sustain the load. 
By documenting the condition in the RFP, you may avoid 
potential adjustments. It is important to assess the following 
information:
•	Roof structure and type (flat, angled, metal, wood, etc.) – 
determines the attachment methods that may be used. 
•	Orientation of the roof – especially important if it is
a sloped roof. Southern facing roofs are ideal but not 
necessarily mandatory. 
•	Roof manufacturer’s warranty – usually lasts a minimum 
of 10 years but can extend over 20 years. Before installing 
solar panels, it is important to ensure that the solar installa-
tion will not void the warranty. Systems that do not pen-
etrate the roof surface or membrane are usually acceptable, 
but it is important to obtain this allowance in writing prior 
to moving forward with the solar project. 
•	Planned roof replacement – if it is to be scheduled within 
a few years, it a good idea to combine projects, which will 
cut costs and minimize facility disturbance. 
•	Potential leak concern – if this exists, you may opt for a 
formal roof survey to assess and document the condition of 
the roof prior to the solar installation. 
•	Obstructions on the roof – items such as roof vents and 
HVAC equipment can hinder the project.
•	Shade from adjacent trees or buildings – can reduce
solar potential.
Ground-Mounted Systems
Ground-mounted photovoltaic systems are advantageous in 
some situations because they can be cheaper and easier to 
install and can be scaled-up more easily. This reduces the 
cost per kilowatt-hour and translates into cheaper energy 
costs for the consumer. Additionally, ground systems offer 
flexibility in the type of technology that can be used. For 
example, the project may have tracking technologies, which 
can result in higher energy output and better project eco-
nomics. One of the key logistical issues for ground-mounted 
systems is the wind speed the system is designed to with-
stand, which depends primarily on the location of the project 
site (e.g., hurricane risks); the soil type and strength charac-
teristics are also important. To obtain more accurate bids, 
consumers often will have a third-party conduct soil sample 
tests prior to issuing an RFP. Wind and soil conditions can 
greatly influence the design and cost of a project. Perimeter 
fencing and site monitoring should be specified in the RFP to 
ensure security, safety, and compliance with local codes.
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General Logistical Considerations
Electrical upgrades or changes may affect the system design 
and potential interconnection to the electrical grid. Any 
planned changes should be documented within the RFP.
For proper maintenance, accessibility to the inverter and 
solar array will be important to the system owners through-
out the life of the project. 
Fire departments will have building accessibility require-
ments, particularly for roof-mounted systems. Some jurisdic-
tions formally specify these standards and will confirm that 
the system meets the requirements during the permitting 
phase and final approval process. In states that do not have 
such requirements, it is important for the government agency 
and the system owner to gain fire department approval early 
in the process. 
Contractually, operation and ongoing maintenance of the 
solar system is typically the responsibility of the system 
owner unless otherwise specified.
Insurance9 
While many governmental entities may be able to self-insure, 
it is important to investigate the minimum insurance required 
by your utility’s interconnection rules. The requirements may 
necessitate additional coverage through private insurance. 
Unfortunately, insurance underwriters charge fairly high 
premiums for PV installations. These premiums can repre-
sent approximately 25% of the annual operating budget and 
may be as large as 0.25% to 0.50% of the project installed 
costs. According to discussions with developers, the cost of 
insurance can increase energy pricing by 5–10%. The high 
premiums are due to two underlying reasons: 1) Insurance 
underwriters still view PV as a risky technology due to 
its lack of long operating history, and 2) the relatively low 
number of projects do not allow underwriters to average risk 
across a large number of installations (i.e., “the law of large 
numbers”). Until recently, Lloyds of London was the only 
underwriter for PV in the United States; however, Munich Re, 
AIG, Zurich Insurance Group, ACE Ltd., and Chubb are also 
actively pursuing renewable energy policies. Reportedly, a 
fifth underwriter is developing a PV product, but no public 
announcements have been made (Kollins et al., forthcoming).
9   Much of this section is adopted from a forthcoming NREL paper:
“Insuring Solar Photovoltaics: Challenges and Possible Solutions”; 
Speer, B.; Mendelsohn, M.; and Cory, K.
In general, insurance is the responsibility of the system 
owner (developer). At a minimum, the system owner should 
be expected to carry both general liability and property 
insurance. Additional considerations may be given to sepa-
rate policies for location-specific risks (e.g., hurricane cover-
age in Florida), property-equivalent policies (which cover 
engineering), and environmental risk (inclusive of pre-exist-
ing conditions). If covered by the system owner, the cost of 
insurance will be factored into the PPA cost of electricity and 
not passed through separately. Thus, a fairly recent realiza-
tion is that it may be cheaper for the government agency to 
insure the system directly, although they don’t actually own 
the system. Then, the system owner is named as an addi-
tional insured party on the policy and agrees to reimburse 
the government agency for the premiums. Insurance com-
panies have agreed to this in previous PPAs (Boylston 2008). 
Because this can reduce overall project costs, this arrange-
ment deserves further investigation with a provider.
One final note concerns indemnification for bad-acts and 
pre-existing structural or environmental risks. Whether 
contractual or not, the government agency may want to 
acquire its own insurance to protect itself from the potential 
of future liabilities.
Potential Deal Constraints Embedded in 
Municipal Laws10
Municipal laws were written before PV installations were 
even a remote consideration. While each jurisdiction operates 
under its own unique statutes, this section lists some common 
constraints that may be encountered. Listed below are the 
categories that may require investigation. More detail on the 
following specific issues is provided at the end of this fact sheet:
1.  Debt limitations in city codes, state statutes,
and constitutions
2. Restrictions on contracting power in city codes and
state statutes
3.  Budgeting, public purpose, and credit-lending issues
4. Public utility rules
5.  Authority to grant site interests and buy electricity
10   Much of this section is adapted from the transcript of a June 12, 2008, 
NREL conference call led by Patrick Boylston of Stoel Rives LLP.
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Conclusions
Financing solar PV through a power purchase agreement 
allows state and local governments to benefit from clean 
renewable energy while minimizing up-front expenditures 
and outsourcing O&M responsibilities. Also important, a 
PPA provides a predictable electricity cost over the length of 
the contract. 
This fact sheet is a concise guide that will help states and 
municipalities with the solar PPA process. The following five 
steps are recommended to formally launch a project (and are 
described in this brief):
Step 1: Identify Potential Locations
Step 2:   Issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) to Competitively 
Select a Developer
Step 3: Contract Development
Step 4: Permitting and Rebate Processing
Step 5:   Project Design, Procurement, Construction, and 
Commissioning
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) can help facilitate the 
process by providing quick, short-term access to expertise on 
renewable energy and energy efficiency programs. This is 
coordinated through the Technical Assistance Project (TAP) 
for state and local officials.11 More information on the program 
can be found at http:/ /apps1.eere.energy.gov/wip/tap.cfm.
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Sample Terms of Executed Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs)
Government Level State County City
Name Caltrans District 10 Solar Project Boulder County Solar Project Denver Airport Solar Project
Location Stockton, California Boulder County Denver, Colorado
Customer California Department of 
Transportation
Boulder County Denver International Airport
Utility Pacific Gas & Electric Xcel Energy Xcel Energy
Size (DC) 248 kW 615 kW 2,000 kW
Annual Production 347,407 kWh 869,100 kWh 3,000,000 kWh
Type 123 kW rooftop, 125 kW carport 570 kW rooftop, 45 kW ground Ground-mount, single-axis tracking
Location Maintenance Warehouse 
Maintenance Shop 
Parking Lot Canopy
Recycling Center 
Courthouse 
Clerk and Recorder 
Addiction Recovery Center 
Justice Center 
Walden Ponds (ground-mount) 
Sundquist
Ground of the Denver International 
Airport
Area 22,200 sq ft 8 county buildings 7.5 acres
Developer Sun Edison, LLC Bella Energy World Water & Solar Technologies
Owner Sun Edison, LLC Rockwell Financial MMA Renewable Ventures
PPA Terms 20 years, 5.5% discount from 
utility rates
20 years, fixed-price 6.5 ¢/kWh 
for first 7 years, renegotiate price 
and buyout option at beginning 
of year 8
25 years, fixed-price 6 ¢/kWh for first 5 
years, buyout option at beginning of year 
6 or price increases to 10.5 ¢/kWh
Status Completed September 2007 Completed January 2009 Completed August 2008
Contact Patrick McCoy 
(916) 375-5988 
patrick.mccoy@dgs.ca.gov
Ann Livington 
(303) 441-3517 
alivingston@bouldercounty.org
Woods Allee 
(303) 342-2632 
woods.allee@flydenver.com
Source: NREL
APPENDIX APotential Deal Constraints Embedded in Municipal Laws
This table lists potential constraints posed by municipal laws. Not all issues will pertain to your jurisdiction; however, this 
table can serve as a short checklist for use in your investigation. The request for proposal (RFP) issue column is meant to 
qualify each issue as to whether it needs to be highlighted in the RFP. 
Category RFP 
Issue? Issue Implication General Findings and Next Steps
1.   Debt Limitations 
in City Codes, 
State Statutes, 
and Constitutions
No Is PPA debt or 
contingent liability?
Debt would require public vote 
for approval.
Contingent liability is allowed 
under purchasing authority 
without a vote.
Most states see as purchasing only what is 
consumed. Thus, a vote not is required.
PPA agreements usually called “energy services 
agreement” to avoid any appearance of debt.
Must be wary of “take or pay provisions” in PPA 
requiring payments regardless of use.
Also, be careful to size so as to not over-
produce based on net-metering rules 
No Is system purchase 
option debt?
A vote will be required to 
approve debt for system 
purchase.
It is important that the PPA deems the purchase 
as optional at fair market value so that a vote is 
not needed until the option is exercised.
2.   Restrictions 
on Contracting 
Power in City 
Codes and State 
Statutes
Yes Contract Tenor 
statutes (e.g., 
limited to 10 yrs 
or 15 yrs)
May limit choice of developers 
based on investment goals.
Research of local rules and precedents may be 
required.
Yes Ability to buy/sell 
RECs
When codes and statutes 
were created, RECs were 
not envisioned.
May determine where 
beneficial REC ownership is 
assigned in PPA.
Each jurisdiction will be different. Research of 
local rules and precedents is required. 
Is there enough general authority under 
electricity purchases (or other) to justify REC 
trading?
Yes Public bidding 
laws
May preclude RFP process 
unless there is an applicable 
exemption to public bidding 
laws.
Research of local rules and precedents may 
be required.
Developer will ask for representation and 
warranty that the contract is exempt from public 
bidding rules.
3.   Public Purpose 
and Lending of 
Credit Issues
Yes Pre-paying for 
electricity
Is this a grant to a for-profit 
LLC that owns the PV system?
In most states, authority exists (such as 
in the opinion of attorneys general) that it 
is permissible if the entities are fulfilling a 
government purpose. 
Research may be required if pre-payment 
is envisioned.
4.   Public Utility 
Rules
Yes How many entities 
will be buying 
electricity (i.e., 
city, county, and/or 
other government 
entities occupy 
site)?
Most state laws and/or rules 
clarify that if you are selling 
electricity to a certain number of 
consumers, then you are a utility 
and subject to Public Utility 
Commission (PUC) regulation.12
This can be prohibitively 
expensive for the developer.
Developers will generally want to contract 
only with a single entity that owns the meter. 
The costs can then be divided among various 
entities.
If the entities are all behind the meter, then they 
would not be subject to PUC regulations.
5.   Authority to Grant 
Site Interests 
and Purchase 
Electricity
No Lease or 
easement?
A lease can have problems 
with disposal and interest in 
public property, which may 
require a public-bidding or 
offering process.
Framing the document as an “easement” 
instead of a “lease” has worked well. Works 
much like a lease except without ability 
to transfer it—except in accordance with 
agreement (usually restricted).
Source: Boylston 2008
12 The threshold is set differently by each state. Most are in the two-five range.
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Sources for Sample Documents 
Samples of requests for proposals can be found using 
simple Web searches—the links below will get you started 
in your search.
NV Energy (Nevada Power Company) is a good source 
for documents which have been previously tested in 
the marketplace:
http:/ /www.nvenergy.com/company/doingbusiness/rfps/
Oregon University System
http:/ /www.ous.edu/bapp/contractfiles/20090522_1545_
Photovoltaic%20Power%20Purchase%20Agreement/ 
RFP%202009-06%20Solar%20PPA.doc
City of Santa Ana
http:/ /www.ci.santa-ana.ca.us/pwa/documents/ 
RFP-SolarProjectandGuideline.pdf
The U.S. Navy recently released an RFP that is very 
thorough in its specifications:
http:/ /www.allenmatkins.com/emails/Renewable/ 
Img/NAVY.pdf
Example RFPs from several California municipalities:
http:/ /www.lgc.org/spire/rfps.html
A current federal government RFP: 
https:/ /www.desc.dla.mil/DCM/DCMSolic.
asp?SolicID=1533
Other Useful Documents:
The documents below are more detailed, in-depth solar 
financing guides.
The Customer’s Guide to Solar Power Purchase 
Agreements, by the Rahus Institute
http:/ /www.californiasolarcenter.org/sppa.html
Solar Photovoltaic Financing: Deployment on Public 
Property by State and Local Governments, by Karlynn 
Cory, Jason Coughlin, and Charles Coggeshall. This NREL 
report (May 2008) examines ways that state and local 
governments can optimize the financial structure of 
deploying solar PV for public uses. It can be accessed at 
http:/ /www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/43115.pdf 
Solar Photovoltaic Financing: Residential Sector 
Deployment, by Jason Coughlin and Karlynn Cory.
This NREL technical report (March 2009) can be accessed 
at http:/ /www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/44853.pdf.
Solar Photovoltaic Financing: Deployment by Federal 
Government Agencies, by Karlynn Cory, Charles
Coggeshall, Jason Coughlin, and Claire Kreycik. This 
NREL technical report (August 2009) can be accessed at 
http:/ /www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/46397.pdf
Contacts 
This fact sheet was written by Karlynn Cory, Brendan 
Canavan, and Ronald Koenig of NREL. For more informa-
tion, contact Karlynn Cory at Karlynn.Cory@nrel.gov. 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
1617 Cole Boulevard, Golden, Colorado 80401 
303-275-3000  •  www.nrel.gov
NREL is a national laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy 
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy  
Operated by the Alliance for Sustainable Energy, LLC
NREL/FS-6A2-46668  •  October 2009
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